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ii. 
Abstract: 
 
 
This thesis outlines how architecture can be considered as an accumulation of 
plausibility. The term plausibility is used herein to mean what architecture is 
understood to be capable of, and what architecture‟s limits are understood to 
be. In-depth archival analysis is used to discuss such understandings from three 
noted architects, Charles F. A. Voysey, Charles Holden, and Berthold 
Lubetkin. Additionally, in-depth interviews have been undertaken with those 
people who currently live or work in the buildings that these architects 
designed. Consideration is given to the reasoning and analysis that the 
architects applied to the question of a building‟s plausible capability in terms of 
how future inhabitants and inhabitations could be affected by their efforts. The 
reasoning and analysis of inhabitants is similarly drawn upon in order to detail 
their consideration as to how and by what means it is plausible for them to be 
influenced by the architecture of the buildings they experience. A consistent 
onus on plausibility, and a concurrent understanding that plausibility is 
produced through an analytical capacity of both inhabitation and architectural 
production, is reiterated throughout, aiming to demonstrate that the 
inhabitation of buildings is a potentially proficient field in terms of the analysis 
that inhabitants can bring to their experiences, a property often overlooked by 
the geographical literature on architecture, but one which can make important 
additions to our understanding of what the experience of buildings might 
involve. A further necessary degree of complexity is added by recognising the 
time elapsed between the production of the buildings in question and their 
current inhabitation.  
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1. 
Introduction and literature: 
How does architecture happen within people’s experiences? 
 
 
The purpose of my research is to complicate current accounts within architectural 
geography as to the plausibility of architecture, and how the experience of a building, by 
which I mean both the experiences people have of buildings and the experiences that were 
designed into buildings (to be encountered in the building‟s use thereafter), can be 
understood through a lens of plausibility, a term which is repeated regularly throughout this 
thesis, and which I use to refer to the ideas of what a building is considered able to do (and 
what it is not able to do) by the architects who designed it, and by those who inhabit it 
thereafter. 
 
I wish to dwell on my use of the term considered. This thesis seeks to differ from, and 
therefore contribute to, the geographical literatures on architecture (which I will refer to as 
architectural geography) by dwelling on the consideration, thought, and analysis that goes 
into the experience of architecture, and the design of architecture for experience. In the 
literature review that follows a number of architectural geographies are seen to produce 
accounts of the architect or the inhabitant who behave in and are affected by architecture 
in quite simple ways, and their presence in the buildings we study seem to be based on the 
kind of behaviours that are relatively non-analytical. Conversely, the architectural 
geographies that dwell on architects‟ practices are suffused with accounts of analytical 
thought and behaviour that are not generally passed on to the inhabitants of those 
buildings. My work, which I situate in the following section in a review of a small number 
of key architectural geography literatures, is predicated in the first place on exploring how 
analytical the inhabitation of building can be, and uses these findings to contribute to an 
emerging sub-discipline in geography which, I argue, has yet to adequately engage with the 
potential proficiency of inhabitation, or indeed the potential proficiency that architects may 
or may not assume of inhabitation. 
 
Variety is the empirical keynote of this study: as I explain more fully in the following 
chapter, in uncovering potentially new versions of the inhabitation of buildings I expect to 
find and produce accounts of the presence and absence of various different ideas and 
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analyses. I study three architects in this thesis, each with a separate chapter in which their 
proposed inhabitations, and inhabitants‟ actual inhabitations, are discussed in turn. The 
three architects I study, through their archive collections at the Royal Institute of British 
Architects (R.I.B.A), are Charles Voysey, Charles Holden, and Berthold Lubetkin, and to 
each archival study, a number of interviews with inhabitants are attached. Each of these 
architects has been chosen because they were practitioners with an eye to plausibility, who 
sought to uncover and utilise plausibility in certain ways, with certain implications for the 
later inhabitation of those buildings which they hoped to affect (even engineer). By 
investigating these three architects, all of whom practiced in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, I intend to open up an account of the building in which it can be 
understood as a complex accumulation of plausibility and, of course, implausibility. 
 
Before I proceed to review examples of the literature in this area and the way geographers 
have manufactured their own plausibilities, I wish to situate the dynamic of my research 
into a particular context which I believe is important, and largely ignored in the 
architectural geography literature (though see Bryden, 2004). That is, simply, the 
production of these plausibilities over a divide in the sense that, on average, the population 
of the UK is younger than the average age of our buildings1. In attending to the plausibility 
of architectural inhabitation, this temporality will often resurface and its importance is 
worth noting here from the outset. 
  
Unfurling my question: 
 
The basic, central question on which this review is based isn‟t actually basic at all. Its 
diminutive form contains the potential to generate an array of complex questions because, 
to make it diminutive, I had to grapple with it, fold, twist, and compact it into this neat 
seven-word question. 
 
                                                   
1 According to the Office for National Statistics, the 2008 estimated population of the United Kingdom is 61,382,200, of 
whom 61% (37,624,800 people) are less that 44 years old (i.e. were born in 1964 or after) (O.N.S: 2009). According to the 
Department for Communities and Local Government (2009), as of 2007, only 41.5% of England‟s housing stock was 
built after 1964 (Ibid) and the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (2005) reported that as of 2004 only 28% of the 
commercial and industrial building stock in England and Wales dates from after 1970. I include these figures, not because 
they provide an accurate picture of the overall age of the building stock of the UK (they obviously cannot do that), but 
because, inaccuracies aside, they still suggest that most of the buildings in Britain were completed before most of Britain‟s 
current inhabitants were born. Even if we assume, quite reasonably, a wide margin of error in these figures to account for 
the different areas they cover and the fact that they were not conducted simultaneously, it is still perfectly reasonable to 
suggest that our buildings are, on average, older than we are. 
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How does architecture happen within people’s experiences? 
 
My grappling and folding is, in essence, a heuristic and, at first, I thought that its action was 
one of occlusion. I imagined the umbrella terms I‟d used as though they were large 
canopies which enclosed a number of concepts and occluded their plurality with a single 
wide-span generalisation. But in writing my seven-word question I have observed that the 
opposite is equally as plausible: if the question is anything like an umbrella, it is furled. It 
does not span an array of concepts so much as gather and compact them (although, 
metaphorically speaking, it would obviously have to span them first before the gathering 
act of furling). The way I‟m going to unfurl this tightly bound question is a defining feature 
of this thesis and what I want to do with it. Additionally, the process of unfurling affords 
me opportunity to introduce a growing body of work on architectural geography. 
 
I would suggest that, up to 2001, architectural geography can be called a “niche” which 
produced a small number of publications, almost all in the form of articles. Shortly after 
the millennium, publications in architectural geography became more numerous and the 
frequency of the production seemed to increase. Of course, there is no stable demarcation 
between a “niche” and a “field”, but architectural geography has certainly grown more and 
more quickly in the last ten years. From these more recent offerings I can outline how 
architecture dwells within geography: how architectural geographers make a space for 
architecture and define it for the purposes of geographical scholarship. 
 
Unfurling “architecture”: 
 
The fifth edition of The Penguin Dictionary of Architecture and Landscape Architecture is an 
interesting point from which to unfurl the meaning of architecture. This is not simply 
because it contains a definition of “architecture”, but because the dictionary itself 
represents an ambitious and uncertain unfurling: a rationale of listing and explaining the 
range, variation, and intricacy of the field in which the term “architecture”, stated 
singularly, must sit awkwardly. The term runs counter to the authors‟ rationale precisely 
because it is such a sweeping and singular front-of-house generalisation. Their recognition 
of this might account for the uncertainty they wrote into the definition: 
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“Architecture: The art and science of designing structures and their 
surroundings […]. Architecture is now understood as encompassing the totality 
of the designed environment, including buildings, urban spaces and landscape.” 
(Fleming, Honour and Pevsner, 1998: 21-22) 
 
Of course, “uncertainty” does not necessarily connote a lack of insight: this uncertain 
definition may deliberately tap into the usefulness of uncertainty perhaps better described 
as fluidity. In either case, architecture is definitely not just buildings or “structures” but the 
surrounding “spaces” and “landscapes”. And it‟s not just “art” but also “science”. I am 
unsure as to how to interpret this uncertainty (or fluidity). It might simply suggest that 
architecture is a field whose boundaries are porous, or it could hint at a more complex 
existence for architecture: not as a field of contents, porous or otherwise, but as a property 
(like electricity) that resides in and animates other things. In this sense I could say that there 
is a certain architectural something about my bookshelves or my shoes, assuming that I 
treat either of these things as fundamentally relational and able to tap into multiple 
properties in order to exist. However, these questions of form and location are less 
fundamental than the provocative sense of architecture unresolved which Fleming, Honour 
and Pevsner end the passage with: 
 
“The aesthetics of architecture cannot be readily distinguished from those of 
the other arts (poetry, music, sculpture, painting), and many questions remain 
to preoccupy architects: what does architecture express? what does it 
represent? and with what means (symbolic or otherwise) can it do this?” [sic] 
(Ibid: 22) 
 
This is a deliberately ill-defined definition which seeks to unfurl itself using uncertainty as a 
mechanism. The uncertainty (in terms of boundaries) extends to the appendage of 
Landscape Architecture in the title, whereas the previous four editions were titled only The 
Penguin Dictionary of Architecture. It also extends to the aesthetic shared ground with the other 
arts. In the final unfurling, the trio of questions that close the passage seem to fling the 
reader towards the other entries in the dictionary that provides an array of possible 
answers, theories, approaches, and further questions. In doing so, it delivers a final denial 
for those readers hoping for a steadfast definition of architecture‟s fundamental essence. 
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For Fleming, Honour, and Pevsner, the term “architecture” has to be uncertain if it is to be 
true to the breadth and variation of the field/property of architecture. 
 
This denial is important because it obliges the reader of the Dictionary of Architecture and 
Landscape Architecture to assemble their own working idea of what architecture is, choosing 
the content and deciding how the content will work. This is equally true for architectural 
geographers: the architecture we study is not pre-defined, and the articles I review here 
(with a few exceptions they are all articles) are obliged to assemble an idea of what 
architecture is, what it contains, and what it does. That assembling will always be driven to 
some extent by what we want architecture to do for us, and what we need to prune or 
emphasise so as to fit it into our conception of geography. So what I‟m about to describe is 
not innocent by any means. 
 
The problem of being either certain or uncertain brings to mind Lloyd Jenkins‟ 2002 paper, 
which seems to embrace this non-definition in a profound way. 11 rue du Conservatoire and 
the Permeability of Buildings assembles an architecture concept with a fundamental and 
overriding property that defines the possibility of a building being defined: that of 
permeability. Permeability, understood as a meta-property, has very substantial 
ramifications: if a building has permeability as its overriding property, permeability will 
allow it to be defined by whatever influences come to bear upon it. In short, the building 
(as it exists at any given point) is the sum of the influences that converge upon it, assuming 
that you imagine that convergence as a web-like network through which influence flows (as 
Jenkins does, after Latour, 1987) and the building as “a relational effect achieved between 
various parts of a network, [in which] objects (such as buildings) only achieve significance 
in relation to other things” (Jenkins, 2002: 230, after Law and Mol, 1995). In a sense, 
Jenkins‟ permeable architecture is self-effacing: it neither contains or attains anything 
except by virtue of its susceptibility to the relational so that “instead of treating objects as 
things in themselves, we need to see objects as entities that maintain their durability via the 
relations they have to other things” (Ibid: 231). Because of this, Jenkins‟ understanding of 
architecture and buildings is the most (potentially) disparate I know of in the architectural 
geography literature, necessarily fragmented in both time and extent: 
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“What we need to have is an analysis that enables us to explore the ways in 
which an individual building alters over time and the way in which various 
connections are created, alter, and permeate a building.” (Jenkins, 2002: 230) 
 
Like many of the authors I review here, Jenkins‟ insights are produced from research into a 
single empirical “unit” (such as one building, or one architect). It differs from them, 
however, because that building is relatively normal2. This focus on normalcy reflects 
Jenkins‟ hope that actor networks will allow us to narrate the normal heterogeneous 
existence of a building: heterogeneous meaning dynamic in terms of its boundary (allowing 
different things in relation to define it) its temporality (a definition that changes with time) 
and its concurrently social and technological constitution in which both humans and non-
humans are equally reliant. Materiality is as central to Jenkins‟ assembly of architecture as 
permeability, and he conceives of architectural materiality like a list of ingredients: “levels” 
that include the “site” (the plot of land), the “structure” (foundations and load bearing 
elements), the “skin” (the changeable external surface), the “services” (wiring, plumbing, 
data, etc) the “space plan” (interior surfaces that form the interior volumes – at least as 
changeable as the skin), and the “stuff” (the flux of chairs, lamps, stationery, etc) (Jenkins, 
2002: 228-229). But these “levels” do not belong to the building: they are contingencies of 
a network, and the building is an expression of the “negotiation” between relations in a 
network and the “delegation” of the building‟s existence to what those relations afford 
(Ibid: 231). The walls, pipes, volumes, and sites of no.11 are so afforded: they do not arise 
on command as a simple response to the owner‟s intent or an architect‟s design.  
 
Intent, design, and composition in general are notable by their absence from Jenkins‟ 
approach, and this absence is something I will return to as my unfurling continues. For 
now, it is worth noting that this absence is most evident, and deliberately so, in the absence 
of the architect and architectural practice (Jenkins, 2002: 225, 227). This is not to say that 
his focus on relationality must logically negate intent, but at the same time I am 
uncomfortable with the onus on contingency in his work. Nonetheless, his approach to 
architecture is favourably acknowledged in Jane Jacobs‟ A geography of big things (2006) by 
way of the “building event”. Her approach to “architecture” as a term is not unlike 
Fleming, Honour, and Pevsner‟s (1998) definition: as a singular term it suggests a degree of 
                                                   
2 11 Rue du Conservatoire, as Jenkins reports, was designed in the nineteenth century by an architect of no particular 
note, inhabited by the sort of person who you would expect of such a house (a silk trader), and seems no more or less 
remarkable than any other town house of the same period in Paris. 
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resolution and stability, and she finds the possibility of a stable and bounded presence for 
architecture in terms of identity or design practice to be problematic (Jacobs, 2006: 3-4). 
Her alternative is an understanding of architecture as part of a larger building event 
whereby a building and its architecture must connect with “non-architectural others” (Ibid: 
11). Like Jenkins, Jacobs considers that buildings and architectures are not self contained or 
self-evident. Specifically, architectural discourses and practices are not sufficient to stabilise 
the existence of a building alone: they need to connect outside themselves with non-
architectural others that deploy efforts (“work”) to stabilise the occurrence of a building: 
with them the building can be understood to succeed, but without that vital work they 
begin to falter (Ibid: 4). The building event is the encompassing term she uses to describe 
the building, the architecture, and the effort deploying non-architectures that necessarily 
connect to and work upon it. 
 
On the face of it, Jacobs (2006) and Jenkins (2002) share a most fundamental feature: their 
buildings are understood as relational materialisations of the things they enrol and connect 
to rather than bounded edifices (Jacobs, 2006: 10). Where Jacobs differs from Jenkins is the 
way she dwells on the possibility of stabilisation that the building event offers through 
“work”, and how this work can be directed toward those formations of enrolling and 
connecting. In Jenkins‟ literal understanding a networked reality is driven by momentum, 
and momentum seems to be the strict property – in both senses of the word – of the 
relational: the way relations move together to affirm and alter a building (or drift apart to 
annul it) is something they do themselves and something that is sovereign to them. Jacobs, 
on the other hand, uses the idea of work to unpick this sovereignty and understand that 
new connections can be engineered, and existing connections can be re-shaped and steered 
so that their coming together can do work as a building event. And whilst Jenkins allows 
the building to be claimed by the network, Jacobs‟ conception of work allows the building, 
as part of a constitutive building event, to make “claims” of its own: 
 
“In this sense, the first steps to a truly critical geography of architecture would 
be to speak about the claims building events make on the ideas and practices of 
architecture: how those claims are assembled, how they materialise and help 
the form to materialise in specific ways, and how they come to operate in 
relation to a range of non-architectural others. In short it would require us to 
think critically and up close about how a professionalized architecture works to 
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sustain itself (or not) as an authoritative practice in relation to building events, 
and how building events are or are not „architecture‟.” (Jacobs, 2006: 11-12) 
 
The principal feature of Jacobs‟ architecture is this combination of the relational, and the 
engineering of a zone of relations around the architectural project that work to prop it up, 
hold it together, and somehow tend to and sustain it. Her two case studies, which I will 
detail in the sections to follow, relate a Singaporean story of a successful building event that 
sustained architecture in its intended form (Ibid: 14-17), and a British story about a similar 
type of architecture whose building event wasn‟t sufficiently compelling to hold it together 
(Ibid: 17-20). These case studies reflect another aspect of Jacobs‟ architecture: building 
events are both human and non-human. The work that Jacobs discusses requires 
synchronisation between the possibilities and potentials of materials (to realise, or perhaps 
administer, human ideas and actions) and the possibilities and potentials of humans (to see 
and use the possible actions that material things do). In both of her stories, the work done 
is in the form of a discourse; in fact, they could both be described as investigations. But 
being discourses doesn‟t detract from their source and origin: they start from, and return 
to, an unfolding materiality. That unfolding could, in principle, be as contingent as Jenkins 
understands it in itself. The difference is that in a building event the building is never left to 
itself: Jacobs is clear that the building can only exist through events of planned 
connectivity, which are as crucial to the building‟s existence as the foundations, load 
bearing elements, services, and etcetera. 
 
The architecture that Kraftl and Adey (2008) assemble shares with Jacobs a sense that 
architecture can inflect or deflect aspects of its relational environment to achieve an 
intended end. Specifically, their architecture is understood as a means of “kindling” certain 
capacities that enable a particular kind of inhabitation or dwelling to become more likely in 
a given building. In short, Kraftl and Adey‟s architectural space is that which has an 
inherent capacity to make a difference, and allows for the possibility of arranging and 
wielding that influential capacity (Kraftl and Adey, 2008: 213-214). This is immediately 
interesting because, even though they do not specify as such, I think that Kraftl and Adey‟s 
account allows for the possibility that this isn‟t obliged to occur in buildings. Theirs is more 
a concept of architectural space, and can refer to any space where a capacity for 
inhabitation has been apprehended and deliberately manipulated so that someone will dwell 
there in a certain way (Ibid). This also means that architecture is not a property of space 
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alone, but also a currency of ideas and intentions about space, by people (which Kraftl and 
Adey do make explicit from their case studies). Where Jenkins begins with an apparent 
contingency of the building, Jacobs follows (chronologically) with the possibility of 
amending the event of the building, whereas Kraftl and Adey trace the means and routes 
by which architectural space can engineer the inhabitation and experience of a building 
(because, as it happens, the architectural spaces they discuss in their two case studies are 
based in what we would commonly understand as being buildings3). 
 
In discussing the capacity and power of architecture, Kraftl and Adey recoil, as Jenkins and 
Jacobs do, from a lexical-symbolical understanding where codes are inscribed into and read 
from buildings. Their architecture of capacity manifests in material and performative ways 
“that evade perhaps all (visual) symbolism.” (Kraftl and Adey, 2008: 214) To understand 
this manifestation they turn to (and ultimately modify) theories of affect, especially those 
temporally directional aspects of affect (Ibid: 215-216; after Anderson, 2002 and 2006; 
Dewsbury et al., 2002; Thrift 2004). I do not intend to engage with affect and its various 
iterations here – it‟s something I will return to in later chapters – but I will sketch out the 
working model Kraftl and Adey start from as a way of understanding what architecture can 
do, and the medium it does it in. For them, as with Anderson (2002), affect is an umbrella 
term that includes the background intensities where affects dwell in a potential state, the 
relational encounters which allow them to emerge, and the results (or “expressions” or 
“consequences”) of that emergence. As background intensities – the potentials waiting to 
be actuals – shift, drift, and redistribute, certain potentials are pushed to a virtual fore 
where they are more likely to be embodied (or “folded” or “actualised”) into relational 
undertakings between bodies: embodiment is the point at which potentials become 
actualised from an ephemeral almost-something to an actual material something. A chord, 
for instance, is an assembly held virtually (in intensities of potential) until a relational 
encounter between a body (the player) and an object (the piano) allows the combination 
that actualises it. As the piano sits unplayed and the player goes to make some tea (or 
something) the potential for the chord remains in potential (and among many potentials) as 
an almost-something between them and strictly between them: the potential can neither 
dwell or actualise in one or the other alone. Affect resides and emerges in the relational, 
never the unitary. 
                                                   
3 They are Liverpool John Lennon Airport (Merseyside), and Nant-y-Cwm Steiner School (Pembrokeshire). The choice of 
these two examples reflect Kraft and Adey‟s preceding publications – not jointly authored – on airports and spaces of 
flight (in Adey‟s case) and children‟s geographies (in Kraftl‟s case). 
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My example of affect is a touch crude, but for the moment it will serve to highlight some 
similarities between Jenkins, Jabobs, and Kraftl and Adey. All three engage with the idea of 
connectivity and the relational as fundamental for an understanding of what architecture is, 
and therefore all three understand the architectural as something that emerges from the 
tension between influences. Jacobs‟ “building event” is held taut (or slack, as the case may 
be) between influences that were crafted and sited to support a building, whereas Jenkins‟ 
permeable building seems to function by way of averages or accretions, where the building 
emerges from a number of linear relations that are conduit-like and route varying 
proportions of stuff and ideas into it. Both of these accounts understand the relational as 
the delivery and addition of ingredients from beyond the architectural: where they differ is 
in the degree to which connectivity can be claimed. Kraftl and Adey‟s turn to affect is 
different again because it understands that in relationality you don‟t simply get an amalgam 
or a negotiated double act: you open a space which actualises a folding-in of something 
extra from a huge field of virtual potential that, at the moment of the encounter, produces 
not player/piano, or piano/player, but something like a chord, or a scale, or an arpeggio. In 
fact, “A body‟s engagement with the world might throw up almost limitless possibilities of 
relationality, which can be expressed in almost infinite ways and can engender almost 
limitless forms and exemplars of affect” (Kraftl and Adey, 2008: 215, after Thrift, 2004). 
 
This erratic hugeness of virtual potential is problematic for Kraftl and Adey much as 
Jenkins‟ network contingency is problematic for me: the whole assemblage of affect seems 
to multiply itself incessantly just as 11 rue du Conservatoire is a multiple outcome of the 
network that claims it. In the actualisation of affect there are multiple bodily postures and 
multiple formations of the material that multiply at the point of contact into an even larger 
multiplicity of encounters. If that were not enough, that encounter completes a circuit that 
precipitates, from a mass of virtual potentialities, a tsunami of actual things existing and 
happening (Kraftl and Adey, 2008: 215, 226). The fact that Kraftl and Adey wish to 
counter this multiplicity forms the keystone of their architectural conception, and their two 
primary questions are, first; whether bodies and objects are necessarily multipliers, leading 
to the second; whether the design and subsequent inhabitation (i.e. the encounter) of a 
building can plan for and manipulate the affectual outcome? For Kraftl and Adey, the 
architectural (as a type of space and a style of intervention in space) is a means of 
pathfinding within the virtual, to engineer and manipulate from its multiplicity a delimited 
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and stable affectual route (Ibid: 226-227). Their two case studies (which I‟ll detail in the 
sections to follow) are intended to demonstrate how certain design decisions have actually 
produced spaces in which affect can be restrained to effect particular outcomes. 
 
Unfurling the architecture from these three key articles reveals three different treatments of 
a common theme: architecture is understood to be something dispersed and dispersable, 
located at multiple sites or emerging from multiple origins. This has important 
ramifications: in considering that architecture isn‟t the strict property of a profession 
(architecture) that contains a key person (the architect) and a key material form (the 
building), it becomes a much larger connective or affective assembly whose formative 
influences can be gathered from a variety of ostensibly non-architectural sources (of 
course, in the case of Jenkins (2002) the terms “assembly” and “gathered” would assume 
that there was more than a minimal degree of intention behind architectural origin, which is 
something I will return to in the following section). This fashion for multi-site, multi-origin 
architecture in geography was originally explored in a 2001 article by Loretta Lees: Towards 
a critical geography of architecture: the case of an ersatz colosseum4. And like the three key articles 
discussed so far, her work also addresses the tension between wide fields of possibility and 
discrete occurrences that happen from/within it. 
 
This fourth key article can best be described as orbiting around (rather than being based 
on) a single prominent building – Vancouver Central Public Library5 – as Lees‟ research is 
located across multiple sites that arose because of that project, which I would loosely 
classify as before construction and after construction. Before construction refers to the 
politicised interpretation of the library design and its meaning (Lees 2001, 62-64), 
concurrent with the politicised process of planning and the related architectural 
competition (Ibid: 67-71). Her approach at this stage attends to the processes through 
which a large public architectural project is negotiated into existence. These negotiations 
take place through various discourses (such as press reports, planning meetings, and 
opinion polls), and the effect of these is to open spaces within the building‟s prehistory: 
spaces where members of the public, policymakers, and other interested parties can exert 
an influence on the outcome in some way. This is the first way that Lees conceives 
                                                   
4 Both Jacobs (2006) and Kraftl and Adey (2008) refer to Lees 2001, as do many of the post 2001 architectural 
geographies here except Jenkins 2002 (which was actually submitted at almost the same time). 
5 Located in central Vancouver and completed in 1995 to designs by the principal architect, Moshe Safdie, “Library 
Square” is the principal library for the Vancouver urban area, and its exterior design is a play on a Greco-Roman 
aesthetic, with regularly spaced columns repeating floor-by-floor around its oval circumference (Lees, 2001: 62). 
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architecture: as a cumulative progression of opportunities courtesy of porous discourses 
about what the building should be like, what it should mean, and what it should do. Large 
architectural projects like this achieve an important existence by way of these discourses 
before any concrete is poured or bricks are laid, and Lees‟ attention to them is quite similar 
to Jacobs‟ understanding of non-architectural others (except that in Jacobs‟ case studies the 
discourses are differently and specifically porous, being official undertakings in both 
instances) (Jacobs, 2006: 14 -20). Because these discourses are porous, and because they are 
key to the way the library was eventually built, the building itself becomes porous by proxy 
(although this is as close as Lees gets to the building per se). At its simplest level, and 
especially in the case of buildings chosen from competition entries, these discourses can 
generate popularity:  
 
“Though the design itself is clearly provocative, much of this passion and 
public feeling was generated through the public consultation process itself, and 
the way in which different constituencies engaged with the library design.” 
(Lees, 2001: 71)  
 
This statement forms the foundation of Lees‟ second (after construction) architecture 
where she introduces “ethnographies of use” (a two pronged methodology of participant 
observation and in-situ interviewing) as a means to apprehend the embodied politics that 
produce the library through the way people use it, i.e. consumption as production (Ibid: 72-
74). As with her architectural conception pre-construction, ethnographies of use negate 
(and possibly efface) the building and the architectural as being meaningful or influential per 
se. If people and their institutions are understood as “generating” pre-constructed 
architecture, they continue to do so in the post-constructed building through the way they 
use it (Ibid). Lees understands the way people use the library as “transformative” (Ibid: 73) 
or describes them as “appropriating” the forms of the building (Ibid). This approach 
provides her with four vignettes, all of which lead her to suggest that the architecture is 
profoundly animated by the way people use it, rather than being particularly animate in 
itself. In this way, Lees‟ second architecture is primarily defined by opportunity. From the 
homeless woman using the toilets as a personal bathroom, to children playing on the 
escalators, architecture is something we produce from the way we consume it, and the way 
we can create styles of consumption that negates the intended usage. In short, we as users 
produce an architecture saturated with opportunities to expand our choices, options, and 
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outcomes. This attention to inhabitants and the potency of consumption is something that 
a number of authors have turned to as a way of dissipating architecture over multiple sites 
and origins, including Kraftl and Adey (2008)6. Their work addresses both the styles of 
inhabitation that architects prefigure into an architectural space, and the way inhabitants 
occupy that space creatively, manipulating it to constrain limited affects from limitless 
potential. Where Lees differs with Kraftl and Adey is her treatment of possibility and 
potential. For her, the occupation and inhabitation of a building is a means or route for 
individuals to profoundly amplify their ability to inhabit creatively. 
 
Lees‟ article works like a fulcrum in this review by rejecting certain agendas in architectural 
geography that had gone before and setting a new agenda for much of the work that 
followed. Her assembling of architecture is defined not only by what she chooses to 
include, but what she specifies to exclude in a series of three anti-architectures (Lees, 2001: 
53-57). The first such exclusion is the idea of litmus architecture that characterises many of 
the early forms of architectural geography (Lees quotes, among others, Kniffen 1965 as an 
example). In this architectural assemblage, buildings were classified as belonging to certain 
cultures or demonstrating certain techniques. Recording the location of that building 
allowed geographers to plot the extent of that culture or technique on a map as it diffused 
over space and time from a given hearth-like origin (Lees, 2001: .53-54). In this case, 
Kniffen (et al) used architecture like a litmus test, to stand (or not stand) for something 
else, assuming in the process that architecture had a fairly reliable reflective property. This 
theme continues through to Lees‟ second anti-architecture, except that reflection is 
replaced by representation: the idea of architecture as part of a quasi-lexical environment 
where a building stands for a concept that was inscribed into it, prefiguring the 
architectural as a form with the power to secure meaning in textual form (and assuming a 
readership) (Ibid: 54-55). Lees‟ third anti-architecture is the political semiotic, an approach 
which retained a lexical understanding of a text-like building but adds to it a ventriloquism 
of political economy: in short, architecture is treated as a derivative outcrop or symptom of 
larger social, political, and economic processes (Ibid: 55-56). My use of the term7 
“ventriloquism” in this sense refers to the way architecture is understood as a conforming 
surface to be shaped and made animate by broader, more profoundly formative processes. 
Architectural agency, such that it is, is understood as being reissued from these processes, 
                                                   
6 See also Bryden 2004, Llewellyn 2003, 2004, and McNeill and Tewdwr-Jones 2003. 
7 I should point out that “anti-architecture”, “litmus architecture”, and “ventriloquism” are terms that I‟ve devised to 
describe Lees‟ arguments – the only term in this passage that she used, and which I retain, is “political semiotic”. 
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rather than created indigenously. In fact, all three of Lees‟ anti-architectures share some 
degree of ventriloquism which Lloyd Jenkins noted in his own (much shorter) anti-
architecture: “All of these texts have one common feature; they all treat the individual 
building as a blank canvas on which another discourse is illustrated […], a form which 
allows the researcher to „make his or her points stick‟” (Jenkins, 2002: 225). The 
architectural assemblages that Lees, Jacobs, Jenkins, and Kraftl and Adey enter into is 
predicated on the exclusion of ventriloquist architecture. Both Lees and Jenkins refer to 
Paul Goss‟ The built environment and social theory: towards and architectural geography (1988) as an 
example of such ventriloquism. 
 
Unfurling “happen”: 
 
Initially at least, my “basic” question is bipartite: “How does architecture happen” and 
“within people‟s experiences”. “Architecture” and “happen” belong together in the left half 
for two very good reasons. The first of these is that the literature I introduced in the 
previous section constructs an understanding of architecture as something specifically able 
to and/or made to happen, e.g. to be some sort of mechanism, or produce some sort of 
outcome, or itself be a product or outcome (and I will detail more of this shortly). The 
architecture in architectural geography is considered so very animate that I don‟t really need 
to specify that it “happens”: I could just as easily say “How is architecture within people‟s 
experiences?” although I admit that it lacks elegance in terms of syntax. This inevitable 
happening of architecture in architectural geography resembles the undefined definition of 
architecture that Fleming Honour and Pevsner settled on: it‟s porous, malleable and 
ongoing (i.e. it reaches no conclusion, or has an open-ended conclusion). What is clear 
from the architectural geography literature is that the happening of architecture is much 
more than (for example) the building‟s staying power. It is not as simple as saying that a 
building happens because it persists in being upright and has yet to fall down or lose too 
many constituent parts like floors or walls. And by extension, it is not as simple as saying 
that a building is locked into a limited route of happenings that is common to and 
inevitable of all buildings. In both cases the building would not “happen” but would have 
“happened” already: the past tense prefigures an end-stop. The temporal hallmark of recent 
architectural geography is that it maintains a sort of recursive present tense and assumes 
that architecture continues to happen, and that architecture‟s happening can be inhabited 
(being porous) and, from that position, influenced (being malleable). Some of this is owed 
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to a common anti-architecture that manifests in the more recent work in architectural 
geography, and it has achieved four distinct things: first, geography‟s anti-architecture is (to 
varying degrees) anti-architect: the architect is not considered to be the building‟s absolute 
maestro or principal creator, and this guides many architectural geographers toward 
considerations of how architecture is defined by other people, things, or networks thereof. 
Second, it is anti-freeze: certain older architectural geographies require the building to be 
meaningfully and performatively stilled, whereas more recent work sets architecture in 
motion and understands it as something that changes and is subject to change. Some of 
this motion and changeability is provided by those other people and things that emerge 
from the first anti-architecture, once the architect is dethroned. Third, it is anti-
ventriloquist: contemporary architectural geography claims to avoid the approach that 
renders all or part of a building as derivative, reiterative, and generally shaped by a mono- 
or omni-causal collection of processes. Finally, it is anti-lexical: it does not understand the 
re-happening of architecture as a matter of buildings being able to correspond with 
inhabitants or users through a symbolic system whereby meanings are written into built 
form and read from it by people in a successful and predictable way. The four of these, 
taken together as anti-architecture, demand that the building be understood as something 
happening by undermining those narratives that would suggest architectural fixity. They 
also open a void in which more dynamic accounts of architecture can emerge as 
something-happening. 
 
Our attempts to fill this void are not without issues: the recursive temporal hallmark of 
architectural geography requires the building to be positioned in a potentially detrimental 
way. Either by exclusion or by inclusion, a number of key recent architectural geographies 
understand the building as a proxy outcome of various influences for which the building is 
a route, medium, or context (as with Jenkins, 2002; Imrie, 2004 and Jacobs 2006). Another 
group of recent offerings are perhaps more fundamentally anti-architectural by considering 
that the consumption of architecture by the people who use or inhabit it is more 
fundamental and productive (as with Cooke and Jenkins, 2001; Lees, 2001; Llewellyn, 
2004(a) and McNeill and Tewdwr-Jones, 2003). Either approach renders a similar affect: 
architectural geography actually directs its attention and efforts away from or around the 
building. The building becomes a field of others (or a point of coalescence): it is made 
animate by other processes or other people with other ideas rather than having much in the 
way of indigenous effective or affective authority. Because of this, the building becomes a 
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place where something can get going, but goes of its own accord thereafter. Architectures 
and buildings are often seen as housing, containing, or routing certain happenings, rather 
than happening very much themselves. Something of this can be seen in the architectures 
of both Jenkins (2002) and Jacobs (2006). 
 
One of Jenkins‟ motivations was to overturn the assumption that a building is frozen at the 
point of completion and account for the way a building changes over time (Jenkins, 2002: 
229). In 1860, the owner of no.11 received a letter from a city engineer, “inviting” him to 
connect his building to the sewer running beneath Rue du Conservatoire. This invitation, 
mundane though it seems, served to connect no.11 to many of the accepted norms of the 
period by material means – it is an example of permeability. The building happened 
differently because of this connecting: by way of the sewerage system it becomes a 
consequence of the prevailing scientific, political, and ethical ideas about health and 
sanitation, and that consequence is negotiated between regulations, materials, engineers, 
technologies, builders, proprietors, and etcetera (Ibid: 331-332). For Jenkins, the building 
does not produce an outcome per se, but is both materially and meaningfully an outcome of 
that which flows through it (and requires it to flow through), and by defining it as 
permeable Jenkins allows the building to change as the networks that permeate it change. I 
see Jenkins‟ “permeable” metaphor as very different to the “porous” metaphor I used to 
describe the architecture entry in the Dictionary of Architecture and Landscape Architecture. I had 
in my mind the image of a sponge which is able to inflect itself upon a fluid-like context: to 
draw influences towards it, and to absorb and retain some. Permeability, on the other hand, 
seems much more contingent on an equally fluid-like idea of flow, especially flowing 
through from one side to another, and therefore allows all sorts of things to happen to the 
building without the building exerting any influence. And if reality is understood as formed 
in and from networks, then these things have the potential to happen a lot. 
 
I ought to expand on the non-influence of the building because I do not wish to accuse 
Jenkins of being simultaneously anarchic (because the existence of the network from which 
a building arises seems coincidental) and determinist (because the existence of a building is 
delegated entirely to that network). The logic of actor networks should refute this: if the 
building is established in the network, as well as being an outcome of it, then the network 
isn‟t something that simply arrives to “do the building”. The idea of sewerage, for instance, 
requires buildings as part of a network that is complementary to its possible existence. 
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Sewerage is, to some degree, a consequence of buildings, just as the building is 
consequentially connected, via sewerage, to all sorts of technologies, materials, and ideas. 
To be established in a network allows no.11 to tap into a capacity to influence and afford, 
and it‟s the same capacity that allowed the building to arise in the first instance. 11 Rue du 
Conservatoire should, in principle, allow equally for receiving and dispatching influence. The 
problem is that it isn‟t actually possible to think about actor networks in simple terms of 
receiving and dispatching after a while: the more you consider its ramifications, the more 
its existence melts into something else, or everything else, in a relentless relational logic 
because (eventually) you arrive at the conclusion that everything that can happen will (or 
has) happen(ed) to no.11 and it happens everywhere else by way of everything else. No.11 
can influence other things, but cannot influence itself because its existence is contingent on 
arrivals from the influences of every other thing, which logically means that the influences 
it renders to other things are not created by itself either, but received from and re-routed to 
everything else. The strange thing about no.11‟s happening in terms such as these is that, 
although the building itself is powerless and contingent on connectivity, connectivity itself 
is also powerless as it‟s a relational amalgam of the influences that other things don‟t have 
either. Either they are powerless, or the power they have is instantly homogenised in a 
mass of relationality. 
 
Jacobs‟ argument uses the same theoretical engine as Jenkins, but her outcome is different. 
In the first instance, her research is directed at a whole building genotype (the highrise 
residential block) and her interest is the way that this form is globalised. Her work is not 
just about how a building happens, but about a specific aspect of that happening in which 
roughly the same form, with roughly the same purpose, can be multiplied and mobilised 
into existence in multiple different locations (Jacobs 2006, p.12-14). Her analysis is a 
development of Latour‟s translation concept (Latour, 1987, in Jacobs, 2006: 13) and stays 
close to the importance of “work” in shaping (or “claiming”) the connectivities that form a 
building. To move a building by way of translation (as opposed to diffusion) requires work 
for the processes of transportation, and more work again to stabilise it at the destination. 
The additions of these associations and connections, formed by the hands it passes through 
(and into) and the various objects and things that coalesce around it, transform the 
building: it is not sealed whilst in transport as the diffusion concept would assume. 
Crucially, at least part of this transformation process is directed and intended. On the face 
of it, Jenkins seems to understand Latour‟s insights as describing a contingency of existence 
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(Latour 1987 in Jenkins, 2002: 225 and Latour 1988, 1993 in Jenkins, 2002: 230) whereas 
Jacobs uses the idea of connectivity as something that can be manipulated or even wielded 
in a knowing way: it is a remaking, re-routing, steering, inflecting and deflecting of 
relationality that allows connections to be claimed, rather than connections to simply 
happen (Jacobs, 2006: 12-14). 
 
Jacobs‟ connectivity casts a new light with which to view Jenkins‟ connectivity, specifically 
his example of no.11‟s sewerage connection. A less pessimistic re-examination could see in 
his account the possibility of relational manipulation: the invitation that was issued to the 
proprietor of no.11 in 1860 was a socio-technical engagement that implies a planned 
undertaking to draw (or ally) things together. To understand this drawing together requires 
an understanding of power as translation rather than a directional force from a unitary 
origin and it‟s here that the concepts of allies and negotiations resurfaces to suggest that, 
somehow, relationality can be apprehended and things can be grouped together to work in 
a certain way (Jenkins, 2002: 232). The problem, which may be an accident of the way the 
article is written, is that this manipulation of connectivity is largely implicit and given 
limited attention (Ibid: 231-232), whereas by contrast Jenkins re-states the contingency of 
connectivity at a number of points, often explicitly. Certain terms, like “permeability” and 
“delegation” suggest the removal of agency to contingent elsewheres and seem to clash 
with other terms like “allies” or “negotiations” that suggest the possibility of claiming or 
attempting to claim the network to make something that doesn‟t feel accidental after all. 11 
rue du Conservatoire seems to suffer a lack of resolution as to which mode of happening is 
actually happening. That said, my concerns are not mirrored by Jacobs, who sees 
substantial value in Jenkins‟ work and the way it apprehends buildings through the notion 
of permeability. For her, it equalises and includes the social instead of ennobling it and 
externalising it as something more than a bounded building and its materiality (Jenkins, 
2002: 225-226 in. Jacobs, 2006: 11). But where she sees co-production, I see contingent 
emergence, and where she lauds Jenkins‟ reversal of the building‟s effacement, I see him 
leaning towards (or failing to limit) a purist understanding of connectivity from which a 
new form of effacement arises, and the “black box” (Jenkins, 2002: 225) becomes a murky 
and diffuse fog. 
 
Perhaps I am being too mechanical in my reading of networks and the relational, or 
perhaps my approach is too pessimistic, but I find that Jacobs takes Jenkins‟ framework to 
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a far more useful place, and it‟s her conception of connectivity that seems more workable 
to me. The second of her two case studies, the collapse of Ronan Point8, is one she 
interprets as a combination of embodied human actions, enrolled substances and 
materialities, and enrolled discourses. She uses these to explain how the continuing 
existence of a building type can thrive or, in this case, founder according to the 
connections that hold it together in place. The British highrise became, in Latour‟s terms 
(1987) an absurdity: a technical/scientific claim that, once understood as failing, went from 
being a socially accepted fact to an artefact, from a wholesome truth to a pet theory, and 
people wondered how they ever believed in it at all. The partial structural collapse at Ronan 
Point became emblematic in this wider collapse from fact to absurdity (Jacobs, 2006: 19). 
The gas explosion in Flat 90 on the 16th May 1968 blew out a load-bearing flank wall and 
caused the entire south-east corner tower block to progressively collapse. The inquiry into 
the collapse could have identified a material trigger event and blamed someone for it, but 
the existence of the highrise in a web of supporting connections led the inquiry to a 
conclusion of systemic failure. The weakness of Ronan Point was a product of the weak 
expectations and regulations it connected to and materially embodied in order to secure a 
sense that it achieved safety and solidity. But the building regulations defined quality and 
safety in terms of normal use, rather than unlikely events (Ibid: 17-20). In this case, the 
inquiry worked to apprehend and deflect the previous work that a key relational constituent 
of the highrise had attempted to do.  
 
Ronan Point is an example of designed connectivity, one that was manufactured to happen 
in a certain way to achieve a projected end, even if it ultimately failed. The way Jacobs 
treats the Ronan Point collapse exemplifies the very different ways that Jenkins and Jacobs 
use connectivity, even if they are for the same reasons. Connectivity allows their 
architectures to keep happening and happen at multiple sites, and the manner of that 
connectivity seems to be expressed as membership. Whether by accident or intention, 
Jenkins‟ account allows the building to be defined by membership, and for membership to 
be essentially unrestricted: the momentum is from outside the building. Conversely, Jacobs 
                                                   
8 Completed in 1968 and constructed by Taylor Woodrow Anglican housing to a standard design, Ronan Point was 
located in Newham, London, and rose to 22 storeys with 110 flats. It was constructed using a variant of Large Panel 
System (which Jacobs (2006) describes). The gas explosion in Flat 90 on the 16th May 1968, despite being relatively small, 
caused the whole corner of the block in which that flat had stood to collapse, resulting in four deaths. An inquiry 
determined that the building, which had no structural frame and was supported by interlocking panels that comprised the 
internal and external walls, was unduly flimsy by design, compounded by poor construction techniques and a lack of 
structural redundancy. For contemporary reports, including news footage, see BBC (2008), and Jacobs (2006: 17-21) for 
further details. 
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suggests a system of membership in which intention and planning are key: the “building 
event” allows for the inclusion of discourses and undertakings which connect to the 
building and work (or fail to work) on its definition and the way it happens. The 
momentum is from inside in this case, because it is the building‟s cause that directs the 
connective memberships that form around it. But regardless of whether the building is for 
the unplanned network, or the network planned for the building, connective geographies of 
architecture direct their attentions away from or around the building to discover what 
animates it. Neither the building (as a designed material incursion occupying space with 
shapes and volumes), its design, or its architect are mentioned as having membership, and 
as such the implications of their memberships are effaced. Even the Large Panel System of 
Ronan Point, and the faulty gas connection in Flat 90, are understood by Jacobs to be 
affordances of a connected member, the Building Regulations. 
 
Lees‟ insights are predicated on a similar concept of membership, but in a different way to 
connectedness and networks. The case of the ersatz colosseum assembles an architecture and 
specifies an anti-architecture which has influenced the work of many others since, but 
between these two there are silent architectures she doesn‟t mention at all. The first of 
these non-architectures is the actual building: Lees does not consider it at any great length, 
materially or otherwise, as a member of her architectural conception in any meaningful 
way. It is the memberships created by consumption that makes Vancouver Central Public 
Library happen the way it does, and moreover, happen more powerfully than any cues its 
architectural design may provide. Consumption, either at the planning and consultation 
stage (where ideas, purposes and meanings are consumed) or at the inhabitation stage 
(where the library‟s forms are consumed) is a special and vibrantly productive kind of 
membership, and the building, in terms of surfaces, volumes, spaces, routes, infrastructures 
and treatments, is muffled against it. She recognises the daring postmodern play of the 
colosseum aesthetic, for instance (Lees, 2001: 71), but doesn‟t attribute the efficacy of 
membership to it. This first non-architecture leads logically to a second where the architect 
fades into the background. As the consuming inhabitant is empowered by consumption 
Moshe Safdie (the architect) starts to disappear and, with him, any possibility of his 
ongoing membership within the re-happening building that might shape or define its future 
consumption through provisions (or denials) in design. The library‟s existence was already 
starting to escape his influence – possibly even understanding – and embrace the 
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engagement of others at an early stage: by stating as such, Lees undermines his 
membership from the outset. 
 
“I began to wonder if those who have criticized the ersatz colosseum, and even 
perhaps Safdie himself at times, have missed the postmodern play. The 
colosseum design is ambiguous: it reflects no singular engagement.” (Ibid: 66) 
 
Although she conceives of architecture as something-happening across multiple sites and 
origins, the driving force appears to be the individual creative act, a membership with the 
potency to permeate and ultimately animate architecture experiences. The question is, can 
consumption become so powerfully productive without limits? Is the architectural a 
medium that allows us such soaring memberships? Lees‟ architecture seems to suffer the 
same problem as Jenkins: it allows for certain actions or likelihoods to generate and keep 
on generating without substantial limitation. It also proposes a very top-heavy distribution 
of very potent memberships as a means to a dynamic understanding of architecture, 
memberships that are principally available to inhabitants after the building‟s completion, 
and which make substantial creative freedoms available to them. 
 
The principal reason why I wrote “architecture” and “happen(ing)” into the left half of my 
question is because I need to use them together to develop this idea of membership. I‟d 
argue that the inevitable happening of architecture which is written into recent architectural 
geographies seems to actively invite it. The re-happening building allows for people and 
things to join in, which further implies that buildings happen in a way that generates a 
capacity or space in which such a joining is possible. If a building is an architectural 
something that can be enrolled into as I‟ve just outlined, then I would be interested in 
expanding the idea to ask what sort of different memberships are possible in and of a 
building, especially those particular memberships afforded by the building‟s initial design 
and designer: the architect. A building may be a re-happening thing, but the architect of 
that building is ideally placed to deliver a very potent opening shove, the momentum of 
which influences many – possibly all – of the happenings that follow to some extent. For 
me, unfurling “happen” is all about the architect and what s/he wanted the building to do 
(or put another way: the kind of happening s/he wanted it to have) by virtue of an 
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enhanced membership, and the left half of my furled question is where my interests in the 
possibilities of the architect have come to reside9. 
 
Why, when I have just criticised Lees for defining a cache of enhanced memberships, 
would I argue for a consideration of the same in the architect‟s case? In the first instance, I 
already know that certain architects understood their memberships as being so:10 it was the 
assumption of capacity, both of the building as capable of exerting influence and the 
architects role in crafting such capacities, that led them to design certain properties into the 
building that would (hopefully) render influence or execute effects of some kind. Their 
stories will follow in later chapters, but I can offer some general opening observations 
about the architect‟s role. The architect is one of a number of people who are present at 
the building‟s inception, but their particular presence is overarching: the building only 
becomes possible when s/he corrals these people‟s demands and needs, creating a network 
which accounts for each in the final design.11 In this sense the architect is positioned at the 
centre of gravity, and s/he is also positioned at the effective start of the building‟s life12. 
This is crucial, because it‟s at this point that certain possibilities can be dimmed and others 
emphasised by virtue of the trans-material zone the building occupies whilst in the 
architect‟s hands. The potential materiality of a sketch or elevation needs to attend to the 
wishes of the client, the limitations of regulation, and the limitations of materials, 
techniques and sites, so it certainly isn‟t without constraint. But notwithstanding, it may be 
the point of least constraint. This is where the maximum possible scope for the building‟s 
outcome is available to the architect: the “position” and “gravity” of their membership 
allows the architect to open a space around them which encompasses more possibilities to 
choose from, combine, and experiment with than will ever exist again for that building. I 
                                                   
9 By unfurling “happen” in this way, I‟m also starting to unfurl “people” by proxy through an understanding of the 
architect as a person and a role in which I am specifically interested. 
10 I know this from a combination of the readings I‟m reviewing as part of this unfurling process, especially Gruffudd 
(1995, 2001) Llewellyn (2003, 2004) and Kraftl and Adey (2008), along with my previous research for my BA and MA 
dissertations, and a viability survey which I undertook at the start of my doctorate in 2004/5 during which time I 
reviewed a number of the larger manuscript collections held by the Royal Institute of British Architects. 
11 These other people will be detailed in my empirical chapters, but as an initial outline they include the client, the 
contractor(s), the suppliers, the local planning authority and the regional/national planning authorities who act through 
them. If wood, concrete, brick, steel, and glass form the ingredients of a building in a basic material sense, then clients, 
contractors, suppliers, and authorities are the basic materials with which the architect is provided at the start of the design. 
Or put another way, these interwoven influences form the necessary trellis on which the design grows, but it is the 
architect who is responsible for drawing these strands together in a way that will work when the building is finished. 
Nonetheless, the architect‟s membership is essentially gifted to him/her by these other people and organisations who 
require architecture: I would not wish to give the impression that I think the architect subsumes their influence, but then 
again, I am of the impression that s/he profoundly organises them. 
12 I say “effective” because, whilst the client may start the process of wanting a building, and whilst the planning and 
building regulations may already be in place, none of these things alone can start the building: it requires the architect to 
network these things together and apply their abilities for the building to emerge just as it requires clients, builders, and 
authorities to make themselves available to be networked. 
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imagine this space to be conical: at the beginning the architect has the maximum range of 
options, but obviously the form of a building would struggle to indulge in every possible 
feature or treatment within the architect‟s ability. Therefore, as the evolving design comes 
to favour certain approaches and exclude others, the space it happens in narrows. And it 
seems that the only way that space can be reopened to its (literally) original extent is to 
demolish and build anew: it‟s the only point where a “full” design can be achieved. Once 
the architect‟s elevations have been converted into a completed build any future creativity 
is obliged to the original in the sense that they must start from the point where the 
architect left off and work within certain parameters that endure from their original 
design13. 
 
My unfurling of “happen” along with “architecture” is the start of a specific research 
agenda that is apparent from the emphasis I‟ve placed on the architect and the way they 
open up possibility within the limits of buildings. When an architect‟s membership is fresh 
and they start to prise open their conical workspace, what manner of possibilities do they 
imagine are available to them? I am interested in those idealistic architects who made space 
for the possibility that the creation of various shapes, surfaces, textures (and etcetera) can 
be causative or influential. The starting point of my research has been those architects who 
developed a cache of traceable beliefs and understandings that allowed them to apprehend 
such possibilities and design those assemblages (of shape, surface, shade, etc.14) so that the 
building could communicate or demonstrate something. This is a story of piercing 
ambition in which a building‟s behaviour could be designed into its architectonic form, and 
that those forms could behave themselves and repeatedly perform the specific acts 
designed of them. I have found and opened the caches of three architects with the aim of 
tracing what sort of performances they thought could be undertaken architecturally, and 
why they should be motivated to make their buildings do such things. My unfurling of 
“happen” does not, therefore, assume a rudderless building which is overly susceptible to 
whim. “Happen” attends to how a building is designed to happen in certain ways, by 
                                                   
13 My meaning in this instance is pragmatic: additions to a building generally maintain floor and roof lines, for instance, 
and partial demolitions have to work around or replicate load bearing elements. The question of whether style and 
approach should be replicated is a different (deferent) question which I will turn my attention to in the next section and in 
the empirical chapters that follow.  
14 Lists such as these raise the question of how far I‟m going to unfurl “architecture” or “buildings” and raise the 
possibility that I could break the building down to a list of ingredients (fixed surfaces like walls, floors, ceilings etc., 
flexible surfaces like doors, widows, etc., surface treatments of colour and texture, the enclosed volumes that are formed 
where these planar surfaces meet like lounges, bedrooms, chimneys, etc., non-void volumes like pilotis or buttresses, the 
arrangement and routing of these volumes into a plan, and so on). I‟d suggest this is the principal limitation of the 
“unfurling” metaphor (which I discuss later in this chapter). Suffice to say, the architects I studied intended that their 
work should be consumed as unitary: complete and whole. 
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drawing on certain means, toward hoped-for ends, through the efforts of the architect. 
This also serves to partially limit my unfurling of “architecture” in terms of my research. 
For me, architecture is a property created by architects and delivered in the forms they 
design: it describes the beliefs and philosophies of those architects who made ambitious 
possibilities for themselves, and it is composed of their reasons for doing so, and of the 
things they did to compel these possibilities to emerge later in the building‟s life. 
 
There is a small body of work in architectural geography by Rob Imrie that would 
immediately call into question my emphasis on the architect by drawing attention to those 
things that impinge upon and compress my conception of their creative conical 
memberships. In a 2004 article, The role of the Building Regulations in achieving housing quality, he 
details how the ways a building might happen are prefigured by the regulatory environment 
they are to be built in (Imrie, 2004). Throughout his work Imrie‟s principal interest has 
been the interface between – and the management of the interface between – people‟s 
bodies and the material environments they dwell in (see also Imrie, 2003), and his interest 
in this case is how the regulations for disabled users – Part M – is apprehended, and what 
effects it has (Imrie, 2004: 423). Essentially, Imrie seeks to follow Part M from its 
beginnings as a legal document through the various processes of design, planning, and 
construction, to see what happens to it en route. As his account unfolds it becomes 
obvious that as Part M is routed toward an actual completed building, much of it is lost in 
translation, or subject to disinterest and creative interpretation. Such treatment, argues 
Imrie, is built into the document itself: Part M seems tokenistic, indeterminate, and through 
terms like “reasonable provision” leaves ample space for transgression, discretion, and 
interpretation of what was originally intended to be a definite and legally binding incursion 
into architectural space (Ibid: 433-435). 
 
Pre-empting Jacobs (2006) Imrie attends to the non-architectural others of regulation (Part 
M), enforcement (the Building Control offices where he undertook his interviews) and 
construction (the site where Part M is supposed to be made material). In this instance, he 
understands the happening of buildings as occurring outside the confines of the architect‟s 
conical membership and the inhabitants‟ creative consumption, unlike Kraftl and Adey 
(2008, also Bryden, 2004; Lees, 2001 and Llewellyn, 2004(a)). In attending to these often 
effaced sites and detailing how they can impinge upon and refract something that, like Part 
M, is intended and supposed to directly oblige buildings to perform in a certain way, Imrie 
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challenges the idea that the building‟s happening “pauses” between the architect and the 
consuming inhabitant: these in-between sites are not merely procedural and functional, an 
insight which can also be found in Jacobs‟ Ronan Point case study (Jacobs, 2006: 17-20). 
Unlike Jacobs, Imrie‟s account of the demise of Part M from something definite and 
obligatory to something near-voluntary and interpretable allows Imrie to discuss how the 
building‟s performance is made to fall short of intentions, whereas Jacobs‟ event (regardless 
of efficacy) understands the building event as a network of good intentions that stabilise 
the building and hope to keep it performing in a definite and intended way. Imrie‟s building 
event15 is potentially more complex: it‟s not exactly “for” the building, not all elements 
within it sit comfortably together, and there is a suggestion of subtle infighting between 
these elements and the possibility of their marginalisation. 
 
It is also worth considering that if Part M, a supposedly obligatory incursion into 
architecture, is enfeebled both by the way it is written and the environment it enters into, 
then the designed incursion of architects in which I have declared an interest might be 
equally susceptible, and their conical membership might not count for much. The possible 
incursions of architects and the practices that might allow for these incursions is something 
Imrie gives attention to in an earlier paper, Architects’ conceptions of the human body (Imrie, 
2003). Retaining the bodily theme, Imrie seeks to understand how architects factor the 
bodies of those who use buildings into their work (Ibid: 51-52), and in doing so he attends 
to prefiguring acts of architectural practice and what these mean for the way a building 
happens. By this I mean the way architects think their building will be occupied, and how 
they tailor their designs to that prefigured occupation. From a combination of interviews in 
architectural schools (Ibid: 53-55) and the offices of practising architects (Ibid: 55-58), 
Imrie finds that architectural understandings of the body are peripheral at best. 
Architectural schools skim the subject either in overtly theoretical terms (that have minimal 
implication for practical building design) or by defaulting to the standardised bodily 
dimensions that are commonly available (see, for example, Baden-Powell, 2001: 64-65 or 
Adler, 1998) (Imrie, 2003: 23-55). Practising architects either address the body through a 
series of assumptions and generalisations, or not at all. One key assumption is that the 
architect uses his/her body as a normal corporeal baseline, assuming that users are like 
them (Ibid: 55-56). Equally interesting is the fact that many architects believe that 
                                                   
15 Imrie does not use the expression “building event”, but his conception seems to work in terms of Jacobs‟ (2006) 
terminology. 
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architecture appeals to and works at the cerebral level, as material sustenance for an 
enquiring style of occupation, and the body simply contains these enquiring faculties (Ibid: 
57-58). 
 
In my preferred terms of an architect‟s conical membership, Imrie‟s discussion directs 
attention to what architects fill (or fail to fill) this conical space with, and how that content 
is formed. In the case of the body, that content is either ignored or effaced in a series of 
assumptions. But these assumptions, Imrie argues, are rooted in professional architectural 
practices, especially that of drawing. By identifying drawing as a principal currency of 
architectural practice, he proposes that architects are given to think in terms of arranged 
elevations, volumes, and shapes to the exclusion of that which might untidy or unbalance 
that arrangement. Untidy bodies are thus excluded not only from drawings (where, at best, 
they are included as a blob-like motif) but also from architects‟ schema of prefigured 
occupation (Imrie, 2003: 58-63). For Imrie, the way an architect might make architecture 
happen is not simply the production of shapes, surfaces, and volumes, but the proto-
material enactment (i.e. drawing) of considerations, assumptions, and at least one key 
effacement, of how the building will eventually be used and considered. The ramifications 
of this insight are important in terms of my own conceptions: the architect‟s conical 
membership, even if it is the point of least constraint in the building‟s story, is not a field of 
unrestrained choice such as that which Lees (2001) might conceive of inhabitation. 
Practices and mediums such as drawing necessarily occupy that space and influence the 
outcomes, especially if one of those outcomes is a set of drawings to present to the client 
and contractors. Furthermore, Imrie tells a story of inadequate prefiguring acts on the part 
of architects, and that underestimating elements of the inhabitation-to-follow (such as 
bodies) might nullify their efforts in some way. 
 
There are relatively few architectural geographies that attend to the architect alone when 
considering how buildings happen. Perhaps the most purist of these is Mike Crang‟s Urban 
morphology and the shaping of the transmissible city (Crang, 2000). On the face of it, such articles 
eschew the important multi-site and multi-origin trend in architectural geography, but both 
Crang (2000) and Imrie (2003) should be understood as accounts of how architects have 
apprehended and worked with the distributed reality of architecture and the inhabitation(s)-
to-follow. In Crang‟s case, two architects (Marcus Novak and Lebbeus Woods) catch his 
interest for the way they‟ve conceived of city time-space (although he doesn‟t discuss what 
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specific implications this has for the way they design built interventions there, so his article 
is located firmly in the abstract environment of their considerations). Both of these 
architects understand the contemporary and electronically super-connected city as a 
dynamic condition of time and space in which, instead of elements being mobile across an 
urban surface, the surface itself is malleable and can bend, fold, and contort to bring 
ostensibly separate or disparate elements into proximity and contact (Crang, 2000: 304). 
Novak understands this as a part human, part technological achievement, as technological 
connectedness allows people to “throw” their agency, to achieve effects at a distance (Ibid: 
307). Their technologically mediated actions lead him to re-imagine space in three 
dimensions as a squeezable looping torus, and space is no longer a void that separates. 
 
“Space ceases to be the ground for the juxtaposition or distribution of given 
elements, geography ceases to be a context for building or a question of scale 
but becomes a rupture of scale, and buildings cease being discrete elements but 
are topological operators crossed by different dimensions.” (Crang, 2000: 308) 
 
Woods has a similar conception of collapsing and looping and also credits this to light-
speed communication, but for him that collapsing un-fixes authorities and hierarchies and 
generates heterogeneous interference and cohabitation where once there was clarity and 
compartmentalisation (Ibid: 310-311) “This architecture” Crang explains, “responds to 
both technical and social geographies where existing orders and fixities are challenged” 
(Ibid: 313). 
 
Despite these two examples being highly abstract and, by Crang‟s own admission, imagined 
(Crang, 2000: 313), they show how architects consider the nature of the territory into 
which buildings will go. The informationally connected city dweller and their abilities (in 
terms of an effective end of Euclidean space and the technological morphing of the urban) 
are apprehended by Novak and Woods as the start of the process of crafting an 
architecture that might work there. 
 
Pyrs Gruffudd‟s Science and the stuff of life takes a different approach on a similar theme. In 
the first instance, his work is a historical geography and his case studies are two 1930‟s 
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health centres: the Pioneer16 Health Centre in Peckham (Gruffudd, 2001: 397-399)17 and 
Finsbury Health Centre18 (Ibid: 405-409). But Owen Williams (architect at Peckham) and 
Berthold Lubetkin (architect at Finsbury, see chapter five) have quite different approaches 
to the two architects that Crang studies. Rather than understand architecture from the 
perspective of a challengingly malleable spatial territory, they understand architecture as a 
means of condensing and stabilising specific things and processes from a wide array of 
possible content. Gruffudd‟s argument is based on two different understandings of 
modernism: “techno-cosmopolitanism”, the updating and re-making of existing practices 
(which he ascribes to Williams‟ approach at Peckham) and “middling modernism”, 
understood as a total break with previous approaches and the liberty to pursue an 
absolutely new approach (which he ascribes to Lubetkin‟s efforts at Finsbury) (Ibid: 396-
397). Crucially, despite their different modernisms, both of these buildings were 
“biotechnic” in that they apprehend and worked harmoniously with nature and natural 
bodily processes (Ibid: 397). 
 
For Gruffudd, the architect is key. They both understood their ability to enclose space as a 
means to foreclose what contents and processes were there, and to arrange the ways they 
could be experienced, and this process could not happen without the architects‟ input. 
From a wide range of potential happenings, architecture can bring together a combination 
of particular happenings in a bounded space, and Gruffudd understands architecture as the 
planning for and designed arranging of this recursive availability of stuff (in which certain 
possible contents are apprehended and others are deflected). In terms of something-
happening, the building is not effective in itself: it works by collecting and routing effective 
content through one location and looks to that combination of content to do the work. At 
Finsbury Health Centre things like fresh air and sunlight induce better health. The purpose 
of the architecture is to make these things available in one location (Gruffudd, 2001: 409). 
And at the Pioneer Health Centre, surveillance was one affordance of many that allowed 
healthy living to be instated in its members, but the building did not create these 
affordances so much as route them together (Ibid: 401). Whether for the “techno-
                                                   
16 The Pioneer Health Centre, designed by Owen Williams (1890-1969) and commissioned by two doctors (married to 
one another) was completed in 1926 and lapsed in 1950. Its dual purpose was to provide social, recreational, and 
healthcare services to the people of Peckham (London) whilst allowing the staff of the centre to observe the patrons for 
research purposes. See Gruffudd (2001) for further details. 
17 A third offering by Gruffudd (2000) discusses Lubetkin‟s approach to zoo design. 
18 Completed in 1938 in what is now Islington, London, Finsbury Health Centre was one of the first purpose-built inner-
urban health centres in the UK. It was one of a number of projects that Lubetkin, with Tecton, undertook for Finsbury 
Borough Council. See Gruffudd, (2001) for a discussion, and Allan (2002: 105-107) for further details and illustrations. 
29 
 
cosmopolitanism” of the Pioneer Health Centre or the “middling modernity” of Finsbury 
Health Centre  (Ibid: 411) the architects in either case achieved a system of availability for a 
selection of provisions, i.e. their enclosing of space worked to select content and arrange 
for its recurring availability.  
 
It‟s important to note that this is a historical geography and Gruffudd is presenting 
Williams‟ and Lubetkin‟s interpretations of architectural happening, rather than making an 
argument for how architecture might actually happen. Nonetheless, this is a substantially 
different way to look at building events: Lubetkin and Williams use buildings to apprehend 
and organise the world of non-architectural others, deflecting some whilst routing others 
(recursively) into architectonic forms. It is the building that stabilises a selection of non-
architectural others, and the architecture of the form is the means to that stability. In terms 
of Jacobs‟ building event (Jacobs, 2006: 11), Gruffudd‟s account of Williams and Lubetkin 
effects a reversal: non-architectural others are not seen as props for the building to lean on 
and be stabilised by. They do not work on the architecture. The architecture works on 
them. 
 
A different account is provided in Gruffudd‟s 1995 article, Propaganda for seemliness, which 
attends to the work of Clough Williams-Ellis19 (the owner and architect of Portmeirion). 
The approach is outwardly similar to Science and the stuff of life: an investigation of the way an 
architect created his own personal way of dealing with and understanding modernism. 
Specifically, “Williams-Ellis‟ modernism challenged the conventional polarity of urban 
modernity and rural traditionalism, and sought a reconciliation through ordered landscape” 
(Gruffudd, 1995: 412). Gruffudd‟s approach to Williams-Ellis is to account for his ideals 
and his architecture as intentions and devices, the former being achieved by use of the 
latter, and his primary device was to achieve aesthetic beauty and the successful 
deployment of architectural forms that could generate pleasure (Ibid: 406-409). His high 
opinion of natural (aesthetic) beauty was key to making this work: if architecture and 
planning could be reconciled with the beauty of natural landscapes and ordered in such a 
way to contour and blend with the natural site without spoiling it (as he attempted at 
                                                   
19 Bertram Clough Williams Ellis (1883-1978) was an architect and an author of architectural books. Although he was 
involved in the design and planning of British new towns, he is often best remembered for a) being an ardent champion 
of conservationism, for which he was knighted and b) Portmeirion, the Italianate village on the Dwyryd estuary in 
Gwynedd, North Wales which he constructed, often from architectural salvage, between 1925 and 1975. Gruffudd (1995) 
provides a useful introduction to his beliefs and approach. 
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Portmeirion and his plan for Stevenage new town), then Williams-Ellis believed that a 
pleasurable and beautiful architecture of order could be achieved: 
 
“[T]he interplay between site and buildings, the creation of physical order, and 
the spiritual value of aesthetic beauty are clear themes. In this sense there is no 
tension between Williams-Ellis‟ ordered architectural and planning principles 
and modernist architectural style.” (Gruffudd, 1995: 413-414) 
 
The emphasis on “physical order” referred to the kind of laissez-faire planning that 
Williams-Ellis recoiled from because of the disordered way it encroached onto and scarred 
the natural landscape (Ibid: 411): urban function required beauty and nature to be 
harmoniously manifested. Essentially, Williams-Ellis‟ architecture used organic nature as a 
benchmark and emulated it as a means to beauty, and the key to that emulation was to 
develop an architecture that could be sited in places like Portmeirion without ruining their 
beauty.20 His principal device, then, is to use nature as a proxy to make tangible two 
otherwise intangible outcomes (beauty and pleasure) which is the primary difference 
between Gruffudd‟s articles: in Science and the stuff of life Williams and Lubetkin are 
understood as routing tangible and functional (natural) content, whereas in Propaganda for 
seemliness Williams-Ellis is understood as attempting to meet a perceived spiritual need and 
appeal to feelings and sensualities. On second glance, however, Williams-Ellis‟ approach 
seems to be the same: the intangibility of his project requires a tangible proxy or surrogate. 
The concept of beauty requires an already-existing something that is actually beautiful (or 
at least perceived to be so) to secure it, and in this case it is nature‟s beauty, a materially real 
form or content which, when routed into an architectural project, is understood to 
manifest the concept (hence the emphasis on reconciliation between beauty, nature, and 
physical order in planning/architecture (Gruffudd, 1995: 413-414)). 
 
Imrie (2003) Crang (2000) and Gruffudd (1995, 2001) focus their accounts of architecture 
as something produced by the architect, which at first glance would suggest that they 
eschew the multi-site, multi-origin approach which has been critical in the transition 
between ventriloquist architectural geographies and the more contemporary examples in 
which architecture is understood as happening. A second glance, however, tells a different 
                                                   
20 In fact, Williams-Ellis‟ love of natural beauty led him to support some unusual causes, such as the landed gentry. Their 
continuing stewardship of estates protected these areas from laissez-faire development (Gruffudd 1995, p.415). In this 
and other ways, his conception of beauty was bound to the specific beauty that nature provided. 
31 
 
story of prefiguring acts, and how some of these other sites and potential origins have been 
considered (with varying degrees of efficacy) by architects. All of these accounts detail the 
way architects have thought about the wider realities that their buildings will exist both of 
and in, and what implications they may have for the designs they produce. I want to 
emphasise this point and the way it isn‟t, in fact, a discrete point that starts and ends near 
the beginning of a building‟s story. By accounting for their prefiguring acts, Imrie, Crang 
and Gruffudd have implied the existence of other (future) sites and origins as part of the 
architect‟s approach. In other words, their conical membership contains not just options 
and choices at that point, but strategic possibilities to make the building recur in a certain 
way from an understanding (which may equally be reasoning or guesswork) of the 
characteristics of the reality it will occupy. There is a possibility that the architect‟s role 
after the building‟s completion is not simply a matter of sedimentation or palimpsest, but 
of recurring incursions. The fact that a number of key architectural geographies have 
ignored or effaced the membership of the architect means that such temporal possibilities 
are sometimes missed, but not in the case of Bryden (2004) and Llewellyn (2004a), who 
provide accounts of both the occupied reality of a building, and the recurring intentions of 
the architect and architecture within that reality. 
 
Of course, the source of architecture needn‟t always be an architect. In Inga Bryden‟s There 
is no outer without inner space the architectural design is provided by the Vastu Purusha 
Mandala, a working drawing of sorts that specifies the spatial layout of the traditional 
Indian (Hindu) courtyard house (the haveli) with the aim of connecting the domestic realm 
to large cosmological ideas (Bryden, 2004: 30-31).21 The haveli is, in this way, implicated in 
the vastu, (meaning the translation between the human and divine) and is understood to 
straddle the physical and teleological worlds: in fact, it is meant to demonstrate that these 
worlds are not really separate at all. The haveli occupies and arranges space with a purpose 
                                                   
21 Home (Oikos) is inseparable from cosmos (Temenos) in Hindu philosophy. Haveli are built on a conception of necessary 
harmony between these micro and macro scales, specifically, that the spaces should be designed to intimately connect 
human lives to the cosmos. Specifically, a grid, in which there are nine cells (each containing a divinity) is laid over a 
diagram of Purusha (cosmic man, in the lotus position) serving to hold him down and impose divine order upon him, a 
concept known as Vastu Vidya or Vastu (literally: where the translation between human and divine occur). The whole 
concept is represented in a working drawing of sorts: Vastu Purusha Mandala. It is superimposed onto the site and goes on 
to form the basis of the haveli’s form, proportion, and symbolism (Bryden 2004 p.30-31). The inner chowk (courtyard) is 
built around this nine-cell grid, and it has both private and public functions The rest of the house around the inner chowk 
is derived from a sixty-four square manduka, or eighty-one square paramshagika grid, which dictates the proportions of 
rooms, covered and uncovered spaces (the size of the latter reflecting the social status of the occupant), and so on, but all 
with a strict symmetry that references the meaning of the Vastu as manifested in the inner chowk (Ibid p.31-34). Vastu is a 
continuing and popularised tradition in contemporary India despite other approaches which, according to Vibhuti 
Chakrabati (whom Bryden quotes), “invent” distinctions between physical (outer) and spiritual (inner) aspects of house 
and home (Ibid p.34). 
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in mind, and Bryden attends to it not only as an outcome of the documents that define it, 
but also as an actual built thing with volumetric and spatial properties (Ibid p.30-34). But 
Bryden‟s work is not just about what is supposed to happen: it‟s also about how or if that 
happening has actually continued to the current inhabitation, especially as the Vastu Purusha 
Mandala was intended to define the spatiality of the haveli’s future habitation (for instance, 
the spatial interaction or separation between men and women (Ibid: 36)). 
 
The inhabitation of the haveli is something I will discuss in more detail in the following 
section, but the story that Bryden tells is ultimately one of intended compatibility. In terms 
of happening, the building is understood not only as a medium of connection between the 
human and divine, but a connection to a meaningful register that will be accepted by future 
inhabitants of the haveli who will be familiar with that register, along with the meaning of 
the vastu and what it is meant to achieve. The haveli does not literally produce a link to the 
cosmos or the belief thereof; it produces an architectonic expression of cosmological 
association which would be familiar to future inhabitants, and expected by them through 
their beliefs and worship. The impulses of the haveli are not newly deployed beliefs, but 
architectural appeals to existing ones. The continuation of the vastu by architectural means 
may sound enormously ambitious, but it is actually an exercise in plausibility and reckoning 
on the likely continued provision of plausibility in future inhabitations (as is true of the 
current residents of this particular haveli who continue to provide some degree of 
plausibility) (Bryden, 2004: 39). 
 
Such pre-emptive dialogues between architecture and inhabitation are also explored Mark 
Llewellyn‟s Urban village or white house (Llewellyn, 2004(a))22 which tells the story of Kensal 
House23, an early modernist block of flats located in Kensington and commissioned in 
1936. There are three elements in Llewellyn‟s account that make Kensal House happen: the 
architect and architecture as an intervention in inhabited space, a pre-Jacobs form of 
building event by way of a particular non-architectural accompaniment to the building, and 
                                                   
22 An earlier article by Llewellyn (2003) also discusses Kensal House, but his purpose in this case is to provide a 
methodological argument for his approach, so I will discuss it in the following chapter. 
23 Completed in 1937 by E. Maxwell Fry with Elizabeth Denby in Ladbroke Grove (London), Kensal House was a very 
early social housing scheme. Whilst there were already innovative modernist apartment blocks in Britain, Kensal House 
was among the first to be built as social housing, commissioned and financed by the Gas Light and Coke Company and 
intended for re-housed slum dwellers from West London. The building incorporated a number of innovative and 
experimental features in an attempt to deliver beneficial effects to the inhabitants, for details on which see Llewellyn, 
2004. 
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the productive processes of inhabitation which Llewellyn is keen to emphasise in terms he 
borrows from Lees (2001): 
 
“The simplistic dichotomy of production and consumption is not effective in 
enabling an understanding of the intricate processes of adaptation and 
possession that takes place in homes.” (Llewellyn, 2004(a): 229) 
 
Kensal House was understood to work in two ways. In the first place it was a new material 
treatment of domestic life, different and superior to the unhealthy and overcrowded homes 
that were common to that area (Llewellyn, 2004(a): 231-233). It also worked as an event, a 
tended-to edifice in which there were handbooks, guidelines, and rules (such as approved 
colour schemes and allotted times for hanging out washing) (Ibid: 238-240). The latter, in 
the manner of an event, was outright didactic and formed of instructions and the policing 
of those instructions. The former, by contrast, was a discreet architectural happening by 
way of hinting, prodding, and nudging people by architectonic means to behave in certain 
ways (that were afforded by the architectural articulation of shapes, surfaces, volumes, and 
openings, etc.). The architect, E. Maxwell Fry, designed east-facing bedrooms for each flat 
and zoned the functional elements (the kitchen, bathroom, and balcony) together in a 
“working unit”, along with spaces outside the flats where people would be routed together 
and (perhaps) socialise (Ibid: 233-235). The kitchens in the flats are particularly interesting 
for Llewellyn (to the extent that he wrote a separate paper about them, see Llewellyn 
2004b): their “existenzminimum” design was purposefully compact, reducing journeying 
between appliances and maximising the efficiency of food preparation (Llewellyn, 2004(a): 
234-235 and Llewellyn, 2004(b): 46-48). What Llewellyn discusses in this case is 
architecture as the planned exposure to or availability of effective things (like sunlight, 
social contact, and efficient movement) and the planned deflection of unwanted outcomes 
(like isolation, understood as a possible outcome of living in flats and corrected by routing 
residents through circulation spaces where they would more likely to interact). 
 
The happening of Kensal House, however, is not just an architectural incursion. The 
second member of the design team, Elizabeth Denby (a “housing consultant”) added 
herself to the building‟s event as a manager, intervening in the everyday lives of Kensal 
House and coaxing behaviour from the residents like an amplifier for Fry‟s architectonic 
34 
 
nudges (Llewellyn, 2004(a): 235-236)24. The handbooks, colour schemes, and so forth 
disciplined the ongoing experience of the building, and she also delivered her influence by 
way of social institutions within the complex like the Feather‟s Club (the social club at 
Kensal House) and the nursery, with its doses of sunlight, cod liver oil and milk: “Denby 
had great eugenic and moral faith in the process of putting the children of the slum-ridden 
North Kensington district through this nursery” (Ibid: 236). 
 
The theoretical aspect of Llewellyn‟s approach is provided by Lefebvre‟s “representations 
of space” (i.e. space that has been designed) and “representational space” (i.e. that 
produced in the hearth-like environment of everyday life) (Llewellyn, 2004(a): 230 after 
Lefebvre 1991, 1996). Between these two spaces Llewellyn sees an opportunity to breach 
the dichotomy of production and consumption and investigate how inhabitants can take 
possession of the ongoing production of their homes from the way they understand and 
materially treat the space (Llewellyn, 2004(a): 229). Fry and Denby sought to use both the 
architecture and event of Kensal House to create feelings and behaviours that were 
appropriate, which Llewellyn counters with accounts of how residents have resisted this 
imposed cache of appropriate materalities by producing their own ways of living there, 
based on their own understandings of what was “appropriate” (Ibid: 241). This is especially 
true of the kitchen: 
 
“Class-based identities became the defining factor in using this room. People 
were aware of the “appropriate” way to use the space, but felt that their whole 
identity as working class did not fit with the way these rooms had been 
designed, and they had to find the “right way of doing things”, completely 
contrary to the intentions of the architects”. (Llewellyn, 2004(a): 241) 
 
This meant contriving ways to both cook and eat in the kitchen, even if the design was 
supposed to deflect that possibility and nudge residents towards the dining/living area 
(which most residents habitually kept “for best”). Interestingly, whilst the kitchens were 
seen by some residents as impinging on their preferences, the approved colour schemes, 
despite being more overtly didactic, were often favoured and accepted. The “gravy” brown 
and beige shades of most working class homes seemed to be dismal reminders, provided by 
                                                   
24 Although Denby was also involved in the “nudging” as she had been principally responsible for the layout of the 
existenzminimum kitchens (Llewellyn 2004a p.234-235) 
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the landlords, of their tenants inferior status, whereas the pastel shades of the approved 
colour scheme made residents feel more worthy and appreciated with the suggestion that 
their class didn‟t have to evoke the dour (Llewellyn, 2004(a): 243). 
  
Llewellyn‟s account is possibly the most complete in my review in terms of how a building 
happens, combining architecture, building events, and inhabitation to tell the story of 
Kensal House in a way that shows how its architecture sometimes finds a way to work, and 
on other occasions does not. This is the start of the transition, in terms of my unfurling 
question, between “happen” and “within”. Imrie (2004) Crang (2000) and Gruffudd (1995, 
2001) all detail various ways in which architectural happening occurs forwards, towards and 
ultimately “within” the lived and experienced building. The difference is that Bryden (2004) 
and Llewellyn (2004) actually follow such happenings as they are routed within to account 
for the ways they might work or fail. All six of these readings work to some extent to cross 
the divide between “happen” and “within”, but none of them collapse the distinction as 
profoundly as Kraftl and Adey (2008). For them, the happening of the building is specific 
and directional: the building is understood as happening to people, although not in terms 
of direct correspondence (Ibid: 213-214). Instead, the building changes the possibilities that 
inhabitants may experience by laying those possibilities (or “virtualising” them) in the path 
of their encounters with it. As something happening, architecture is again understood as a 
temporal act extending forward from the point of its design and making provisions in its 
future for certain affects to arise:  
 
“Architectural design operates via discourse and practice, materiality and 
immateriality, ephemerality, and stasis to channel, preclude, and evoke 
particular affects. In phenomenological terms, this observation renders a 
building with affective and even limited agential power” (Ibid: 226-227) 
 
The happening of architecture and its ability to do something intended of it is one of 
generating provisions for possibilities and likelihoods: the experience of an inhabitant 
cannot be crafted directly by architectural means, it must be virtualised as affects that might 
happen. But it‟s important to note that this process of virtualising possibilities is also 
available to the inhabitant. The inhabitant does not “experience” in some basic receptive 
way, but in a creative way, and the happening of the building (in accordance with the logic 
of affect) is as contingent on bodily inhabitation as it is a product of design. Capacity is not 
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the achievement of architects alone (Ibid: 216-224). 
 
Unfurling “within”: 
 
Shared or negotiated capacity may not seem like a particularly original point, given that it is 
made by both Llewellyn (2004) and Bryden (2004), but the difference becomes evident in 
Kraftl and Adey‟s second case study, the prayer room at Liverpool John Lennon Airport 
(Kraftl and Adey, 2008: 221-224). In this case, the architectural is something practiced by 
the Chaplain with strategies that instate or configure affective capacities into that space. 
The affects that she hopes for are those of peace and tranquility “by slowing down the 
environment in contrast to the outside hustle and bustle of the terminal” (Ibid: 224). How 
this actually happens is through the creation of a material anti-terminal, clearly demarcated 
from the terminal itself, softly lit and softly furnished with cues that suggest calmness and 
persistence, such as the inclusion of books: “Although the books had an obvious textual 
meaning to them, it was the practice of reading that the chaplain wanted the room to afford” 
(Ibid: 223). The affects of tranquility and peace were hoped for as a relational outcome of 
engaging with these various arranged materialities, both in themselves as inviting those 
affects, and by comparison with the turbulent terminal outside. “The affective atmosphere 
was changed through the room‟s relationship (comparison) with the outside, the creation 
and maintenance of boundaries, and, most important, the micromanagement of the 
materials that made the room” (Ibid: 224).  
 
The difference, as shown in this example, is that Kraftl and Adey‟s architecture is pan-
architectural: it is not merely multi-site and multi-origin. It is a property, and its availability 
as a property allows it to be drawn upon by inhabitants and users of buildings as well as 
architects and those involved in what we might traditionally understand as design: 
architecture in this sense is ostensibly the equal property of “within” (understood as 
inhabitation) as it is “happen” (understood as architects and architectural practice) and it 
can be practiced by the Chaplain at Liverpool John Lennon Airport and a qualified architect 
like Christopher Day at Nant-y-Cwm with equal efficacy: 
 
“The design and manipulation of affects requires a tremendous amount of 
work that occurs beyond formal design processes, but as part of what we might 
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term everyday experience once a building has been completed.” (Kraftl and 
Adey, 2008: 219-220).  
 
What Kraftl and Adey have achieved here is not merely resistance from within inhabitation. 
It is the mass architecturalisation of inhabitation, which swiftly collapses the distinction 
between “happen” and “within”. In their haptic and performative use of a building, 
inhabitants can lay out certain constellations of affects for themselves. The teachers at 
Nant-y-Cwm believe they can virtualise a specified and limited number of “affective 
potentials” (especially on a theme of “homeliness”) by micro-managing what materials are 
available and how they are arranged: these constructions are intended to constrain the huge 
potential field of affects by constraining the human and non-human encounter that would 
actualise them (Ibid: 220). In this case, it allowed for a non-didactic style of teaching in 
which the material environment, set up to “gesture” towards homely encounters, was 
designed to deliver a cache of affects in a gestured relation to particular and proper bodily 
postures:  
 
“As we saw in our case studies, the organisation and choreography of materials 
and bodies creates a stubbornness or persistence of affect, to invoke 
simultaneously repetitive (a school curriculum, or one reader after another in 
the Prayer Room) and iterative senses of space, and dwelling, simultaneously to 
create senses of stability and safety [sic]. Affect is not merely a random swirling 
of potential coming to rest at one moment.” (Kraftl and Adey, 2008: 227) 
 
This is the sort of account that defines what “within” means: it refers to the territory of 
inhabitation and asks questions about how powerful it might be and what it might mean 
for buildings. If architecture is to happen within someone‟s experience, does that mean that 
a person will create a space within their experience and draw architecture into it, or does it 
mean that architecture has a certain weight of momentum with which it forces its way into 
our experiences? Or does it perhaps mean that it happens because it‟s available as a creative 
use of space to just about anybody (Kraftl and Adey, 2008)? In terms of “membership” I 
want to see what the architect‟s prefigured undertakings mean for an inhabitant-user‟s 
experience and the nature of their membership and, conversely, what using or inhabiting a 
building does to the performances a building was designed to undertake and what 
impositions it makes on the architects‟ membership. My research agenda, insofar as I‟ve 
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discussed it, suggests that architecture – specifically an architect‟s approach to building 
design – can be thought of as having momentum of a sabot25 in that it projects, along with 
its form, cues for the manner of its experience. Unfurling “within” marks the start of a 
balancing act for me in which the inhabitant (or user) of a building becomes more 
prominent. In a way, this is a preamble to the unfurling of “experiences”, if you understand 
this term as encompassing both the encounters that happen to us (or are engineered for us) 
and the encounters we engineer for ourselves. This sort of question, of a person‟s ability to 
receive, resist, or create and their agency therein, and of the building‟s ability to project 
itself forcefully or inadequately, or indeed the possibility that the two actually merge into a 
single property, characterises my understanding of “within”. Such questions will be 
revisited regularly in the empirical chapters to follow.  
 
A number of the readings I‟ve analysed here amplify the idea of within-ness through the 
lens of inhabitation, and specifically, the idea that the inhabitation of a building can 
encompass or perhaps eclipse the architectural. In this case inhabitation is understood as a 
powerful body of acts and meanings which use architecture as a medium to flourish. How 
architecture matters and the degree to which it can do anything (i.e. its membership) is 
reliant on being drawn within this more powerful body, so it becomes a subsumed thing. 
This can be said of Lees‟ (2001) work: her processural outlook recognises architecture as 
something around which people can construct formative discourses, or engage in formative 
performances. These profound capacities for consumption seem to remain latent until 
something (like architecture, either existing or proposed) can be drawn into (within) them. 
Doing so activates the substantial productive possibilities of consumption; in fact, these 
possibilities seem so substantial that they override and quash the possibilities of 
architecture. Existing within, the building becomes bland, docile and factual: the fact of its 
there-ness or proposed there-ness allows consumptions to coalesce around it in a way that 
seems almost self-sustaining: only at a minimal level does the building matter from such a 
position, and only at a minimal trigger-like level is the inhabitant/user‟s experience 
stimulated by the architecture. 
 
Lees is not the only author who makes a consumable out of architecture. In Steven Cooke 
and Lloyd Jenkins‟ (2001) Discourses of regeneration in early twentieth-century Britain the building is 
                                                   
25 A type of projectile munition whereby a hardened “slug” is encased in a pointed metal sleeve. On impact, the sleeve 
splits an armoured surface and the momentum of the slug causes it to either carry on through the sleeve, or else it acts 
like a hammer and shunts the whole sabot forward. Commonly used in tank and anti-tank warfare. 
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understood in terms of the space that has been made for it within certain social and cultural 
discourses, and into which the building is imported in the belief that it can perform a 
certain function and address a certain problem. Like Lees, the building in question is 
subordinate in terms of the way it happens: it is essentially waiting to be drawn into the 
discourses that will put it to work. Unlike Lees the building is actively subordinate: it is 
credited with having some effect, rather than being a docile platform for inhabitation. In 
this case the building in question is the former Bethlem Royal Hospital for the mentally ill 
(which now houses the Imperial War Museum). The hospital vacated the building in 1930 
in a response to then-current (if unfounded) ideas about the restorative qualities of 
pastorally located recreation and the tarnished image of mental healthcare (which had 
become associated with images of gloomy dungeon-like buildings) (Cooke and Jenkins, 
2001: 382-384). Lord Rothmere, the building‟s owner, hoped to demolish it and create a 
park so that the people of Southwark could enjoy the same rejuvenating recreational 
opportunities (Ibid: 386). This appeal to bodily health clashed with the interests of the 
Imperial War Museum, then located in South Kensington, which was seeking new 
premises. Supporters argued that the museum was important in explaining (and possibly 
mythologising) the horrors of war to the nation in the cause of generating national (British) 
unity through education (Ibid: 385). 
 
Cooke and Jenkins tell an interesting story of the way the vacant buildings were caught 
between competing discourses of physical health, mental health, and education for 
nationalist purposes. Eventually, the wings of the building were demolished to make room 
for parkland, and the central portico and dome were retained for the museum, so that the 
site was geared to reform both body and mind (Cooke and Jenkins, 2001: 387-388). In this 
case, “within” is not understood at the individual scale, but at a broader social level, and the 
consumption of the building is strictly pre-defined rather than allowed to generate in its 
own direction. McNeill and Tewdwr-Jones (2003) don‟t mince their words in this respect: 
architectural projects are “tools” used as a means to an end by political and national 
interests who provide a cache of meanings which are delegated to or enforced into its 
form. 
 
Architecture, Banal Nationalism, and Re-territorialisation tells the story of how one particular 
building was conceived to be imported into discourses about nation and national identity in 
a supra-national EU context and used to perform a preferred version of nationhood on a 
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global stage – the “architectural mega-project” (McNeill and Tewdwr-Jones, 2003: 738-
739). Interestingly, those same discourses meant that it was never built: Cardiff Bay Opera 
House was designed by Zaha Hadid26 in 1992, but from its inception the idea of the 
building was dragged between different class-based interpretations of what Welshness 
ought to be. Hadid‟s design was criticised on its own terms, but fundamentally it was also 
understood to be competing for funding with the (also proposed) Millennium Stadium 
(Ibid: 741). This understanding opened up class arguments, and as an architectural 
frontispiece for the nation the Opera House was seen as avant-garde, elitist, and Anglo-
centric, whereas the stadium to which it was opposed connected to the world through a 
more genuine and grounded version of Welshness (Ibid: 742-743)  
 
Between Lees, Cooke and Jenkins, and McNeill and Tewdwr-Jones is a gradually escalating 
presence of the building, even if it remains stubbornly subordinate to the individuals or 
social/cultural/national discourses that apprehend and make use of it. Llewellyn‟s idea of 
“within” achieves a more balanced architectural presence that does not, as Lees does, imply 
that architecture is a no more than a materially articulated array of opportunities for users 
to apprehend. Part of this is down to his use of Lefebvre‟s (1991, 1996) dual distinction of 
representations of space and representational space (Llewellyn, 2004(a): 230) and the way 
he sets Lefebvre up to be (slightly) demolished27 in the course of his argument by 
accounting for the way that these two sites are not actually separate and unitary, but 
connected in either direction: design and inhabitation do not only have production in 
common: they are implicated and combined with one another by certain actions and 
processes (Ibid: 245). These include the continuing presence of Elizabeth Denby at Kensal 
House in a management capacity, and Maxwell Fry‟s efforts to consult the residents 
(making them feel included), which serve to draw representations of space and 
representational spaces into one another (Ibid). At Kensal House, Lefebvre‟s dualism of 
production is so collapsed, and in doing so it offers Llewellyn a way to account for how the 
design team crossed from representations of space to representational space to produce 
                                                   
26 Hadid is a much noted architect who Jonathan Glancey, writing in 2006, described as: “still the world's only major 
woman architect, by which I mean an architect who will go down in the history books” (Glancey, 2006). Glancey‟s 
interview is a useful starting point for details of Hadid‟s approach and style. Glancey later described the plans for Hadid‟s 
MAXXI – the National Museum fo the 21st Century Arts (Rome) as “like a surreal motorway intersection imagined by JG 
Ballard, or a wiring diagram plotted for the palace of esoteric giants”, and on visiting the near-completed building 
suggested that; “The walls of Hadid's new museum, unveiled to the public this month, not only curve but change in depth 
as they do so. There are moments where walls become floors and even threaten to become ceilings, diving and curving 
like bobsleigh tracks. (When I went there last week, Hadid told me she wanted the building's concrete curves to “unwind 
like a ribbon in space”.)” (Glancey, 2009). 
27 “Slightly” because Llewellyn still relies upon Lefebvre‟s breach of the dichotomy between production and 
consumption. 
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certain outcomes within a resident‟s experience, and how residents produced their own 
architectural happenings to counter those design efforts they found wanting, whilst 
reproducing those that worked for them (Ibid: 245-246). Neither design nor inhabitation 
were securely contained in representations of space or representational space respectively. 
Compared with Lees‟ all-powerful within, Llewellyn understands that the architect and the 
design actually matter and can do something, both in architectonic terms of shapes, 
surfaces, and volumes, and in terms of building events (namely Elizabeth Denby‟s personal 
incursions, which is perhaps the key site where Lefebvre‟s dualism is demolished). 
Inhabitants can also dip into these same possibilities.  
 
Such possibilities also feature in Bryden‟s account, which includes both the way a haveli is 
supposed to happen, and how it actually happens in terms of its inhabitation. She differs 
with Llewellyn in that the possibilities of successful architectural incursions (or creative 
consumptions) are afforded by either by shared knowledges or accidents of charm. By 
design, the haveli is a fundamentally gendered building with spaces that segregate men and 
women and spaces that manage their interactions. This strict spatiality is apprehended 
within the sphere of inhabitation and actually achieves this effect. Most of the female 
residents like the way it affords them privacy without enclosure (latticed windows allow 
them to see whilst they remain unseen) (Bryden, 2004: 34). As for the haveli’s cosmological 
connections, Bryden points out that “All the inhabitants of the haveli has some knowledge 
of Vastu and its relation to the organisation of domestic space. This knowledge has been 
gleaned from books, pamphlets […], television pundits, articles in the press, and „current 
debate‟” (Ibid: 35). In short, the spiritual logic of the vastu on which the haveli is based has 
been reiterated, and this reiteration has maintained a plausible environment for the haveli to 
carry on working as a set of architectonically mediated spiritual instructions. The 
continuation of the occupant‟s Hindu beliefs generally, and of the vastu specifically, allow 
for the continued plausibility of the haveli (Ibid: 36). It is worth noting, however, that this 
plausibility is something that is essentially gifted to the haveli by the occupants and their 
cultural context. Technically, it is entirely within their power to anull that plausibility by will 
of choice, and in this sense Bryden, like Lees (2001), allows for the possibility that the 
happening of architecture can be controlled entirely from within its inhabitation. As it 
stands, the plausibility is still intact, but the occupants have changed its extent. The wife of 
the owner has moved her bedroom from a female to a male area, and western style 
bathrooms have been retrofitted (Bryden, 2004: 37). Nonetheless, “Although some 
42 
 
scepticism is displayed, on the whole vastu is viewed by the families as important for the 
health of both the domestic space and the body, and for bringing peace and prosperity to 
the household” (Ibid: 36). 
 
The accounts of Llewellyn and Bryden return me to the challenging pan-architecture of 
Kraftl and Adey (2008) because both Llewellyn and Bryden allow for a similar possibility in 
their work. When Llewellyn collapses Lefebvre‟s dualism he allows everyday inhabitation 
access to the processes of design, and the ability of the haveli to reiterate the vastu could be 
interpreted as a voluntary affordance of the residents. In both cases, equalising the power 
between architecture and inhabitation might deliver full control over architectural 
plausibility to the inhabitants (if they wanted it). Kraftl and Adey‟s (2008) approach to 
“within” and the way they collapse the distinction between “within” and “happen” also 
implies this possibility (given that their abilities match that of the architect), along with an 
interesting and possibly unintended side effect. On one hand they understand architecture 
as a condensing and contracting sort of happening that creates a limited affectual outcome 
from a mass of virtual potential (Ibid: 215). But they also understand architecture as a 
widely available property which can be applied to a material environment by anyone, 
suggesting the unlimited availability of the possibility to restrain affect. In this way, 
although they foreclose the multiplying encounter, they open another potential for 
multiplication as architecture‟s mass availability. On the face of it, this mirrors Lees‟ 
multiplication (of possibility) at the point of inhabitation, but wielded in different 
theoretical terms and with a much heavier emphasis on materiality and material encounters.  
 
The use of books in the prayer room as part of affectual micromanagement caught my 
attention (Kraftl and Adey, 2003: 223). Their connotations of a leisurely and quiet passage 
of time are part of an extended materiality which goes beyond the volumetric, tactile and 
spatial and connects to an assumed body of meanings that books have prior to the 
encounter and which work to limit the affective potentials that might emerge with an 
encountering body. It‟s important to note that in both of Kraftl and Adey‟s case studies the 
materiality they discuss happens as a combination of material facts and material stories. 
This suggests to me that the material form with which architecture happens is designed (or 
in Kraftl and Adey‟s terms, “design(ated)”) from an understanding that the encounter 
between architectural materiality and inhabitants‟ bodies is foretold before it actually 
happens. The design of forms and volumes (like Nant-y-Cwm‟s cubby holes) and the 
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arrangement of materialities (like the Prayer Room‟s books) draws upon how those things 
have been commonly, normally, habitually, or properly apprehended by people before, and 
uses that as a basis for how those things will be apprehended again. It is, in fact, a reversed 
virtuality of precedent, rather than possibility. This is my understanding of what Kraftl and 
Adey refer to as “gesturing” and its how I understand their architectural concept, in 
material terms, as extending it‟s happening to the territory which I would characterise as 
“within”. Reversed virtuality bestows architecture with a degree of currency with which to 
“buy” some influence over the way people behave in architectural settings, and it allows a 
degree of control over both sides of the encounter. The gesturing material form is at risk of 
becoming a shadowy corner of another black box. 
 
It‟s worth noting that a number of readings here do not really have a concept that 
correlates with my idea of “within”. Unlike Lees (2001), Llewellyn (2004), Bryden (2004), 
and Kraftl and Adey (2008) they do not ask how people weave architecture into their lives, 
or how it occurs to them, either because it is outside their remit, or because they assume 
that architecture happens to people much as it was supposed to happen. Both Imrie (2003) 
and Crang (2000), for instance, understand “within” in terms of “happen”: their accounts 
discuss how architects reason, imagine, or assume that people and spaces operate in the 
hope that their buildings can be made to correlate: the prefiguring of within (such as what 
the body or the folding of space might mean for a building) is part of the way architecture 
happens and is a way of temporally extending “happen” to “within”, but their remit does 
not extend to investigating the actual inhabitation that follows their (hopefully) correlating 
intervention within. In a similar vein, those articles that rely on an idea of connectedness or 
networks do not attend to people directly: whilst Jenkins (2002) and Jacobs (2006) both 
include people, their potential productivity as inhabitants of architecture is effaced 
(although for Jacobs they are differently productive as instigators of building events, which 
I discuss in the next section). 
  
At the start of the previous section I described my basic question as “initially” bipartite: 
“How does architecture happen” and “within people‟s experiences”. From my unfurling of 
the left half of the question I have arrived at a far more specific question that I want this 
thesis to address. I want to understand the way an architect occupies the conical space at 
the start of a building‟s life (granted to them by an enhanced membership) in terms of 
designing not only a performing building in principle, but a performance with momentum, 
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designed to carry on performing in the building‟s future and so stretching the architect‟s 
membership from the understanding that in future realities there exists a capacity to be 
performed to or upon. This may owe less to understanding (i.e. reasoning or qualification) 
than it does to assumption. The core of my research has been to understand these 
processes of temporal projection, and the architectural geography literature has taken a 
passing glance at this idea by way of Bryden (2004), Crang (2000), Gruffudd (1995, 2001), 
Imrie (2003), and Llewellyn (2004a). For a number of reasons I think that architectural 
temporality deserves more than a passing glance or implicit treatment. The three architects 
I‟ve studied didn‟t just have ideas: they have strategies for making these ideas persist and 
reiterate themselves, not just by way of a design vocabulary, but by crafting incursions into 
environments that they‟ve tried to understand the morphology of in advance in such terms 
as (for instance) new spatial realities (Crang, 2000), bodily possibilities (Imrie, 2003), 
spirituality (Bryden, 2004 and Gruffudd, 1995), availabilities (Gruffudd, 2001) or unfurling 
modernisms (Llewellyn, 2004(a), also Gruffudd, 1995; 2001).  
 
The forward temporal projection of architecture implies the future experience of the 
people who live or work there, and this is the second primary site of my research. By 
specifying as much, I do not wish to provide a simple argument as to whether the 
architecture “works”. By attending to inhabitants and their experiences of a building I am 
specifically interested in how they have constructed their membership and what, if 
anything, they credit the architecture with. In short, this is an exercise in bi-directional 
plausibility, the extent to which inhabitants think it is plausible to be affected by 
architecture, and their ability to close off plausibilities.  
  
Unfurling “people” and introducing “experiences”: 
 
As a textual device “unfurling” is starting to lose its elegance. Once unfurled, it becomes 
apparent that each individual word in my furled question merges into the next, and now 
that I‟m at the end of the unfurling, I find that the people and how they matter has already 
been implied. So I suppose that my unfurling metaphor is another form of propellant: it‟s 
useful while it lasts, but furled within it are a series of problems that necessitate its end. The 
main problem I face now is that if the question were allowed to unfurl to its full span there 
would be too much to cover: being so tightly furled in the first instance occludes the all 
important limitations. I‟ve already specified some of these, but I have yet to specify a very 
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obvious one: asking how architecture happens within people‟s experiences is not the start 
of an impossible task of mapping out the full experience of a person – essentially, their life 
– and then working out what sort of place or role architecture might occupy there. But at 
the same time my work is about what architecture does, or can do, within the wider 
contexts of their lives. The solution to this problem of scale is methodological, discussed in 
more detail in chapter two for which I have saved the term “experiences”. But briefly 
summarised, my approach has been to start with the architecture in their wider experiences. 
Hence my wording of the furled question, of architecture happening within people‟s 
experiences (as opposed to people‟s experience of architecture). 
 
An important point to make about people in terms of my research is that we live in a legacy 
landscape, and I want to address the fact that only limited portions of our surroundings are 
either new or recent. In the case of buildings, most of our surroundings are older than we 
are, a point I made at the start of the chapter. This observation is important because the 
buildings I have researched were all completed between 1889 and 1939, and doubly 
important because I am interviewing current residents and users, rather than the original 
clients. From the outset I did not want to look at recent architecture that was inhabited by 
the people who commissioned it because I don‟t believe it‟s pertinent to the current 
condition of occupying a building in the UK today. Almost everybody inhabits architecture 
without being the client of an architect, and it‟s the reality of this gap I want to 
apprehend28. This has substantial ramifications for my research agenda because the original 
client would have straddled “happen” and “within” in a very different, possibly more 
fundamental way. In terms of my basic question, it would certainly undermine all possibility 
of it being bipartite, initially or otherwise. It might also undermine part of Kraftl and 
Adey‟s pan-architectural conception. In both of their case studies, blurred accounts of 
architects, clients, and inhabitants are deployed to fulfil their argument. In fact, in the case 
of Nant-y-Cwm (Kraftl and Adey, 2008: 216-221), the parents were actually volunteer 
labourers during the construction of the kindergarten. It causes me to wonder how much 
pan-architecture owes to these proximities: if the conical space at the start of the building 
includes the architect, client, and inhabitant (possibly as one person in the case of the 
airport prayer room (Ibid: 221-224)) then the continuing story of the building would 
probably be pan-architectural, but I‟m not sure that pan-architecture would survive the 
common discontinuity that I‟ve identified. My approach, then, in terms of inhabitants, is 
                                                   
22 See footnote 1. 
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that the productive inhabitation of architecture is something different from the productive 
inhabitation of the architect‟s conical space, and that difference is the result of the gap. 
 
It is for this same reason that I am interested in the prefiguring and projecting acts or 
architectural temporality. If the building was always inhabited in the productively diffuse 
way that Kraftl and Adey outline (and in an unbroken continuum between designer and 
inhabitant) then I can see the possibility of inhabitants being able to wield profound 
architectural possibilities, but the reality of the situation is different and most often marked 
by change and disjunction – a gap. The existence of that gap justifies a study of 
architectural temporality as a key facet of contemporary architectural reality. This is not a 
study that is limited to architectonics and architect‟s codified beliefs and understandings. 
Crossing the gap may also invoke temporal building events (Jacobs 2006 p.11), non-
architectural others that serve to connect the present with the past and support that 
projection (such as publications, archival data, and other sources of information). 
 
I would also suggest that recent architectural geography may have treated its anti-
archtecture a little too zealously when it comes to people. In recoiling from work like Goss 
(1988) and Knox (1987) and their understandings of symbolical and lexical architectures 
with cerebral appeal, we may have fashioned an individual who injects no thought into 
his/her architectural experience. With the exception of Bryden (2004) architectural 
geography addresses the experiencing inhabitant as a primarily sensual, pragmatic, and non-
contemplative feeling unit. The books in Liverpool John Lennon Airport‟s prayer room 
also reveal this nicely and suggest how Kraftl and Adey (2008) understand how architecture 
happens to the inhabitant: it can deploy affects that can induce, at best, a contemplative 
state (as the prayer room is understood to and as the books connote), but it cannot induce 
specific contemplations. The way buildings “make a difference to their inhabitants” (Ibid: 
213) is by way of non-contemplative sensation-like feelings because architecture works in a 
bodily, rather than a cerebral way. This is something Kraftl and Adey take from more 
general conceptions of affect and the material turn (Ibid: 214). But it is not something that 
I feel obliged to base my work around, especially bearing in mind the insights of Bryden 
(2004). My research at both the architectural and inhabitation sites has been to allow for 
the possibility that one or both may have a style of engagement that is at least partially 
based in consideration. 
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The most powerful people in this account have been those discoursing around or 
performing in the ersatz colosseum (Lees, 2001). Lees‟ interpretation of the ersatz colosseum is 
highly and selectively peopled, and it is the manner of the peopling, rather than the 
principle, that is particularly troublesome for me. Her ethnographies of use suggest that people 
in the act of consumption are powerful enough to override architecture and its cues for 
practice or experience. People are effectively non-susceptible to architecture: they can see 
right through it, and I mean this in an almost literal way. If Jenkins conceived of existing 
accounts of architecture in geography as a “black box” (Jenkins, 2002: 225) then Lees‟ 
architecture has transparent properties. If it could be thought of as a box, then whatever 
occupies it shows through clearly and unaffected as though that box were Tupperware, 
displaying human capabilities and preserving their maximum possibilities rather than 
arbitrating them. But this isn‟t entirely fair, because the last thing Lees understands by the 
term architecture (and in the way it happens within) is as a box. If the relative transparency 
of the building (and architect) is a flaw in her work, then her considerable strength has 
been to un-box the building from its architectonic limits and understand it as something 
always happening during which capacities, or opportunities, open up and allow productive 
forms of inhabitation to take place. In doing so, she re-situates both the building and 
architectural practices into a porous story: a trajectory of events and openings that starts 
well before the building‟s inception and continues well beyond its completion. Lees‟ most 
substantial and important contribution to architectural geography has been this expansion 
of scope in terms of a building‟s multi-site and multi-origin occurrence, and many of the 
post-2001 architectural geographies reviewed here have availed themselves of that 
principle, especially in attending to the productive possibilities of inhabitation (as with 
Bryden, 2004; Llewellyn 2004a and Kraftl and Adey 2008). 
  
Conversely, a number of architectural geographies understand the individual person as 
mediated and connected. Such is true of Jenkins (2002). People are not absent in his 
architectural conception, but they are not treated with particularity. Instead they are 
necessarily allied with things that, together, are able to produce formations like buildings. 
In the networks he envisages, people are not treated independently of anything else, human 
or non-human, and the “negotiations” (Ibid: 230) that allow formations like buildings to 
arise gives equal promise to human motivation and non-human action, as in the case of 
no.11‟s sewerage connection which requires both in order to happen. Sewage is, after all, a 
human product, and the idea of sewerage is our human and non-human idea/assemblage 
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for dealing with it, but for that idea to be realised requires a critical mass of conditions, 
materials, processes, and knowledges to come together. This is not simply a matter of 
stating that humans and non-humans are equal: the important point in terms of 
architecture is how relationality undermines the possibility of non-humans and humans 
being separate. 
 
Ostensibly, Jacobs lauds the approaches that Jenkins uses to understand buildings, and this 
includes the equalisation of human users and non-human materialities in terms of capacity 
and influence. But her first case study suggests to me that some people are more equal than 
non-human others. Singapore‟s Housing Development Board (HDB) enthusiastically 
deployed highrise residential blocks as part of what Jacobs interprets as a “rage for 
modernity” (Jacobs, 2006: 14-15), but the increased incidence of suicides from the upper 
storeys (the “highrise leap”) started to undermine its position as a key form of 
modernisation and modern living. This undermining was inflamed by a study of 
behavioural psychology which determined that the new residential environments were the 
cause. The HDB sought to connect something to the highrise to reinforce its validity, and 
the answer came by way of another study which understood that the highrise leap was not 
born out of any misery caused by the highrise: rather, it facilitated it by accident of its 
height (Ibid: 14-17). This new connection to the Singaporean highrise and the good work 
that it did became a popular fallback for the HDB: 
 
“Indeed, the history of highrise housing provision in Singapore is heavily 
populated with social scientific accounts of highrise quality of life, and for 
many years the HDB sponsored much of this scholarship itself in the name of 
“improvement” and ”innovation”. As such, this scholarship, even when 
critical, often came to be incorporated in the systems that not only sustained 
but ultimately enlarged highrise housing, such that today Singapore leads the 
way internationally in what is now called „supertall living‟”. (Jacobs, 2006: .17) 
 
What interests me here is the way that these connections allow people to deploy, as part of 
a larger building event, intentional and performative discourses that affect a stabilisation of 
the event into a formation which has been pre-designed, and which that performative 
discourse was intended to achieve. Although the content of the HBD is both human and 
non-human, the intention behind and composition of that connection (i.e. the “work”) is 
49 
 
specifically human. I have already mentioned that Jacobs‟ work is more attuned to the 
possibilities of composing relational formations than Jenkins, but in both his example of 
no.11‟s sewerage connection and Jacobs‟ second example of Ronan Point, I get the sense 
that non-human or non-architectural others are not equal in their relation, but subordinate. 
A building may work as a human and non-human assemblage of connections, but the 
creativity of people seems to provide the gravity that draws and holds the non-human 
together and specifies the manner of its human interface. 
 
This creative gravity is te principal focus of my research. In the following chapter, I outline 
a methodology which expands on these themes. 
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2. 
Methodology: 
Unfurling “experiences”. 
 
 
In the previous chapter I unfurled the architectural geography literatures, and some related 
literatures, around the question how does architecture happen within peoples’ experiences? That 
unpacking expanded both my research question and discussed the disciplinary terrain in 
which I will address that question. The purpose of this chapter is to explain how I have 
sought to reconcile my position within the current disciplinary landscape with the “other” 
terrains I attend to in chapters three, four and five. These “other”29 terrains are, in the first 
instance, the hopes that the original architects had for the agency that their buildings could 
effect, and their understandings of what was needed to secure that agency was present in 
the inhabitation of the building thereafter. The second “other” terrain refers to the 
experiences that current inhabitants have of those buildings and what they are (or, indeed, 
are not) plausibly articulating in terms of their inhabitations. In attending to these  I aim to 
shed light on how the buildings studied are understood as able to contain and reiterate the 
architect‟s hopes, or (less specifically) how they are perceived as places laden with intention.  
Further, the thesis explores how those hopeful intentions impose upon or, alternatively 
(and less deterministically) appeal to the indulgence of the current experience of 
inhabitants. To formulate architectures that would alter people‟s behaviours, the three 
architects I study here rationalised, and believed in particular formulations of, what 
inhabitants would be like in terms of what could appeal to them, or what they were 
susceptible to. The reconciliation I intend to achieve with this chapter is to denote what my 
particular attending of these terrains (the architects‟ intentions and the inhabitants‟ 
experiences) means in terms of the insights I can reasonably gain from my position, as 
framed in the literatures I discussed in the preceding chapter. Put another way, when 
gripped (metaphorically speaking) what insights can be squeezed from these terrains, and 
how will those insights be affected by the way in which I grip? From the outset, the terms 
“attendance” and “grip” denote my understanding that my work as a researcher is 
implicated in the field, and I am not external to or separate from the things and people I 
research (and this reflects the largely taken-for-granted understanding in and beyond 
cultural geography that research implicates researchers into their fields and their findings). 
                                                   
29 I return to the term “other” shortly in my discussion of Douglas Ezzy‟s performed interview presences (Ezzy, 2010). 
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My research, and the methodology it utilises, attended the terrains I‟m interested in and, 
because I was “there” in various different ways, those terrains were modified by my 
presence and interested attendance. That modifying precedes, but was equally pre-empted 
by the way I‟ve encapsulated those terrains in my particular understandings and analyses 
(reflecting particular interests and aims) in order to write this thesis. The end result is a 
presented version that I‟ve altered through my particular attending of it, before distilling it 
into particular salient themes, and encapsulating it in a new context of my understandings 
and analyses. As such, there are at least three stages of alteration and removal from 
whatever the “original” was before my encounter with it (although the originality of these 
terrains prior to my attendances, perhaps especially the archive collections I‟ve used, merit 
further discussion which I will proceed to in the following sections). 
 
In essence, and in the spirit of the preceding chapter, I am unfurling experiences from the 
question how does architecture happen within people’s experiences? I seek to examine through this 
exploration not only what those experiences – designed or inhabited – are like, but what 
they will be like once they‟ve been through the acts of being researched. For this particular 
unfurling it may be useful to think of experiences through a three-strand heuristic. The first 
and third strands are, respectively, the building as a project (i.e. the architect‟s hopes and 
the devices to articulate how the building should be experienced) and the building as an 
environment (i.e. the currently inhabited building and the nature of its experience among 
users). Between the first and third strand is a second strand, the building as a presence. 
This second strand emerges from my research into the first and third strand, that is to say, 
the way the building is constituted between how it is currently experienced and how was 
intended to be experienced.  To both the first and the third strands of this heuristic, 
methodologies are attached which suggest the degree to which I can attend these realities 
and what my engineered presence (“squeezing”) in or adjacent to them means for the 
resulting insights. Much of the rest of this chapter is dedicated to the discussion of these 
two strands. I look to the methodologies of the first and third strands in this heuristic to 
generate (not transcribe) insights that tell us something about what is actually there, present 
and happening at the building – the second strand – from these two productive sites. 
Because of this, the first and third strands of my methodological heuristic share the work 
of the second which has, as such, no methodology for its direct discussion, but is instead 
illuminated from either side and understood as an outcome of considered, unconsidered, 
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but ultimately creative acts of plausibility, though I do not aim to treat “creative” 
synonymously with “imagined”. 
 
There are two principal sources (or, following my terminology in the preceding paragraph, 
“sites”) that are attached to the first and third strands in my methodological heuristic. The 
first of these is archival. In order to generate insights about how my three architects hoped 
to design buildings for the production of particular experiences, I have undertaken 
substantial archival research from their personal papers and publications in which they 
wrote about and developed understandings of these efforts and reasoned on (or believed 
in) their plausibility. The second source/site, attached to the third strand, is that of in-
depth interviews with some of the people who currently work in, inhabit, or otherwise use 
buildings designed by my three architects. My interviews with them are intended to 
produce their accounts of the building‟s plausibility and to understand how the original 
design intentions are noticed and interrogated, or else taken for granted and ignored (and 
points between), or as the case may be, created anew by a thinking and analytical kind of 
inhabitation that builds new causes for the forms among which inhabitants dwell. The 
second strand, the presence of the building is, as I discuss above, an outcome from 
between which, in attending to the first and third strands, emerges in this study as a 
disjuncture insofar that there is a temporal gap between the designed production of the 
building and its current inhabitation (discussed in the previous chapter in terms of its 
absence from the architectural geography literatures, in which the architectural design of 
the building is in some way contemporaneous with its inhabitation, excepting Bryden 
(2004) and, to a lesser extent, Kraftl (2009)). It also emerges across this disjuncture as a 
complex combination of plausibilities, some of which, as I argue below and outline in the 
following three chapters, may work to close this disjuncture, though it is not inevitable. 
The investigations I outline below dwell on what I understand to be the two principal 
sources that feed this context. Although there are many other aspects that feed into that 
complexity (such as planning, heritage, the wider architectural profession, an inhabitant‟s 
“status” in economic and cultural terms, and so forth), I believe these can be hinted at by 
attending closely to my first and third methodological strands, rather than treated explicitly. 
 
Broad methodological arguments: 
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Before discussing these two strands, the building as a project and the building as an 
environment, a number of general comments are worth making on the empirical and 
methodological scope of this thesis as a whole, the most obvious of which is size. This is a 
large project in terms of empirical scope when compared to other works of architectural 
geography which, as I noted in the preceding chapter, tend to investigate one or two 
buildings (or sites) at a time, or one or two architects. My research, in contrast, investigates 
seventeen different buildings by three architects producing a total of nineteen in-depth 
interviews, most of which comfortably exceeded an hour in length. A number of 
architectural geographers have undertaken more interviews, but only relative to one or a 
small number of buildings (for example, Kraftl, 2006; 2009). My purpose in expanding this 
empirical scope stems from my understanding that architecture can mean and do various 
things, a possibility which is ruled out by studies of a comparatively narrow scope which 
may, inadvertently, produce accounts of commonality, or else accounts of similarities and 
differences between two alternatives, but not accounts of variety. My intention is to outline 
and, to a degree, fill out, and definitely not rule out, the variety of ways architecture can be 
considered, rather than looking at how variously a single project is understood (as in Lees, 
2001; Jenkins, 2002; Llewellyn, 2004(a); Adey, 2006; 2007, Kraftl, 2006; 2009), or how two 
single projects can be understood compared against each other (as in Crang, 2000; 
Gruffudd 2001; Jacobs, 2006). I do not wish to claim that this is a nomothetic study: the 
methodologies I outline in the following sections are very definitely idiographic. What I do 
claim is that it is possible to look closely at variety and possible to admit to variety without 
making general categorical statements. Moreover, looking closely does not mean looking 
narrowly, and it has been my aim in this thesis to sketch out the variety of how 
inhabitations are designed into and lived out from buildings: certainly not the full variety, 
but enough to demonstrate a wider variety and bring into architectural geography an idea 
of what alternatives are available within the terms I introduced in the previous chapter. 
 
Each strand of the methodological heuristic I describe above has its own particular 
methods with which to produce insights, however, before exploring these I want to situate 
them within the qualitative ferment of contemporary research in human geography and the 
currently understood (or debated) possibilities for geographical work in the field. I 
undertake this overview using Crang‟s qualitative method progress reports (Crang 2002, 2003, 
2005) and Davies and Dwyer‟s later progress reports (Davies and Dwyer 2007, 2009, 2010). 
Across these six articles, I suggest that five salient themes emerge: the reflexivity of rigour, the 
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depth of insight, the problem of words, the problem of knowing, and the scale of subjects. These five 
themes, taken together, form an overview of what is understood to be possible and 
reasonable of empirical research in human geography, reviewing how closely and accurately 
geographers can develop knowledge of the experiences and processes that interest us and 
what might happen to those experiences and processes because of our 
attentions/attending. 
 
The first two of these five themes can be treated together because the depth of insight, that is 
to say, how close or proximate we can get to the reality of that which we research, is 
couched in a concern about the degree to which we are implicated in the research we 
undertake, including the uncomfortable possibility that we may fundamentally induce our 
findings, concerns addressed under the reflexivity of rigour. Davies and Dwyer are generally 
more hopeful for substantial depths of insight by reflexively closing on, for example, 
nature: a closeness which is lacking in “traditional deconstructive positions” that focus on 
how nature is imagined and imaged for given ideological ends (Davies and Dwyer, 2007: 
259-260). The accounts they summarise share a common foundation in which the 
researcher positions themselves to be constituted by nature rather than scanning it for 
representational potentials in social and cultural milieu, a deliberate kind of vulnerability or 
porosity that shifts the power dynamic of “traditional” nature studies by admitting to, and 
indeed, admitting those agencies that are more than the researcher‟s interpretation insofar 
that our individuality as researchers is de-fortified, allowing what defines us to be delegated 
to the influence of the field we are researching (Ibid: 260-261). A key example of this is 
Wylie‟s work on the covalent nature of himself, his body, and the path on which he walks 
(Wylie, 2005). The methodological hopes for this creative de-fortification of the researcher 
are repeated in Davies and Dwyer‟s later summary of artistic interventions as geographical 
research, in which geographers collaborate with artists or are otherwise involved in artistic 
projects (Davies and Dwyer, 2010: 91-92). This collaboration ideally takes the form of a 
positioning whereby “awkward questions” can be asked of geographers, along with 
“ontological questioning of the objects and relations of research” from a different field 
with different practices and protocols (Ibid: 92), and there is an assumption here, though 
perhaps not an unreasonable one, that whilst art isn‟t academia, it shares with the academe 
the necessary querying of ontology, albeit from different perspectives that form a useful 
contrast from which to build those methodological engagements that centre on 
submission, particular constructions of porosity (perhaps even to the point of 
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vulnerability), and a resulting openness that displaces those more cartographic and 
translation-like impulses of representational research with an articulate “learning to be 
affected” (Latour, 2004: 210, in Davies and Dwyer, 2008: 400). Deliberately allowing 
oneself to be moved by research participants is a powerful methodological tool (or 
powerful absence of tools) with the potential to entrain those research participants rather 
than fixing them through translations into preferred academic terms (Davies and Dwyer, 
2008: 400). 
 
Crang is more critical of these possibilities, and usefully so: the various articulations of the 
close or “insider” information that Davies and Dwyer repeatedly hope for requires a kind 
of commonality between the researcher and those being researched, alongside an 
admittance that the research is necessarily and unavoidably co-constituted (Crang, 2003: 
494-495), but closing the distance between them to the point of being an “insider” draws 
on an ambitious understanding of what reflexivity can do and how efficacious a 
researcher‟s self knowledge can be, and Crang warns that “we do need to question the all-
too-common assumption that there is one researcher, with an unchanging and knowable 
identity, and one project, with a single unwavering aim” (Crang, 2002: 652). This questions 
Davies and Dwyer‟s apparent hope to open out a space in the researcher‟s self to 
contain/entrain research others on their own terms. Such space-opening seems to call for a 
reflexivity that is not guaranteed, indeed, Crang argues, reflexivity can become supra-
reflexive if this inward looking self assessment is over-amplified to produce a singular 
domain of anxious introspection from which we do not – cannot – look out at the field at 
all, only inwards toward an all-encompassing positionality where the others who we 
research disappear, making the researcher exceptional again (Crang, 2003: 498; 2005: 226). 
These are two very different accounts of what reflexivity can produce in terms of depth or 
closeness, centred on the difference between Crang‟s co-present production of research (in 
which the researcher and the researched meet in a co-constructed research encounter) and 
Davies and Dwyer‟s covalent30 production of research in which the participants are 
mutually entrained by one another‟s presence and where the co-habited space that Crang 
variously describes is replaced with the hope for an direct enmeshing between participants. 
In general methodological terms, this is the difference between a close (co-produced) kind 
                                                   
30 The term “covalent”, which I‟ve chosen to summarise Davis and Dwyer‟s overall argument, refers to covalent bonding, 
a model of how molecules are formed from their constituent atoms by sharing the electrons (and the vacant capacity for 
electrons) that orbit around their respective nuclei, such that they are not so much adjacent or proximate as enmeshed like 
atomic cogwheels. 
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of adjacency, and a covalent hope for a more unitary encounter. As the following sections 
describe, my methodology has either intentionally or accidentally drawn on both, and the 
degree to which I methodologically entrain that which I have studied is a key feature – and 
ethic – of each strand in my heuristic, much as it may be for the rest of the geographical 
discipline. In fact, the plausibility of entraining may be the key methodological issue we 
face in general terms. Because they are so potentially important, these two themes 
encapsulate the other three themes which I briefly describe below. 
  
In all six progress reports, the idea of bodily co-presence and “being” situated “there” in 
the flesh and in common situations with those who we research is often discussed in terms 
of the closer (or, indeed, covalent) engagement such ethnomethodologies claim to offer, 
being more representative of those people and situations, and perhaps especially more 
representative of the non-representational aspects of their reality. The idea of representing 
non-representation is strangely paradoxical, an issue recognised by Crang, and Davies and 
Dwyer, as part of a larger problem with words, but that paradox may not be the main problem. 
In all but one of these six reports31, ethnomethodologies are understood to counter the 
possibility that asking people for spoken accounts of their everyday lives is to convert those 
lives out the normal reality in which they happen, a distorting which is also assumed of 
other approaches which, though they may not be strictly verbal, elicit a kind of up- or 
down-scaling of what is (or was) actually happening (Crang notes that this has often been 
the fate of visual methods in geography (Crang, 2003: 500)). Whereas Crang is cautious 
about these claims, Davies and Dwyer are excited about the potential to go beyond words 
(even if we return to them eventually) in order to enact that which cannot be, or would not 
survive, being verbally engaged (Davies and Dwyer, 2007: 258-259), and they are equally 
enthusiastic, for example, about the ethnomethodological enacting of archival research, to 
imagine the actual acts that were behind, or can be generated out of, that which is archived: 
in short, archives suggest performed origins that are worth thinking about, and even 
performing again  (Davies and Dwyer, 2010: 90-91, 92). Perhaps most tellingly it is silence, 
the very absence of words, which is understood to be a performance full of discernible 
actions, a performance of refusal, dismissal, and a creative kind of ignoring which forms an 
exemplar of how things are done literally without words (Davies and Dwyer, 2008: 400-
401). 
                                                   
31 In his first report, Crang cautions against the assumption that participatory methods automatically or necessarily offer 
an enhanced kind of proximity or closeness with those we research (Crang, 2002: 651) 
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In short, words are either too much (in terms their abstracting potential or their wilful 
fixity) or, except in the event of silence, they are too little (in terms of the need to complete 
them by animating what leads into or leads out of them). The haptic and materially situated 
research which emerged from a concern with these concomitant scales of words, and the 
representational in general, try to avoid the “God-trick of the invisible, omnipresent 
narrator” (Crang, 2003: 499), to mute a-priori representational structures in the hope of 
ascertaining what is actually being done through an ethnomethodological closeness. As 
such, the problem with words is intimately connected with the problem of knowing simply 
because representational research seeks to produce in its final form, and thus (arguably) 
seeks to find a particular kind of thinking-through in the field it researches that reveals 
everyday processes and experiences to be deliberately meaning-laden and connected to 
ideas which those everyday processes re-behave. Such a meaning-laden view may, in fact, 
impose a more of a meaning burden onto those places and people that we research. The 
hope to relinquish this burden and discover the non-cognitive reality of how places and 
people actually work causes Crang to sound a similar warning as he does with 
ethnomethodologies in general: the non-cognitive turn is not automatically more authentic 
in terms of the experiences it can access and the politics of representation it can dodge 
(Crang, 2005: 225) and he recognises an over-confident excitement in the potential for the 
non-cognitive to produce liberations, recognising that research on dance, for example, 
demonstrates that it can easily and, perhaps, necessarily be more-than-non-cognitive 
insofar that what happens to the corporeal body during dance can plausibly be referenced 
to a representational body of ideas (Ylönen, 2003: 559 in Crang, 2005: 231), an intertwining 
of the non-cognitive and haptic with the discursive and representational which is missing in 
some of our work, including geographical work on dance that overestimates the non-
cognitive by isolating, and then ennobling it32. Crang‟s overall argument on this point, 
spread across his three progress reports, seems to suggest that non-cognitive and non- or 
more-than representational research, whilst it may claim to correct a-priori representational 
assumptions, may work from an a-priori position of its assumed, even hoped-for absence. 
 
                                                   
32 This is my understanding of Crang‟s critique, during which he mentions Thrift but does not actually reference this point 
to any specific publication, though I assume he means to suggest Thrift‟s 1997 work on dance (Thrift, 1997). If, indeed, I 
am reading too critical a stance into Crang‟s summary then I would point to the fact that such a stance exists elsewhere: 
the problem of ennobling non-representation was recognised as early as 2000 by Nash, who (specific to Thrift‟s 
approach) suggested that it “offers more theoretical guidance for considering practices over representations rather than 
strategies for bringing them together” (Nash, 2000: 661). 
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Absences and presences lead me onto the scale of subjects and the possibility that attending 
the noncognitive has the potential to be both an expanding and a contracting of what the 
“subject” (the people and places we research) can be understood to comprise. And 
regardless of whether we are co-present or covalent with them, the subject is growing in 
scope. Part of this growing is less to do with recognising how big the subject is, and more 
to do with recognising how narrowly we have looked at them, which Davies and Dwyer 
recognise as an outcome of a certain, singular, vector-like research practice that sought to 
categorise and close that which we investigate, and which needs to be replaced with habits 
of openness and reflexivity (Davies and Dwyer, 2007: 258). These habits foreground a 
different scalar understanding of the work we do, allowing us to extend what sort of 
possibilities and potentialities a subject can occupy, including what is felt and imagined 
(rather than witnessed and narrated) and that which extends over the dichotomy between 
the material and the immaterial (Ibid: 261-262). In short, recognising that we have looked 
narrowly, and getting out of that habit, allows the subject to reach his, her, or its full scalar 
potential, which Crang apprehended as the “translocal” subject who is not helpfully still, 
solid, and bounded, but extensively existing over a field of relations (Crang, 2005: 228-229). 
One key methodological upshot of this understanding is that uncertainty is deliberately 
understood of the accounts and experiences we access, folded into our engagements and, 
hopefully, worked into the accounts we produce thereafter (Davies and Dwyer, 2010: 93). 
This is the logic behind the temporal and what could be called the trans-verbal stretching 
of the otherwise time-stilled wordiness of the archive (described above under the heading 
problem with words), so that they no longer capture pasts in stable form (Ibid: 89-90) and 
further accounts for their interest in the new, much broader subject identities that can be 
created in cyberspace (Ibid: 94). The scale of subjects as I‟ve described it here is a useful point 
from which to start thinking about interviewing and what scales it allows. 
 
Interviews and claims of experience: 
 
Before I detail my interviewing methodology, I wish to briefly start by outlining how many 
interviews I‟ve undertaken, and with whom. Taken as a whole, the interviews I undertook 
for this project engaged with a substantial mix of people, although owner-occupiers form 
the largest group. Four of my seven Voysey interviews were with couples (two with young 
families) who owned or were paying off their individual properties on a freehold basis, and 
five of my six Lubetkin interviewees either owned their properties or, in two cases, owned 
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a leasehold on them. All of my Holden interviewees were employees at buildings owned by 
their employer, as was the case with three Voysey buildings and one Lubetkin building, 
though one of the Voysey buildings was staffed by volunteers rather than employees. One 
of my interviewees at a Voysey house was both a tenant and an employee, whereas the rest 
of the employee inhabitants in this study worked in their buildings and domiciled 
elsewhere. It is also worth noting that there were two retired architects and one practising 
architect among the twenty-five people (over nineteen interviews) who I studied, one living 
in a Voysey house, one working in a Voysey building, and the other living in a Lubetkin 
house. None of my other interviewees had ever been involved in the architectural 
profession, or indeed, any immediately related professions such as construction or 
planning. Additional to the two retired architects, five interviewees were retired from their 
non-architectural jobs.  
 
Interviewees were contacted by letter in the first instance, in which I enclosed a response 
card and a postage paid envelope for them to return to me with further contact details if 
they were willing to be interviewed. The original contact letter suggested that the interview 
would be informal (and I believe that they all were) and at a time and location to suit them 
(in the event, all of the interviews took place in the buildings in question, either domiciles 
or workplaces)33. From the outset, all of my interviewees were promised anonymity, 
although all but one suggested that this was unnecessary (and the single instance where it 
was thought to be necessary was in a discussion with the current inhabitants about the 
previous inhabitants, and not about themselves). For this reason, I am not able to identify 
all of the buildings in this project: I can only admit to those buildings which house enough 
inhabitants to assure me that they could anonymised among their number34. The purpose 
of anonymity is without methodological basis in this instance: it is, in fact, my means to 
maintaining confidentiality and privacy by ensuring that the whereabouts of my 
interviewees‟ homes and workplaces are not known or, as the case may be, further 
                                                   
33 A total of eight respondents rejected my request, and the remainder provided their contact details on the card for me to 
discuss the interview further. Of those respondents I contacted on receipt of the cards (almost all by e-mail, and the 
remainder by telephone), only one elected not to proceed with the interview. By this stage, all of the interviewees were 
aware that my research question dealt specifically with the potential effectiveness of architecture. All twenty-one 
interviews were undertaken between June 2007 and May 2008 with one exception in August 2008. None of my 
interviewees were under eighteen years old, bit aside from this the age profiles of were fairly evenly spread from early 
twenties to late eighties. In gender terms however, men are better represented in this thesis than women (of whom there 
were eight). 
34 They are, in chapter order, Voysey: Winsford Cottage Hospital (Beaworthy, Devon) and Voysey House (formerly 
Sanderson and Sons‟, Chiswick, Greater London). Holden: Senate House (Bloomsbury, Central London), Arnos Grove 
underground station (Enfield, Greater London), Morden underground station (Merton, Greater London), and Bristol 
Central Library (Bristol, Avon). Lubetkin: Highpoint One and Two (Haringey, Greater London). Each of these buildings 
are staffed or inhabited by at least twenty people. 
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publicised (to prevent scenarios whereby, as one of my Lubetkin interviewees related to 
me, undergraduates, postgraduates, and even lecturers would regularly ring his doorbell 
hoping to ask a few questions or be offered a brief tour). It is, of course, possible that my 
policy of anonymity, functional though it is, may have prompted my interviewees to 
disclose more to me and disclose more honestly, but by the same token, anonymity may 
have produced an artificial sense of safety and comfort within the research encounter 
which, as I discuss below, seems to be an outpost of a “friendly” kind of interview 
methodology which may not be helpful to me, and perhaps geographical research in 
general. 
 
In a sense, interviews are unavoidable in my research because there are certain research 
methods that I cannot reasonably indulge in if I am to attend the third “strand” of my 
methodological heuristic. I use (rather than choose) interviews to build an account of the 
experiences and the variety of experiences in the current inhabitation of the buildings of 
Voysey, Holden, and Lubetkin. “Variety” is the key term here: a participant observation 
requires a medium- to long-term commitment to a bounded situation which is experienced 
and engaged with, i.e. participated in. What that situation can actually do and mean emerge 
from a researcher allowing it to happen to them and observing it happening to others. To 
experience some of these buildings as an inhabitant, to report back on what happened to 
me from living in and dealing with the building, and to produce a thesis which analyses the 
traces the building left in me is a tempting and promising proposal, but implausible given 
my aim to engage in the potential variety of architectural experience and for obvious 
practical reasons besides35. Participant observations invest a large amount of time and 
produce a large volume of detail from a small number of engagements, as with Lees‟ (2001) 
study of Vancouver Central Library, although her work may have more in common with 
unobtrusive method than participant observation, (see Lee, 2000)36. A commitment to variety 
requires me to substantially reduce how committed I am to each research encounter so that 
I can attend more of them, even if this multiple attending also marks a kind of truncating 
                                                   
35 I should further point out (perhaps somewhat obviously) that I was not in a position to get a job at, purchase, rent, or 
otherwise inhabit the buildings I‟ve studied in any way other than my brief encounters with them during the interviews I 
undertook.  
36 Lee explains that unobtrusive method is deliberately covert, as it involves the observation of people as they go about 
their business in public without asking them to narrate or explain it, or indeed joining them or replicating what they are 
doing. The research act is never admitted to or understood as co-produced on the understanding that data cannot be 
generated if the subject knows they‟re being researched – that knowledge produces different, non-genuine behaviour 
(Lee, 2000: 1-4). There seems to be an echo of this in Lees‟ study of Vancouver Central Library and her “ethnographies 
of use” (Lees, 2001: 71-75) which seem to record her observant non-involvement in the politics of use that interest her. 
Lees‟ ethnographic vignettes are discussed at greater length in the previous chapter. 
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compared to the full scope of what a participant observation might attain (for an optimistic 
account of what is possible, see Herbert, 2000). However, I believe that certain elements of 
ethnomethodology (understood as I‟ve described it above) can be utilised in interviewing, 
and in relation to my own methodology I examine the possibility of enabling a closer 
integration between me and those who I researched through the recent introduction of key 
feminist theories of the other into interviewing methodology (Ezzy, 2010) which, in terms 
of interview techniques, may offer a covalent edge to the otherwise co-constitutive 
encounter that interviews represent. 
 
These integrative tactics, promising though they are, do not excuse me from recognising 
the primarily verbal nature of interviewing.  The centrality of the verbal in this method 
produces particular outcomes in terms of the shape of the insight I produce, and it 
constitutes a particular treatment of my interviewees (i.e. the fact that I have rendered them 
verbally). In the first instance I accept that non-objectivity is a given not only of interviews, 
but of qualitative methods in general (as I established in the preceding section).  Interview 
data emerges from a relationship between researched and researcher, and that data is best 
thought of as originating from that relationship rather than directly vended by the 
interviewee or simply discovered by me.  The insights and information are produced by 
both interviewer and interviewee and reflect a dual absence of objectivity (Crang, 2001: 221 
and 2003: 494). Interviewing cannot transcribe the experiences of my interviewees: they do 
not simply “vend” information. I made particular efforts to produce particular information 
from the interviews I undertook, so that information will in some way reflect my 
“squeezing”, along with the interviewee‟s relative pliability or resistance. The kind of 
squeezing I did reflected my tastes, interests, and a position amid a collection of (academic) 
practices where there are certain norms and expectations that define what it is possible to 
speak about and what definitions and procedures are valid (Foucault, 1970-1971: 199 in 
McDowell, 2010: 16037). Jackson and Russell (2010) expand this point in a way relevant to 
interviewing in general (their work otherwise dwells on life history interviewing). Interviews 
are, they argue: “a co-production, with authority shared between an interviewer and an 
interviewee” (Jackson and Russell, 2010: 181) in which the identity offered to the 
interviewee tells interesting stories of the researcher‟s positionality. 
 
                                                   
37 McDowell mistakenly references p.23 of this collection and dates it to 1977 (i.e. the date the collection was published). 
The transcribed lectures to which she refers were actually dated 1970-1971 and the material she uses is on p.199. 
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“Interviewees are sometimes described as informants, narrators or interview 
partners. The terms are significant as „narrator‟ emphasises the agency of the 
person telling the story (compared to the more passive role of „interviewee‟); 
„informant‟ implies a degree of duplicity on the part of the narrator, providing 
the interviewer with privileged access to confidential material; and „partner‟ 
emphasises the relational nature of the life history, produced in dialogue with 
the interviewer (although the „partnership‟ may be far from equal).” (Jackson 
and Russell, 2010: 181) 
 
The idea of creating and managing memberships across the research encounter sits at the 
centre of both McDowell‟s (2010) and Ezzy‟s (2010) interview methodology. McDowell 
considers this through the problem of fixity resulting from academic intention insofar that: 
“the very act of naming something, perhaps even thinking about it, always, however 
temporarily, constitutes an ordering or a representation of a relationship” (McDowell, 
2010: 169). That naming and ordering may be articulated to appeal to our discipline of 
origin, to please a certain readership and satisfy certain norms therein (Ibid: 166, a similar 
point is made by Jordanova on the practices of historical research discussed in the next 
section (Jordanova, 2006: 91)). The nature of interview memberships, especially 
considering the researcher‟s institutional and disciplinary origins in norms of naming and 
identifying, requires a continual effort to equalise or reduce power differentials that we 
might potentially create: this remains the case even though the power differential is (at least 
initially) weighted towards the interviewee insofar that the researcher is dependent on their 
goodwill for the interview to happen in the first place (McDowell, 2010: 161). Many 
interview methodologies emphasise the reduction of these differentials as a means to 
diminishing the potential oppressiveness of the interviewer‟s presence, concurrent with the 
hope that with this potential oppression lifted, the interviewee will “flower” (Ezzy, 2010: 
166) and otherwise reveal not only more in the interview, but more that can be said to have 
originated from them and their experiences rather than the norms we might constrain them 
into or otherwise impose. Ezzy‟s interview methodology is designed to enable such a 
flowering, which he understands to be a performed technique rather than necessarily 
contained in the verbal alone (Ibid: 165). A key element of this is to construct an encounter 
where the interviewee feels important, valued, and enabled so that being forthcoming is 
understood be possible, and is further understood to matter and be beneficial. McDowell 
recognises that good faith is implicated in this, which normally requires the researcher to 
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reveal something of themselves (McDowell, 2010: 162) which, I suggest, is a recognition 
and sharing of the vulnerability that an interview produces. Between McDowell and Ezzy I 
ascertain a methodology where an overarching idea of care, nurture and friendliness are key 
devices to be performed across the research encounter which, properly articulated, will 
allow a degree of closeness by effacing the overarching teleological bias of academic 
institutionalism and framings. 
 
Exactly how well the construction of friendliness works to equalise the power relations in 
the interview may not matter if the interview contains an inherent sort of violence which 
converts everyday processes into verbalised, conversational forms quite different from and 
lacking familiarity with the fundamentally non-verbal ways in which those processes might 
have originated. I would, however, point out that some studies question how out of the 
ordinary interviews really are relative to everyday life.  For example Silverman (1993, also 
Atkinson and Silverman, 1997) discuss the normalisation of interviewing in certain cultures. 
Silverman‟s work is noted by McDowell (2010: 161) and Brinkmann (2007: 1117-1118) 
who argue that it is possible to see interviews as commodified cultural forms that also 
commodify opinion and experience by packaging it in a particular way. Moreover, the 
commodification of opinion through the interview as a product is commonplace. We are 
surrounded by and normalised into an interview culture through printed, transmitted, and 
electronic media. The idea of the interview, and perhaps also the idea of transferring 
experience into conversational form, need not be understood as a violent, or even 
substantial shift from the norm. The interview is not entirely alien to everyday life and does 
not lie entirely outside of “normal” or “everyday” contexts, and whilst it may not be 
regularly experienced at first hand (only two of my interviewees had been previously 
interviewed about the buildings they inhabited, in both cases by the local press38), it is not 
so far out of the ordinary to be outlandish: interviews are known about, and they have 
either known or assumed features and characteristics. It could further be argued that 
interviewing also taps into a more normalised everyday experience of telling stories and 
communicating impressions conversationally, and that the conversion of everyday 
happenings into verbal accounts is, in fact, part of the normalcy of the everyday more 
generally, a conversion to words which Lorimer tacitly recognises, albeit in written form 
                                                   
38 In three additional interviews, though my interviewees hadn‟t been interviewed before as such, they had talked in a 
largely incidental way with scholars, journalists, and other authors who came to “look at their house” or take photographs 
rather than talk to them per se. Anna and John, along with Barry and Denise (who inhabit two of Voysey‟s houses), both 
recalled being visited by Wendy Hitchmough in the early 1990‟s when she was preparing her monograph on Voysey 
(Hitchmough, 1995).  
64 
 
(Lorimer, 2003) and further recognised in verbal form in a 2007 special edition of Social and 
Cultural Geographies on the practices of oral history (see Riley and Harvey, 2007). 
Furthermore, something like the conversational flexibility of interviews, familiar in the 
media, has come to displace the question-answer regime that used to pervade interviewing 
in geography and, in effect, was little better than a verbal questionnaire and aimed for an 
objectivity which has since been thoroughly overturned (McDowell, 2010: 159-160). 
 
I do not, therefore, assume from the outset that there is something automatically abstracted 
or less real about the interview, and this marks the start of an account of how, in fact, 
interviewing can plausibly create a covalent kind of closeness between the interviewer and 
the interviewee. Ezzy‟s (2010) methodology seeks to implicate both positions deeply within 
the respective identities of each participant by drawing on particular theoretical axioms 
from which to understand the interview and its capabilities. Drawing on the work of 
Irigaray (2001) and Benjamin (1988 (1990)), Ezzy argues that the hope for a rational 
autonomous individual is produced in acts of domination, which stem from a cache of 
ideas which claim that, as individuals, we are autonomous and bounded. Such an attitude 
dominates the other by refusing to understand or accept that the other is critical to our 
status, and seeks to subdue the possibility of being constituted by or confirmed through the 
will of others: in short, the nature of domination is contained in trying to dominate the idea 
that we have to allow part of who we are be externally granted by others, a fundamental 
delegation of who we are as individuals to the necessary recognition of us by other 
individuals (Ezzy, 2010: 164-165). For Benjamin this is understood as “communion”, 
opening a space in one‟s behaviour to be inter-subjectively confirmed, an admittance based 
on admitting that such admittances are necessary (Benjamin, (1988) 1990: 18). Irigaray 
understands this as the “caress” (Irigaray, 2000: 27), through which she criticises the 
probing nature of certain scholarly discourses and advocates openness, to know others by 
giving (as in, gifting) them a space in one‟s own individuality where they can create a 
discourse of themselves rather than being defined from our particular and erroneously 
fortified individualities, or the illusion that we are absolutely individual. Irigaray explains: 
 
“To sense you, to preserve a place for you and to speak to you beginning from 
this memory. To find tone, rhythm, meaning. To cultivate the breath until the 
words can rise up in me and pass the threshold of myself. [...] To perceive what 
the other is, while not knowing it. Not to use such knowledge but to make my 
gaze helpful to him: an aid, a resource [...] capable of contemplating without 
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violence or capture: to insist on transcendence here and now, with us and 
between us [...]. To be silent to allow you to speak, to give birth to you. And to 
us as well.” (Irigaray, 2000: 14) 
 
Only these last sentences, “To be silent... us as well”, are quoted by Ezzy (2010: 166), and 
they neatly describe his primary example, an interview with “Celeste”39, and his overall 
argument. In short, Ezzy uses the idea of communion/caress to offer her, in the manner of 
a gift, a covalent opportunity to speak. I return here to my earlier use of the term 
“covalent” to describe Davies and Dwyer‟s overall hopes in their progress reports insofar that 
Ezzy believes that communion/caress was drawn upon to allow Celeste‟s otherness to 
become a constituent of his self in the interview process, for her to be confirmed by him in 
a space he gifted her in his own, but unfortified, individuality (Ibid). The excellence of the 
responses she provided in that interview were resultant of Ezzy‟s particular methodological 
gifting, producing in Celeste a gratitude for the opportunity to speak to another who is, 
almost literally, caressing her speech rather than othering her to further secure a fortified 
individuality: it is that gratitude for such a willing and confirming space, or a recognition 
from the interviewee that is in some way akin to gratitude, that seems to form the logical 
corollary of the gift in Ezzy‟s argument (Ibid: 165) and it is in such circumstances that 
interviewees will speak most frankly, most openly, and most fully of themselves (Ibid: 168). 
As a methodology, to caress or have communion is to be simultaneously expansive and 
diminutive as an interviewer, to expand a space for others as both a gift for them and a 
constituent of you, but to achieve this expansion through a diminution of the self or, more 
accurately, the selfishness of the self in terms of its assumed autonomy. The covalency of 
this is in the way the interviewee attains defining properties in the research encounter that 
researchers like myself might otherwise hoard, and the overall plausibility is contained in 
the fact that we need to be recognised as individuals (and researchers) by our interviewees 
if the research encounter is to happen at all, that is to say, if we expect to be told anything 
at all. 
 
This mutually covalent entraining is an exciting prospect, but I have certain misgivings 
about Ezzy‟s communion/caress methodology, and these misgivings also extend to the way 
interviews have been undertaken in architectural geography (not that these particularly 
                                                   
39 In common with Ezzy, all of my interviewees in this study have been identified with pseudonyms to maintain their 
anonymity, an approach which I discuss at the end of this section. 
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incorporate communion/caress). The problem lies in the presumption that interviewees are 
malleable and susceptible to providing our preferred answers, which further suggests that 
their own insights and opinions are so lacking in potency that they can be very easily 
occluded. Methodologically, ideas such as communion/caress, theoretically advanced 
though they are, form an a-priori model of how the interviewee works and, having stated 
or implied that we find them to be fragile, we believe we must be careful, that they must be 
treated gently (or, indeed, caressed), or else the robust kind of analytical discourses 
academics engage in will displace their “real” insights. This assumed malleability, and those 
methodologies that prevent the interviewees being deformed into statements of our a-
priori philosophies, strips the interviewee of the ability to analyse us, understand and 
challenge our motivations, and problematise our questions and the parameters that we set 
in asking them. As I discussed in my introductory chapter, there seems to be an implicit, 
sometimes halfway explicit assumption that people‟s architectural experience will generally 
be characterised by vague impressions, loosely defined and clustered around general 
preferences, and I am worried that this precludes the possibility that inhabitants analytically 
consider the architecture they inhabit thoughtfully, insightfully, and even technically, and 
that interview methodologies such as Ezzy‟s and McDowell‟s (2010)  may inadvertently 
stupefy those qualities and produce a skewed understanding of what inhabitations are 
possible40. The people we interview may be more astute than our interviewing allows for, 
and I wonder whether Ezzy‟s methodology offers the interviewee the best position from 
which to speak, and whether interviewees wouldn‟t speak “better” if they were positioned, 
or indeed entrained, in a more stimulating methodology. 
 
This possibility is described in a number of methodological statements including Denzin 
(2001), Kvale (2006), Tanggaard (2007), and Brinkmann (2007) whose statement seems to 
be the most powerful among them, not least from his opening suggesting that most 
interviewing is just opinion polling, generally couched in the norms of a biographical 
account (Brinkmann, 2007: 1119-1120). Most interview methodologies, he argues, are 
doxastic, that is to say, they set out to engage with and collect doxa, the unreasoned opinions 
and experiences of people (Ibid: 1117). This, Brinkmann argues, is problematic because 
people may not live doxastic lives in which their opinions simply count and are unwaveringly 
                                                   
40 I am also concerned some geographies are understood to be unspeakable not because they deal with subjects that are 
too complex (haptic, affectual, taken-for-granted or un-reasoned) to be verbalised, and not necessarily because they are 
unlikely to survive the (perhaps destructive) shift from those subjects‟ native expressions to a verbal solidity. I believe, in 
fact, that some geographies seem unspeakable because we don‟t position our respondents so that they can adequately 
speak about the more-than-non-cognitive and more-than-non-representational lives they lead. 
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affirmed in an unlikely kind of benevolent context. It may be more useful to consider that 
people‟s opinions and experiences happen in an epistemic context with normative qualities, 
in which opinions, beliefs, and actions have to be justified and subject to argument about 
whether they ought to exist (Ibid: 1123).41 
 
If this sounds somewhat oppressive compared to Ezzy‟s communion/caress methodology, 
it might be worth considering what a doxastic understanding of the interviewee restricts 
them from. Crucially, mapping doxa onto interviewees reserves the epistemic for the 
researcher to indulge in, which may mark a failing to open ourselves out acts of confirming 
the other as Ezzy hopes that they can be if, in fact, we are not allowing them to access that 
part of the self we analyse with. There is an uncomfortable possibility that interviewees 
may be put an inadequate position from which we risk stupefying them (Brinkmann, 2007: 
1119). By constituting them in a different kind of self from the one we use to write our 
work, and further constituting them in a caressing kind of entrained context that may differ 
substantially from epistemic everydayness, we risk producing false impressions and analyses 
of them, that is to say, analysing responses which our own methodology prompts 
participants to (quite innocently) fabricate (Ibid: 1121-1122). If we ignore this potential, 
though plausible extreme, we are nonetheless presented with the problem that a doxastic 
interview will generally produce a list, or a poll, of people‟s opinions and experiences, 
which fails to adequately connect into the reasoning (literally, why they are thought to be 
reasonable) that forms them. What an interviewee says under doxastic circumstances, which 
may actually be more accurately described as the absence of circumstances, is potentially 
unreal for having been produced outside of the epistemic norms that animate opinion, 
insights, and knowledges. Whilst I recognise that, in interviews, we always deal with the real 
in a mediated way, the doxastic interview seems to risk the generation of fictions in 
unmediated space, and I detect in Ezzy‟s communion/caress (and McDowell‟s more 
general friendly co-constituency) the idea that opening out a free or unimpeded space for 
the interviewee to be more forthcoming does not question adequately what will come forth 
in those essentially false circumstances – it represents a substantial methodological 
assumption (Brinkmann, 2007: 1125-1126). 
 
                                                   
41 Both doxa and episteme are terms from Socrates‟ understanding of dialogue “whose purpose was to move the 
conversation partners from doxa to episteme (i.e. from a state of being simply opinionated to being capable of questioning and 
justifying what they believe is the case).” (Brinkmann, 2007: 1117.) 
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My methodological approach, whilst recognising Brinkmann‟s critique, does not suppose 
that Ezzy‟s (or McDowell‟s) insights are necessarily incompatible. Ezzy‟s overall point is 
that interviews can be oppressive if we do not undertake something like communion or 
caress and open ourselves to confirmations of the other (Ezzy, 2010: 164-165), and Ezzy‟s 
explanation of how this would work as a method combines habits of quietness and 
listening (a quietness which forms a productive absence crafted to do important work, a 
notion which might appeal to the performativity of silence as Davies and Dwyer discuss it 
(Davies and Dwyer, 2008: 400-401)) and the ability of a researcher to apprehend that which 
might impede the interview dynamic, especially the verbal and non-verbal manifestations of 
discomfort that may come from interviewing those who are very different to the researcher 
(Ezzy, 2010: 167). But these confirming efforts sound doxastic: they describe an onus of 
care and the creation of that which might ease the flow (“dynamic”) of the interview, which 
in Ezzy‟s case is represented by a particular kind of quietness, or the defusing of 
awkwardness, which would be absent in the episteme. This need not be the case, and whilst 
I am not suggesting that we should argue with and challenge interviewees at every 
opportunity, I am suggesting that the confirming space that Ezzy describes does not have 
to be blank so that interviewees can narrate themselves without impediment, but epistemic, 
recognising that spaces without impediments are both abstract, and contain their own 
potential impeding. As such, I have tried to combine the covalent possibility of Ezzy‟s 
work with the epistemic nature of Brinkmann‟s critique by creating a capacity for the other in 
my interviewing methodology which invites them not into an apparently unimpeded space 
of doxa, but into a differently confirming epistemic space in which I offer them not only 
communion, but also a conforming of their epistemic potentials and the complexities behind 
their opinions and experiences that would otherwise be dulled by too simple a conception 
of communion/caress. I believe Ezzy‟s understanding of how research participants can be 
made covalent is as important as making sure that we place (or entrain) them in a context 
that will not denigrate them, and in achieving this we have to do more than simply “let” 
interviewees speak, and much more than hope that the more we “let” interviewees speak, 
the more forthcoming they will be with genuine insights. 
  
The results of my combined methodology, evident in the three chapters that follow, are 
interviews of a particular shape and accounts of a particular style. The first obvious point is 
that, rather than just making a list of what has happened and what opinions are there 
(“polling”), my interviews have also produced an idea of what could happen. My interviews 
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do not only account for my interviewees explanations of their experience as it exists and 
has existed, but also (and I believe, resultant from extending our discussions beyond 
doxastic listing and toward epistemic reasoning) how their current experiences are understood 
proportionally within a wider field of potential experience which could happen, but which 
they have not actualised into their everyday experience. Perhaps most evident in my 
interviews with Holden inhabitants (chapter four), I found this analytically realised 
background of potential to everyday experience hugely interesting, but it has required me 
to carefully denote when my interviewees were discussing what their experiences were, and 
when they were discussing what they plausibly could be and in some cases why those 
potentials were left waiting. 
 
Reflecting my aim to invite the interviewee into potentialities of analysis, and recognising 
their epistemic potentials for analytical inhabitations, the following three chapters contain 
large tracts of what I understand to be the more analytical edges of their inhabitations 
rather than their more haptic or non-cognitive inhabitations (not that these are absent). 
The fact that these analyses are there and, I believe, more obvious than the norm for 
architectural geography, reflects the opportunity I made in my attending for them in terms 
of normative space, rather than a space for me to jump start their doxa into my particular 
episteme. And because that space was normative, it encouraged them to argue against me and 
the assumptions and preconceptions that I would otherwise have “squeezed” into the 
encounter. The normative space I opened in my attendance was one in which interviewees 
were encouraged to criticise me, by discussing the interview process with them prior to the 
interview and encouraging them to point out if I had, for example, asked a leading question 
(having explained first what this was) – which a number of them did.    In this way I strived 
to  combine Ezzy‟s and Brinkmann‟s insights and  open out a friendly space for them to be 
productively unfriendly in. It is my hope that this encouragement to find the errant or 
presumptuous in my line of questioning also encouraged my interviewees towards an 
epistemic mode which may, in fact, retain Brinkmann‟s argument in reverse. Brinkmann 
could be criticised for believing that it is the researcher that is responsible for the epistemic 
conversion of the interview, and his examples reiterate the interviewee‟s continual probing 
to force (or, of course, reveal) the epistemic behind the doxastic (Brinkmann, 2007: 1128-
1131).  In contrast to this belief in the need to push interviewees, I believe that if we are to 
take interview respondents seriously and understand their capacities, we need to invite, 
rather than induce (or at least use the act of inviting to gently induce), the epistemic in a 
70 
 
way more attuned to Ezzy‟s covalent understandings. As such, a key element of the 
method I generated from my methodology was to explain to interviewees exactly how 
problematic I was, of which a potential for leading questions is one possibility (a self-
honesty that might appeal to McDowell‟s idea of good faith (McDowell, 2010: 162)). My 
interviewees were, in short, not so much invited as requested to problematise the questions 
and my assumptions.  
 
In what can best be described as a pre-interview briefing, I suggested to each interviewee 
that the questions I asked were not solid and final, but more like proposals. I asked them 
(in terms of a request for help, rather than an invitation by my grace) to interrogate my 
questions and the limits or preferences they imposed, rather than answering within the 
confines and assumptions I had produced by myself. I suggested that some of my 
questions might ask them to read more into their experiences than seemed plausible, or 
indeed, might ask them to diminish their experiences. I also asked them to re-frame 
questions that might have seemed geared to generating the kind of answers that I might 
find most interesting, and that it was necessary for them to reassert the pitch and 
plausibility of the interview, which included rejecting certain questions, explaining to me 
how my questions were errant, and availing themselves of the opportunity to produce new 
questions (in fact, my last question asked them what they would and wouldn‟t have asked if 
they had been me). My interviews exercised a method of delegation that reminded 
participants that it was important to apprehend the interview and change it, and not simply 
as a reminder that they could choose not to answer questions. I was less concerned with 
the option of opting out, and much more inclined to remind my interviewees that they 
could define the shape and style of how they opted in. This briefing, or preamble, was the 
initial means of opening out a friendly space in which they could safely choose to be 
unfriendly, and my understanding of my questions as, in a sense, deliberately sacrificial, 
aimed to stretch that friendly unfriendliness throughout the interview. As such, my 
reframing of the interviewee as thoughtful and aware stretches that thoughtful awareness to 
the conduct of the interview, and edges away from the idea that only the researcher is 
qualified to be ethically aware of, for instance, the potential for leading questions, or a pitch 
that is too abstract or literal. The questions themselves, insofar as their original form 
survived, did not assume that their experiences or their understandings of their experiences 
were going to be simple, and I deliberately asked about the (potential) analytical aspects in 
their inhabitations.  
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Some of these questions were non-specific and intended to let the discussion “roam” in a 
descriptive manner, some of which were pointed and intended to focus the discussion, and 
some of which were abstract – a patina of different modes of query which opened with an 
explanation of the way I thought about buildings as a postgraduate student (that is to say, a 
bisecting, inquisitive and explanatory posture). The first question I posed was; “...that‟s 
how I think about buildings. How do you think about buildings?” My aim in doing so was 
to create a sense that the purpose of the interview was to deflect the discussion away from 
me and what I might make of the building, and give the interviewee something to diverge 
from (or, indeed, accord with). The questions that followed included their initial and 
changing feelings about the building and the appeal (or annoyance) of certain features, and 
questions such as what they knew about the architect (and how they‟d come by that 
knowledge). These were followed by questions concerning the creation of impressions and 
the delivery of effects through the building, ranging from a general conversational level 
(“What impressions do you think this building might be trying to make (if at all)?”) to a 
more pointed level (“Would you be able to suggest how those impressions are being 
made?”) to a point of analysis (Do you think it‟s reasonable to say that the building can 
actually have effects on people, designed or otherwise?”). The interview was not, however, 
strictly structured around these questions and in some instances the interviewees had 
already covered many of them before I‟d had chance to ask them. An example of an early 
interview (preceded by some examples of the cue cards I used in these interviews) is 
provided in the appendix to this thesis. Throughout each interview, “friendly 
unfriendliness” was consistently invited – in fact, the last question in each interview was: 
“If you had been doing this interview, what would you have done differently, and what do 
you think you might have asked?” The opening quotes from the start of the second half of 
chapter five demonstrate how useful some of the responses to this particular question 
were. 
 
This is not, by any means, a watertight methodology because, to reiterate my point from 
the start of this section, it probably isn‟t possible to correspond directly with and thereafter 
wholly import the thoughts and experiences of interviewees over a research encounter and 
into the final written piece. Rather, my methodology hopes to ensure that my interviewees‟ 
accounts are more sure-footed and amplified in the three chapters that follow, and not 
squeezed so hard that they end up compressed and shapeless. I have tried to create a 
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membership for my interviewees in the research encounter that specifically invited the 
possibility, and pointed to the benefits, or refuting and altering what I might have been 
trying to do, especially as the sort of information I wanted to produce was based, in the 
first instance, on the habits and expectations I am normalised into, and in the second, on a 
degree of ignorance on my part which led me to presume, before beginning my interviews, 
certain things that were quickly refuted. I presumed, for instance, that the role of heritage 
agencies (English Heritage, Historic Scotland, and Cadw) would be critical through 
inducing inhabitants to toe the original architectural lines that Voysey, Holden, and 
Lubetkin originally laid down, but this was not so and, in fact, the influence of heritage 
agencies in my interviewees‟ experiences has been minimal. I further presumed that key 
texts such as Hitchmough‟s 1995 book on the life and work of Voysey (Hitchmough, 1995) 
would profoundly narrate the buildings in a way more powerful than the buildings they 
discussed, a kind of textual defibrillation of architectural forms which made explicit the 
messages that the buildings had failed to reiterate. Again, my assumptions were refuted, 
and I want to make it clear from the outset that, whilst such accounts are not unimportant, 
it is the experience of the building that has emerged as definitive in this study, rather than 
the narration of that experience by the corpus of literature that has inevitably accompanied 
the three architects I studied (an inevitability resulting from their respective statuses, which 
I discuss in the final section of this chapter). The source of this and the other refutations 
and reframing which define my interviews in the following three chapters was, I believe, a 
product of the interview method I distilled from the methodology I‟ve described above.  
 
Their friendly unfriendliness towards me was, in a sense, also a friendly unfriendliness 
towards the architect who, in a form particular to me, I entrained with me and reproduced 
in the interviews. It is this entraining that I now turn to examine. 
 
Between inhabitations and architectures, presents and pasts: 
 
The first strand of my methodological heuristic is about architectural pasts, with the 
intention of understanding what the architect hoped to achieve by forming buildings from 
particular ideas and in particular ways.  The nature of what is possible of architectural 
history, that is to say, what can be claimed and what limits ought to be assumed, is a 
relatively little-discussed subject within the specialism. I have found, much as Lorimer 
(2010: 249-250) found with archival methodologies, that the provision for such 
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considerations is limited. In common with Lorimer, Ballantyne notes that this widespread 
absence in architectural histories generally produces work that conforms to a largely 
unconsidered genotype (and I will detail what he considers this to be shortly) (Ballantyne, 
2006: 45). In this section of the chapter I outline the methodology and the cues from (or 
against) which I‟ve developed an understanding what it means to study architectural pasts, 
but this is an inherently uncertain methodology. The hub of that uncertainty is, simply, that 
I do not know how accurately I can claim to study the past, or how I am supposed to claim 
that the architects and buildings I study are definitely “past”, either of themselves or in the 
context of my research. I will return to this problem in more detail as this section 
progresses, but this issue notwithstanding, I still require a methodology of residues and 
remainders to apprehend this first strand in my heuristic. If I am not definitely studying the 
past, I am nonetheless still dealing with something whose origins and ideas which have 
survived in a form that is in one sense fixed (unless new documents are discovered or 
purchased and added to the archive), and cannot be narrated, redacted or re-framed in the 
co-present way that interviewees can negotiate with the investigating researcher. Regardless 
of how “past” my architects and their buildings actually are, my investigations of them 
need to deal with and understand the temporal implications of this research site and, 
perhaps moreover, the political implications of what it means for something to be 
understood as “historical”. 
 
I should first explain how I arrived at the three architects who I study in this thesis. My 
choice of Charles Voysey, Charles Holden, and Berthold Lubetkin was based, in the first 
instance, on the parameters of my research question and the fact that I needed to select 
architects who had practised far enough in the past to create a disjuncture between their 
designs and current inhabitations of their buildings. I maintain that such disjunctures are 
important, representing as they do a potential underlying tension in the way buildings in the 
United Kingdom are occupied (see chapter one). And, it goes without saying, there had to 
be substantial surviving archives (or publications) for (or by) those architects, and each 
architect had to have produced a reasonable quantity of buildings so that I had a reasonable 
number of potential interviewees to contact. From this, I assembled a shortlist of archive 
collections, almost all of which were managed and made available by the R.I.B.A. From this 
point, I was able to rule out certain architects on the basis that to study them would have 
undermined the onus on variety on which my empirical work was based. So, for instance, 
architects who had only designed ecclesiastical buildings or mass housing projects were 
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sidelined in favour of studying architects who had produced different kinds of building, to 
secure the maximum possible variety of building that I could engage with through 
interviews thereafter. 
 
From those archives that remained (all of which were, by this point, located at the R.I.B.A) 
I discounted all of the collections that had minimal or incidental engagements with the idea 
of plausibility in terms of architectural affects and effects, and selected from the remainder 
those three architects that made the most sustained engagements. Voysey, Holden, and 
Lubetkin were the three architects selected based on how well they met the parameters of 
my research question and the emphasis on variety therein, not on the basis of my 
preference or a particular taste for their work. In terms of variety, these three architects 
represent an interesting combination. Voysey and Lubetkin were both highly ambitious and 
hoped to assist quite profound effects to fruition through their work, albeit by very 
different means, with Voysey emphasising spirituality and Lubetkin emphasising rationality. 
Holden, as a useful counterpoint to both, emphasised service and pragmatism in the 
generation of effects which were, in general, less ambitious, but no less considered as to 
their plausibility. 
 
How, then, should architecture to be investigated from a historical perspective? There is a 
fairly small body of methodological literature that addresses this, and raises the question of 
how architecture should be incorporated into and treated by narratives of and about the 
past. Güven distinguishes between the “history of architecture” where architecture is 
understood to be history‟s object, treated as history treats other objects of analysis, and 
“architectural history” which denotes a particularly architectural way of thinking about the 
past (Güven, 2006: 76-77). Güven firmly rejects the idea that architecture should be used as 
a stage on which historical enquiry reanimates the past as “history of architecture” suggests. 
Such a positioning is problematic as it would allow history to transcend its object, such that 
architecture would default to a container-like space rather than having agency by means of 
space in the formation of histories (Ibid: 76). As such, Güven prefers the possibility of 
“architectural history” and argues for a methodological separation for the sub-discipline 
from other forms of historical enquiry: not only from “history of architecture” but also art 
history. The logic in peeling away architectural history from art history is, in the first place, 
generated from the idea that artworks work in a narrow kind of way which is (plausibly and 
innocently) piecemeal and constrained: artworks are isolated and contained events with 
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defined boundaries to both their physical form and the nature of their encounters (i.e. they 
are going to be seen insofar that people go to see them: they are, in a sense, attractions, the 
visiting of which forms a particular way of paying attention to them) (Ibid). Architectural 
history, on the other hand, requires a much broader methodology to reflect an 
understanding of architecture as socially and culturally diffuse in the way it is conceived and 
put to work, aiming to include those things that art history, understood as the history of 
artworks, can plausibly preclude. Architectural history is obliged to reflect the different way 
it is encountered, and expand beyond the going-to-be-seen encounter to include spatial 
dynamics,42 wider functionalities, and being populated, a far wider scope than art history 
requires, and enough of a reason not to assume that architectural history should draw on 
methodologies from art history (Ibid: 76-77). Mumford (1924) is seen as a trailblazer in this 
approach, and Güven argues that Mumford did not simply catalogue buildings and their 
immediate histories, but accounted for their wider membership of and implication in larger 
systems (Ibid: 77).  More contentiously, Güven argues that we ought to proceed as 
Vitruvius43 proceeded, expanding beyond the immediate architectural object in a lightly 
polymathic style, and correlating working knowledges of the multiple fields that 
architecture connects to (I say “lightly” to reflect the fact that these multiple fields require a 
general, rather than a sustained, kind of engagement in Güven‟s methodology) (Ibid: 79). 
Güven‟s methodology is, in short, to research architecture through its connections from an 
understanding that architecture exists in an inherently connected way. 
 
It may be prudent to consider that Güven‟s lightly polymathic methodology invokes a 
heightened, perhaps artificially heightened, sense of how effective and important a building 
can be by understanding buildings as widely constitutive of other processes in society and 
culture as opposed to the object of art history, which is not connected into the necessary 
day-to-day work that architecture does. Architecture is understood in this sense to have its 
fingers in many pies, and this may explain why Güven argues that architecture should be 
given a privileged status as compared to the other things that history might study – its 
                                                   
42 In using the term “spatial dynamics” Güven refers specifically to the planar and volumetric surroundings, along with 
the routes and vectors, which are created by the plans and elevations of buildings. 
43 “Vitruvius” usually refers to Vitruvian Man, a drawing by Leonardo da Vinci c.1486, rather than Vitruvius himself (a 
Roman engineer who lived around 10BC), whose architectural treatise De architectura, denoted many standard practises for 
architectural design such as heating and ventilation, but most notably the standard bodily-derived proportions on which 
da Vinci based his drawing. The measurements derived from Vitruvian proportion include the yard (the distance from the 
sternum to the middle finger of an outstretched arm ) and the foot (the width of four palms) – all such measurements 
were multiples of a smaller body part (so a palm was the width of four fingers). “Vitruvius” and “Vitruvian” in 
contemporary architectural terminology generally refer to an effort to produce some form of standardised and repeatable 
architectural “rule” or procedure, as Vitruvius did. See Nuttgens (1997: 91, 102-104) for a brief overview. 
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connectivity does not allow it, in Güven‟s understanding, to be anything other than crucial. 
The problem with this idea of connectivity is that it seems monodirectional in that 
architecture influentially pulses outward from a central point through these many 
connections, almost the opposite of Jenkins‟ (2002) understanding of networked 
connectivity as discussed in the previous chapter (whereby the building seems to accrue 
from the convergence of multiple and more powerful external positions). Güven, whilst 
recognising that these connections can be theoretically bi-directional in principle, avoids 
hinting at how these connections might work in the opposite direction to impact upon and 
influence architecture, to become (at least partially) the outcome of contextual processes. It 
seems likely that this is an outcome of his hopes for a privileged historical status for 
architecture.  
 
The potentially special status of architecture is similarly appealed to by Yegül (2006) who 
outlines the methodological pitfalls of those approaches that appear to dismember the past 
of architecture and architects through a Derridean kind of deconstruction, although as 
Yegul demonstrates with a psychoanalytical deconstruction of Vitruvius, it is tempting to 
produce deeper understandings of things by carefully dismantling them (Yegül, 2006: 62). 
Nonetheless, Yegül is concerned by the imposition of Derrida‟s idea of the “absence of 
presence” whereby historical narratives are logically understood as a product of arbitrary 
structures like language, and this is seen to prompt a potentially unfair understanding of 
history as a constructed indulgence (rather than the articulation of findings) by filling in – 
essentially fabricating – past absences with currently familiar meanings (Ibid: 63). Yegül‟s 
argument is that the deconstructive stripping and unmasking of the past is undertaken from 
a platform of certain key tastes and beliefs such that, in much the same way as those 
historical practices it criticises, it finds what it admires, and it admires an arbitrariness 
which may not represent the reality of architecture in its original form. It is here that Yegül 
starts to outline an ontology of buildings which allow buildings and the practices of 
architecture therein to solidify and preserve concepts and meanings, a kind of ontology that 
deconstruction inevitably misses because its a-priori institution is the arbitrary, which it 
holds invisibly prominent. Deconstruction relies on a world formed discursively, and this 
undue prominence results in a concern with the social and political ideas that can form, 
shift, and reform about architecture rather than the ideas that architecture can solidify 
(Ibid). Architectural history, if it were to employ deconstruction as a methodological aspect 
of its enquiry, may occlude the meaningfully secure (even truthful) possibility of particularly 
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architectural pasts because of its inclination to discover the absence of such securing and 
the prevalence of the discursive, and the suggestion here is that architecture works in a 
more solid medium. 
 
The “nihilistic core” or deconstructionism in history does, at least, address the problem of 
truth and the enormous power claims that being “true” tap into, but that same nihilism is 
too apt to efface and delete that which may be significant and enduring (Yegül, 2006: 64). 
Perhaps, Yegül argues, the half-truths and word games of postmodernism and, moreover, 
the “reciprocating scale of time” therein (Ibid) may be a more promising avenue insofar 
that it allows the past to interrogate the present and potentially presentist tastes, including 
the presentism that dismantles pasts which may, in fact, be rather more coherent than that 
dismantling presumes. Yegül‟s alternative is to consider that past architectures might be 
phenomenological things that are more securely present because of what they hold 
together, and because they are adept at holding things together. In Heideggerian terms this 
represents a gathering, not a dismantling, and architecture understood thus is a privileged 
situation or, after Satre, a “perfect moment” (Satre, 1964: 195-199; in Yegül, 2006: 65). The 
hope here is to tap into the intentionality that past architectures might retain, of a building 
solidifying certain formulations of togetherness, rather than always ready to spin apart 
through a centrifugal arbitrariness. Yegül argues that places and architectures are laden with 
this sort of deliberate poetics which reminds us that we are somewhere, not nowhere, and 
this can be traced through the practices of architect (Yegül‟s example is critical regionalism, 
in which the brusque quasi-automatic perception of global architectural forms is 
interrupted by deliberate architectural acts that puncture this familiarity with “highly  
appropriately chosen poetic devices of defamiliarisation” (Tzonis and Lefaivre, 1990: 31; in 
Yegül, 2006: 66)). Yegül makes an overall argument for architecture‟s history to be 
privileged: certainly too privileged to be deconstructed if we recognise that a key feature 
and capacity of built form is to assemble and gather. To deconstruct is to falsify a present 
taste for the arbitrary onto a past that holds together far more assuredly than 
deconstruction presumes. 
 
Güven and Yegül both offer methodologies of architectural history that emphasise 
something special about architecture that would be missed by what they variously 
understand to be the prevalent discourses of historical study. Ballantyne (2006), on the 
other hand, is cutting in his criticism of these special discourses, and his commentary on 
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architectural historiography is laden with disdain for the way that historiography, such that 
it is, has emerged through the exercise of architectural conceits. There is a sense that the 
study of architecture in history has simply emerged through the uncritical preferences of 
practitioners in a wider discipline for the kind of privilege that Güven and Yegül variously 
argue for. He argues that the methodology of architectural history needs to be bedded on a 
key admission to the strange context of power in which an architect works. Like Ezzy‟s 
communion/caress methodology of interviewing (Ezzy, 2010: 165) where the interviewee 
confirms the interviewer, Ballantyne argues that the client confirms the architect and makes 
him possible. Unlike Ezzy‟s communion/caress, the power relationships in the history of 
architecture are fixed firmly in the favour of the client. Architects do not love or are 
addicted to power per se despite accusations to the contrary: they are attracted to (not by) 
clients with power and money and the inclination to express as much, as these clients will 
provide the best opportunities for an architect to afford the indulgences of his44 art 
(Ballantyne, 2006: 40). To be engaged by a wealthy client is not, however, a means to 
opening up unmediated possibilities for architects: it is emphatically not an open invitation, 
but more like an empowered leasing of their resources to the architect they employ, a lease 
that is highly conditional on what the client wants, and conditional on a wider context 
whereby architects have to express, additionally, the architectonic expression of the ideal 
being in society to which their clients aspire (Ibid: 38). This interwoven economic and 
social reality is, Ballantyne argues, often absent from architectural history discourses (Ibid: 
40) Architects have to perform those actions that would keep them employed or else they 
cannot undertake to perform anything at all: architects are, as such, either powerless or 
                                                   
44 All three of the architects I study in this thesis were men, which reflects the overwhelmingly male constitution of the 
R.I.B.A manuscripts collection. In her introduction to the more interesting corners of the collection, Mace's 1998 guide 
mentions only two women: Miriam Wornum and Jane Drew, with an additional mention of Lady Emily Lytton, wife of 
Sir Edwin Lutyens. A search through Mace‟s names index reveals few more (Mace, 1998: xiii-xv). This in turn reflects the 
constitution of the architectural profession both currently and in the past. In 2005 Building Design launched their 50/50 
campaign in an attempt to address the fact that, at the time, only 14% of practising architects were women (Building 
Design, 2005). Without doubt, the architectural profession is a male dominated field, and Walker confirms that this has 
been the case, quantitatively speaking, from the 1700's to the present (Walker, 1995). However, Walker's account reveals 
that behind this quantitative expression, striking though it is, is a substantial history of women in architecture which is 
worth remembering. Women's involvement in architecture's history is by no means insubstantial: before the 
professionalisation of the discipline (when architecture was primarily an artistic pursuit for the aristocracy which Walker 
refers to as the amateur tradition) it was understood that certain kinds of buildings ought to be designed by women (Walker, 
1995: 93-94, admittedly these buildings were often connoted with domestic or nurturing functions and were often 
philanthropic, rather than commercial, in their functions), and following professionalisation in the mid 1800s women 
were often employed in architectural practices, though  rarely at a senior level (this would not follow until the twentieth 
century, and Walker's argument is that women had a more equal footing in architecture before its professionalisation). 
Women were generally found working in technical roles that required delicacy and care such as detail drafting (ibid: 97). 
Without doubt, the architectural profession is and was dominated by men, and this is true of the period I study, but that 
domination shouldn't be taken to mean that women were either absent, or else so marginalised as to be insignificant or 
without the power to influence, and the fact that this thesis deals with the work of three men should not be taken to 
mean that they practised in environment from which women were completely absent. 
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more-than-powerless. Historical accounts of architecture, he argues, have to account for 
the willing, not wilful, architect and work from that image, simultaneously empowered and 
disempowered by drawing on a very conditional and leased brand of ability (Ibid: 42). 
 
However, historical accounts of architecture are not so candid about the nature of 
architecture in general. Ballantyne suggests that architects value most what they can 
control, and this is reflected in the methodology (or absence thereof) that architectural 
history utilises in which undue value is placed on form, colour, texture, light, and especially 
“style”, a cache of design options which are discussed as the central focus of architecture. 
“Options” is the key term here, because architectural history documents architectural 
indulgences, amplifying those features which architects can decide upon and control as the 
larger and most significant part of architectural practice (Ballantyne, 2006: 44-45). An 
enquiry that amplifies architects‟ options results in a neutron-bombed historiography in 
which the building as an outcome of architectural craft is considered more important that 
the impact it can generate on people‟s lives (Ibid) and it also ignores the particular life, 
lifestyle, and empowerment of the client who, in truth, specifies most profoundly what a 
building should and can be (Ibid: 45). The historiography of architectural history is, thus, 
intimately connected to a wider self-deception of the (mythical) significant architect in the 
field of architectural practice.45 
 
Ballantyne‟s proposals can be seen as a vicious pre-methodology, that is to say: he proposes 
an approach to the historical understanding of architecture which assumes, prior to that 
approach, that all architecture is produced in the vicious context of the architect-client 
relationship where the latter dominates. I hope to diverge from this (pre-) methodology. In 
the first instance, Ballantyne understands but may also fail to understand architecture as a 
marketed commodity. He proceeds from a “customer is always right” understanding where 
the market is contained entirely in the client‟s wishes: the client owns the terms of the 
market and architects respond to their invitations in a necessarily acquiescent kind of way. 
However, it seems no less plausible to suggest that architects can also invite within the 
                                                   
45 Some of these criticisms have already been recognised and deflected by those architectural geographies that outline “the 
bodily traces of the building‟s occupants” (Llewellyn, 2003: 269). Llewellyn‟s interviewing methodology is based on an 
understanding that “To engage solely with the drawing board reality of architectural ideology and ignore the experience of 
inhabited reality seems to answer only one set of questions about architecture and space” (Ibid: 266), a recognition of a 
trend which he attributes to Lees (2001) and which, as my previous chapter demonstrates, has been continued in later 
works. In a sense architectural geography already recognises the problems of overemphasis on forms and features and the 
way they void inhabitation from the question of what architecture is. It‟s also worth noting that architectural geography is 
not intimately bound to architecture‟s inflated opinion of how profound and effective it is, as Ballantyne suggests of 
architectural history. 
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logic of a market: they can utilise their brand of design and claim exciting possibilities 
thereof, and such an understanding needs to address the possibility that an architect can 
apprehend and alter that which clients want, i.e. that an architect might convince a client 
that he knows better as to what is actually best for the client. An architect might, for 
instance, point to his experience, training, professionalism as a commodity within this 
market-like dynamic that puts him in a certain position that may not be empowered per se, 
but is at least positioned to recover some power in the relationship. The architect can also 
limit the choice of what is on offer, not necessarily through outright refusals so much as 
arguing for (perhaps selling) certain ideas and combinations of ideas, lacing them with 
suggestions of how exciting, life-changing, and altogether attractive they are, and creating 
what is attractive rather than submitting to client- or context-generated ideas of what is 
attractive. In short, I suggest that the dialogue between architect and client is not as 
directionally fixed as Ballantyne suggests, or that the norm of being employed by a client is 
as solidly normative as he suggests, and it may also overemphasise what the brief is capable 
of. The brief is implied in Ballantyne‟s methodology as part of the solidity of client power, 
but the brief may not be that simple. I do not believe that the process of a client issuing a 
brief to the architect can logically be considered as absolutely constraining the architect (if 
the architect was constrained to an act of transcribing a design from a brief, would the brief 
not be the actual design?), the design is not irrevocably contained within its terms. Fulfilling 
the brief‟s expectations is a space, rather than a vector, where there is capacity for an 
architect to indulge his own tastes and beliefs which, when presented back to the potential 
client, remains a space in which he can tend to, argue for, and persuade into an existence 
those forms and features that suits him and which suits the client‟s changed mind 
(depending on how convincing the architect is) (see Tomes et. al., 1998 and Ryd, 2004 for 
overviews). I would suggest that it is not reasonable to drop the idea of commodification 
into a methodology or pre-methodology of architectural history without seeing the 
possibility of it being co-constitutive of the architect and the client, rather than the exercise 
of the client‟s power, backed up by cash and/or cultural capital. It marks a substantial 
generalisation that I do not consider tenable. 
 
I am more sympathetic to methodologies of the present and the possibilities for an idea of 
how current the past is (see Chattergee, 2006). In fact, this has become more of a 
methodological necessity in various subtle ways which I explore in the following three 
chapters, and in the rather more obvious overall sense that these buildings are, with two 
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exceptions, still put to the same or very similar uses they were designed for. Though there 
may be a recognition that these buildings were constructed in different and interesting 
social and cultural contexts, and although they may belie their age through varying degrees 
of wear and tear, most of the buildings in this study are understood, to varying degrees, as 
belonging in contemporary circumstances much as new buildings do (although this 
belonging is not always very secure, and I will complicate this point in the three chapters to 
follow). The upshot for me and my methodology was that, as my empirical work 
progressed, I found it increasingly difficult to classify, for example, a Voysey house from 
the 1890‟s as being or belonging in the past any more than a house built in the 1990‟s. 
Similar difficulties are faced by Güven (2006) who notes that each newly completed 
building is a potential member of “the club of architectural history” (Güven, 2006: 74) 
which inexorably expands the body of what is (potentially) historical, along with the fact 
that each individual building, regardless of age, builds up layers of its own history in its re-
use and re-understanding (Ibid: 75). In short, what architectural history has as an object of 
enquiry is increasingly numerous and, in each incidence, increasingly verbose.  
 
This inexorable expansion seems to de-stabilise the past and the present as separate entities 
by recognising the very fluid relationship between them, and as an overall methodological 
strategy it may be prudent to proceed on the basis that my work is not, strictly speaking, a 
historical geography. I am looking at how current inhabitants experience a building that is 
currently there with the emphasis on current: I am not discussing these buildings as if they 
happened in or belong to a past time. As such, my research has more in common with 
longevity, the extensiveness of being current and the tenacity of “old” things to remain 
current, rather than being understood as left over. Although I study accounts from archival 
sources, the products of those accounts still exist and are still being inhabited, and I am 
very uncertain at the prospect of interpreting the age and oldness of these buildings as 
though they are antecedent of the contemporary, and that their current existence is in a 
semi-dormant form largely displaced by more recent and relevant offerings: indeed, there is 
a risk of understanding that semi-dormant status as a kind of retirement from the 
contemporary, whereby an old building is re-cast as something that helped lead into and 
prepare the way for those currently affirmed things that displace it. However, the nature of 
my research and the way this thesis is structured denies this “leading-to” validity where an 
old building is a pre-echo of something more valid. Without doubt, the buildings I study in 
this thesis have a distant inception, but this does not mean it is reasonable to understand 
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them as any less current than something that was built in the recent past. They are, after all, 
still inhabited, and almost all of them are put to the same uses that they were originally 
designed for. They also exist in a context in which it is relatively normal to inhabit and use 
buildings in the present that were not built recently or, in fact, during out lifetimes (see 
previous chapter). I find it difficult to countenance a methodology on the terms that 
something of the past is “past” and no longer belonging in the current unless it is very 
particularly labelled as being of the past. It appears to me that longevity is a better frame to 
approach my work through rather than antiquity. Longevity does not rule out the potential 
to be current (taken literally, it actually suggests a recursively successful articulation of 
being current), and it is not easy for me replicate the dustiness of Lorimer‟s archive here 
(Lorimer, 2010: 248-249). That which I study does not seem to settle, or indeed give the 
appearance of being settled, into the past. 
 
This worrisome temporal ontology does not alter the fact that I have utilised archives for 
my study of Voysey, Holden, and Lubetkin. Lorimer (2010) suggests that the practices of 
archival research are rarely discussed in detail, and this is partly because they are stored 
written documents (written in the past, by people of the past, about past events) and, being 
written, the assumption emerges that even if they are not self-evident as research objects, 
the way we engage with them is by sitting down and reading them, which is as self evident 
as how one handles an article (academic, news, or otherwise) (Lorimer, 2010: 249-250). In 
the absence of a methodological statement, certain acts coalesced and became the 
traditional norm which Lorimer describes as a taste for forensic detail and scrutiny, the 
cross referencing of those forensically produced findings to other similar findings so that 
they are mutually supported by mutual precedence (a kind of quantitative edge), and an 
ability to spot bias and tainting (Ibid: 251-252). The outcome was objectivist-positivist style 
of inquiry that understood archives as datasets waiting to happen, and rejected acts of 
inference, conjecture, speculation, and other such interpretations as errant (Ibid). Lorimer‟s 
archival methodology hopes that some of this conservatism can be rejected, starting with a 
rejection of the masculinist trope of conquering the past by rendering it into a particular 
kind of sensible format which appeals to a particular kind of sensibility (Ibid: 261). The 
emergence of Lorimer‟s “making do” methodology further hopes to produce archival 
vitalism, not least by extending the idea of an archive outside the traditional sedentary 
bounds of the reading room and, he notes, perhaps geographers have always imagined the 
archives they read into imaginatively animated scenarios: 
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“It is now inaccurate to figure archival work as an entirely sedentary exercise. 
However, on reflection, this was never so. While the body is ever present on 
site, thoughts are restless and nomadic. [...] Oftentimes, without any great act of 
will, researchers call on their geographic imagination to picture, to populate, 
and to personalise the pasts to which they are dedicating such time.” (Lorimer, 
2010: 257) 
 
Lorimer argues that a plausible next step is an archival portability that capitalises on this 
geographical imaginary by locating the archive in landscapes which that archive refers to as 
a corollary of imagining the landscape from the archival setting (Ibid: 257). Lorimer also 
hopes, additional to portability, for the generation of a more collagist archival 
methodology, the logical result of abandoning the attempt to violently staple findings 
together into academic triangulations and a respectful kind of light-footed presence: “In 
such a fashion, the principles of beachcombing and „freeganism‟ – reclamation and 
accumulation by other, less wasteful means – can be turned back on the exercise of 
research” (Ibid: 259). 
 
My archival work is differently vital to Lorimer‟s. His methodology displaces the 
masculinist-positivist approach of facts arrived at by intra-archival triangulations, and I do 
not doubt the value of this, or the light-footed presence with which he places himself in an 
archive understood to be collage-like. I agree that it is not reasonable to claim facts out of 
archival sources, not least because the archives themselves are specifically produced to 
meet certain criteria and interests (I discuss these below), and my attendance (in fact, the 
attendance of any researcher) in an archive is similarly produced to follow up and elucidate 
certain aspects of pre-defined interest. Neither the archive, nor my attending of it, produce 
a full or factual account of each architect I study. In fact, my attendance at the archive 
performed surgery on the traces of the architects I studied. I was specifically looking for 
insights into what they wanted their buildings to do, and how they hoped this could be 
plausibly achieved through combinations of assumptions and/or architectural devices. 
There are many other aspects of their biographies, practices and thoughts which (unless 
they spoke directly to or immediately contextualised the architectural intentional) I pared 
away in order to specifically look at this aspect and reflect my interest. I ought to 
emphasise “interest” in this instance as a reminder than I am interested, not disinterested, 
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and I would suggest that only disinterested researchers could synthesise and constrain the 
full scope of each architect I study in this thesis, possibly resulting in the exhaustive 
triangulations which Lorimer describes as exactly that which ought to be avoided (Lorimer, 
2010: 251-252). My surgical conversion of the manuscript collections of Voysey, Holden, 
and Lubetkin into a research resource is a heavy-handedness that might offend Lorimer, 
and in an indirect way also serves to corral and connect findings in a way similar to that 
which he criticises of traditional archive methodologies (though in my case, through a 
medium of dismissal). And yet it is only through this very heavy-handed vector – the 
simple need to constrain this study, the recognition that I can‟t look at everything – that I 
can expect to treat archival finds with the “freeganic” delicacy that Lorimer hopes for (Ibid: 
259), which I couldn‟t possibly replicate except at this immediate and immediately 
contextual level. It is a surgical violence that allows me to tend, rather than corral, the 
archives. 
 
This is not to say that I follow Lorimer‟s methodology with precision thereafter. In the first 
case, I did not create or perform archival portability as he does, not least because I never 
thought it was my place to perform it, and because I assumed from the outset that a 
portability for the archive I used already existed insofar that the insights that were recorded 
by Voysey, Holden, and Lubetkin were intended to be “placed”: that those ideas were 
destined to be architecturally produced in some form, though not necessarily a secure or 
sure one. Indeed, Lorimer‟s insights almost suggest that the archives we use were created 
for the sake of archiving, which is obviously erroneous (and may represent my erroneous 
reading, or reading too much into, his arguments). My understanding of archives is that 
they exist for and because of something outside them. A methodology intent on vitalising 
them seems surplus to requirements from this perspective and, moreover, to assume that 
archives need this treatment seems to assume that they are ordinarily stilled. I cannot help 
but feel that we are better off, and potentially more light footed, by connecting archives to 
the vitalism they connote in and of themselves rather than dragging them into our 
imaginations, in situ or otherwise. It is no less possible, and perhaps more plausible, to look 
at archives less as scripts or reviews of performances, and more as pre-performances of the 
actually performing things that a given archive is about. In other words, what I read in the 
85 
 
archive can be thought of as having a corollary (at least in hopeful form) outside the 
archive46.  
 
In the second case, I am more inclined than Lorimer to arrange my archival collage 
differently to how I found it, an approach that rejects his fleet-footed attendance. In doing 
this, I recognise a strange combination in his account between affirming the geographer‟s 
creativity through imaginative and off-site (but in-situ) reanimations of the archive, whilst 
restraining the geographer from creative vectors through the archive itself: to tend, rather 
than attend. I do not, by any means, wish to be ignorant to his point that the archive is 
violently treated by the sort of attendance which dismembers delicate collages to produce 
certainties from their original rambling forms. Nonetheless, if one of my architects made 
the same or similar points in different locations in his archival collection, dated to different 
times, I have generally brought them together and treated them as emergences from and 
evidence of an original idea, repeated down the years. This could be criticised as a 
neatening of the practices of an architect in a way that he never actually practiced, but this 
criticism aside, I felt that I had to take the recurrence of things more seriously than a 
collagist approach might, and whilst my methodology may inadvertently neaten the 
architect, I hope that it also attests to the potential for Voysey, Holden, and Lubetkin to 
have practiced neatly and consistently too, as I do not wish to impose a messiness on them 
which I cannot be sure was the case (indeed, the repetition of the same or similar idea in 
different places and times suggests a consistency that might not be suited to a collagist 
approach). By the same token, I have to bear in mind that Lorimer‟s archives seem 
altogether more naturally, almost organically produced than the institutional archives that I 
used, and some sort of rearranging and triangulating, masculinist or otherwise, has already 
been visited on the archive before researchers like me have a chance to make their own 
surgical inroads. 
 
The rearranging and triangulating of the R.I.B.A archives is therefore worthy of note. 
There are certain aspects of this thesis which have emerged somewhat by accident: 
sometimes this errant quality has been deliberate, as reflected by my interview 
methodology, and sometimes they are inadvertent. One such inadvertent outcome is the 
                                                   
46 In fact, in the course of my archival research, I found that many of the archive documents I was reading were written in 
hindsight after the completion of a given building or, indeed, the architect‟s retirement, and we might argue that this is a 
case of the situation being reversed in which, rather than the archive being animated outwardly, the archive is in fact 
doing its own kind of animation which is, potentially, not unlike the extra-architectural events that Jacobs describes 
(Jacobs, 2006: 10, see my discussion in chapter one). 
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high profile of each architect I‟ve studied. Most architects do not get their personal and 
professional papers archived and made available, as this often requires a substantial 
investment by the organization that would archive them. The purchase price marks the 
start of that investment, and even if the archive is given in the form of a bequest, there are 
ongoing archiving costs that have to be met. As a result, the archives that are made 
available are generally those that are understood to be important, either in general terms or 
specific to the organisation who is investing in the archive. Voysey, Holden, and Lubetkin 
were all lauded by the profession, though not always consistently. Eventually, all three 
architects received R.I.B.A Gold Medals (Voysey in 1940, Holden in 1936 and Lubetkin in 
1982) and all three architects have been reviewed in substantial monographs (on Voysey, 
Simpson 1979 and Hitchmough 1995; on Holden, Karol 2007; and on Lubetkin, Coe and 
Reading 1981 and Allan 1992). If nothing else, this is an important commentary on the 
constructed nature of archives and a recognition that what gets archived and what gets 
ignored is the result of a larger narrative as to what the archive should ideally do, and what 
architectural history ideally is. It‟s my understanding that R.I.B.A‟s archive rationalises the 
history of British architecture into key practitioners and the key buildings they produced, 
and understands that these practitioners generated certain ideas and practices which 
contribute to, perhaps even institute elements of, the current practice of architecture. It is, 
in short, a list of the most important breakthroughs and innovations in the field, a register 
of achievements and achievers, on which basis Voysey, Holden, and Lubetkin seem to have 
been included, and others ignored.  
 
What gets “ignored” is a surprisingly complicated act that the term “ignore”, if interpreted 
as unequivocal rejection, might belie. In the case of the R.I.B.A archives there are different 
ways of ignoring papers in the manuscript collections of each architect I‟ve looked at, and 
most of these relate back to the OPAC which the manuscripts and archive service shares 
with the R.I.B.A British Architectural Library (R.I.B.A, 2010). The Voysey collection is 
sufficiently compact to have an OPAC record for each item with descriptions (sometimes 
quite detailed and, for smaller items, transcribed in full). Thus, in one sense, the size of the 
collection influences how much or little of it is ignored. The Holden and Lubetkin 
collections are vast in comparison, and only receive this kind of detail in certain cases. 
Whereas the Voysey collection is detailed page-by-page, the Holden and Lubetkin 
collections often have whole folders described as “assorted notes” (an archival box might 
contain over twenty folders and each folder might contain up to approximately forty loose-
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leaf, stapled, or clipped documents). Those items that receive lengthy descriptions are, 
generally speaking, those which are associated with important events (such as Holden‟s and 
Lubetkin‟s Gold Medal acceptance speeches), those which discuss what are understood to 
be the key works of each architect, and those which are understood to form microcosms of 
their ideas and philosophies (as is the case with the way their Gold Medal speeches have 
been recorded). In this tripartite nomenclature of events, works, and microcosms, certain 
things get “ignored”. As an example, I would refer to Lubetkin‟s notebooks (which I have 
made substantial use of in Chapter Five). These receive minimal attention in R.I.B.A‟s 
OPAC, despite containing substantial amounts of some of Lubetkin‟s most personal 
thoughts, and the way he worked through, considered, and reconsidered his philosophical 
and ethical approaches. However, it does not easily fit into the tripartite nomenclature I‟ve 
identified, not least because they are rough notes. The OPAC tends to dwell on that which 
is more finished, polished and, perhaps, representative. However, what I hope is clear from 
this is that the R.I.B.A do not outright dispense with anything. They emphasise and de-
emphasise key aspects of the archives they hold through their OPAC, and the printed 
“handlists” shelved in the archive and manuscript reading rooms, but this ignoring does 
not constitute outright dismissal, and definitely not disposal. The R.I.B.A received both the 
Lubetkin and Holden archives as bequests (the transfer of the Lubetkin archive actually 
began whilst Lubetkin was still alive, and continued after his death in the manner of a 
bequest) and every item originally bequeathed remains available. It is the degree to which 
those items are admitted to in the subsequent organisation of the archive that constructs 
what is “ignored”. 
 
Conclusion: 
 
The point on which I ended the previous section raises the question of whether my 
findings in the three chapters to follow actually tell us something about inhabitation 
generally, or whether they are special inhabitations limited to special buildings that are 
different and debatably relevant to that (possibly) far larger body of architecture that is 
ostensibly normal, achieved but lacking achievement. This possibility may be reflected in 
the fact that each building in this study has been listed, mostly at Grade II or II*, and a 
small number at Grade I, another accidental outcome, but one that shouldn‟t be surprising 
given that the interests that confirm the importance of archiving certain architects are 
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similar to and linked with those that decide what ought to be preserved outside the archive 
too. 
 
In answering this, and in closing this chapter, I return to my assertion that it is possible to 
look closely at variety in a way that architectural geographies have only partially achieved. 
This thesis aims to make a start at looking closely at the various ways buildings are 
designed to be experienced and the various ways inhabitants experience them. It is not my 
intention to state how or to what degree my insights can be generalised (this additional 
question falls outside the scope of my thesis and would be better suited to an altogether 
larger document, assuming that “variety” is compatible with generalisation at all), and the 
fact that I have studied three ostensibly important architects means that some of the 
varieties I will now proceed to outline may be greater in number and more “special” 
compared to a more diminutive and modest array of inhabitations in buildings understood 
as being of normal and modest origins. But I do not believe that these insights are so 
special, or located so far outside of architectural norms, to be irrelevant to architectures of 
inhabitation or inhabited architectures as a whole. To assume that this is the geography of a 
special enclave is, I believe, unreasonable. It may be more reasonable to suggest that I am 
delineating an empirical attendance around the more vigorous and vibrant aspects of 
architectural inhabitation to see what is possible and plausible, and that elements of these 
inhabitations may be present in reduced form in other inhabitations at buildings which do 
not have the “special” veneer that the buildings I study may have. In admitting this 
possibility, however, I am concerned about the concurrent possibility of writing off a large 
body of architects, buildings, inhabitants and inhabitations as relatively basic in 
comparison. To identify them as basic would be thoroughly unsuited to a thesis which aims 
to complicate the capacities of inhabitation in architectural geography with ideas of 
perceptive analysis in inhabitations and “pre-” habitations. I cannot, and would not, suggest 
that the architectures and inhabitations I haven‟t studied or generalised toward are 
diminished in their vibrancy As such, this thesis forms an exploration of what is possible, 
and contains no guarantees as to how widespread those possibilities are. It is enough, for 
now, to sketch out what those possibilities are unto themselves, which the following three 
chapters undertake to do relative to the methodological points I‟ve outlined in this chapter. 
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3. 
Voysey: 
 
 
In this first (of three) empirical chapters I aim to expand both on Charles Voysey‟s 
understanding of architectural plausibility, and the plausibility that is created or offered by 
the current inhabitants of Voysey‟s buildings. “Inhabitants” is a key term here: the idea of 
plausibility that this chapter and the following two chapters engage with will revolve 
around the inhabitant. This focus may seem obvious (where else would an architect of 
inhabited buildings aim to be effective?), but a building does not have to be effective 
towards its inhabitants per se: it can, for example, try to be effective at blending into the 
surrounding landscape, and a given architect may not consider the need to be specifically 
effective at all. This possibility notwithstanding, the three architects I investigate in these 
three central chapters all understood that the effectiveness they were trying to plausibly 
create was supposed to have effects on the inhabitants of their buildings. This chapter, and 
the two that follow it, aim to outline what effects a building attains as a result of the 
planned inhabitations and the actual inhabitations that shape it. That is to say, firstly, its 
inception at the point of being designed, and secondly, its conception at the point of being 
inhabited. These two sites, which form the first and third strand in the heuristic I detailed 
in the previous chapter, are the points from which I construct the building and the various 
plausibilities of it being or failing to be effective (the second strand). I ought to reiterate 
that I am not seeking to outline how the angularity and sinuosity, smoothness and 
roughness, wideness, thickness, colour, balance, or any other such property of the building 
might have an effect. To fix or otherwise discuss the inherent properties of a built form in 
such a way lies outside the scope of my work here (though for an introduction, see Dovey, 
1999). Instead, I look to either side of the building, towards the inceptions and conceptions 
that produce it as an intersection of plausibility between the architect and the inhabitants. 
Those forms and things are still there, but they are discussed here as to the plausibilities 
that are attached to them, rather than the inherent mechanics of what they do. 
 
Because I look to either side of the building to better understand it, this chapter and the 
two that follow share a common structure whereby the inception – the architect‟s 
intentional work – and the conception – the latter inhabitations – are treated one after the 
other, clearly demarcated by images of the work of either Voysey, Holden, or Lubetkin. 
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The first half of this chapter is formed by my discussion of Charles Voysey‟s architectural 
approach and what his approach could plausibly project into and through the building. As I 
seek to understand what he was trying to achieve and by what means, it will become 
increasingly evident that the plausibility he developed was based around a postulated, 
virtualised inhabitant who had certain capacities and characteristics that would be amenable 
to the effects that Voysey was trying to create. Put another way (one that might appeal to 
Jenkins‟ (2002) understanding of a network-emergent building), Voysey‟s plausible 
architecture was based on enrolling an inhabitant that he hoped and reasoned would exist, 
and who needed to exist in order for the architectural effects to properly, plausibly 
materialise. In this way, inhabitants were as much a constituent material for Voysey as were 
bricks, stones, timbers, and cement: to an extent, people had to work as he hoped they did, 
if the building was going to plausibly work as he argued it should. This may suggest that 
Voysey maintained a simplified, material understanding of his future inhabitants who co-
operated silently. In fact, he demonstrated and worked from a merged ontology where 
personalities and materials converged and combined producing, he hoped, a building that 
could assert itself meaningfully almost as if it had a personality itself. 
 
The possibility of architecture being effective in its current inhabitation depends, to extents 
which I will explore in the second half of this chapter, on how astute and efficacious the 
current inhabitants of Voysey buildings believe that Voysey was in predicting them and 
their needs, tastes, and analytical capacities. Here, what the inhabited buildings can 
plausibly do is based around a concept of inhabitation which is quite different from that 
which currently prevails in the architectural geography literature, specifically because I aim 
to demonstrate that inhabitants can bring often perceptive and enquiring modes of 
inhabitation to the buildings they live in or use. People do not simply take up space in 
buildings. They do not simply find things nice, pretty, and convenient, as is sometimes 
hinted at in recent work in architectural geography and in some of the attendant literatures 
(as I discuss in my introductory chapter). Inhabitation includes the astute, knowledgeable, 
and analytical projection of plausibility toward the building. Between this projection (my 
“third” strand) and the architect‟s projection (my “first” strand), I set up the conditions 
from which to produce an account of how buildings are intersections and co-constructions 
of plausibilities, some of which dissipate and become lost, some of which remain, and 
some of which are in contention with one another.  
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An additional aspect which I will explore in this chapter is that of the disjunctures between 
Voysey‟s work at the point of completion and the current inhabitants of his buildings. 
There is, potentially, something productive about these disjunctures, though it would be 
easy to suppose that the opposite is true. In this and the two chapters to follow, I begin to 
outline the possibility that these disjunctures do not split inhabitants off from the architects 
and the architectural effects they intended the building to have. In fact, the disjuncture is a 
potential amplifier to the plausibility of those effects. The possibility of a strange and 
different origin of the building that is tangential to current norms and expectations is, for 
some, enticing and sparks in their imaginations a process whereby closer attention is paid 
to the building and, therein, to the possibility that it was produced to contain and effect 
particular intentions. In some of the arguments to follow (in the second half of this 
chapter) the fact that the building is understood to originate outside contemporary norms 
is a cue for them to be un-taken for granted, to receive closer and more analytical attention 
which may make them, despite the time elapsed, at least as present, and perhaps more 
present by virtue of being closely examined, as contemporary buildings which, being 
contemporary, emerge from norms which can be assumed of them. 
 
Such arguments represent a complication of the inhabitant and a complication of Jacobs‟ 
(2006) building event. Her understanding of the event is that it is externally formed with 
non-architectural narratives that explain and animate the plausibility of the building 
(Jacobs, 2006: 11), but in my research I detect the possibility that building events can be, at 
least in part, internally formed through the behaviours of inhabitants which, like Jacobs‟ 
external props, keep the building going in a way similar to what the architect intended, or 
what is imagined that the architect intended (as I do not wish to suggest that the enquiring 
nature of inhabitation is able to simply transcribe and reiterate those original intentions). 
There is the possibility of considering that people‟s inhabitations are like narrating events, 
produced by the closer attention that these buildings merit over a disjuncture, and that this 
contextually produced interest has the effect of internalising the event into the inhabitant, 
whose interest forms a narration that keeps the building going as intended, much as Jacobs 
thinks that published narratives keep buildings going (or explains their failings) (Ibid). 
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Box 3a: Charles Francis Annersley Voysey. 
 
Personal events and associations: 
 
28th May 1857: Born, Hessle, nr. Hull (East Riding of 
Yorkshire) to Rev. Charles Voysey and 
Frances Maria Voysey nee Edlin. 
1859: Voysey family move to Craigtown, 
Jamaica. 
c.1861: Voysey family return to UK: Rev. 
Voysey becomes curate of Great 
Yarmouth. 
c.1861-1864: Rev. Voysey is transferred to, and then 
dismissed from, St. Mark‟s Church, 
Whitechapel (London). 
c.1864-1871 Voysey family move to Helaugh, North 
Yorkshire, where Rev. Voysey is made 
curate, then vicar. 
1871:  Rev. Voysey expelled from Church of 
England. 
1871: Rev. Voysey inaugurates Theistic 
Church in London. 
1881: Voysey commences his own practise in 
London, but receives no commissions 
for buildings, designing wallpapers and 
textiles instead. 
1885: Marries Mary Maria Evans. 
1890-1906: Voysey‟s busiest period, during which 
the majority of his works are completed. 
1912: Rev. Voysey dies 
1917: Unofficially separates from Mary Voysey 
and moves, alone, into a flat in central 
London. 
12th Feb1941: Dies, Winchester (having been moved 
from his London flat at the outbreak of 
war). 
 
Education: 
 
c.1871-1872: Attends Dulwich College. 
1874-1879: Articled to John Pollard Seddon. 
1879-1880: Employed in the practise of Saxon Snell 
as an assistant. 
1880-1881: Employed in the practise of George 
Devey. 
 
(Source: Briggs and Hitchmough, 2007: Hitchmough, 
1995: 8-30) 
Returning to Voysey, the following section begins to discuss how, and for what reasons, 
Voysey hoped to secure effects in his buildings that could overcome a variety of 
hypothesised disjunctures to 
productively reach the inhabitant, 
including the potential for 
planning authorities and building 
contractors to annul his carefully 
designed incursions. Moreover, 
implicit in his philosophies on the 
plausible effects of architecture is 
the possibility that his work 
would be lasting, and in my 
introductory discussion above it 
should not be assumed that the 
effect of Voysey‟s architecture is 
one that only happens in friendly 
acts of activation by inhabitants. 
Whilst the inhabitants‟ 
engagement with the disjunctures 
they experience is important, 
Voysey‟s designs and, to some 
degree, the thinking behind them, 
may have solidified effects into 
the building that, arguably, work. 
That is to say: he designed certain 
experiences to happen whose 
happening is actually experienced 
by current inhabitants. 
 
Charles Frances Annersley 
Voysey (see Box 3a for basic 
biographical details) can, and has, been classified as an Arts and Crafts architect. Such 
classifications are largely problematic, given that they serve to neaten and homogenise 
individuals into groups with common characteristics. Nonetheless, his work does bear 
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Box 3b: Charles Francis Annersley Voysey. 
 
Professional timeline and key commissions: 
 
1879-1880:  Supervises construction of various 
projects for George Devey. 
1880: Voysey starts his own practise. 
1880-1888: Voysey is employed principally on non-
architectural design work including 
furniture and interior designs, but 
principally wallpaper and fabric patterns. 
1882: Completes first independent work, 
interior designs for a summer-house in 
Surrey. 
1888: Publishes speculative cottage design in 
The Architect leading to his first 
architectural commission. 
1891: Completes 14 South Parade (Bedford 
Park). 
1893: Completes Perrycroft (Malvern). 
1895: Completes Annersley Lodge, for Rev. 
Voysey (London). 
1898: Completes Broad Leys and Moor Crag 
(Cumbria). 
1902: Completes Sanderson and Sons 
wallpaper factory (Chiswick). 
1906: Completes The Homestead (Frinton-on-
Sea). 
1911: Completes house in Malone Road, 
Belfast – his last commission for a full 
building. 
1911-1927: Commissioned for various minor works, 
including alterations, interior 
decorations, furniture designs, and 
church fitments. 
1915: Publishes Individuality (Voysey, 1915) 
1924: Elected Master of the Art Workers‟ 
Guild. 
1929: Elected a fellow of the R.I.B.A. 
1940:  Awarded R.I.B.A Gold Medal. 
 
(Source: Hitchmough, 1995: 8-30, 230-234) 
certain hallmarks of a movement which extended across the creative arts to include 
architecture, and which emphasised simple, natural forms. This does not entail actual 
transcripts of natural forms in 
design (though this was not 
uncommon), but emphasises the 
natural way of creating forms, that 
is to say: honest to the functions 
they were to be employed for, and 
to the materials they were made 
from. By recoiling against 
superfluous and ostentatious 
over-decoration that seemed to 
define the Great Exhibition of 
1851 (Davey, 1995: 13) and the 
machined harshness of mass-
produced products (Cumming 
and Kaplan, 1991: 9) the Arts and 
Crafts movement aimed to 
produce materialities without 
artifice, but also without the 
inhumanity of pure functionality. 
In architecture, the figurehead for 
Arts and Crafts was A. W. N. 
Pugin47, and he expounded two 
essential principles. In the first 
place, the building should contain 
no features superfluous to what 
was appropriate or necessary, and 
in the second (and closely related) place, ornamentation should not be appended to 
buildings, but should be included as part of those appropriate and necessary parts (Davey, 
1995: 15-16). Voysey‟s work broadly accorded with these principles, but found in them 
sufficient breadth to create his own particular interpretations, and to claim that he, and his 
                                                   
47 Augustus Welby Northmore Pugin (1812-1852) is credited with shaping the early Arts and Crafts movement around a 
kernel of Gothic and medieval revivalism – although Pugin‟s understanding of the medieval is famously rose-tinted 
(Davey, 1995: 13-16) 
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work, were absolutely and necessarily individual, the complexities of which form much of 
the discussion in the first half of this chapter. 
 
Voysey‟s buildings, illustrated in a plate section in the middle of this chapter (marking my 
transition from archival to interview analyses) sit low in the landscape, generally in 
emulation of the natural morphology that surrounds them, and weighted there by large 
pitched roofs as if to keep them from immodestly poking out or protruding. Asymmetrical 
and buttressed, so that the walls slope to the ground instead of chopping into it at right 
angles, their frontages are carefully arranged with simply detailed windows, doors and 
ancillary features. Although these features are arranged in bands, their positions alternate 
within these bands, and few features are repeated exactly like another – each has its own 
stylistic treatment, which shares a theme with neighbouring features, rather than copying 
them. The result is a variegated facade which is, at the same time, consistent. And although 
his buildings are simple, Voysey was not a minimalist (and it could be suggested that he 
accorded with Arts and Crafts principles in this respect). There are no wide blank expanses 
of wall or glass in his buildings. It would not be too unreasonable to describe their aesthetic 
as cottage-like (though Voysey House48 (fig. 3.1) is the obvious exception), but they are far 
more precise, efficient and assured in their execution than any cottage I can imagine, and 
far more functionally adept, with fit and purposefully designed features and the relative 
absence of obstacles. All of these features that I have described here (and illustrated in the 
plate section in the middle of the chapter) can arguably relate to particular motivations and 
ideas which I now proceed to discuss. 
 
Introducing Voysey: 
 
Voysey‟s most introspective thoughts are to be found in The value of hidden influences, as 
disclosed in the life of one ordinary man. Dated 5th June 1931, it is the only lengthy 
autobiographical document in the R.I.B.A‟s manuscript collection. It was also written in 
hindsight: Voysey had turned seventy-four two weeks previously, and excepting sporadic 
commissions for minor works, he had not practiced architecture49 for twenty years. This 
                                                   
48 Located in Chiswick, London, and completed by Voysey in 1902 for Sanderson and Sons, manufacturers of wallpaper, 
Voysey designed the building so that its width would comfortably accommodate an open roll of wallpaper, with large 
windows to illuminate the work in progress. It has since been converted into offices (at which point it was renamed 
“Voysey House”), and a small penthouse was later added behind the roof parapets, which itself has also been converted 
into office space (see Hitchmough, 1995: 232). 
49 I make this point in terms of the completion of buildings. According to Hitchmough (1995) Voysey‟s practice stalled 
briefly until a flurry of commissions arrived between 1907 and 1909. He designed four houses in 1909, one of his busiest 
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may explain its resigned, melancholy tone as he outlined his perceptions of his unpopularity 
as an architect. It is here that Voysey seems most honest, perhaps brutally honest (but by 
no means apologetic) about his professional life, and I would suggest that he took this 
opportunity to cast a similarly frank and critical light on his personality. In this opening 
section, I detail Voysey‟s account of his personality, not for the sake of contextualising an 
argument, but because Voysey understood that architecture could form personalities 
through the same ontological means that his own personality had been formed. 
 
The specific characteristics he listed here are couched in an understanding that his 
personality was delegated to some degree, and he traced the origins of those key aspects of 
his character away from himself, crediting their initiation to certain situations, the influence 
(directly or indirectly) of social and cultural contexts or, as in the following example, his 
immediate family and friends. He was the third of ten children and the eldest son, 
inheriting his father‟s name (it was through his father‟s side of the family that Voysey could 
claim to be descended from John Wesley50). He shared the company of his elder sisters 
(Frances and Mary), who, he wrote, “exercised a very salutary and humbling effect upon 
their brother” so causing the emergence of “highly strung, imaginative, and nervous” 
aspects of his personality (Voysey, 1931a [Voc/4/6]: 1)51, qualities which he found 
beneficial to the many varied tasks he recalled undertaking when, after completing his 
pupilage, he worked as an assistant in the offices of noted domestic architect George 
Devey (1820-1886) (Ibid: 4)52.  
 
The effect that Voysey‟s sisters (allegedly) caused in him, and the possibilities these effects 
enabled in his professional life, show us only one small corner of Voysey‟s interesting 
childhood and adolescence. Those authors who have written about Voysey tend to dwell 
extensively and linearly on this period through what seems like a common “policy”, 
                                                                                                                                                     
years of practice, and Hitchmough argues that “when Voysey designed them, at the age of fifty-two, he probably did so in 
the belief that his practice was regaining momentum after a fallow period of a few years” (Hitchmough, 1995: 201). 
However, after the fourth house only one more confirmed completion is documented (in Belfast, 1911), and thereafter, 
the most substantial commissions he received were for small extensions and decorative schemes (and the flow of these 
steadily dwindled: he received only three such commissions in the 1920‟s, see Hitchmough, 1995: 230-234). He was asked, 
and presumably paid, to produce a number of initial designs for clients who, ultimately, lost interest, and he also produced 
a number of (failed) competition entries (for details of both see Simpson, 1979: 129-137), but these sporadic projects 
didn‟t require anything like the scope or detail of a full design scheme. Some of the extra scope and detail required outside 
producing plans and elevations is explored later in this chapter through the correspondence between Voysey and one of 
his clients.  
50 Charles Voysey‟s great, great grandmother, Susanna Wesley, was the sister of religious reformer John Wesley (who 
founded the Methodist Church in England) (Hitchmough, 1995: 9). 
51 Although autobiographical, Voysey wrote Value of hidden influences in the third person.  
52 Devey was a member of the Theistic Church, which was founded by Voysey‟s father, the Reverend Charles Voysey 
(Durant, 1992: 9). 
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whereby key aspects of Voysey‟s adult personality are traced back to a series of trigger-like 
events and encounters in the first twenty years of his life. This tendency is evident in the 
work of Brandon Jones (1978, 199853) Simpson (197954), Hitchmough (199555) and Davey 
(199556), who all project Voysey‟s childhood and adolescence indelibly forward into his 
adult life, prompting (or at least explaining) many of his actions right up to his death (12 th 
February 1941). As such, both Voysey and his biographers share an understanding of his 
development that proceeded along trajectories, the directions of which were founded early 
in his life. To understand Voysey and his character as a lifelong reiteration of boyhood 
influences is undeniably problematic. Then again, their approach may not be entirely 
incorrect or unreasonable given that Voysey made it clear that this is indeed how he chose 
to understand himself in certain respects, and that some of his most valued attributes were 
deliberately and proudly reiterated results of a formative youth, rather than automatic 
reiterations of the habitual and normal (like his highly strung nervousness): he valued these 
attributes intensely and consciously chose to reiterate them throughout his adult life in a 
way more deliberate and voluntary than these authors always allow for. 
 
Voysey‟s father, Reverend Charles Voysey (1828-1912, “Reverend Voysey” hereafter) 
features heavily in these reiterations. The first twelve years of his life were frequently 
disrupted by his father‟s career, which took them to various locations, mostly in the UK, 
but also including eighteen months in Craigtown, Jamaica, where Voysey claims that “a 
kind black nurse found it necessary, in order to keep the baby boy of three quiet, to give 
him so much sugar that it developed jaundice, which was followed by a weak digestion that 
lasted for the rest of his life” (Voysey, 1931a [Voc/4/6]: 1). Shortly after the family 
returned to England, Reverend Voysey‟s controversial sermons began to attract widespread 
attention (they had already caused him to be dismissed from his previous parish in London, 
                                                   
53 Brandon-Jones‟ suggests that Voysey was a staunchly individual “old-fashioned Tory” (Brandon-Jones, 1998: 98), but 
also suggests that his father, Reverend Voysey, was instrumental in introducing Voysey to the work of John Ruskin, and 
he further reports that Voysey inherited some of Ruskin‟s books from his father (Ibid: 96). Out of all the authors 
mentioned here, only Brandon-Jones ever met Voysey: he was christened by Reverend Voysey and worked in the 
architectural practice of Voysey‟s son, (Charles) Cowles Voysey (Ibid: 92-93). 
54 Simpson suggests that Voysey was “as unyielding to change as his father” (Ibid: 13) 
55 Like most other authors, Hitchmough argues that the influence of Voysey‟s father and his tribulations, is “worth 
evaluating in some detail because they had such a profound, and in some respects disastrous, effect on his adult character 
and behaviour” (Hitchmough, 1995: 11, emphasis added) and whilst she recognises that the effect cannot be quantified, 
she attributes a number of Voysey‟s adult beliefs and characteristics to Reverend Voysey‟s influence (Ibid: 13). 
56 Davey‟s opening statement on the continuing influence on Voysey‟s childhood is interesting for the way he connects 
that influence to (what he understands to be) key forms and treatments in the nomenclature of his architectural grammar: 
“Voysey‟s early years must have been very happy, if strictly regulated, and, perhaps as a result, there is an element of what 
some have condemned as childishness in all his work: a delight in simple jokes, such as designing an iron bracket to the 
profile of a client‟s face, and a love of obvious symbolic imagery: hearts, bull‟s-eye windows and big green water butts.” 
(Davey, 1995: 89) 
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after which time he was appointed curate, and then vicar, at Helaugh (North Yorkshire). 
He was charged with heresy in 1869 and found guilty by the local church authorities. When 
he appealed to the Privy Council (conducting his own defence) his ongoing trial caught the 
attention of the national press (Hitchmough, 1995: 10-11). He was found guilty again and 
offered the opportunity to retract his claims: instead, he re-affirmed them and was swiftly 
deprivated thereafter. Those claims included denying the divinity of Christ and Christ‟s 
miracles, and refuting the idea that a loving God could cast his subjects into hell, claims 
that reflected his rationalist re-reading of the Bible (Ibid). 
 
However, the trial had harvested a number of key supporters and generated sufficient 
interest and support that, on moving to London shortly after, Reverend Voysey founded 
the Theistic Church, which solidified the key aspects of his beliefs into a theology. The 
impact of this on Voysey was assumed sufficiently potent that, prior to an exhibition of his 
work in 1931, a particularly famous admirer said of him: 
 
“What his father preached to thousands in London, Mr. Voysey has interpreted 
in stone and colour.” (Betjeman, 1931: 93) 
 
Voysey and his father were close, and part of this closeness may stem from to the fact that 
Voysey did not consider himself academically adept. Like all the boys of the family he had 
been sent to Dulwich57 for his schooling, but “the eldest son was so backward and stupid 
that the headmaster was not keen to admit him. The preliminary viva voce so upset his 
nerves that he appeared more stupid than he really was” (Voysey, 1931a [Voc/4/6]: 3). 
Because of this, Voysey was schooled at home by his parents: he was taught by his mother 
at first and, alongside his elder sisters, learned needlework and knitting (Ibid). Thereafter, 
Voysey recalled that he was “taken in hand to be taught by his father. [...] The father was 
tender hearted and affectionate to a degree seldom surpassed. And suffered far more than 
his son when he felt it to be his duty to rap his son‟s knuckles with his keys, to cure his 
stupidity” (Ibid: 2). This tongue-in-cheek comment belies the importance of his father‟s 
company in terms of the personal result Voysey credited it with: 
 
                                                   
57 Dulwich College (in Southwark, South London) list Voysey as one of their famous alumni: his school number was 892 
and he attended from 1872 to 1873 (Dulwich College 2010). 
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“And he [Rev. Voysey] visited his parishioners throughout a struggling parish 
in company with his son, who in this way to some extent imbibed his father‟s 
principles, and learnt to reverence his generous nature, which in after life 
proved to be of more value than a classical education” (Voysey, 1931a 
[Voc/4/6]: 2) 
 
In this way, Voysey understood that he was receiving important faculties from his father, 
and of these faculties, one in particular stood out for the possibilities it offered: 
 
“When Providence wants to affect the movement of men‟s minds collectively, 
he sends a few pioneers to work individually. Individuality, not egotism, was a 
passion with this man, who in consequence disliked all forms of collectivism.” 
(Voysey, 1931a [Voc/4/6]: 6) 
 
Voysey thus credited the combination of his father‟s company and teaching with a lasting 
appreciation of the human faculties of character and intellect. A much wider world was 
opened up to him in the realisation that he was not, in fact, obliged to “collective” forms, 
established elsewhere and followed by (but restraining) the multitude. He could, instead, 
develop his own ideas and approaches into thoughtful territories of his choosing rather 
than simply dwelling, uncomfortably and perhaps unhappily, among the ideas of others 
(such as the staid environment of scholastic learning). This may mark the germination of 
individuality, a concept of key importance to Voysey, and one that he credited to his father‟s 
example58. Specifically, individuality was inspired by Reverend Voysey‟s aversion to 
Anglican dogma and his concurrent rejection of fixed, imposed ideas whose fixity quelled 
the possibility of new ideas and annuled the faculties for generating them anew. This fixity 
was the natural opposite of individuality, and Voysey termed it collectivism. The interplay 
between defective collectivisms and corrective individualities motivates Voysey‟s whole 
philosophy, and I‟ll return to that interplay throughout this chapter to illustrate it. It is 
worth noting now, however, that he did not understand individuality as a licence for 
unrestrained journeying into new territories and possibilities: in fact, Voysey credited his 
                                                   
58 It should also be noted that Rev. Voysey was credited with introducing Voysey to the works of Ruskin (see footnote 
52), whose influence may be equally as potent. John Ruskin (1819-1900) was an acclaimed and highly influential 
polemicist, and an art/architecture critic who suggested that if architecture was pared back to the perfectibility of rules, 
anybody could learn them by rote. Humane architecture, he argued, had to be imperfect, or “savage”, because it allowed 
for invention in the absence of rules, and de-mechanised the human in that process. Davey argues that this had a 
profound impact on the Arts and Crafts Movement as a whole (Davey, 1995: 18-19). 
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individuality with producing a highly territorial aspect in both his architectural philosophy 
and his personality. The territoriality of individuality was a product of the discipline 
required to produce one‟s own ideas, which entailed the rejection of the external and 
different: 
 
“He was insular to the backbone. And could not admit that familiarity with 
foreign countries was necessary for true culture. The avoidance of fashionable 
practices [of architectural revivalism] was congenial to his rabid individualism. 
Obviously this type of mind was regarded by many as a form of egotistical self-
isolation. And a form of eccentricity only understandable to those of similar 
temperament and mental outlook.” (Voysey, 1931a [Voc4/6]: 8).  
 
There is, here, a hint at the price he paid for his beliefs in social and cultural terms. Writing 
shortly after his death, Voysey‟s son Cowles59 stated that Voysey never had a hobby as 
such, did not play games, never holidayed, and never travelled overseas (Voysey, C c.1941 
[Voc/5/3]: 5).60 Nonetheless, in Voysey‟s own writings and the writings of those who knew 
him (such as Betjeman (1931) and Brandon-Jones (1976, 1998)), is a sense that individuality 
produced a defensive stance. Voysey‟s thoughts were at once freed from collective dogma 
after his father‟s example, but in their individuality and the “rabid” attention that 
individuality required to one‟s own faculties, they simultaneously produced a constraining, 
insular logic. 
 
His reflections in Value of hidden influences seems to allude, a little sadly, to this irony. 
Furthermore, despite his germinating teenage discovery of individuality and the recognition 
that traditional scholarship (such as that he received – briefly – at Dulwich) was a collective 
instrument, he always regretted his supposed minimal academic ability. He was “haunted by 
the consciousness of being insufficiently educated in the generally accepted sense of the 
word; so increasing his natural shyness that he shrank from society and the meeting of 
strangers to the day of his death” (Voysey, 1931a [Voc/4/6]: 8), although those who knew 
and wrote of him suggested that he was wry, adequately sociable, and aside from being 
perhaps a little intense, charming company. Perhaps the melancholy tone in which he wrote 
                                                   
59 His full name was Charles Cowles Voysey, but his friends and colleagues referred to his by his middle name, a 
convention which I will follow here to avoid confusing him with Voysey and Reverend Voysey. 
60 In fact, this last observation is incorrect: Voysey travelled with the Art Worker‟s Guild on a brief trip to the 
Netherlands in 1906 (Brandon-Jones, 1998: 93). 
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Value of hidden influences fails to do him justice here, and perhaps this is a useful reminder of 
two important points: the first, that archived manuscripts are by no means unmediated or 
“clean” sources, and second, that although archives are stilled and unchanging, the person 
behind the archives was a changeable complexity of moods, ideas, and attitudes. 
 
What these points demonstrate, or at least start to demonstrate, is that Voysey thought of 
himself as intrinsically caused: he argued, as those who have written on him since have 
argued, that he was re-behaving attitudes that he had been previously exposed to. From the 
outset, there is an ironic contradiction between the delegation of his personality to the 
influences of others and the claim that the principal characteristic he entrained by such 
means was the necessary fortification of his personality against dogmatic impositions, to 
wall himself off so that nothing errant or dogmatic would prevent him from forming his 
own ideas. The principal instance of this contradiction is his apparently unyielding 
reverence for and emulation of his father‟s anti-dogmatic individuality. The apparent 
impossibility of delegating the acts of possessive self-definition – of being induced into not 
being induced – is a conundrum that animates and complicates Voysey‟s whole approach 
to architectural design, and the rest of the first half of this chapter is formed by my efforts, 
and my understanding of Voysey‟s efforts, to work through this conundrum and to 
ascertain how it was implicated in, and productive of, buildings that could manifest effects 
on future inhabitants. I have started to discuss this here because, as the following two 
sections demonstrate, personalities and externalities (i.e. that which lies outside the mind) 
existed in an osmotic relationship, each infusing into the other and mutually entrained. This 
ontological understanding and the way it informed his architectural output was, I suggest, 
not merely a model reserved for architectural design. More fundamentally than that, it 
described the formation of his personality and how he‟d become who he was, an unusual 
mix of fortification and delegation that included preferred ways of being affected, alongside 
the means (and the conditions that would merit those means) of retreat and deflection. For 
Voysey, the formation of his personality was a precedent for the process of creating 
architecture along the same lines and he was, in a way, his own prototype in terms of how 
to influence and be influenced. This is why I have opened this chapter with a discussion of 
his personality, and why the remainder of the first half of this chapter discusses how 
architecture could alter personalities by apprehending them where they could be most 
profoundly affected. 
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Thinking at the point of Love: 
 
The task of discussing Voysey‟s philosophy would be easier if it had a neat, central node 
through which his conceptions were linked, and from where they radiated out. In place of 
such a node is a diffuse ethical charge which flows outward and through his more defined 
understandings. But whilst the centre is indefinite (and perhaps unreasonable of me to 
hope for), the cause to which he dedicated himself is clear, and his conceptions and 
observations, though they are variant in themselves, are all routed towards it. This cause – 
Voysey‟s overriding aspiration – was to improve thought, and the purpose of his 
philosophy was to map the ways that thought could thrive and attain a particular kind of 
excellence, the ways it could stagnate and fail, and the conditions that would lead to either 
eventuality. Critically, he also believed that thought (of any quality) could not be withheld 
and would inexorably find some form of outward expression, arguing that the “true motive 
of our desires will dominate, and turn the scales for good or evil” (Voysey, 1906: 7, 8, 21-
22; Voysey, 1932: 461). This understanding acts as a loadstone within Voysey‟s ontology in 
which the mind cannot have or occupy a sovereign territory (or manifest a solid barrier) 
between it and the material/social outside world. Introspection was therefore a temporary 
state, and he conceived of thought with an inexorable, centrifugal momentum.  
 
The importance of thought for Voysey reflects and is reflected by the substantial pleasure 
he derived from the accumulation of various different considerations: my lasting 
impression of him is that he enjoyed being thoughtful and found satisfaction in assembling 
his thoughts into remedial theories that provided steadfast truths and answers (it may have 
been the quiet thrill of arriving at answers that provided a substantial part of that pleasure). 
At the same time, thinking was more than just a pastime for Voysey: his philosophy, both 
in general terms and specific to architecture, relied upon the possibility of a co-existence 
between what people liked and what people thought. He believed that the most 
fundamental, normal, and purposeful human act was to develop affections, and it was at 
the point of affection that thought could potentially achieve both its zenith and its most 
dismal low. He wrote62: 
                                                   
61 Many of Voysey‟s published and unpublished writings include statements to this effect: some are veiled or couched in 
explicitly moral terms, whilst others are stated in a more factual manner that specifically attended to material incursions or 
inhabitations. His (unpublished) 1932 Bookplates, symbolism and philosophy makes the simplest statement in this respect, that 
to create something was to inevitably discharge “passions” into it (Voysey, 1932 [SKB458/2]: 4), and the same was true of 
our deficiencies. 
62 In my discussions of Voysey I will often span large periods of time between quotes: this is because his outlook, from 
the early 1900‟s to his death in 1941, remained fundamentally the same. The only real differences are in the examples he 
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“No-one will deny that “love” is the most potent motive power known to man. 
Throughout all ages men have felt this so keenly, that life may be said to be 
one great struggle towards a just classification of the objects of our 
affection…” (Voysey, 1904: 71) 
 
And, 
 
“…to enquire of oneself the why and the wherefore of our likes and dislikes is 
immensely helpful, and stimulating to reason and justice.” (Voysey, 1915: 40-
41)  
 
These affection-based acts of liking (and disliking), loving, and enjoying were fundamental 
to Voysey because he believed they were fundamental to the emergence of character (“our 
existence here,” he wrote, in the opening to his only full length book Individuality, “is for the 
purpose of growing individual characters.” (Voysey, 1915: 7)63). By identifying the “most 
potent motive power” of human existence, he identified a point of origin where his hopes 
for better thought would need to work. In doing so he also hinted at the cerebral and 
enquiring forms that thought ought to take (hence the emphases on terms of enquiry like 
“why”, “wherefore”, and “classification”). Locating this eudemonic fountainhead of human 
character at the affections offered Voysey a site from where he hoped to weave such 
considered thought, and the nature of that consideration was to analyse, understand, and 
classify the affections according to the qualities (or deficiencies) they offered. “All we need 
to acquire” he wrote “is the power to discriminate between good and noble thought and 
feeling and the baser sort” (Voysey, 1909: 107)  and, “It was not enough to have a vague 
sentimental liking for artistic work, for sound reason must be sought to explain one‟s likes 
and dislikes.” (Voysey, 1931(a) [Voc/4/6]: 6)64  
 
                                                                                                                                                     
used or the subjects he discussed as new influences came to bear on society and architecture. More of these will be 
outlined as the chapter progresses, but for now it‟s important to note that in almost all cases Voysey apprehended 
changes in society and architecture with the same philosophical rubric rather than changing his philosophy to allow for 
them, a trait he shares in common with Lubetkin, who also stuck to his guns fiercely. Of my three architects, only Holden 
allowed for the fallibility of his conceptions to any substantial extent. 
63 The full quote reads: “Let us assume that there is a beneficial and omnipotent controlling power, that is perfectly good 
and perfectly loving: and that our existence here, is for the purpose of growing individual characters.” (Voysey, 1915: 7)  
64 Similar points are reiterated in Voysey, 1906: 6-7, 25. 
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Voysey‟s hopes for architecture were firmly attached to this ethic of confirming, rescuing, 
or otherwise assisting the emergence of good thought by strengthening human reasoning at 
the point of affection. This appeal to reasoning should not be interpreted as an appeal to 
scholasticism. Such efforts, he argued, were limited to the collection and listing of facts as 
they were materially manifested, whereas Voysey sought and hoped for wisdom, a more 
intuitive and “spiritual” sort of insight which extended factual knowledge to include the 
richly meaningful properties that things possessed, but which science (understood as paying 
attention to the physical alone) could not apprehend (Voysey, 1915: 17-20). Voysey‟s use of 
the terms “spiritual” in his written work does not indicate an understanding of material 
things as god given (although he was clear in his beliefs that there was a “beneficent and 
omnipotent controlling power” (Ibid: 7)51), but rather that all things had (and could not be 
bereft of) character, and that character had to be understood and accounted for in the way 
things worked. The inevitable suffusing of everything with character in Voysey‟s 
conceptions is the start of a complex and interesting ontology which I discuss in the 
following section. The shape of Voysey‟s epistemology, on the other hand, is indicated by 
his recoiling against pure scholasticism as a means of reasoning about this world, though he 
had no problem with scholastic approaches so long as they were always tempered, perhaps 
subdued, by spirituality (Ibid: 19). His alternative way of accurately knowing an 
interconnected ontology of material facts and spiritual apprehensions proposed that objects 
of study should be broken down into their constituent parts and investigated, almost as 
though each small part was related in a constructional way as though one were building it 
(Ibid: 13: 14-15). This process of disassembling, looking, and reassembling was far more 
productive than simply creating facsimiles of the whole (this was simply imitative, rather 
than knowledgeable (Ibid)). This would, as I understand it, invoke a kind of wonder, or 
reverence, for the beauty of the way things fitted together and worked, for the idea that 
they were the product of endeavour and will. It appears that to work out how something 
worked was, in some sense, to personify it, that to pay a particular kind of attention to such 
things that recognised the effort they went to in order to hold together. 
 
His architecture was thus designed to appeal to and assist this very personal and potentially 
very analytical process which, arguably, reflected the personal and analytical process by 
which he claimed to have developed his own thinking (through his relationship with his 
father) and his uncomfortable (if brief) tenure at Dulwich. The nature of that process is 
outlined in the following section. 
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The Eudaemon: 
 
 “Eudemonic” is a useful term when discussing Voysey‟s conceptions: meaning conducive to 
happiness and deriving from the Greek Eudaemon – a benevolent demon – it has come to 
connote a more considered, cerebral happiness, as opposed to the raw hormonal force of 
elation or ecstasy. It neatly mirrors Voysey‟s project of weaving reasoned consideration into 
the fundamental eudemonic acts of being human (as he conceived it). It also sits well with 
Voysey‟s understanding of the word “love,” which excluded either being in, or falling in, 
love (hence, I suggest, his recourse to inverted commas around the word (Voysey, 1904: 
71)). In excluding the romantic or sexual from his understanding of the term he was left 
with a remainder which was not only platonic, but also pragmatic and highly reasoned (or 
at least, with an enhanced capacity to be reasoned about). For this reason I will use the 
term “affection(s)” instead of “love” to more accurately represent what he really meant, i.e. 
developing an appreciation, taste, or otherwise reasoned enjoyment for something. 
Eudemonic is a term of my choosing and I think it best describes this aspect of his 
thought, though I am not aware of Voysey having used it in his manuscripts or published 
work.65 
 
To describe affection as a fountainhead within Voysey‟s philosophy may suggest that he 
interpreted the affections people formed as somehow elemental, pure, unitary, and 
influential to the point of deterministic. But Voysey‟s thinking did not allow for such 
simplifications. Affections could not be invented in the confines of the mind: in fact, 
affections were not even possible unless they were for or about something from an outside 
word full of things to encounter and like (or dislike). The reality of affections was that they 
could only exist in a conjoined state, and those things that affections conjoined with 
brought with them all manner of influences. Voysey understood that affections, being 
conjoined, were at least as delegated as they were determining, and he understood that 
“character” was principally the aggregated result of those affections we chose to retain and 
return to. In other words, character was both motivational and habitual: to build a life that 
                                                   
65 That said, Eudaemon-like imagery arises at least three times in his commissioned work and personal effects: first, in a 
plaster book-end which Voysey is said to have made himself and which he based on his own facial features (Brandon-
Jones, 1978: 29), second, an upscaled version of the bookend, carved in stone at a house he designed for George Müntzer 
(of the building firm F. Müntzer and Son) at Guildford in 1906 (Ibid), and third, in a wallpaper design, The Demon, of 1899 
(reproduced in Hitchmough, 1995: 50). In all cases the demon seems smiling and benign (as befits Voysey‟s religious 
beliefs), and this repeating motif has often caused me to wonder whether he was aware of the Eudaemon or the concept of 
eudemonia, despite never mentioning it per se. 
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would continue to include those encountered things that our affections identified as good 
and worthy, and to develop more and better personal faculties to apprehend them with. So 
understood, a person‟s existence in the world was inexorably centripetal as well as 
centrifugal: our most fundamental thoughts leached back into the world of encounters with 
which they had conjoined.  
 
I‟ve chosen to make and reinforce this point early in my discussion because Voysey‟s 
affections profoundly intersect the individual human with the more-than-human. The way 
Voysey mapped out this populated human existence emphasised an osmosis (rather than a 
simple “encounter”) between a material world with its many objects and morphologies, and 
the individual together with his/her faculties. The term “encounter” suggests two discrete 
things becoming proximate or adjacent: osmosis adds a sense that these things are 
susceptible to one another and that they might encroach on one another in some way, 
which better describes Voysey‟s ontology. Clearly, for Voysey, the more-than-human world 
was far more than a collection of interesting things for already-formulated thought 
processes to be applied to: at the point of an osmotic encounter they provided fundamental 
components that completed our fundamental eudemonic circuits, inciting fundamental 
human faculties of affection, from which to build characters the sought our likes and 
eschewed our dislikes (Voysey, 1909: 118; 1915: 7). This was emphatically not a matter of 
correspondence (of messages or impulses being projected over some form of divide and 
with some form of delivery medium). It was a conjoining which, along with “eudemonic” 
and “osmosis”, are terms that Voysey did not use, but which I‟ve chosen deliberately to 
describe his understanding that human existence (understood as fundamentally affection-
driven) can only be, at least initially, profoundly more-than-human.  
 
In fact, my explanation of this process and the terms I‟ve chosen are rather more analytical 
than Voysey would have liked. He conceived of affection, character, and the analytical 
understanding of both in a more symbiotic and organic way, and he understood this to be 
obviously natural and self evidently normal66: 
                                                   
66 When Voysey made his claims and observations, they were often made with little to support them. Whereas we might 
keep our claims “upright” by buttressing them with reasoning, precedent, or evidence, Voysey relied on bold statements 
delivered with the forceful confidence of his belief (and those things that his belief rendered obvious to him) hoping this 
would firmly plant his claims. For instance, in his discussion of the importance of “love” (affection) he stated: “No sane 
creature was ever born without the power to love…” (Voysey, 1904: 71, my emphasis) invoking at once a sense of one‟s 
potential idiocy/insanity by countering this assertion. Similarly, he would often describe his statements as “obvious” or 
self evident in some way, and fall back on powerful but untenable comparisons (such as his claim that viewing ugly 
surroundings was harmful to us in the same way as foul odours were (Voysey, 1909: 113): this was at a time when germ 
theory was yet to be fully accepted and foul odours (“miasma”) were still widely understood to be the means by which 
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“Reason, conscience, and love are the three faculties that should operate in all 
we say and do; and by love we mean that emotion of reverence, respect, and 
admiration for all that we regard as noblest and best. […] Motive is the key-
note to all subsequent action and the fruit of character.” (Voysey, 1906: 6-7) 
 
 Whilst the more-than-human is central to Voysey‟s philosophy, this quote (from Reason as 
a Basis of Art) suggests that “central” should not be misinterpreted as “equal”.  The 
emphasis on enquiry and reasoning here (and in his written and archived work generally) 
suggests that the more-than-human should be subordinate, and that its centrality should be 
functional compared to the attendant human faculties like “reason, conscience, and love...” 
(Ibid) whose powerful ethical illumination outshines the material and social. Within the 
osmotic dynamic of affection, the effect of individual faculties seems to be more profound 
and purposeful and constitutes a cerebral reach that can capture and discipline that 
conjoined-with existence and exert an ethical influence on it, highlighting the “best” things, 
and especially the “noblest” things, to be apprehended in the osmotic encounter. This sort 
of apprehension would seem to be substantially beyond the realm of emotion as that term 
is understood in sensual or impulsive terms. Voysey believed that the affections could be 
intelligently attended and ethically equipped, and Voysey‟s project was to assure this 
attending and equipping, so maximising the human command of an inherently more-than-
human reality. When I discuss Voysey‟s principal aim of improving thought, I refer in 
particular to these faculties and the noble attributes they were understood to harvest: the 
thinking that qualified people to command the best from a conjoined reality at the point of 
conjoining. 
 
This idea of command describes, theoretically speaking, the ideal way for a person to exist 
in a more-than human reality; with their affections buttressed by reasoning and ethical 
faculties. However, Voysey‟s project to locate the affections within an enhanced intellectual 
sovereignty was not assured: he was sufficiently astute to recognise from the outset that 
thought and feeling did not automatically guarantee ethical fortification at this key point. In 
fact, a substantial element of Voysey‟s architectural approach was to create a story of 
human existence in which lofty capacities were ostensibly the norm (and always the ideal), 
                                                                                                                                                     
disease was transmitted). Such approaches kept Voysey‟s critics well nourished. A review of Individuality (Voysey, 1915) in 
the Burlington Magazine for Connoisseurs freely admitted to his skills as an architect and designer, but described his outlook as 
“without systematic reasoning” and “full of trite moralities” (J.R.F., 1915). 
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but a very fragile norm that could be threatened by certain key vulnerabilities. The 
possibility of these vulnerabilities – the key vulnerability, as it were – was provided in his 
ontology because affections, to exist at all, had to enmesh with and allow the influence of a 
world beyond the individual and his/her faculties (a world full of things to like and dislike). 
By definition, affections could not be insulated in the mind, and the world they conjoined 
with (especially the world at the turn of the century when Voysey was practising) seemed to 
be full of malign influences that had been crafted with an appealing nature, using that 
appeal as a currency with which to charm our affections and by-pass those processes of 
consideration and evaluation on which he placed such importance. The affectionate 
osmosis between the individual human and the social and material worlds provided equally 
for nobility and fallibility. 
 
Investigating this fallibility will eventually return this discussion to collectivism. Before 
doing so, however, I want to trace how the above line of thought outlines another key 
feature of Voysey‟s ontology. Although he specifically aimed to equip the mind with 
faculties of reason and ethics at the point of affections, he simultaneously realised that the 
material and social aspects of the world were also equipped. The material aspect of the 
world – that of stuff and objects – had a dual capacity. It had the capacity to affect the 
mind per se in an unaltered state, but moreover, that capacity was accessible to people who 
could expand and alter its influence. He wrote: “All objects possess intrinsic qualities, 
having a direct influence on our minds and emotions, but, in addition, we invest them with 
associations” (Voysey, 1911: 60). Voysey outlined this latter process with a (very) simple 
example: 
 
“If I cannot be graceful and comely, I can at least have a graceful and comely 
umbrella, and in that way help keep up my interest in those qualities” (Voysey, 
1909: 112) 
 
In short, things could be given ideas that they did not ordinarily have – the capacity of 
material was porous and accessible such that people could commandeer, expand and direct 
it to a given purpose. Voysey‟s umbrella, in this instance, was suffused with some typically 
noble qualities which could be conjoined with it. It also demonstrates Voysey‟s thesis that 
the world we were encountering/conjoining did not exist in some blank and natural state: it 
accommodated a huge variety of human intent, some of which was, like his umbrella, 
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graceful and comely, and some of which was not. In this way, our characters, via our 
affections, yielded to the ideas and intentions contained in the things and objects we 
encountered (in a centripetal sense), and these things and objects also absorbed the 
thoughts, feelings, and intentions that we inevitably expressed (centrifugally). Voysey 
outlined this point a number of times, for instance: “…the ugliness in our homes is due to 
ugliness in our character far more than to poverty or ignorance,” he wrote (Voysey, 1906: 
22) and “Sincere thought and feeling is transmittable through things material, soul 
responds to soul. […] How else do we explain the emotions we receive from works of 
art?” (Voysey, 1915: 17). 
 
The possibility that this presented to Voysey was that, with sufficient reasoning and 
exercise of faculties, not only could people apprehend the best, noblest aspects of that 
which they encountered affectionately, but they could return that favour to the material 
world in that same osmotic moment. This raises a number of interesting possibilities, all of 
which seem to share an essential feature: that of rationalising a plausible interface between 
people and materialities from which to practice architecture that could have an effect.  
Voysey‟s understanding of plausibility was formed between the possibility that we could 
define the content of what could be encountered, and the possibility of engineering the key 
point of the encounter, the affections, to conjoin with only the best kind of encounters. 
 
The porosity of material things in Voysey‟s philosophy assumed that materials could both 
absorb our thoughts and feelings, and repeat them or render them legible in some way, 
which raised ethical questions for Voysey himself.  In what sounds like a quantitative 
understanding of a qualitative logic, the osmotic encounter that affections allowed for (and 
which allowed for the mutual manipulation and vulnerability of both characters and 
materialities) could be purified by the sort of reasoned thought that he proposed. If, by 
attending the affections with “reason, conscience, and love”, we could favour the best 
things to affect and constitute us and reject or somehow annul the more malign influences 
we might encounter, that system of personal purification would eventually extend to the 
world of objects and materials. As long as we hoped for and sought the noble and ethical 
from the world and remained able to reject the inadequate and malign, this dual regime of 
demand and rejection would leave inadequate and malign forms in a state of disuse, and the 
demand for the noble would lead to a more-than-human world replete with noble forms 
waiting to be encountered. This self-reinforcing logic seems to sit at the heart of Voysey‟s 
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hopes, both as a means to the better (nobler) thought he wished to see of people, and as a 
means to remove the malign influences that might threaten it. It also demonstrates his 
understanding that the key to achieving nobility was not contained entirely within the 
faculties, but in generating an environment replete with noble possibilities, thus: 
 
“It is for us to kindle the thought and feeling that shall form the motive power 
by which material forces are turned to good account.” (Voysey, 1909: 103) 
 
And, 
 
“Let us then see to it that our work is palpitating with sincere and noble 
thought and feeling, whatever our work may be.” (Ibid: 109) 
 
It is also clear that having affections, if interpreted as a particular act of consuming, was 
also an act of crafting: Voysey looked to and hoped for an element of craftsmanship in 
everyone. In the first instance, the simple act of choosing had implications of craft for the 
way its regime of demand and rejection re-made the material world. Our surroundings were 
a crafted reflection of both our tastes and our grasp of noble faculties. For the most part, 
this was how the centrifugal part of Voysey‟s ontology worked, although the individual may 
not believe it... 
 
“[T]he great majority do not regard their possessions as having anything to do 
with their own personal characters, and will resent such a suggestion.” (Voysey, 
1906: 23) 
 
For those like Voysey, however, who were actually involved in the design and production 
of these materialities, the ramifications were more immediate and demanded “generosity”: 
that is, to be literally generous with the noble and benevolent content of a designed or 
produced material form (Voysey, 1909: 118, 120). Because Voysey understood that the 
materials he worked with were porous (that they could be commandeered and used to 
reflect and reiterate ideas), he also understood that it was the concomitant duty of designers 
and craftsmen to take advantage of this porosity. There were, however, no specific means 
of doing so: Voysey understood this to be the natural and normal result of an osmotic 
reality, and the intentions of designers and craftsmen would essentially flow into an object 
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as it was created by virtue of proximity and absorption rather than inscription. 
Unfortunately, this provided equally for the possibility of failure: material could just as 
easily reflect our base motives and inadequacies. And when such materials provided 
inadequate cues to our affections, it was a very human act of inadequacy given that those 
materials simply acted as extensions of our intentions. 
 
Indeed, it was not so much an ambition to render the osmotic encounter to the benefit of 
our faculties as it was a necessity and an obligation. Voysey recognised the possibility that, 
if we failed to engage with the world in this particularly wilful manner, we were essentially 
submitting to it instead, allowing a sensual world of material offerings to define us without 
question: 
 
“...we have run after the perfection of the machine and preferred it to the 
perfection of the human heart.” (Voysey, 1909: 108) 
 
Running through Voysey‟s ontological understanding is an ethical imperative to avoid this 
by consistently bringing ourselves to bear on the material world and that, if we are lacking, 
or if our faculties fail us, we would default to base and unconsidered offerings which 
profoundly undermined his principal aim (of improving thought). If people were too 
content (or idle) to form affections for things without adequate faculties in attendance, the 
things they liked, and the characters they developed, would remain stagnant.  
 
The philosophy outlined here, in which an osmosis between the individual and the more-
than-human is enabled by affectionate acts of liking and disliking, is the source of Voysey‟s 
architectural approach, his system of ethics, and his motivation. But, interestingly, there are 
points in his published and archival work where he abandons the osmotic idea in favour of 
an idealised separation between “physical” and “spiritual” nature (“spiritual” connoting the 
faculty-laden individual mind67): 
 
“Our nature has always been twofold, viz., material and spiritual.” (Voysey, 
1909: 104) 
 
                                                   
67 In Voysey‟s earlier publications, he used the word “higher” instead of “spiritual” to describe the noble thinking he 
hoped to find in people.  
111 
 
In an early pamphlet, he went so far to describe them as “separate spheres” (Voysey, 1906: 
11). This may reflect the complexity of an approach that attempts, as he did, to combine 
and account for the cerebral and the corporeal in the same moment (of affection), and it 
may equally reflect the fact that this conjoining wasn‟t supposed to be equal so far as he 
was concerned, but skewed in favour of people and subordinating the material to their 
command. It may also admit to the tension between trying to combine two things that 
obviously engage one another profoundly, but are self-evidently distinct: this causes me to 
wonder whether he used the idea of affection as a third “sphere”, activated by the 
encounter and lifting elements from both the physical and higher spheres, ordinarily 
distinct, into a different space of affection that is neither “physical” or “higher” but 
surrogates elements of both, always aiming to render the result to the advantage of our 
faculties. As he wrote: 
 
“[I]n early life men learn to separate their characters, and live two lives. One 
which has a moral purpose, and one which is purely material. Instead of which 
we ought to combine the two, and so remain more conscious of the moral 
significance of all matter, mindful too, that matter is merely the vehicle for the 
expression of thought and feeling, and the school-house of character.” 
(Voysey, 1915: 53) 
 
This suggests the possibility that Voysey‟s “separate spheres” (1906: 11) is a statement of 
policy, and whilst his ontology admits to the osmosis between the individual mind and the 
external world of materials and things, it may be that he sought a degree of distinction 
between them in practice so that the more cerebral faculties might remain ascendant. 
 
At this stage in my account we can start to review the construction of plausibility in 
Voysey‟s approach to architecture, despite the fact that architecture has not been 
particularly emphasised so far. Indeed, it is apparent that when Voysey considered the 
plausibility of enacting ideas through materials he worked at a general level which included 
architecture only as part of the general schema of a combined ontology and epistemology. 
Specifically, the combined contradiction of his personality, understood as both delegation 
and fortification (which I discussed in the previous section) starts to emerge as a key aspect 
of how to be affected and how to manage affects with and through non-human things at 
the point of their encounter, which Voysey understood as inexorable per se, a constantly 
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reiterating osmosis wherein the personal and internal had to be constituted by and 
constituting of impersonal externals. This combined centrifugal and centripetal ontology 
was, I suggest, as true for existence generally as it was for him personally, a plausible up-
scaling of his delegated and fortified character as he understood it. 
 
The affect of affections, the sense that they faced onto and inexorably encountered the full 
force and scope of a world to encounter (so producing that osmotic connection) were 
empowered: they could, in the face of vast potential, discriminate, curtail, and sustain in a 
way that did not allow the person and personality in the osmotic dynamic to control what 
they encountered as such, but did allow them to retain in some sense those more favourable 
encounters. Affections were, in this sense, affectually astute by utilising the contradiction of 
delegation and fortification that Voysey understood from his own experience. It admitted 
to the necessity of an extra-individual world and how we (and he) were constituted by 
delegation through an osmotic ontology with it (as affectionate beings in need of a body of 
things to like), but it also outlined affectual empowerment therein that converted the 
vulnerability of delegation into an astute presence of deflection and retention. 
 
Plausibility seems to spring from this principle in two ways. In the first instance, there is an 
understanding that people were accessible through their affections and the discrimination 
that was attached to them. As an architect, Voysey could use the fact that people 
constituted the inner self of personality through the affectionate experience of the 
encounterable world outside them. But crucially, this centrifugal and centripetal process 
repeatedly exposed the outside world to affectionate faculties in a cyclic motion within that 
osmotic process which, through processes of discrimination (reasoned preference) was able 
to gradually reproduce and populate that social and material world with accretions of those 
preferences. The more astute you were, the more this possibility was asserted, and Voysey 
constituted his approach to architectural design around such an astute presence (itself 
based on his finely honed affections). As an architect, he could create spaces for 
inhabitations which his own affections had purified of the malign and mediocre, and 
suffused with more favourable ideas and features. In essence, he could return a purified 
material form to the world of encounters, and by making that encounterable world more 
acceptable to the affectionate encountering that defined osmotic human existence, Voysey 
arrived at a route-like plausibility for his buildings. 
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Collective failures of thought: 
 
I noted earlier that for Voysey the whole point of refining the affections by the application 
of thought was to allow those more noble attributes to fill and beneficially define the 
mental inner sanctum of “character” (which, in Voysey‟s terms, can be understood as the 
reverently filed cumulative proceeds of the affections, a mental shrine to the things we like 
and seek and a reminder of what to eschew). Evidently, those same affections were also 
intended to identify and reject the malign, that which might harm and diminish us. But the 
very nature of human affections left us vulnerable in key ways, thus: 
 
“What we love we imitate, and we love the line of least resistance. We love to 
contemplate rules and regulations, and flow with the great river of officialdom. 
But were we left without control to work out our own salvation, the native 
love in us would still lead us to imitate what we thought best. We should still 
try to perpetuate all that we thought good.” (Voysey, 1919: 25) 
 
Malign, but, as the above quote (from On Town Planning) shows, contrived with an appeal, 
and crafted to slip through the affections using appeal as a currency. It also hints at 
Voysey‟s complex relationship with and understanding of imitation, as both something 
couched in the affectionately reasoned individual character (“the native love in us would 
still lead us to imitate what we thought best”) and equally liable to a more base existence: as 
a lure to wean an individual off thought as a process, and onto thought as already-thought 
provisions that were shared en-masse such as “rules and regulations” and “the great river of 
officialdom”. Voysey referred to this as collectivism, and to understand his view of 
collectivism is to understand the most substantial threat to thought and the affections as 
Voysey conceived them, not least because collectivism operated on affectionate terms: it 
was fundamentally easy to like.  
 
Voysey discussed collectivism in terms of a natural opposite: individuality. Interestingly, he 
expended more effort (and many more words) describing collectivism than he did 
individuality (this was even the case in Individuality, his only full length book (Voysey, 
1915)). Perhaps he believed that a full description of the evils of collectivism would leave 
the only decent route (i.e. individuality) starkly evident without the need for clarification, 
especially if it was a natural opposite (and, thus, simply required a reverse logic to 
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collectivism). But I would argue that a more convincing explanation can be found in the 
above quote and the suggestion that, if a way could be found to ameliorate the oppressive 
weight of collectivism, peoples‟ indigenous natural faculties would re-assert and beneficially 
serve their characters at the point of affection (“[W]ere we left without control to work out 
our own salvation, the native love in us would still lead us to imitate what we thought 
best...” (Voysey, 1919: 25)). Essentially, Voysey‟s project to invigorate thought was not so 
much a case of creating new and better faculties, but having considerable faith in the 
normal (albeit oppressed) human faculties and the possibility of their liberation. 
 
Collectivism, put most simply, was understood as provision of and submission to already 
defined and established standards: it displaced the individual thought processes by 
providing a ready-made alternative that one could, in a sense, acquire complete and ready 
for use, without need of investing thought and consideration into creating one anew. What 
Voysey found most offensive about collectivism was the way it mothballed the intellectual 
and ethical faculties of the individual and devolved those considerations to mass provisions 
that were, essentially, lists of behaviours to be repeated. That is, the displacement of 
character with conduct. 
 
“Individuality being the basis of character, collectivism can have little effect 
that is not harmful to its development. Conduct can be controlled by collective 
action, but conduct is not character, nor is it always the result of character.” 
(Voysey, 1915: 37-38) 
 
In providing lists of acceptable conduct and proper behaviours, collectivism essentially 
starved independent thought. Voysey believed that a person should conduct themselves as 
a result of the choices they formed, which followed the logic of their characters, and 
therefore their affections – that which they liked, disliked, and (Voysey hoped) that which 
they found ethical and just. Collective behaviour severed the umbilical between character 
and conduct so that a person did not behave themselves, but behaved another disembodied 
self, or perhaps more accurately, a homogenised non-self. Collectively provided conducts 
looked after themselves: they were pre-formed and pre-justified.  
 
The horror of collectivism, for Voysey, was the way it isolated and annulled our own 
thinking through such acts of collective imitation, which dulled the potential vibrancy of 
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thought into habitual following or aligning (Voysey, 1923: 3). To follow a pre-ordained way 
of life did not require much in the way of consideration (because it did not really require an 
individual to arrive at decisions). Collectivism allowed for a passive absorption of ready-
made behaviours, and Voysey recoiled from this casual passiveness because of the way it 
truncated the need to engage with higher thoughts and considerations. What collectivism 
actually did was to deploy motivations and actions into people‟s lives that were not their 
own, self generated, thoughts and characters. Collective imitation did not call for this 
exercise of feeling and consideration. As a result, Voysey understood these behaviours as 
inherently false. A true act was a direct outcome of an individual‟s own thoughtfully 
mediated character, but if the act came from another source, as was the case with collective 
imitations, then it was effectively a pretence (even if eschewing such pretences gave rise to 
an antisocial kind of peculiarity):  
 
“It is better to give expression to honest personal feeling than to pretend to 
feelings which we have not got. It is painful enough to feel peculiar, and attract 
attention, but far worse to live a false life – to make false pretences and either 
deliberately or carelessly to convey a false impression.” (Voysey, 1906: 20) 
 
The logic of collectivism meant that dishonesty would come to define the way people 
acted: it didn‟t just dull the vibrancy of thought, it also undermined an individual‟s ethical 
self-containment and the possibility of sincerity. To have this self containment breached 
meant that an individual was no longer his or her own outcome – a sincere outcome – but 
a surface of pretences. For an individual to be original (as in, of their own origin) Voysey 
believed he had to restore something of this self-containment to them, from which 
sincerity would follow. Thus; 
 
“True originality is the outcome of sincerity. If the artist‟s motive is to purify 
character and stimulate the higher affections, he is engaged on a mission of 
common interest to humanity.” (Voysey, 1906: 28) 
 
As the opposite of individuality, collectivism also starved character, and the individual 
development of character, by offering the individual a ready-made suite of behaviours 
which, again, could be repeatedly deployed in everyday life without having to build up a 
strata of personal reasoning and motivations that attached those acts to the service of a 
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body of noble and ethical outcomes. Voysey believed that such “higher” thoughts could 
only be arrived at through individual effort, and that a large part of their value lay in the 
fact that an individual had worked to achieve them. If no effort had been expended in their 
creation – if they had been essentially purchased whole – then a key part of the process had 
been circumvented. To understand how or why collectivism worked is to return to the 
fundamental affectionate acts of Voysey‟s ontology: something like collectivism works 
when it combines with and completes (in an osmotic kind of way) an individual‟s 
affections, and brings to that combining an offering that is likeable or attractive.  
 
Collectivism‟s attractive offering was to provide a route of minimal resistance, and 
especially minimal mental effort, with a suite of ready-made answers and behaviours that 
were both neat and widely shared, which solved a number of inter-personal problems into 
the bargain. Voysey was suspicious of this neatness: “It seems fatally easy”, Voysey wrote, 
“to generalise and fasten onto general likenesses. And so much more easy than to perceive 
differences. Symmetrical arrangement is more ready to the hand of the unskilled than the 
harmonious arrangement of differences and unlikenesses [sic]” (Voysey, 1919: 25). The 
displacement of individual thought with neat and easy collective offerings damaged thought 
not only by denying it a territory (by capping and stilling ideas), but also denying it 
nourishment by blanching the variegated nature of reality with likenesses and symmetries. 
He referred to it as being material by which he meant, most simply, the stripping down of 
everything in the encounterable world to a format so blandly functional as to form a 
strange kind of servility: one which did people‟s thinking for them, but which rendered 
them servile to the process of being thought for too insofar as it divorced them from their 
will. As he described it in Individuality: 
 
“The fascination of having our thinking done for us is very real to minds 
already jaded by material interests, and so the needs of the flesh will jostle out 
the thoughts of the spirit. And thus we find collectivism most powerful in 
relieving us from personal responsibility and anxiety, we require little mental 
effort in obeying established habits, and after a time become more automatic in 
thought and action. It‟s a kind of lathe process that turns off all individual 
knots and angles, and smoothes us all down to one standard pattern.” (Voysey, 
1915: 40-41)  
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Voysey‟s understanding of collectivism is perhaps most interestingly described in On Town 
Planning (Voysey: 1919) in which he noted that people enjoyed considering how other 
people should behave, and enjoyed creating social prescriptions that would unify and order 
human affairs. However, he suggests and then hovers between two explanations for the 
collective preference. He explains, on the first hand, that we seem naturally predisposed to 
such collective modes of thought, and that “we delight to picture how other people should 
behave...” and that we enjoyed arriving at generalisations (Ibid: 25). Alternatively, and in 
almost the same breath, he suggests that the prominence of science and material provision, 
resultant of an industrial age, has produced a starvation of the spiritual and imaginative 
faculties wherein “the throb of the machine has taken the place of the throb of the human 
heart” (Ibid). It is difficult to know from this whether it is circumstance (an industrial age) 
that has foisted collectivism on people, or whether its origins are far closer and emanate 
from a dark corner of the human psyche. A further possibility, which Voysey outlined in 
Reason as a basis of art (Voysey: 1906) is a critique of contemporary polite society; that to do 
as others do is polite, sociable, and the height of manners (Ibid: 15), whereas to act as your 
individual character suggests is, at best, ostentatious and, at worst, repellent (Ibid: 20). He 
variously extended this social critique to institutions and traditions that reinforced such 
behaviour, such as trades unions (Voysey, 1915: 42) and planning authorities (Voysey, 1919: 
25), and he saved his most bitter criticisms for a scholastic tradition which had always 
judged him to be inadequate (Voysey, 1906: 19; 1909: 107, 121; 1915: 20). All of these 
institutions, along with the influence of polite society, created an environment that was 
oppressively rich in collective impulses. 
 
It‟s important to note that, for Voysey, sameness and collectivism were not the same thing. 
Collectivism was an imposed sameness, but sameness could also be produced through a 
common core of goodness (spirituality). To be the same or to be similar wasn‟t the 
problem, and Voysey‟s anti-collective stance was not some precursor of postmodernism or 
anarchism or the start of unbridled choice. The difference was that collectivist sameness 
was imposed and degenerated the faculties because it was a sameness that was copied, 
whereas individual sameness was arrived at and chosen individually  by analytical effort of 
will rather than copied: the sameness in this case was the logical outcome of those naturally 
occurring fundamentals, revealed as collectivist aberrations were removed from 
consciousness. Individual sameness, in contrast to collective sameness, was made up of 
noble concepts, and their being discovered was key to cementing that nobility. Imposed 
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collective behaviour couldn‟t achieve such heights: it had to operate at lower levels of habit, 
sensuality and materiality, whereas the retention of the use of discriminatory faculties at the 
affectionate point of encountering retained the ability to recognise and deflect the errant. 
 
To take an example, Voysey considered that revivalism in architecture was a potent outpost 
of collective impulses in general (although it wasn‟t an exact fit). To apprehend 
architectural history as if it were a catalogue, selecting and assembling already-designed 
forms and features into a building, seemed to exemplify imitative behaviour in the 
architectural profession: it certainly emphasised the minimal thought it required, as Voysey 
argued that such selections were made not from a basis of consideration, but of whim, 
fancy, and fashion. This particular architectural historiography had particular material 
effects: it made it easy and normal to produce vulgar buildings that bristled with over-
elaborated historical indulgences. Voysey did not make such criticisms as an outsider: he 
had experienced this at first hand whilst working in George Devey‟s practice, recounted in 
1874 and after: 
 
“Asked by his client to join a house party, he [Devey] would make the most 
fascinating, catch-penny sketches while dressing for dinner and present them 
during dessert, charming everyone, but getting them worked out by clerks who 
had to make all detail on the traditional lines of a bastard Jacobean period. [...] 
Given the style and period, books were drawn from the library shelves and 
approved examples of details were chosen; a chimneypiece or chimney, an oriel, 
a door, or a window from several books. Such things as these were copied and 
welded together and like the ingredients of a Christmas pudding, equally hard 
to digest.” (Voysey, 1931(b): 91) 
 
To Voysey‟s mind, this imposed a homogenised and unitary approach to a profession 
which, by definition, required a far more flexible, insightful, and deductive stance. More 
specifically, that approach was the homogenisation of precedence, such that revivalism 
(sustained and eased by a particular architectural historiography), produced buildings that 
served the needs of their original creators, rather than the current needs of contemporary 
inhabitants and inhabitation. This is not to say that Voysey was disparaging about “other” 
forms of architecture, in that: 
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“The finest architecture the world has ever seen has always been the honest 
expression of human needs and aspirations. And this is equally true of the 
noblest classical buildings. If we lived and thought and felt as Greeks, Greek 
architecture would be a true expression for us.” (Voysey, 1911 [Voc/3/2]: 60) 
 
Rather, Voysey disparaged revivalism for the way it eroded and enfeebled the architect‟s 
faculties through the cumulative effect of multiple acts of imitation: the assembling of 
already-designed forms required minimal consideration as compared to designing a 
building anew, and not merely because of eschewing a labour-saving historiography. 
Honest design required the application of analytical thought at a number of complex levels: 
from an understanding of the character and needs of the inhabitant, to a further 
understanding of how the building might accommodate this and the nurturing of 
spiritualities. This was a substantially bigger task than “Christmas pudding” architecture 
which was, in effect, a habitual and stilled practice of architecture that repeated existing 
work from a historical repository without doing anything new, with the aim “that we may 
create beauty intelligently, with a holy purpose; and not imitate as apes the semblance of 
fine feeling, while remaining gross and stagnant.” (Voysey, 1906: 14) 
 
Voysey‟s discussion of revivalism is useful at this point because it reveals two further 
ramifications of the collective way of thinking as he saw it: the first of these is a particularly 
still type of “gross and stagnant” temporality. For a collective idea to be made available to 
(or foisted upon) the public, it had to give the impression of being finished, stilled, and in a 
way, insulated so that progress would not invalidate it, nor the passage of time cause it to 
decay.  
 
“[T]he great danger of collectivist action is in the acceptance of a given idea as 
final, and fixed in its value; silencing the individual conscience and discouraging 
personal criticism and enquiry.” (Voysey, 1915: 39)  
 
The danger in accepting these ideas as complete and irrefutable from the outset was that it 
left no room for their criticism, modification, or rejection. Voysey also considered it un-
natural: he argued (in an unpublished article of 1923 titled Tradition and Individuality in Art) 
that perpetual progress was a universal law of nature and, by understanding nature to be 
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inherently beneficial, Voysey was always suspicious about the fixity of social or material 
offerings that were declared “finished”: 
 
“[W]e must leave the door perpetually open for progress and welcome 
(critically if you like) all attempts to improve our traditional modes and 
methods.” (Voysey, 1923 [Voc/3/1]: 5) 
 
This, Voysey‟s preferred temporal understanding, can be traced back to the Rev. Voysey‟s 
heresy trial. To declare that an idea is finished (i.e. that it represents the maximum possible 
extent of progress and is the final and best outcome) logically demands that alternative 
ideas, such as the Rev. Voysey‟s alternative practices, are inferior and hazardous to a shared 
dogmatic perfection. Voysey recognised that such forms of collectivism generated a 
powerful temporal component of stillness, often understood as “tradition” (Voysey, 1923 
[Voc/3/1]: 3) and countered this with a progressive temporality. 
 
Having identified collectivism as an errant mode of imitation, and having defined 
revivalism as a particularly temporal example of collective unconsidered imitation in 
architecture, Voysey also developed an understanding as to the correct kind of imitation for 
architectural practice to proceed from. Fitness was central to this understanding and 
Voysey‟s view of nature is essential to his understanding of fitness: “If we would go 
humbly to nature more” he argued “we should have a juster [sic] reverence for mans‟ work 
[...]. What we want is a more reverent study of nature and nature‟s ways” (Voysey, 1909: 
111). Voysey‟s own reverence for “nature‟s ways” was in its fidelity to current requirements 
and current conditions, and he hoped to emulate the way that nature, as he understood it, 
addressed the world by attending to the world directly, rather than falling back on, for 
example, revivalism: he argued that “If fitness is to be our law, as it is nature‟s law, we must 
not pin our conceptions to pre-existing forms too rigidly” (Ibid: 116). Voysey did not 
propose transcribing nature as a keynote of architectural design, but he did appreciate its 
logic as a metaphor for how architecture ought to think about the production of buildings. 
Nature, observed Voysey, developed into the forms it needed to thrive most effectively, 
and no individual part clashed with another, or wasted any of its efforts on frivolity – it 
only worked towards achieving the very best form, as fit as possible for its purpose, its 
conditions, and its requirements (Ibid: 114-117; 1915: 14-16), though there were also more 
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directly architectural cues as to how errant imitation should be displaced by fitness, and 
Voysey had an abiding admiration for Gothic architecture in this sense: 
 
“Gothic architecture grew out of the careful consideration of requirements and 
conditions, and obedience to the natural qualities of materials, in fact, all the 
best building throughout the world has grown that way, and was ever so 
created, until men became corrupted by materialistic ideas, and the mode of 
expression was regarded as more important than the conditions and 
requirements with which they were dealing.” (Voysey, 1915: 61) 
 
The brilliance of the Gothic, for Voysey, was a function of an isolationism which, in the 
same moment as isolating itself from collectivist impulses, implicated Gothic architecture 
deeply into the task it had to fulfil in a way that was more connected with genuine needs 
and aspirations: it was, in effect, a replication of the fidelity of nature in architecture and a 
deflection of the errant idea that we ought to live as, for example, Greeks. Instead, fitness 
provided for the very best interests of people and, I would suggest, it was this provision and 
the honesty of that provision that would appeal to affections and allow Voysey‟s offerings 
to be liked. 
 
An ontology of cyclic osmosis through which Voysey understood personal engagements 
with a world of encounters defines Voysey‟s theoretical hopes for plausibility, one in which 
the affections were understood as faculties that could control what, from the encounterable 
world, was knowingly imitated and combined with other fundamentally good imitations. 
Voysey hoped that he could improve people by filling those parts of the encounterable 
world he controlled with good things to imitate (though their goodness was, of course, 
identified by his own affections which he never really saw fit to question). Perhaps more 
than this, he also hoped that he could make his offerings liked and likable by routing them 
through an understanding of natural logic (and a compatible appreciation for the Gothic) 
which resulted in fitness, to serve people‟s needs directly and beneficially, without frivolity, 
and in a way that was directly relevant – “fit” – to them. I would suggest that he also hoped 
this would work as an example of what proper affections, attended by consideration, could 
achieve in terms of seeing past or deflecting already-thought and already-finished 
provisions which were not fit. Voysey‟s understanding of plausibility appears to hope that 
dwelling in a fit environment might produce fit people who would appreciate not only the 
122 
 
fitness of his architectural offerings (the eudaemonic first stage of being accepted through 
their affections), but the agency that the building also embodied through ignoring and 
deflecting the errant: in short, that it might act as an exemplar that was not only beneficial 
to future inhabitants, but demonstrated, or at least hinted at, the knowing fortifications and 
delegations through which it had attained that beneficence, and offered itself as an example 
of how inhabitants might also achieve cogent deflections in their affectionately osmotic 
relationship with a world which was habitually errant, through materialism, revivalism, and 
other –isms that he treated under the heading of collectivism which provided ready-made 
thinking and already decided decisions which appealed to that errant corner of people‟s 
selves that appreciated such offerings, albeit mistakenly and to their continued detriment. 
Perhaps the most overt suggestion of this possibility comes from On Craftsmanship (Voysey, 
1904) in which he stated: 
 
“Undoubtedly the love of ideas outside ourselves helps to make joy in our work 
manifest. Think of the merriment of the medieval craftsman who rejoiced to 
see other people laugh with him. Happiness is only possible when shared, and 
so we feel most happy when we see others derive happiness from our 
craftsmanship, when we can turn men‟s thoughts and affections to the highest 
in nature. For art is not intended only to please. Hence we must love the best in 
order to inspire such love in others through our own work.” (Voysey, 1904: 72) 
 
I outline some of these offerings in their apparently mundane forms (doors, rooflines, 
floorboards, bath enclosures) in the next section in terms of how Voysey tended to these 
forms (essentially a cache of his own imitations articulated materially) in the process of 
their being actualised into actually existing buildings, in which different articulations of 
plausibility are opened up and explored, before I proceed to discuss the plausibilities that 
are produced by current inhabitations of Voysey‟s buildings. 
 
Extending Voysey’s affections through the built form: 
 
Depending on the stage of progress, architectural design occupies a variety of different 
materialities which vary in their intensities. The least material of these materialities – the 
one in which the actual materiality is held in virtual potential rather than taking form – is 
the two-dimensional stage of drawings and ideas. Voysey‟s sovereignty over this stage, 
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whilst not absolute, was profound and allowed him the maximum scope in terms of design 
possibilities, ideas and indulgencies, before the building started to solidify into its actual 
form. In addition to being the most “virtual” stage, this was also the most personal and 
exclusive stage, where the building was captive to (and emergent from) Voysey‟s efforts 
alone with only the client‟s means and needs to consider (which I will discuss shortly). 
Voysey obviously relished this stage of his work, and something of this is recalled by his 
son Cowles: 
 
“I was always astounded by the rapidity of my father‟s method of working. He 
generally made his own drawings [...]. During a week-end he would make a set 
of one-eighth scale working drawings for a medium sized house.” (Voysey, C. 
1941 [Voc/6/9/6]) 
 
The transition from the personal and virtual materiality of design to the actual materiality 
of executing the design is marked by an abrupt shift from a bounded and unitary territory 
(commanded by Voysey and occupied by the proto-house and (ostensibly) the client) to a 
networked existence of delegations and negotiations which involves a variety of others: 
human others (like masons, decorators, plumbers, and etcetera) and non-human others 
(like stone, paint, drainage, and etcetera). These “others” default to an ideal and highly 
compliant existence during the personal-virtual design stage, precisely and quietly achieving 
Voysey‟s ideas in advance, but when the proto-house is no longer insulated in the virtual it 
becomes necessarily connected to the imperfect reality and vagaries of the others it needs 
to enable its actual materiality. The architect‟s presence in this new environment is mostly 
textual, contained in drawings and documents that are passed to the contractors. I will not 
discuss the drawings at any length here: Voysey was evidently a skilled draftsman but his 
plans and elevations are, for obvious reasons, standardised to show locations and 
dimensions in much the same way as any contemporary drawing68. Of more interest to me 
are the Specification of Works, a document that accompanied the drawings and ordinarily 
contained instructions as to, for example, surface treatments, glazing, joinery, fittings, and 
etcetera.  
 
                                                   
68 His working drawings are a different matter, and were painstakingly drawn and coloured. 
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A copy of the specification for Broad Leys69, one of Voysey‟s larger projects (a lakeside 
holiday home for a prominent industrialist, now owned by the Windermere Motor Boat 
Racing Club) survives in the R.I.B.A Manuscripts (Voysey, c.1898 [Voc/3/5]) and charts 
the networked spatiality of the house by specifying the extent and destination of the 
various connections. For instance, the cement had to be procured from one of two specific 
companies70, whilst specific materials from specific suppliers were defined for the kitchen 
floor71, chimneypots72, roofing slates73, ventilation grills74, and paints75. Broad Leys’ 
Specification of Works begins to sound more and more like a spatial exercise in which 
Voysey, recognising the networked existence of Broad Leys’ construction and the multiple 
influences displacing his sovereignty, apprehends those multiples and constrains them, 
attempting to spread his sovereignty along the connections that were necessary for 
achieving, for example, a chimneypot. When, for instance, it came to the front door, 
Voysey created a precision network, defining the direction, extent and purpose of each 
connection required (having specified separately that the timber should be English oak): 
 
“Front door. Strap hinges to be provided by Mr W. B. Reynolds of 28 Victoria 
Street, p.c. £4.5.0 the pair exclusive of packing and carriage and two 9‟‟ brass 
barrel bolts No. “819” from Messrs Comyn Ching and Company, Castle Street, 
Long Acre, WC, p.c. 3/9 each and provide the sum of £1.10.0 for lock and two 
knobs and 3 keys to be approved.” (Voysey, c.1898 [Voc/3/5]: ixx) 
 
Voysey‟s approach to the network and the way the building came together seems to 
replicate and extend the control that virtuality had offered him by petrifying the network 
                                                   
69 Located at Ghyll Head, near Windemere, Cumbria, and completed by Voysey in 1898 for a wealthy industrialist, Broad 
Leys is currently the home to the Windemere Motor-boat Racing Club, who operate the building as a club house and 
boutique hotel with restaurant. As at nearby Moor Crag, the gardens were laid out by noted landscape architect Thomas 
Mawson (see Hitchmough, 1995: 231). 
70 From Messrs. O. Trenchmann and co. of Hartlepool, or Messrs. Graves, Bull and Lakin of Paddington. (Voysey, c.1898 
[Voc/3/5]: v) 
71 Voysey specified 1½‟‟ Shap granite  from Shap Granite Paving Company for the most part, otherwise local stone 
tooled, rubbed and bedded onto 3‟‟ concrete (Voysey, c.1898 [Voc/3/5]: vi) 
72 Voysey specified 3‟ red earthenware chimneypots for each flue from Stanley Bros. Ltd of Nuneaton. (Voysey, c.1898 
[Voc/3/5]: x) 
73 Voysey specified: “Roof. Cover the roof with 2nd quality Green Westmoreland slates from Tilberthwaite Quarry.” 
(Voysey, c.1898 [Voc/3/5]: xiv), worthy of note because he almost always specified highest quality materials. 
74 For each exhaust flue, Voysey specified one “Voysey” pattern exhaust ventilator from Comyn Ching, painted white 
four times (Voysey, c.1898 [Voc/3/5]: ixxx) – this was a pattern of his own design, and Comyn Ching was one of a 
handful of companies who produced Voysey metalwork designs. Comyn Ching seemed to produce larger ironwork 
pieces, whereas Thomas Elsey and co. produced smaller more delicate items (such as light fittings) to Voysey‟s designs in 
steel, bronze, brass or copper. Items of a more mechanical nature were provided by W. Bainbridge Reynolds (see Bury: 
1978). 
75 Voysey specified that the colouring would be made with best oil white lead and purified linseed by Mander and co. 
(Voysey, c.1898 [Voc/3/5]: xxxvi) 
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and systematically deleting the alternative possibilities and agencies that a network might 
offer (and which might undermine him). A closer examination of Broad Ley’s door, for 
instance, reveals that all the connections he petrifies there lead to a foundry or blacksmith 
that produced Voysey‟s own metalwork designs (on which see Bury: 1978). It appears as 
though his efforts served not only to constrain the network and the potential agency of 
connectedness, but also to enhance his position in the network, achieved in a two-pronged 
manner by strictly defining particular connections, and contriving other connections that 
looped back towards him. 
 
Voysey did more than tightly define the networked materialities of Broad Leys. He also 
extended his enhanced presence to the site and the contractors: that is, the location on the 
shores of Windermere where that network came together. One of the first requirements of 
the specifications was that his physical presence there was accommodated among them. He 
wrote: 
 
“Office. Provide office for the use of the Architect with desk, stool, basin, 
towel, soap, and clothes brush” (Voysey, c.1898 [Voc/3/5]: i) 
 
Voysey reasserted and reinforced the need for his presence throughout the specification by 
creating opportunities for further design decisions at various points during construction, 
decisions that he had deferred with terms such as “to be approved” or “as approved” that 
allowed him to define the nature and frequency of his presence and influence. Moreover, 
he did not limit this presence to himself: he extended it to the bodies and behaviours of the 
contractors by virtualising himself as the ideal workman and declaring what that should 
entail, namely the same kind of ideal, diffident, proficient and deferential workman he had 
imagined at the personal-virtual design stage. At one level, he stated this as a simple 
reminder that he expected excellence of them: “All materials and workmanship to be of the 
best of their respective kinds and the Contractor is to leave the work in all respects clean 
and perfect at the completion thereof.” (Voysey, c.1898 [Voc/3/5]: ii) Equally simple were 
his instructions on how to handle certain materials and processes, such as applying two 
coats of paint to all non-visible ironwork (Ibid: xxxiv). Similar instructions include: 
 
“No lead or iron pipes are to be buried in the wall or plaster but must be fixed 
on battens on the face of the plaster” (Voysey, c.1898 [Voc/3/5]: xxxiv) 
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“[Floors are...] not to be secret nailed” (Ibid: xx) 
 
Understood as part of the network, not unlike the connected-to materialities of doors and 
chimneys, the contractors themselves required much the same treatment through which 
their potentially errant influence could be made compliant. The most interesting examples 
in the specifications occur when the human and non-human strands of the network merge: 
when the contractors were actually handling and applying craftsmanship to the materials. 
In the structural elements of Broad Leys to be dressed with stone, for instance: 
 
“The whole of the stone to be of the best quality of the stone specified free 
from vents, flaws, sand or clay holes and any other defects, and to be set in 
cement on its natural beds and to be left clean and perfect in every respect.” 
(Voysey, c.1898 [Voc/3/5]: xiii) 
 
The disciplining of the stone into a flawless and compliant state is matched to its ideal 
treatment by the stonemason, displacing the possibility of what he might do and replacing 
it with an ideal of what he must do. There was no point in fixing the material 
connectedness of Broad Leys if that material was wielded incorrectly or deficiently at the 
point where it was incorporated into the emerging house. This is a fairly simple example as 
compared to what the contractors had to do for those areas of frontage that were not 
dressed in stone: 
 
“Cement roughcast all external walling, buttresses and chimneys exposed to 
view except those parts specified to be in dressed stone with clean washed 
sharp sand and well washed gravel or stone chips finished to a very rough 
surface with pebble or stone chips as approved; the last coat to be mixed 
pebbles or stone chips and cement mixed together and applied with a spoon 
while the second coat is soft. The first coat to be scored over to form key for 
second coat.” (Voysey, c.1898 [Voc/3/5]: xxx) 
 
In this case, the contractors‟ behaviour was doubly important. Up to a point, stone could 
look after itself, as a large portion of its material existence preceded human influence, and 
this also applied to the individual constituents of the roughcast: its sources (i.e. preferred 
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types and suppliers) could be easily defined. However, the creation of the roughcast as a 
finished substance was achieved by the contractors, who would define both the quality of 
the finished material in combination and the efficacy of its use thereafter, and the particular 
specificity Voysey issued for the roughcast (also evident in his specificity regarding the 
front door), suggests to me a nervousness about what the contractors might do that belied 
Voysey‟s intentions, (in a way that the materials unto themselves could not) producing the 
pre-material politics that seems evident here insofar that the behaviour of contractors is 
petrified into the behaviours Voysey postulates of them. 
 
What has gone unsaid so far is the influence of the client, and an obvious criticism would 
be that Voysey exerted such control over the networked existence of the building that it 
undermined clients‟ choices in terms of materials, features, and etcetera. Indeed, I would 
suggest that Voysey was no less wilful with his clients than he was with his contractors, and 
sought to exert a similar type of discipline on them. On this aspect of his practice, R.I.B.A‟s 
manuscript collection is virtually silent; however, a 1949 article by John Brandon-Jones (An 
architect’s letters to his client) transcribes a number of letters from Voysey to an early client, 
Cecil Fitch (an up-and-coming lawyer (Brandon-Jones, 1949: 494)). Fitch had 
commissioned Voysey at some point before 189976 to design him a house in Wimbledon 
that later became known as Gordondene (and which has since been demolished). Brandon-
Jones didn‟t include transcripts of every letter between Voysey and Fitch (and only one 
from Fitch to Voysey): in fact, the transcripts in this article seems to have been selected 
and pruned by Brandon-Jones to favourably counter a generally held opinion: “Voysey can 
never have been an easy architect from a client‟s point of view, yet his disarming reply to 
Fitch‟s letter shows that he was not always so obstinate, as legend has painted him; in this 
case he was prepared to make a sensible compromise...” (Ibid). In order to make this point, 
I get the impression that Brandon-Jones had to swim against a substantial current that 
eventually subsumed him. The resulting transcripts reiterate Voysey‟s continuing 
belligerence with only a brief glimpse of his obliging nature. Brandon-Jones admitted that a 
Voysey client would have to have substantial reserves of faith to allow Voysey the full 
exercise of his insistence, but countered that Voysey himself must have had courage to 
have taken responsibility for the whole creative task (Ibid). 
 
                                                   
76 The drawings for Gordondene are dated 1899 (Hitchmough, 1995: 231-232), though the commission may originate from 
1898. 
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The overwhelming theme that emerges from An architect’s letters is that Voysey understood 
the project as a territory whose bounds were always firmly within his reach, and over which 
his sovereignty was (ideally) unchallenged, a combination which allowed him a profound 
degree of ownership. The fact that Gordondene was for somebody else did not alter the fact 
that it was from and by him: a material execution of his ontological philosophy and an 
architectonic transcript of his personality. Challenged by Fitch on the form and extent of 
the stable block, he replied: 
 
“I cannot spoil my proportions by cutting off the stable roof. We must manage 
by moving the stable building 5ft to the east and the house 5ft to the west and 
3 or 4 ft. to the south. You won‟t mind that, will you?” (Voysey, in a letter to 
Fitch: 10th October 1899) (Brandon-Jones, 1949: 495) 
 
Understood as a material excursion of his personality and character (and in accordance 
with his ethical logic and osmotic ontology) Voysey could no more devolve command of 
Gordondene any more than he could allow his character to be externally animated. If 
anything, the extension and amplification of himself into the plan and forms of the house 
was even more profound than his inhabitation of the site and construction processes: the 
continued effacement of Fitch assured a strict depopulation of the virtual design “territory” 
that Voysey fashioned around him, especially if Fitch‟s wishes required further compliance 
from him by way of, in this instance, building regulations. 
 
“If you move your house further to the hedge you increase the height of your 
walls, so adding to the expense as the building act will require you to have 
thicker walls.” (Voysey, in a letter to Fitch: 23rd September 1899) (Brandon-
Jones, 1949: 495) 
 
That said, Voysey‟s letters to Fitch can be disarming: in the first letter that Brandon-Jones 
transcribed into his 1949 article he addressed his client on equal and friendly terms, before 
proceeding to outline his role as one of diminutive servitude, especially as regards the 
overall cost, which appeared to be Fitch‟s overriding concern: 
 
“My dear Fitch, 
I hope you will agree to drop the Mr. on both sides. 
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Let me know the reasons for your objection and I will meet them. It is what I 
am meant for. Tell me what you want and I will tell you how to get it most 
economically.” 
(Voysey, in a letter to Fitch: 23rd September 1899) (Brandon-Jones, 1949: 495) 
 
This quote offers no evidence of the Voysey I have so far outlined: instead of treating the 
design as a limited territory over which he could enjoy sovereignty, Voysey seems to open a 
(much less rigorously delimited) space big enough for the client to object, interject, and 
otherwise co-habit on terms that appear at least equal, and perhaps even diminutive on 
Voysey‟s part. Given Brandon-Jones‟ particular (if tentative) aims, it probably made sense 
to open with this excerpt, but the excerpts that follow demonstrate a more vehemently 
territorial Voysey that strains his argument to breaking point: 
 
“Certainly you had better not see the drawings until they are finished and 
coloured. They will not give you the slightest idea of what you are going to 
have. All artistic questions you must trust to me to decide. No two minds ever 
produced an artistic result.” (Voysey, in a letter to Fitch: 4th December 1899) 
(Brandon-Jones, 1949: 496) 
 
This excerpt is a useful microcosm for Voysey‟s approach to his client: most of the other 
excerpts that Brandon-Jones transcribes share one of the typical features outlined here. The 
first sentence: “Certainly you had better not see the drawings...” serves to limit potential 
involvement to Voysey himself, either by drawing the design territory tightly around 
professional processes that exclude laypeople (drawings) or fortifying that territory in 
temporal terms, whereby any involvement outside Voysey has to wait until an advanced 
“finished and coloured” stage, a point at which the design is more consolidated than it is 
pliable. Similarly, the last sentence (“No two minds...”) necessarily de-populates that 
territory and qualifies the singular sovereignty that the third sentence (“All artistic questions 
you must trust to me...”) demands, and which insulates Voysey from compromise, allowing 
him the full scope of his artistry. The second sentence (“[the drawings] will not give you 
the slightest idea...”) is aimed squarely at Fitch and serves to efface him from the design 
process, either by the proximity of Voysey‟s inviolable professionalism and artistry, or by 
emphasising the inferiority of his lay insights, thus: 
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“As to the light in the hall, I hope you will forgive me for saying you know 
nothing about it at all. You will ruin the look of the hall from the outside and 
the in if you alter the staircase window, which is going to light the hall 
magnificently.” (Voysey, in a letter to Fitch: 10th October 1899) (Brandon-
Jones, 1949: 495) 
 
But the commission couldn‟t continue without a client: there had to be someone (with 
some money) to build for, and that person had to be allowed some sort of opportunity to 
decide the outcome of his investment. This admittedly obvious point is reflected by the rift 
between Voysey‟s invitational, even servile, posture in his letter to Fitch (of the 23rd 
September 1899), and his fiercely territorial letter to Fitch less than three months later (4 th 
December 1899). It appears that Voysey resolved these two extremes (in favour of the 
second extreme) by creating a space for client‟s ideas and inputs, and energetically pitching 
himself against those ideas on their arrival: a space that was simultaneously invitational and 
hostile. In fact, the tactics I have just outlined are at their most evident when Voysey had to 
confront some of the choices and demands that Fitch felt inclined and able to make. In the 
above quote (10th October 1899) Voysey achieved this by emphasising how ruinous and 
mistaken the client‟s input could be, as compared to the magnificence of his design and the 
associated benevolence of his professional considerations: 
 
“If you have the cupboards altered a fresh detail will have to be made for which 
my fee is three guineas. And I think you ought to pay me some compensation 
in addition as it involves my doing what to any professional eye would be 
considered a gross blunder... the wilful planning of a huge dust trap.” (Voysey, 
in a letter to Fitch: 25th March 1901) (Brandon-Jones, 1949: 498) 
 
Benevolence is a key point to understand in these interchanges: Voysey understood that in 
effacing the client, he was insulating them from their own harmful impositions. In design 
terms, Voysey‟s approach had a firm basis in avoiding the sort harmful and ruinous 
possibilities that constantly tried to assert themselves on the design process: innocently 
enough from his clients, and rather more insidiously from other sources. This approach of 
identifying and excluding the ruinous from design allowed him to reveal a remainder of 
quality, a process that happened alongside those more creative acts of (perceived) 
architectural quality. Negation and exclusion were as important to Voysey as achievement 
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and inclusion, and those things he didn‟t design – the absences – are as important as the 
things he did. 
 
Whichever means (or combination of means) Voysey used generated his territorial 
retention of control, a common effect was the amplification of his own responsibility: he 
effectively denied himself the feeble claim (as he perceived it) that key design outcomes 
were merely the loyal execution of the client‟s express wishes (Brandon-Jones, 1949: 494). 
His benevolent effacement of the client widened the scope of his liability and deepened his 
involvement, and I think it‟s important to understand that the sovereign territory he 
created was not a shamelessly unconstrained space in which to indulge his ethics and 
artistry (although it offered this possibility): it also obliged him to – and served his deep-
seated sense of – the exercise of duty to the clients he ultimately silenced, a point he 
reiterates (twice) in his letters to Fitch: 
 
“Your architect would be an incompetent noodle indeed if he let you in for the 
misery and inconvenience you suggest in your last letter.” (Voysey, in a letter to 
Fitch: 15th January 1900) (Brandon-Jones, 1949: 496) 
 
“You are perfectly right in your suppositions but you are not right in fearing 
that I could so far neglect my duty as to allow such a terrible blunder to be 
made in the building of the terrace wall. „Fear not for I am with thee...‟” 
(Voysey, in a letter to Fitch: 10th March 1901) (Brandon-Jones, 1949: 498) 
 
This enhanced duty was the natural by-product of the client‟s effacement: it prompted a 
degree of consideration and surrogation that would have otherwise been provided by the 
client‟s articulation of his own needs, likes, and dislikes. Without them, Voysey had to 
make a substantial effort of the imagination to virtualise a stand-in that could both 
accommodate his principles, and also meet or exceed the expectations of any reasonable 
client. This imagined hybrid client is discussed in specifically surrogated terms in Ideas in 
Things: 
 
“I now invite you all to fancy you are architects, and commissioned to build me 
a home. Shall I tell you of some charming villa away in Italy, or Kamschatka 
[sic], that I have seen and liked. Shall I dwell on my own taste and so control 
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you actions and feelings; because I am paying you, must you be my humble 
servant? No! My dear architects, let me rather marry your spirits to my own, 
and see what broad principles of thought and feeling there are already, to work 
in unison – affections common to all men.” (Voysey, 1909: 122) 
 
I use the term “hybrid” deliberately to describe how Voysey‟s imagined client existed as 
collection of characteristics that, together, formed a favourable mirror for Voysey‟s 
intentions. In effect, the hybridity was an extended Voysey, folded into the reception of his 
buildings by suffusing the client with his own characteristics, an act that understood clients 
as porous collections of voids where there was space to fold co-operative postures that 
eagerly sought those material corollaries of nobility and individuality that Voysey sought to 
provide. Unsurprisingly, Voysey fits his imagined client like a glove: an apposite metaphor 
given Voysey‟s intentions to shape and animate the future inhabitation of the spaces he 
created. These high expectations were reflected in his description of the client relationship 
in marital, rather than transactional terms, exorcising any sense that Voysey‟s skills could be 
purchased and, in being so purchased, reined to the client‟s whim. The reasonable client was 
expected to exercise self-control and understanding in this respect: to voluntarily efface his 
own tastes and opinions rather than reinforcing them with cash. By displacing the agency 
of his actual clients with his ideal virtual “omni”-client, Voysey completed a profoundly 
broad and deep control of the architectural processes that pervaded the design, the site, 
contractors, supplies and materials (together making the building), and the client, insulating 
himself as best he could from the agentic potential of these various elements and their 
realities: he achieved, or aimed to achieve, a blanket virtuality. 
 
It was also an ambitious virtuality. An interesting episode in the design of Gordondene is 
related in three letters between Voysey and Fitch on the 10th, 11th and 12th October 1899. In 
the first instance, it is interesting to see that Voysey‟s virtuality was briefly punctured by a 
sense of embarrassment at his demeanour: 
 
“Many thanks for your most reasonable letter. You make me quite ashamed of 
my own impulsive strong language. I wish to be emphatic, but not rude. I will 
look to your light.” (Voysey, in a letter to Fitch: 12th October 1899) (Brandon-
Jones, 1949: 495) 
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It‟s difficult to say whether Fitch‟s gentle tone was a deliberate tactic against Voysey‟s 
impositions: Brandon-Jones transcribes only one letter from Fitch. But in any event, Fitch 
had found another way to breach that virtuality. In an earlier letter, Voysey had refuted one 
of Fitch‟s queries as to the plot: “If you move your house further to the hedge you increase 
the height of your walls, so adding to the expense as the building act will require you to 
have thicker walls.” (Voysey, in a letter to Fitch: 23rd September 1899) (Brandon-Jones, 
1949: 495) but in his letter of the 10th October Voysey contradicted himself in a brusque 
response to a different query: “I cannot spoil my proportions by cutting off the stable roof. 
We must manage by moving the stable building 5ft to the east and the house 5ft to the 
west and 3 or 4 ft. to the south. You won‟t mind that, will you?” (Voysey, in a letter to 
Fitch: 10th October 1899) (Ibid). Fitch, responding, said: 
 
“As regards the movement of the stables you will recollect your statement [23rd 
September 1899] that to move the house further down hill would enormously 
increase the cost [...]. You now seem to propose to move the whole house 
bodily down hill (i.e. 5 feet to the west and 3 or 4 ft. to the south). If you will 
assure me now that it will not increase the cost of the house I don‟t mind, but if 
it will I mind very much when I see that two feet off the length of the gable will 
obviate the difficulty. Seriously, do you think the difference of that two feet will 
spoil the proportion of the stable roof? I tried it and did not think it would, but 
you know best and I don‟t desire to be in any way unreasonable.” (Fitch, in a 
letter to Voysey: 11th October 1899) (Brandon-Jones, 1949: 495) 
 
Although he reiterated his desire to remain reasonable, Fitch seems to have profoundly 
undermined the ideal of Voysey‟s virtual design territory, using Voysey‟s contradiction as 
an opening through which to reach areas of the design (like proportion and layout) that 
were supposed to be sacrosanct, and using his monetary command to invoke design 
decisions. Voysey‟s response is interesting, and was interpreted by Brandon-Jones as a 
compromise and evidence of Voysey‟s reasonable side (Brandon-Jones, 1949: 494). 
 
“Certainly bringing the building very much forward would increase the cost, 
but if we bring it only 3 feet to the south and 5ft. to the W, I think the extra if 
any will be very small because the ground does not drop so much in the west 
corner. Then we can compromise by cutting off a little from the stable roof and 
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shifting the stable perhaps a trifle.” (Voysey, in a letter to Fitch: 12th October 
1899) (Brandon-Jones, 1949: 495) 
 
Although diffident in tone (Voysey is, after all, looking to Fitch‟s light) I find it difficult to 
reconcile this statement with Voysey‟s frequent and emphatically territorial rebukes to 
Fitch, against which this looks isolated and feeble. Moreover, Voysey is already starting to 
re-extend his control over the situation: whilst he appears to agree to Fitch‟s request, that 
agreeing brings the issue back into his sphere by claiming that his take on Fitch‟s changes 
has a plausibility emergent of his professional status, and Fitch‟s observations can only 
reasonably be met by his particular interpretation of the changes he proposed. I would 
suggest that Voysey was distinctly uncomfortable at the prospect of losing his sovereignty 
of the building‟s forms through these processes, not least because it appears that to retain 
virtuality was to retain plausibility, even if common sense suggests that a building will never 
plausibly do anything if it only ever remains virtual. Retention is the key to understanding 
what this means, and the important point is that virtuality was not retained per se. Rather, 
the useful effects of virtuality, in terms of what they could offer Voysey, were projected 
forward beyond the immediate inception of the building and into those points where it 
would ordinarily have come under the auspices of clients and contractors. I would argue 
that the efforts I‟ve just described, through such practices as the petrification of the 
network and maintaining an invitationally hostile space for the client to be discomforted in, 
was less concerned about creating plausibility, and more concerned with trying to retain the 
plausibilities that Voysey had already created, to stretch them and keep them going until 
Voysey knew that it was in some sense fixed into the building. As such, I consider that his 
behaviours both at the site and towards the client can best be described as practices of 
plausibility, whereas his earlier and far more philosophical ruminations on what and how a 
building could and ought to do are better described as ontologies of plausibility. Of course, 
these two types of plausibility are highly interconnected. The hybrid client which Voysey 
formulated in Ideas in Things is one such point of interconnection which neatly produces a 
client who will assure that Voysey‟s hopes are made actual in a way that s/he never is, but 
whilst the client in Ideas in Things is not real, it could be argued that Voysey attempted to 
map his/her qualities onto people like Fitch. Even when Fitch was able to escape that 
mapping, Voysey attempted to gently return him to the invitationally hostile space from 
which he had emerged. In a more obvious way, the workmen at Broad Leys were limited to 
very particular behaviours to ensure that his intentions were solidified into the building, 
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and the material ingredients of the building were similarly disciplined, curtailing the 
network which would form Broad Leys in a practice of plausibility that stretched the 
sovereignty that virtuality offered to Voysey through to the processes that would fix the 
building.  
 
To attach practices of plausibility to ontologies of plausibility makes logical sense insofar 
that, if the buildings he designed were understood as outcrops of his character, Voysey 
could not simply let his designs exit his office unattended without exercising some control 
over what happened to them thereafter: it contradicted his whole idea of how he (and 
everybody else) existed. Then again, it is interesting to note that these practices of 
plausibility contradicted, to some degree, the ontologies of plausibility that he created and 
worked to, most especially those temporal aspects of his ontology that refused the idea of 
fixity and declaring things as final. This is a useful reminder that Voysey was not always 
true to his own ideals and could dispense with them when it suited him. In fact, the 
temporality of Voysey‟s approach un-fixed the finality of the world and allowed him to 
alter it, but I suggest my interpretations here show that he was inclined to re-fix his work 
once he had arrived at a satisfactory form, to make sure that the potential vagaries of the 
contractors and the potential impositions of the client were subdued as much as possible. 
To do otherwise would have been to lose the plausibilites he‟d gained in the unfixing 
process that his thoughtfully delegated and fortified existence in the world demanded.
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Fig. 3.1: Voysey House (photograph by Steve Cadman). 
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Fig.3.2: Voysey-designed letterbox. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.3: Winsford Cottage Hospital (rear elevation). 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.4: Moor Crag. 
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Fig. 3.5: Perrycroft. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.6: Perrycroft. 
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Fig. 3.7: Moor Crag 
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Fig. 3.8: Voysey-designed fireplace. 
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Fig. 3.9: Voysey-designed doorlatch. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.10: Littleholme. 
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Fig. 3.11: Broad Leys interior. 
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Diagnosing Voysey: 
 
The way a Voysey house is experienced is wide ranging (and a principal purpose of this 
chapter is to illuminate that range and further illuminate how the extent, direction, and 
shape of that range happens because of, or in spite of, the architecture) but among this 
experiential variety is a common biographical theme. To some degree, all of the resident-
users I interviewed form a biography of Voysey as part of their overall experience of his 
buildings: they develop understandings of what Voysey was like as a person, including 
specific elements of his personality, which they arrive at with the help of various different 
sources, but primarily from the material-emotional acts of living in or working in a Voysey 
building and their encounters with the shapes, materials, volumes, and details that he 
deposited there. This is a key initial point to make clear: residents do not rely any less on 
understandings they‟ve developed through their experience just because they also, in some 
cases, agree with and repeat certain insights of the various scholars and critics who have 
studied him. It seems that a key element of living in – and enjoying – a Voysey building is 
to extend the scope of their experience beyond the immediate material existence of the 
building to include their own version of Voysey. 
 
In my interviews I wanted to explore why they should be so motivated, and what this 
supra-material expansion offers to resident-users. At a general level, they expand their 
experiences to include Voysey for the sake of crediting someone for the building, which 
stems from an understanding that the building is a product of a stratum of motivations 
which were themselves the product of the particular characteristics, which emerged from 
Voysey‟s particular personality. In creating their experience of a Voysey building, resident-
users extend their inhabitations in order to locate the reasons for the things they see and 
experience to a human source that exercised human attributes. In this way their extended 
inhabited materiality is a partially biographical one, in which a roofline, or a ventilation 
grate, or a door-latch, does not start and end with its physical manifestation, but is the 
discernible outcome of Voysey‟s personality. A door-latch does not merely hold a door 
closed, but is a latter-day exercise of Voysey‟s character (as perceived from the point of 
inhabitation), his hatred of frivolity, and his love of the simple and effective functionality of 
things. This is the first of a number of extensions which I will discuss in this chapter: such 
extensions are important in understanding how Voysey‟s buildings are currently inhabited. 
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What is also obvious is that this extending does not make space for an “original” Voysey: it 
is a creation of the resident-user in a diagnostic style, and is therefore tailored to the way 
they experience the building. There is a different “Voysey”, varying in his potency, for each 
of the buildings I‟ve visited. A common theme in the development of each “Voysey” is the 
extent to which the building that he designed serves that particular resident-user: if a 
feature offers something pleasant or useful to them, or ameliorates an annoyance of some 
kind, there is a sense that Voysey‟s caring nature is being extended to them through 
material offerings, and the appeal of the building is not just their usefulness or beneficence 
per se, but the fact that someone cared enough at the outset to provide them. For example, 
consider the following exchange: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
And Julian also understands that: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
This sort of enjoyment, and the “Voysey” that emerges from it, can be either the result of 
an offering that creates pleasure and provides something likable, as Daniel and Jane have 
found with their windows, and it can equally be Voysey‟s diligence and restraint in 
ameliorating or removing potentially annoying features. This diagnosis of care is not, 
however, universal, and the perceived failure of one of Voysey‟s buildings has led to a 
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number of unflattering diagnoses from Florence and Adam. In the first place, their 
experience of the rooms he designed has led them to a particularly corporeal diagnosis: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
The height of the windows (and doorframes) in their house are understood to be 
specifically “for Voysey” and applicable, in this case, to his stature. They are not only 
annoyed about this because the windows are too low and do not allow for what they think 
is sufficient natural lighting: they are annoyed because Voysey‟s considerations appear to 
extend no further than him and the height complex they diagnose of him. They do not feel 
that they benefit from the warmth of his consideration. 
 
Paul: So you‟re pretty sure then that he designed this entire house around his 
own body shape? 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
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[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
In this sense, their house is a temporal failure of sorts: the bumptious Voysey they diagnose 
reflects a number of features which have become annoying but which persist inexorably in 
the fabric of the building: a palimpsest of a flawed personality which is imposed materially 
on them. This failure, however, represents the start of another means of inhabiting a 
Voysey building which draws upon diagnoses of Voysey‟s personality. It allows current 
resident-users to surrogate the design process at those points where it is perceived to fail, 
to imagine what they would do (or, more commonly, avoid) to make it succeed. Perceived 
failure becomes a means by which resident-users can route themselves into this process. 
For example: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
Reflecting on these biographical features, one inhabitant expanded upon the idea of 
surrogation to Voysey‟s engagement with the future occupancy of his buildings. John, as a 
retired architect, recognises (and diagnoses) in Voysey the sort of thing that he would do: 
to design for himself. 
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[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
Here, it is interesting to note that a number of other resident-users understand that 
Voysey‟s design process collapses the distinction between the architect and the inhabitant: 
it is understood as an attempt to perform a future version of them, to simulate how they 
might want to live, and design the building to serve that imagined client. In short, they 
correlate their expansive experience of the building to a similar effort on Voysey‟s part, one 
of forward surrogation. 
 
Perhaps this is most true in those instances where resident-users feel benefitted by 
Voysey‟s offerings, much as John and Anna do, but it raises the important question of 
Voysey‟s stance. To understand himself as a future inhabitant could have one of two broad 
effects: on the one hand it could suggest that Voysey‟s work was replete with considerate 
offerings and the amelioration of annoyances for future users, and his forward surrogation 
is part of an act of care and an invitation to indulge in pleasing and useful features, as John 
and Anna have found with the shapes and proportions that surround them: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
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The other possibility, of course, is that Voysey did not surrogate the future inhabitant, but 
attempted to invade and control the possibilities of their future inhabitation in wilful acts 
of personal imposition: this has been the observation of Florence and Adam, who find the 
features of their house not invitational, but deliberately constraining. They interpret these 
features as Voysey‟s particular indulgences and their interpretation is that he believed that 
people were, or should, be akin to him and respond to the same material cues. And their 
diagnosis of Voysey reflects this. 
 
Living with a Voysey Building: 
 
The appeal of these offerings, and the reason they‟re enjoyed so much, is because they are 
comprehended in an invitational way: as space for inhabitants to form their own styles of 
inhabitation and exercise their agency (in whatever form it takes) without being impeded or 
frustrated. This extending and expanding the options and opportunities of inhabitation 
(rather than their occluding or constriction) is a recurring understanding in my interviews. 
As a material-architectonic achievement, these substantial allowances seem to arise 
primarily from the amelioration of design failures like dust traps, inadequate storage, 
botched orientation, and other potential pitfalls that would otherwise force the residents to 
undertake their own ameliorations, either by acting contrary to their preferences to account 
for them, or by making actual structural alterations to the building to correct them. This 
might, perhaps, go un-noticed in a number of cases, but certain situations serve to highlight 
these thoughtful absences which, in turn, purify the architectural environment of potential 
frustrations, such as: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
And on a similar theme, Julian suggested that: 
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[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
This absence of problems – the fact that residents are not impeded by them as obstacles or 
forced to ameliorate them in some way – creates an almost hygienic architectonic that is 
filtered and cleansed of annoyances and ugliness. A principal understanding of Voysey‟s 
consideration, skill and achievement seems to be based upon inspired absences which are 
no less important, it seems, than brilliant incursions. When the mediocre and substandard 
are excised and their absence is noted, an edifying and hygienic remainder is automatically 
revealed. 
 
The inhabitation of a Voysey building is a complex territory, and that complexity prevents 
me from splitting “inhabitation” into a list of essential domestic practices such as cooking, 
eating, sleeping, and so forth, and as such, I‟m also prevented from understanding the 
building as a simple series of spaces to house them. A hallmark of this complexity is the 
way it extends beyond these standard and expected dwelling practices and ventures into the 
comprehension of design. Specifically, this extended aspect of dwelling sees inhabitants 
considering the proficiency of the design in achieving certain ends: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
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Not all inhabitants extend their dwelling as positively as Barry does: in fact, some 
inhabitants find proficiency to be consistently lacking. But these different outcomes (some 
of which I will detail further) are the result of a fundamentally similar process characterised 
by a critical extending of inhabitation into the building‟s production and the way it 
reproduces its functions. Barry does not simply eat and sleep in his house: he consciously 
dwells in the recursive evidence of its proficiency and quality, being impressed by and 
enjoying the cleverness of the volumetric weaving Voysey employed (even if the house 
could, in principle, contain the same specification  arranged around a more rudimentary 
plan). In doing so, he and the other Voysey inhabitants I‟ve interviewed are expeditionary 
in their dwelling, extending their experiences to include understandings of design and 
design skill. A Voysey house is not simply inhabited in the terms of an itinerary (four 
bedrooms, two receptions, and etcetera), but as the thoughtful exercise of intention and 
proficiency in assembling and executing those contents.  
 
The extension of inhabitation into design varies in its potency: at its most potent it takes 
the form of surrogacy: this more than just dwelling in and through a recognition of design 
intention and proficiency (or lack thereof). Surrogacy describes the actual (re-)occupation 
of the design process and the designer‟s strata of intentions insofar as they are understood. 
Jane and Daniel, for instance, have created an experience of their home that is deferent to 
their understanding of its originality: an understanding they‟ve developed from a research 
process which is also, fundamentally, part of their inhabitation experience: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
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[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
Jane and Daniel‟s surrogation seems to contain two barely distinct acts of extension – their 
“abilities” – both closely allied through the process of research77. The first of these 
extending abilities seems to create a profoundly powerful space within their inhabitation 
for a re-inhabitation of Voysey as a designer: in order to restore their house, they are 
essentially reproducing themselves as the kind of designer he was through the study of his 
plans and elevations: they even extend a simulation of Voysey‟s preferences to “their” 
choice of furniture and fixings: [Redacted interview material - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - -] 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
The second of these extending abilities is more expressly temporal allowance whereby the 
house is allowed to default, through the process of restoration (and the surrogation of 
                                                   
77 [Redacted interview material]. 
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Voysey‟s design strategies and policies as a means to achieving it), to an earlier form that is 
closer to Voysey‟s original conception. Their restoration is aimed at recuperating Voysey‟s 
original shapes, spaces, and materials, along with the sensations and impressions that they 
will provide, rather than a recuperation of Victorian-Edwardian living: with the exception 
of their kitchen alterations and the provision of various low-key services78, Jane and Daniel 
have doggedly swathed their house in temporal insulation, eschewing their original architect 
and his (con)temporality in favour of Voysey‟s design. This is powerfully expressed in their 
stated intention to [Redacted interview material], an unusually strong statement of 
plausibility whereby Jane and Daniel‟s inhabitation is based around an analytic which 
understands the house to be vocal, insistent, and irrevocably habitual and wilful such that 
certain choices are not plausibly available to them. This further suggests that their house, 
inhabited as such, enhances the plausibility of reproducing the kind of didactic work that 
Voysey hoped of it, and that their inhabitations are the ongoing result of Voysey‟s 
intentions as to how the house ought to be inhabited. By the same token, it is worth 
keeping sight of the suggestion that Jane and Daniel seem to put research and re-discovery 
at the fore of their analytic inhabitations, and the “speech” that the house can articulate so 
powerfully may, in fact, amplify the house to reflect their hopes for what they want it to be: 
a vibrant research object. If this is the case, then Jane and Daniel‟s analytical inhabitation 
doesn‟t simply [Redacted interview material] because it is powerfully vocal and plausibly 
narrates Voysey‟s intentions. Their speaking house may be a necessary understanding that 
produces the house as a research object, understood as a connectivity to the past and to 
Voysey as a historical figure which serves their preferred inhabitation which is, I think 
obviously, laden with analysis. Specifically, theirs is an analysis of the house that serves 
their continued research-driven inhabitation of it, and it is this that may generate the 
plausibility of it “speaking” from their hopes for it to speak, through which they can 
surrogate, for their interest, the processes that brought it about. 
 
I would suggest that all the Voysey inhabitant-users engage in surrogation of some kind 
whereby their inhabitation extends into Voysey as a designer, and from the evidence of 
their material surroundings (and the assistance of secondary sources) into Voysey‟s persona 
and motivations, though none as profoundly as Jane and Daniel. But even Jane and Daniel 
have a limit to their surrogation, and like all of my interviewees there is evidence that the 
                                                   
78 Jane and Daniel‟s house was not originally fitted out for electricity, although it has obviously been retrofitted and then 
re-wired a number of times since then, most recently when Jane and Daniel moved in (1998). They have also installed an 
oil-fired boiler which provides hot water to a number of (very low profile) radiators. 
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diagnosed Voyseys they create is limited by an element of plausibility. My interviews 
suggest that it‟s quite common and normal to comprehend Voysey‟s motivations, and even 
his peculiarities, from the experience of architectonic materialities: 
 
Adam: Yeah I don‟t know how this fits in, and you probably haven‟t got a 
leading question about this- 
Paul: [Laughs]. 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
In this example, Adam (and Florence) fashion an obsessive – perhaps mildly neurotic – 
Voysey from a material experience. Ignoring, for the moment, how apposite their diagnosis 
is, it is interesting to note that this is where Florence and Adam‟s Voysey stops. Even if 
inhabitants are aware of Voysey‟s high-minded ethical goals (and in a truncated form, many 
of them are) they do not extend their diagnoses this far: habits, peculiarities, and pragmatic 
professionalism generally mark the limits of diagnostic plausibility. Voysey‟s intricate 
ontology, his densely woven ethics, and his didactic theories seem too large and complex to 
be hinted at in material form. In Andrew‟s case, for example, Voysey is split neatly into 
two: in order to qualify or credit aspects of his experience he retains a pragmatic Voysey 
who, he assumes, aimed to produce good work that rendered good service to the 
occupant...  
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
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The largeness and brightness of Voysey House is an outcome of a diligent and pragmatic 
Voysey attending to the client‟s original needs, although that diligence should be normal 
and expected in any event. But diligence is the maximum extent that Andrew will allow 
Voysey to credibly achieve in the context of his experience. Thereafter, the plausibility he is 
willing to offer runs dry... 
 
Paul: Are you familiar with that agenda? Or have you read- 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
This act of dismissing Voysey (as [Redacted interview material]) marks the split in 
Andrew‟s Voysey and defines the extent that Voysey can be employed in his experience, 
much like Florence and Adam‟s split Voysey though, in their case, whilst they understand 
that Voysey had motivations, these are of little consequence to them in their everyday lives: 
[Redacted interview material - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- -] In fact, Florence and Adam‟s split Voysey, whilst it allows for a limited degree of 
plausibility, is somewhat over-ridden by the disservice that their house renders and the 
sense that it has, in certain ways, imposed on them (see above). This occludes (along with 
their everyday concerns) whatever that plausibility would have otherwise offered, and in 
their case the split, whilst it recognises a small corner of plausibility and that Voysey was 
definitely attempting something, does not allow Voysey‟s influence to be plausible either 
before or after that split. 
 
Voysey is similarly, if less summarily, split in the experiences of all my other interviewees. 
The location and depth of that split obviously depends on what inhabitants believe to be 
credible or plausible, but in all my other interviews the split in their respective Voyseys 
occurs at the point where the credible or plausible becomes unlikely, abstract, or silly. 
However, the fact that there is a point at which Voysey‟s credibility falters does not 
undermine or invalidate the credibility of his efforts up to that point, and the existence of a 
possibly silly or potentially aloof strata of ideals does not spoil the day-to-day usefulness 
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and skilfulness of the building and its design. Despite being very simple buildings, Voysey 
was in the habit of detailing his homes with sentimental carvings and metalwork. I found 
them a little too sickly to be charming when I visited the buildings, but Julian, for example, 
was able to ameliorate and merge such features into the wider, plainer, and far more 
practical plausibility of the house, a practical plausibility that he extends to surround 
features that might otherwise be didactic in their intentions: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
Similarly, Barry recognises that the impressive execution of his house must be sourced 
from [Redacted interview material - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] but at the same time it doesn‟t actually intrude into the 
conception of his experience, from which it is split. The living, mystical concepts of 
Voysey‟s ontology and ethics, whilst they may have produced the results that Barry now 
lives in, only needs to echo faintly in his experience. In fact, when I tried to explicate some 
of Voysey‟s more theoretical understandings to Barry, though he recognised the plausibility 
of what I was suggesting, he countered with his own suggestion that such understandings 
were more germane to Voysey‟s execution of the building than to Barry‟s current 
experience of it: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
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This combination of recognising, yet choosing to ignore or efface the more idealist and 
philosophical side of Voysey‟s motivations seems to be the principal function of splitting 
Voysey (although my choice of “split” is probably too definite to describe Julian‟s more 
subtle practical enveloping of what might otherwise be didactically inclined features). 
Similarly, Anna and John employ a split in the experience of their house which effectively 
filters Voysey‟s didactic ambitions from the objects that surround them and leave them in a 
more pragmatic state, but not a state devoid of awareness that such ambitions were present 
in the first instance. In fact, John reflected that that presence, whilst not without 
consequence, had to be made diminutive otherwise Anna and John‟s experience would be: 
[Redacted interview material - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ]He re-confirmed this later in our discussion: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
This returns us to the invitational understandings of living in a Voysey building that some 
of my interviewees maintain, insofar that one key aspect of the way Voysey‟s current 
plausible existence is split is by understanding those less plausible aspects as invitational, 
and theirs to choose if and how to indulge in. For instance, Jane and Daniel, recalling the 
first time they viewed their house, [Redacted interview material- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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- - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ]. Julian‟s appreciation of the 
simplicity he experiences at his house is invitational insofar as he extends an understanding 
of his choice to his choice of design features that matter to him: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
This is not, then, a simple case of what people “get” and “don‟t get”; it is certainly not that 
the original complexities of the building are entirely beyond their understanding. In fact, 
aspects of those complexities can be submitted to the reasoning of inhabitants and, much 
as Anna and John [Redacted interview material], inhabitation can demonstrably have an 
interrogative capacity which splits off what is implausible about the building and 
concentrates on the plausible.  
 
The splitting of plausibility in the inhabitation of Voysey‟s buildings produces, or is perhaps 
produced by, the potential for a fragmentary experience of the buildings. This can be 
instead of, or additional to, the building being understood as an ensemble with a consistent 
theme. In the former case, Florence and Adam do not really have an overarching 
“ensemble” into which their experience of their house fits, and it seems that as a result 
their experience is to like some parts and dislike others, without exactly understanding 
these as emanating from a wider theme. This may be a result of the fact that, like Andrew 
at Voysey House, Adam and Florence‟s reasons for purchasing their home in the first place 
were largely pragmatic, and rather less affectionate than might otherwise be expected of my 
other interviewees: Adam recalls that [Redacted interview material - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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- - - - - - - - - ]. Fundamentally, and somewhat in common with Andrew (but with 
diminished affection), Adam and Florence [Redacted interview material - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ]. Whether or not the pragmatic motivation for Florence and Adam‟s 
inhabitation is contributory, or whether it is enabled their enquiring dismissal of the ideas 
behind Voysey‟s design incursions, Adam is cursory about his likes and dislikes without 
connecting them together into an overall liking or disliking of a house that could be 
apprehended as a material articulation of ideas, but is instead, and despite them, largely 
understood as [Redacted interview material]: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material]  
[Redacted interview material]  
[Redacted interview material]  
[Redacted interview material]  
[Redacted interview material]  
[Redacted interview material]  
[Redacted interview material]  
[Redacted interview material]  
 
As for the other residents I‟ve interviewed, their part-by-part inhabitation seems to be 
contained and linked together by the idea that the buildings were, in fact, driven by ideas 
which it is still plausible to discern in the form and details of the buildings as with, for 
instance, Barry‟s appreciation that some sort of [Redacted interview material] is at work, or 
Julian‟s understanding that the building overall combines the ergonomic with the aesthetic. 
 
The impression I was left with from my interviews is that the Voysey residents were both 
capable of and often inclined to engage in quite perceptive and inquisitive forms of 
inhabitations. If I were to make an overall observation on this, it would be that residents 
understand themselves differently, in ontological terms, to Voysey. Voysey‟s ontology 
integrated personalities with materialities and, I would suggest that he believed this would 
re-shape people much as a piece of wood could be worked. Perhaps unsurprisingly, and 
perhaps expressed most forcibly by Andrew, and Florence and Adam, the inhabitants I‟ve 
interviewed do not understand themselves as being connected in this way. They understand 
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themselves as more bounded, with characteristics that are the result of their own choices. 
This may be critically important to the idea of architectural plausibility because inhabitants 
think of their own ideas, choices, and characteristics as having a forceful presence that 
cannot be easily or plausibly be affected. And it is indicative of the perceptive and 
inquisitive nature of inhabitation that Julian suggests that we don‟t actually know whether 
(for example) some aspects of house design could be relaxing or whether the inhabitant is, 
in fact, the sort of person who is often stressed. In short, the possibility of a building 
plausibly having an effect cannot be definitely answered: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material]  
[Redacted interview material]  
[Redacted interview material]  
[Redacted interview material]  
 
Similarly, and commenting on Voysey‟s reverence of nature and natural logic, Jane notes 
that: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
Whilst this is indicated in all my interviews, it is perhaps best represented in Florence and 
Adam‟s experience of their house which, driven by a degree of indifference about the 
building in general, perceives in Voysey‟s efforts a degree of unreasonableness which they 
are conscious of and capable of understanding, but which is dismissed with those same 
faculties. Florence and Adam, in a way more obvious but, I believe, shared with the other 
inhabitants I‟ve interviewed, can create an awareness of Voysey‟s thinking and what he was 
attempting to achieve, but they are simultaneously aware of their ability to ignore, efface, or 
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remake it. In fact, that insightful awareness of the potentially incursive nature of the 
building is the key to generating an inhabitation that can apprehend it. 
 
Material offerings: 
 
The fact that the buildings are prevented from doing things does not mean that there isn‟t a 
corpus of things that they can do and that have effects. 
 
The shapes, treatments, and forms that Voysey employed are credited by the inhabitants 
I‟ve interviewed as able to do something, to create feelings within the bounds of plausibility 
I described in the preceding section. Daniel and Jane find that the low, wide, horizontal 
shape of their house has an interesting and pleasing effect, one which she credits to a 
tessellation between the design intention and the way people look at things... 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
...and this tessellation continues in Daniel‟s understanding of the scalar potential of this 
feature in terms of how makes him feel (or, specifically, how it doesn‟t make him feel).  
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
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My interpretation of this is that Jane and Daniel (quite at odds with Florence and Adam) 
understand that the building has been fashioned to be compatible with their bodily terms. 
The scale of their house doesn‟t belittle or diminish them. A similar point emerged from 
my interview with John and Anna, whereby the importance of shape and proportion 
creates a result which is more amenable to them in terms of their comfort in the way forms 
are split up and made easier to look at in the process, a “break” that scales the building so 
that it is not too extensive for them to apprehend. 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
The excerpts I‟ve presented above demonstrate, I would suggest, that the experience of 
scale is important for how approachable and usable the building is by allowing it to fall 
within the inhabitant‟s scope, and in saying this I detect the possibility of a spatial kind of 
ownership. Part of this is contained in the impression that the building, as Jane, Daniel, 
Anna, and John experience it, does not extend away from the inhabitants to indulge in the 
ostentation of large spaces (in fact, there is a general consensus that these buildings are not 
ostentatious, discussed below, though Adam and Florence and, to a lesser degree, Andrew, 
find them to be presumptuous), but I think that a further effect of this might be that the 
inhabitants can reach, inhabit, and thus be able to effectively apprehend the whole of the 
building, i.e. it is scaled down to their reach. My argument in this sense adds a dual 
meaning to scale, by which I refer not just to the size of something, but the potential to 
physically surmount it (my use of the term here is more often used to describe acts of 
climbing and ascending). I would consider that this dual meaning of scale is evident, to a 
degree, in the inhabitation of Voysey‟s buildings insofar that all its corners and levels can 
be apprehended from the human scale. This apprehending is visual in the above two 
examples, but I believe it may also activate an ownership of the inhabitation insofar that 
those corners and levels are not out of reach: they can be used, or indeed altered, by the 
inhabitants, producing the impression that the space is definitely theirs, and not, through 
the creation of the out of reach, an architects‟ indulgence.  
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Alternatively, the inhabitation of these scalar aspects of Voysey‟s design could plausibly 
create the sense that the building was designed very much for its inhabitants rather than for 
the service of some other cache of ideas. This seems to be the case with a number of my 
interviewees, and if the building is scaled “for” inhabitants as Jane, Daniel, John, and Anna 
seem to think, then they may seek out or be willing to recognise what else is for them too 
and recognise it, as Barry does, as the architect‟s skill: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
There is also a general, though not universal, favour for the simplicity Voysey employed in 
the design of his buildings, though this sometimes manifests as the absence of fuss rather 
that presence of simplicity, as is the case with Florence and Adam‟s house: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
And also, in Julian‟s experience: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material]  
[Redacted interview material]  
[Redacted interview material]  
 
Julian further interprets this as the creation of a puritanical Voysey and, in explaining his 
experience he produces and vocalises a particular version of Voysey with a particular 
personality that accounts for the practical and simple materiality he inhabits, thus: 
[Redacted interview material - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - 
- - - - - - - - - ]. Barry, though he does not virtualise a personality for Voysey from the 
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experience of his house, recognises that the rectilinear simplicity of his house is an 
expression of an underlying plan: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
What I find interesting about the simplicity that Voysey inhabitants so readily engage with 
are the complexities that emerge from the experience of simplicity: it is often made to 
perform complex acts within their inhabitations, as is the case with Julian‟s puritanical 
Voysey, and also (as mentioned earlier) Jane and Daniel‟s furniture “policy” whereby 
simple fixtures and fittings are used to beneficially reflect the simplicity of their house in 
general. Simplicity in a Voysey house is variously experienced, from the beneficial absence 
of [Redacted interview material] to the virtualised presence of a puritanical Voysey, and like 
Voysey‟s scalar approach (discussed above), I would also argue that it can represent both 
the absence of the architect‟s intentions (i.e. the absence of grand, suggestive 
ornamentations) and the substantial and biographically identified presence of his 
characteristics. 
 
In my explanation of the scalar and the simple thus far, I have reflected the way that the 
inhabitants I‟ve interviewed do not split apart the aesthetic or ergonomic in their 
experiences. This in turn leads me to reflect upon the erroneous manner in which I 
presented certain questions to them (this is a useful by-product of the interview 
methodology I outlined in chapter two whereby interviewees were invited to question my 
questions). In my interviews I split the aesthetic and ergonomic apart into separate lines of 
questioning, and I would normally ask what ergonomic and functional features they noted, 
liked, or disliked before moving on to enquire, in much the same way, about my 
interviewees experience of the aesthetic elements of their buildings. In their experience, 
however, there is no such split: in fact, there is a consistent necessity for them to remain 
interrelated through the idea that necessary components necessarily needed pleasing visual 
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treatments. For Jane, this idea was almost self-evident, as though it simply didn‟t make 
sense not to combine both elements in the design of a feature: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
The potential for the Jane‟s window seats to be good is created by their combination of the 
ergonomic and aesthetic, and there‟s a sense that these are required equally – that if the 
seats had been entirely practical they wouldn‟t have imparted the same appeal (and it‟s 
possible to suppose that if they had only been aesthetically motivated they would not be 
usable). Perhaps the most obvious example of this combination is in the experience of 
Julian, already mentioned in the preceding section, and confirmed in his explanation to me 
of the impressiveness of his building, and how the combination of the aesthetic and the 
ergonomic is key to that impressiveness:  
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
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[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
In my interview with Andrew at Voysey House, our discussion on the aesthetic elements of 
the building engaged with the ergonomic before I‟d even reached that question. Voysey 
House had formerly been the Sanderson and Sons‟ wallpaper factory before it was 
converted into offices. The wallpaper was hand-made and, to enable this process, Andrew 
suggested that Voysey had designed large strips of glazing to illuminate the employees‟ 
workbenches. Whilst the aesthetic effect of such glazing was striking to him, he swiftly 
connected that visual effect through to the (presumed) functional requirements of 
producing wallpaper: 
 
Paul: Did any other aesthetic aspect of the interior strike you as- 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
In this sense the functional motivation seems important; even if the original function has 
long since passed (the windows were still, naturally, functional in the building‟s new 
incarnation). Perhaps the best way to summarise this point is with Amanda‟s observation 
that to split aesthetics from ergonomics seems implausible if a building is to be properly 
designed (as Winsford79 is in her experience) to be enjoyable in its use, although in this 
instance the understanding of aesthetic and ergonomic manifested as an inside-outside 
split.  
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
                                                   
79 Winsord Cottage Hospital is located in Beaworthy, Devon, a small community hospital paid for by a local benefactor in 
memory of her husband, and completed in 1900. Until 1998 is was run by the NHS, and thereafter has been in use as a 
community centre including social, health, day care, and education functions operated by The Winsford Trust as “The 
Winsford Centre”. (The Winsford Trust, 2010). 
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[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
In closing this section, it‟s worth noting that whilst the combination of the aesthetic and 
ergonomic is important, that combination is sometimes understood to have failed in the 
experiences of my interviewees. This seems to be most evident, I would argue, when the 
functional (or ergonomic) aspects of the building are subsumed by an overemphasis on 
aesthetic indulgences on Voysey‟s part. At Voysey House, for example, the 
weatherproofing is understood to have been undermined by what Andrew assumes to have 
been aesthetically wilful acts on Voysey‟s part, most especially the possibility that he didn‟t 
want rainwater downpipes to show on the exterior of the building. In addition, the glazed 
exterior brickwork (used where alternative and better materials were available) has become 
porous: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
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Temporalities: 
 
To close this first chapter, I wish to return to one of the key features of the thesis in terms 
of the nature of its enquiry, and the methodology I use herein: that is, the disjuncture 
between the current inhabitations of the buildings I study here, and their original design 
and completion when their form was still under the auspices of the architect. In line with 
the methodology I detailed in chapter two, I do not wish to proceed from an assumption 
that disclaims these buildings from a present origin. Leaving the question of how much  
these buildings are either of the present or of the past has left me a space which I can now 
start to fill with how the age of these buildings and the disjuncture between them is 
understood by, and indeed produced by, cogent acts of inhabitation. The way my 
interviewees understand time is important. In some cases, the passage of time diminishes 
the potential for the building to be understood as working because, simply speaking, its 
contextual origins are very different to current circumstances. The ramifications of this are, 
in the first place, that the building is not considered to be Voysey‟s alone and the 
articulation of his wishes. Both Voysey and his buildings are seen to be susceptible to 
contextual influences of the time, such that his buildings are not plausibly understood as 
architectural transcripts of his wilfulness, but a more general reiteration of the norms and 
expectations of the nineteenth century which Voysey simply reissued. This seems to inform 
how Florence understands her house; in fact, at times her inhabitation incorporates an 
almost-defensive stance against the house that may quite substantially contract the 
plausibility it could have. She argues that [Redacted interview material - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -]. Florence finds that certain features of her house don‟t fit the 
day-to-day lifestyle and domestic labours that she and Adam might find easier in a more 
recently built house, one that doesn‟t solidify key aspects of a now absent past which 
impinges on their contemporary experiences. Specifically, her house was laid out such that 
the occupants could dwell at leisure, whilst a servant undertook a substantial portion of the 
domestic work. This long-absent context informed the structure of a house in a way that is 
no longer helpful, even if the house is, on the whole, workable. 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
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[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
Florence and Adam are inclined to be more critical of their house than the other 
inhabitants I‟ve interviewed, which may inform their readiness to find annoyance at 
the incursion of non-relevant oldness into their home. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Jane 
and Daniel also find that features of their home seem to be locked into a past which 
no longer quite works. In this instance, however, it is not the exuberance of having a 
servant that creates the problem, but the austerity of the late nineteenth century, and 
the concurrent austerity of Voysey. Despite the fact that the fitted wardrobes in their 
house were laudably precise and efficient (see excerpt below), that precision and 
efficiency was relevant to a past time which, now gone, has rendered them somewhat 
pointless in a time with different expectations: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
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The difference, of course, is that in the case of Jane and Daniel they are delighted for their 
house to be of the past, and no less delighted when their house unashamedly retains these 
features which are no longer useful, but significant nonetheless in terms of their research-
driven inhabitation. In fact, Jane and Daniel‟s analytical inhabitation of their house 
manifests a temporal complexity: the fact that the building is (or is understood to be) of the 
past is key to Jane and Daniel‟s present and preferred inhabitation. For their house to work 
in the present in terms of their preferences, it was always going to have to be anchored in 
the past. That past anchoring, as I described in the previous section, makes their building 
an efficacious object of research in the present. 
 
Other temporal understandings find that Voysey‟s work is not meaningfully diminished by 
the passage of time, nor indeed diminished to a role of reiterating the social and cultural 
contexts of their inception. Indeed, as Julian suggests, the orientation and proportions of 
his house are increasingly seen as features of most modern houses: [Redacted interview 
material - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -]. In this sense, the building is not understood as 
being dependent on its contexts, and the referencing of its contexts, to work or fail, unless 
of course the plausibility of Voysey‟s work is understood to be contained in an ability to 
pre-empt and reference contexts to follow, in which case a degree of dependency on 
context remains, albeit one more astute than Florence finds at her house. As it happens, 
Florence‟s analysis of the deficient layout of her house relative to her needs is interpreted 
quite differently by John. In his discussion of the servants wing at his house, he surmises 
that Voysey must have, in fact, been pitching the design of the house towards a more 
egalitarian time which stripped away certain more bumptious social norms, a stripping 
which he finds evident in the design of the house, and which may help him to see his house 
less as a historic object, and more valid in contemporary times: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
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[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
  
The influence, or deliberate lack of influence, of the past is therefore important in the way 
the plausibility of these buildings are shaped, though that should not be taken to mean that 
the plausibility of the building is more secure when it is credited with acts of pre-empting 
rather than acts of reiteration, especially in the case of Jane and Daniel whose inhabitation 
calls upon the past to be present. In a number of less prominent ways, my other 
interviewees have also found that there is something about living in an old building that 
makes it special. Whilst Florence is in no doubt as to her annoyance with the temporality of 
her home, she does appreciate the less intentional patina that her house has incurred over 
time, though this is despite Voysey. [Redacted interview material - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -]. 
For Florence, the benefit of time in terms of her inhabitation has less to do with intentions 
that were feeble to context, or a historic sense that the house is important, and far more to 
do with the “flavour” of a matured house, one which, perhaps, has had the sharp edges of 
newness taken off it and replaced with a lived-in patina of dents and divots. This contrasts 
with Julian‟s experience, who recalls the first time he saw his home: [Redacted interview 
material - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -].  History, as Julian understands it here, 
is credited with producing an attendant pride in his house and a sense of privilege. I would 
suggest that both of these are emergent from the idea that in living where he lives, he is 
caring for and maintaining custody of something that is understood to be important, but 
this is merely my suggestion and, although these themes are more prominent in the 
following chapter, in Julian‟s case the historical significance of his house is a pleasant, 
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unconsidered sheen on an altogether pleasant inhabitation. One instance where the 
historicity of the building is analysed, and where that sheen becomes much more 
purposive, is at Winsford, where the building is understood to be historic because it pre-
echoed an important social change in British society by a number of years, and thus 
contains in an original kind of form the beneficent and progressive thought that generated 
it, though as in Florence‟s case, the building itself is ancillary to the idea (though it is 
understood to be a worthy housing for it). 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
In Andrew‟s experience, by contrast, it is the building itself that is of historic value insofar 
that Voysey House, in terms of what it pre-echoes is [Redacted interview material - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - ]. 
 
The complexity of these inhabitations and the plausibilities they produce are varied, both in 
terms of their extent, and in terms of their relative differences. By way of closing this 
chapter, I would like to emphasise the astute and analytical nature by which my 
interviewees produce plausibilities, and peer into the mechanics of how architecture, and 
the architect, can deliver effect. The architect himself is analysed from the architectural 
forms that inhabitants experience, which are themselves made more or less plausible by 
being connected to the motivations and expertise (or lack thereof) of a practitioner. Those 
same astute inhabitations can confirm, or redact, the plausibility of the building through 
querying it as an exercise of care and consideration, including the temporal adequacy of its 
foresight, and how well future inhabitants‟ needs are pre-empted. Perhaps most 
interestingly, however, is the possibility that, though the analytical creation of a “split” 
architect (as I have described it) the plausible and the implausible can be managed in 
tandem so that less plausible aspects of the building, except where they are genuinely 
intrusive, do not breach or undermine the continuation of thos more plausible aspects. 
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Box 4a: Charles Henry Holden. 
 
Personal events and associations: 
 
12th May 1875:  Born, New Lever, Bolton (Lancs.) to 
Joseph and Ellen Holden nee Bolton. 
1890:  Ellen Holden dies. 
1896: Meets Francis Dodd and Muirhead Bone. 
1899:  Meets and starts co-habiting with 
Margaret Steadman*. 
1901: Begins attending Friends‟ meetings. 
1915: Meets Frank Pick. 
1919:  Joseph Holden dies. 
1944:  Offered (and turns down) a knighthood. 
1954: Margaret Holden* dies. 
1st May 1960: Dies, Welwyn (Herts.) aged 84. 
 
Education: 
 
1892-1896: Articled to Everard W. Leeson, Architect 
(Manchester). 
1893-1894:  Trained at the Manchester Municipal 
School of Art. 
1894-1896:  Trained at the Manchester Technical 
School. 
1900-1903:  Attends the Royal Academy Schools. 
1936:  Awarded an honorary doctorate by the 
University of Manchester. 
1946:  Awarded an honorary doctorate by the 
University of London. 
 
*Hutton and Crawford (2004) casts doubt over whether 
Holden and Steadman (nee Macdonald) were ever legally 
married, principally because it is not known whether she 
ever divorced her first husband. Notwithstanding, she 
remained with Holden until her death in 1954, and adopted 
Holden as her surname, so I refer to her throughout as 
Margaret Holden (in line with Karol, 2008: 46-47). 
 
Sources: Karol, 2007: 479-480; Hutton and Crawford, 2004. 
 
 
4. 
Holden: 
 
 
Charles Holden (see Box 4a for basic biographical details) is an exceptionally difficult 
architect to classify. Classifying architects according to the styles they employed is 
problematic in any event for the 
neatening and homogenising 
effect it can have, but both 
Voysey and Lubetkin can, at 
least in the first instance, be said 
to have affinities with the Arts 
and Crafts movement and 
Modernism (or Constructivism) 
respectively. Classifying Holden 
is more difficult again, because 
in the course of his career he 
changed stylistic direction a 
number of times. 
Fundamentally, Holden may 
have been a far more flexible 
practitioner than Voysey or 
Lubetkin were, and perhaps this 
makes sense relative to the 
context in which he practised. 
The practise of architecture was 
enormously changeable during 
Holden‟s career, whereas both 
Voysey and Lubetkin could 
enjoy more secure contexts of 
architectural practise (or secure 
enclaves within changeable contexts) and benefit from some degree of continuity, even if 
they did not belong to the artistic or stylistic camps as Arts and Crafts, or Modernism. 
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When Voysey practised, traditional forms of construction still predominated, as did the 
apprenticeship system of training architects, alongside certain stylistic movements that 
existed in an established state. And when Lubetkin practised, the successors to these norms 
(engineering-derived methods of construction, architectural training schools, and the 
growing influence of Modernism) were new, but they were also reasonably sure footed. 
Holden, practising between these times, had to adjust his approach regularly, rejecting old 
directions and exploring new ones. The plate section in the middle of this chapter attests to 
this changeability. 
 
Holden‟s buildings are concentrated in London, where he made a substantial mark. His 
buildings for the University of London and London Underground are used by millions of 
people. His London Underground stations were built in two tranches, each stylistically 
distinct. The second tranche were principally built for the Piccadilly line, with a small 
number of stations for the Central line. They comprise compact, almost pure masses such 
as cubes and drums with minimal protrusions or indentations except for long strips of 
dusky brick separating (generally vertical) expanses of glazing at regular intervals (such as 
Arnos Grove80 (fig. 4.11)). These shapes are often mounted on a single storey pedestal-like 
entrance block, leaving them slightly elevated and set back. Their style is contained in their 
shapely massing, not in the inclusion of ornament, unlike the earlier tranche of stations, 
principally built for the Northern line, with a small number for the District line. These are 
more monolithic or slab-like in their approach, with few openings except those needed to 
transit passengers from the street to the platforms (such as Colliers Wood (fig. 4.3)). Senate 
House81 (figs. 4.1, 4.2) is different again: it is, in the first instance, enormous – high, wide, 
and long with hundreds of windows, it dominates the centre of Bloomsbury in a way that 
some find displeasing. The central tower and side wings have a chunky, solid immensity, 
                                                   
80 Completed in 1932, Glancey (2007) enthuses that Arnos Grove is “truly what German art historians would describe as 
a gesamtkunstwerk, a total and entire work of art”. The station is in Arnos Grove, North London, and serves the 
Piccadilly line. It is part of a group of stations, including Cockfosters, Oakwood, Southgate, Bounds Green and Wood 
Green, and the staff who work for the group rotate between the different stations, rather than being tasked to a particular 
station. All of the stations, Excepting Bounds Green, were designed by Holden. Bounds Green was designed by a junior 
member of Adams, Holden and Pearson. 
81 Completed in 1937, Senate House (Bloomsbury, London) is physically big enough to contain every other building I‟ve 
studied in this thesis. It was originally conceived as a much larger complex of buildings (for which funding never proved 
adequate), and at completion was the second tallest building in London. It presently houses the principal administrative 
offices for University of London, and also houses the School of Advanced Studies, a large library, Birkbeck College‟s 
School of Computer Science and Information Systems, and a number of large ceremonial halls and circulation spaces. 
The building is most famous, and perhaps notorious, as the Ministry of Information, which was housed there during the 
Second World War, and where George Orwell worked prior to writing 1984. It is often used as a film set when a 
monumental, imposing building is required. A longstanding rumour, related to me by an interviewee, is that the Luftwaffe 
were ordered not to bomb the building so that it could be used as the Third Reich‟s UK headquarters. The way in which 
Senate House‟s experience is story- and rumour-laden is discussed later in this chapter. The complex commission and 
design for Senate House is discussed at length in Simpson, 2005. 
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Box 4b: Charles Holden, professional timeline: 
 
1896:  Works in the offices of Jonathan 
Simpson, Architect (Bolton). 
1897:  Works in the offices of C. R. Ashbee, 
noted Arts and Crafts architect (London). 
1899:  Joins the office of H. Percy Adams 
Architect (London). 
1902-1906: Completes his first independent design: 
(successful) competition entry for Bristol 
Central Library. 
1906:  Becomes A.R.I.B.A. 
1907:  Adams makes Holden a partner in 
practice. 
1913: Awarded the R.I.B.A Godwin Medal. 
1915-1917:  Joins the London Ambulance Column. 
1918-1928: Promoted to Major with the Imperial War 
Graves Commission (IWGC). 
1919-1920:  Official end of military service, appointed 
fourth principal architect IWGC. 
1921:  Elected F.R.I.B.A 
1923:  Starts work for the London Underground. 
1924-1929:  First tranche of Underground stations, 
including 55 Broadway. 
1930: Death of H. Percy Adams, Holden 
becomes senior partner. 
1936: Awarded R.I.B.A Gold Medal. 
1930-1939:  Second tranche of Underground stations. 
1931-1937:  Starts work as sole architect for the 
University of London‟s Bloomsbury 
scheme. 
1942: Elected a Member of the Town Planning 
Institute. 
1944-1949: Planning work commences. 
1944-1945: Canterbury plan (with H. M. Enderby). 
1945-1947: City of London plan (with W. Holford). 
1947-1948: South bank plan (unadopted). 
1949: Tynemouth East End redevelopment 
plan. 
1958: Retires from practice. 
 
Sources: Karol, 2007: 479-480; Hutton and Crawford, 2004. 
 
and yet the external finish in Portland stone lends it a softness which, along with its 
tapering design, give me the impression that it is both immovable, yet yielding. Holden‟s 
earliest full-scale commission, 
Bristol Central Library82 (figs. 
4.6, 4.7, 4.8, 4.9). The east facing 
frontage suggests a Tudor-esque 
style which is dark, handsome 
and undulating, with a long, low 
profile, whereas the west facing 
frontage (not shown) has a more 
Scottish baronial aesthetic, and is 
both lighter and more vertically 
inclined. The interior begins with 
a gloomy grotto-like entrance 
space, eventually leading to a 
large classically featured reading 
room, brightly lit with skylights. 
The example of Bristol Central 
Library may serve to reinforce 
my point in the previous 
paragraph. In the following 
sections I outline why Holden 
changed direction, and employed 
flexibility, as he did. 
 
Auto/biographical details of 
Holden are scant, barely more 
substantial than those on Voysey. 
The only autobiographical recollections of any length are buried deep within his archives 
and comprise fourteen small scraps of paper (Holden, c.1943 [Ahp/10/2])83. In the context 
                                                   
82 Located off College Green in the centre of Bristol and completed by Holden in 1906, having won the competition for 
the commission shortly after he joined the practise of Percy Adams (see Karol and Allibone, 1988: 13). It is best described 
as an eclectic building, combining a number of different styles. It is still Bristol‟s principal library. 
83 Holden used a lot of scrap paper, and wrote a lot of his introspective material on the back of torn-up circular letters, 
junk mail, memoranda, complimentary calendars, and so forth. I found this to be both charming and of great interest for 
the contextual morsels they provided. These particular autobiographical notes are written on the back of committee 
reports, letters, and minutes from (or concerning) various Reconstruction Committees, the War Executive Committee, 
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of Holden‟s enormous archive they seem infinitesimally small; nonetheless, they are the 
only documents that detail his life prior to, or peripheral to, his architectural practice, and 
they offer some key insights into understanding how he approached and inhabited the field 
of architecture, and what he believed was plausible in and of the buildings he designed. 
 
Holden pivots his recollections around his adolescence and early adulthood: essentially, the 
1890s and early 1900s after he left school, bouncing between various jobs. He worked for 
his father, a draper, and briefly worked on the railways before being apprenticed to a 
chemical works in St. Helens: he confesses that “It was not the work he would have 
chosen, but it was not without interest for him and the knowledge gained there often 
proved useful to him in later life” (Holden, c.1943 [Ahp/10/2/iii]: 3). The contrast with 
Voysey, whose practice was then blossoming, is acute. Whereas Voysey was raised in a 
spiritual context of theological ideas and ideals (one where he remained affluent despite 
Reverend Voysey‟s deprivation), Holden‟s childhood and adolescence was firmly seated in 
the materialities of industry and commerce in England‟s industrial north (Ibid: [iv] 4) and 
tinged with his mother‟s death (when Holden was fifteen) and his father‟s bankruptcy 
shortly thereafter (Ibid: [i] 1). In Holden‟s early working life there is a conspicuous absence 
of aesthetic or artistic motivations in favour of (or perhaps symptomatic of) a deep 
immersion in the technicalities of materials, processes, and their manufacture. Perhaps this 
immersion made the absence of the artistic and aesthetic more stark because, at some point 
during this (eventually truncated) apprenticeship he developed an urge to draw, and joined 
a sketching class at the YMCA, recalling that: 
 
“To draw was his great interest – it didn‟t matter what, but just to draw.” 
(Holden, c.1943 [Ahp/10/2/iv]: 4) 
 
I use the term “urge” deliberately (reflecting Holden‟s own term, “insatiable”, in the 
following quote). My impression is that Holden did not understand drawing as the 
necessary acts required to produce drawn images, but as the haptic satisfaction of motions 
and strokes, the weight of force or the delicacy of lightness, the execution of lines, curves, 
shades and shapes of his making, traced through his fingers, hands, and arms. Drawing was 
                                                                                                                                                     
the Uthwatt Report, and the “Sub-committee on Prefabrication and Standardisation” (from which I‟ve derived the datum 
for this document: the circular is dated 30th September 1943), all torn or scissor-cut to slightly less than A5 in size. It is 
also interesting to note the degree to which Holden involved himself in post-war reconstruction and planning at both 
technical and policy levels, a subject I will return to later in this chapter. 
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his bodily achievement of intent, the emerging haptic creation and combined inhabitation 
of a two-dimensional environment of forms and textures. The subject, or indeed the results 
(and any aesthetic or representational qualities thereof) seem ancillary to the bodily 
application of his wishes, via a pencil, to a page and into two dimensional forms of shape 
and shade. This very pure and introspective inhabitation was undermined somewhat by the 
Mechanical Engineering classes which he later joined (these being the only other classes 
where he found any substantial opportunity to draw (Ibid: [iv] 4)). These classes prohibited 
absolute introspection by imposing a necessary design outcome, but in doing so they 
allowed Holden to glimpse design for the first time: an expeditionary leading edge to his 
otherwise private world (Ibid) which was then intentionally extended towards an outside 
world of people‟s needs, of functions performed, and of the third dimension. Armed with 
some technical ability, Holden started to edge towards an architectural career: 
 
“Subsequently, Charles went into his [brother in law‟s] office to help, with no 
knowledge of building, but only an insatiable desire to draw – to draw 
anything.” (Holden, c.1943 [Ahp/10/2/v]: 5) 
 
Holden‟s sister Emma had married D.F. Green, a surveyor, in 1885, and he employed 
Holden as a clerk to draw up layout plans for speculative housing developments. At this 
stage it‟s evident that Holden still retained drawing as his own haptic indulgence (even 
functional drawing with defined purposes and outcomes). Nonetheless, he must have 
shown some promise, as Green felt inclined to approach a noted ecclesiastical architect84 to 
provide training for Holden, and although this architect proved unwilling, he was able to 
secure Holden a four-year apprenticeship with Edward Leeson85 of Manchester, starting in 
1892. During his articles, Holden retained, albeit in diminished form, his appetite for 
drawing, and re-immersed himself in materialities: not chemical engineering, but 
construction. Over four years he attended evening classes in construction, masonry, 
carpentry and joinery, alongside his ongoing drawing classes (Holden, c.1943 
[Ahp/10/2/vi]: 5). This exploratory approach offered Holden a very broad architectural 
concept from the outset, one which dispenses with the introspection of his drawn world 
(to an extent) but retains its haptic engagement. That is, Holden evidently did not wish to 
                                                   
84 Although Holden doesn‟t specify which architect Green first approached on his behalf, it is likely to have been G. F. 
Bodley , who was the only noted ecclesiastical architect working in the area at that time. 
85 Little is known of Leeson, and Holden certainly doesn‟t go to very substantial efforts to recall him: he is very briefly 
discussed in Karol (2007: 51).  
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limit himself to the abstract and two-dimensional drafted world of architectural design. His 
evening classes allowed him to encompass the full scope and materialities of building, 
which seems to have offered him an alternative vector along which to practice architecture 
that starts, so to speak, at the conclusion with the constructional and material acts of 
manifestation and works back towards the inception, i.e. the design. Holden‟s evening 
engagements with the haptic, material, and pragmatic acts of building, additional to his 
architectural training, allowed for a particularly vocal inclusion of constructional methods 
and materials in Holden‟s style of practice. 
 
This alternative vector of Holden‟s emerging architectural practice is a reversal of what 
might be expected: rather than producing buildings from what could be called an 
“expectant” approach (where the character of a building is generated in a definitive process 
of design prior to methods and materials whose job is to obediently form the design), 
Holden‟s approach was “emergent”. The forms, volumes, and detailing of his architecture 
emerged from the methods and materials whose possibilities, limitations, and behaviours 
Holden had experienced, and which were incorporated into his designs. And whilst it goes 
without saying that any architect has to enable this vector in some way (to account for the 
possibilities and limitations that methods and materials allow for) it was particularly potent 
and vocal in Holden‟s case. In designing buildings he drew on the haptic and pragmatic 
experiences of his particular training (in fact, after his training at Manchester Technical 
School, he was employed on their teaching staff for a time – Holden, c.1943 
[Ahp/10/2/x]: 10). He recalled and, in a way, re-performed the stuff and work of building 
at the creative stage of design and enabled them with a degree of insistent influence. 
Whereas other architects without Holden‟s direct and haptic experience might virtualise 
meek, even dutiful materials and methods expected to service the architect‟s intentions 
(within the bounds of possibility), Holden‟s engagement was far more dutiful, and his 
approach to architecture was almost „parliamentary‟ in this respect: his design process 
collected and represented the particular needs and characteristics of the various trades 
involved in building which, taken together, animated his architectural style from without. 
 
Holden‟s parliamentary approach did not represent methods and materials alone. During 
his articles to Leeson, the Building News initiated a monthly student design competition, the 
“Designing Club”86 which Holden regularly entered. In doing so, Holden was not 
                                                   
86 See Karol, 2007: 57-59 – he submitted entries in 1895, continuing through 1896. 
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motivated to market himself or propose architectural manifestos. In fact, his motivations 
were opposed to this: entering under the pseudonym of The Owl87, his intention was to 
invoke criticisms from the reviewers; his purpose remained parliamentary in that he 
allowed for external architectural manifestos to infiltrate and animate his creativity88. 
Holden admitted that at this early stage of his career, “...he knew nothing of design indeed 
design meant nothing to him” [sic] (Holden, c.1943 [Ahp/10/2/vi-vii]: 6-7)) and sought to 
gain meaningful knowledge through a public (though anonymous) process of trial and error 
that the Designing Club afforded. By this stage, Holden‟s work had evidently outgrown his 
early introspection and arrived at a near-antithesis: an outgrowing that sought resolutions 
by seeking or inviting the opinions or impositions of other architects to recognise and 
nullify his shortcomings (Ibid: [vii-viii] 7-8). He correlated them into an approach to 
architectural design that owed more to his journeying into (or invitations to) proxy and 
context than to his own creativity to render himself obedient to the proficiencies and 
preferences of each vector in that network. This approach, despite its dutiful self-
effacement, seemed to work for him, arousing in him a passion for design that “...meant 
something to him deep + real + fundamental” [sic] (Ibid: [viii] 8). 
 
Up until this point, Holden‟s journey into architecture had been that of a practitioner, and 
he was without doubt competent, technically proficient, and able to understand and engage 
with the zeitgeist of contemporary architecture: Karol recalls that he was awarded first place 
in the Designing Club competition five times (Karol and Allibone, 1988: 8) despite some 
caustic feedback from his earlier submissions (Holden c.1943, [Ahp/10/2viii]: 8). But the 
practitioners‟ approach came to have limited appeal for him. Ironically, it was his obliging 
journeys into the field of architecture that brought his perceived limitations into relief: 
 
                                                   
87 Holden explains that “...he took the nom-de-plume of “The Owl” not because of superior wisdom but because he was 
at that time very much a night bird, working often on the competition until 3 or 4 o‟ clock in the morning.” (Holden, 
c.1943 [Ahp/10/2/x-ix]: 10-11) Even as he approached and passed retirement age, Margaret Holden recalled “...he 
worked during long days expanding themselves after midnight, a quiet motionless figure, bending over great sheets of 
paper spread out on the top of the piano” (Holden, M. and Tarling, E., c.1946-1985 [Ahp/10/8]). 
88 The design norms that Holden connected through via the Designing Club were, broadly speaking, of a neoclassical 
persuasion. Neoclassical buildings emphasise classic forms, and can therefore be expected to be symmetrical and include 
columns, often supporting a portico (an open-sided porch placed centrally in the facade and extending, in some cases, to 
the full height of the frontage), emblatures (a horizontal band-like superstructure that rests on top of columns) cornices 
(the overhang or “crown” at the top of the building, over the emblature) and various other forms that were, ostensibly, 
inspired by of transcribed from classical Greek architecture. Some of the most famous streetscapes in the UK, such as 
Regent Street in London, are of neoclassical design, as are key buildings such as Buckingham Palace (although not the 
Houses of Parliament, which are Gothic in their inception). 
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Box 4c: Laws for creations: 
 
LAWS for creations. 
For strong artists and leaders, for fresh broods of teachers 
and perfect literats* for America. 
For noble savans* and coming musicians. 
 
All must have reference to the ensemble of the world, and 
the compact truth of the world. 
There shall be no subject too pronounced – all works shall 
illustrate the divine law of indirections. 
 
What do you suppose creation is? 
What do you suppose will satisfy the soul, except to walk 
free and own no superior? 
What do you suppose I would intimate to you in a 
hundred ways, 
but that man or woman is as good as God? 
And that there is no God more divine that Yourself? 
And that that is what the oldest and the newest myths 
finally mean? 
And that you or any one must approach creation through 
such laws? 
 
Whitman, 1882 (1973): 386-387. 
 
*In both cases Whitman refers to knowledgeable and 
well-read people (i.e. those who are “literate” or “savant”). 
 
 
“Seeing the work of the leading architects the brilliant men of the day, Charles felt himself 
to be suddenly deficient in creative ability – these brilliant strokes seemed to flow so freely 
from the pencils of the great men of the day.” (Holden c.1943, [Ahp/10/2/xii]: 12). That 
deficiency was a recognition of 
how uncertain and faltering his 
own “pen” was, as he understood 
it, something that courting the 
Designing Club did not help him 
with. Such help came from a 
different and more poetic source.  
During his articles Holden was 
introduced to the writings of Walt 
Whitman (1819-1892) who had 
the most profound influence on 
him. It was Holden‟s 
understanding of one of 
Whitman‟s poems, Laws for 
creations, that helped him readmit 
himself to the practice which he 
had almost abandoned to dutiful 
obligation. A close friend and 
architect, J. W. Wallace89, introduced him to Laws for creations and entreated (almost berated) 
him not to abandon a competition entry he‟d been increasingly vexed by.  (Laws for creations, 
from Whitman‟s ongoing anthology Leaves of Grass (Whitman, 1882 (1855-1892)90) is fully 
transcribed in Box 4c). Holden recalled: 
 
“Charles was heartened by the lecture but mystified by the poem – but in 
quietness and seclusion he studied it again and again until it took on a meaning 
deep and searching and imperative. He could not fail.” (Holden, c.1943 
[Ahp/10/2/xiii]: 13) 
                                                   
89 Holden recalls that he had been eager to meet Wallace – an architect based in Bolton – because he had personally 
known Whitman: Wallace and Holden remained lifelong friends until Wallace‟s death in 1926 (Karol, 2008:480 and 
Holden, c.1943 [Ahp/10/2/xi]: 10), although it was the artist Muirhead Bone who introduced Holden to the works of 
Whitman whilst he and Holden were studying at the Manchester Municipal School of Art. 
90 In all cases I refer to the 1882 edition of Leaves of Grass as this was the last edition in which the text was substantially 
changed (the 1892 “deathbed” edition contained new appendices only), although as a point of interest, Laws for creations 
remained the same in every edition.  
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The impossibility of failing, for Holden as for Whitman, emerged from the profound 
possibilities that integrity and honesty to the self offered. Holden‟s parliamentary 
architecture, (as I have described it) had, up to this point, explicitly “owned superiors” and, 
so defined, had looked to them in concert to generate architecture on his behalf: a mimesis 
which, despite its obvious diligence, devolved his creativity to a homogenisation of external 
norms and standards, haptically or socially harvested, which he‟d assembled into an 
architectural “box of tricks” (Holden, c.1943 [Ahp/10/2/xiv]: 14; c.1936 [Ahp/26/1/3/iv-
v]: 4-5). Laws for creations rendered his functionalism and compliance in sharp relief, but 
offered in the same moment the possibility for satisfaction. Instead of trying to attain or 
contain other standards and norms he could seek, reveal, and aim to achieve his own: 
 
“He knew his design would not win but it was his confession of faith, his 
confession of his [illegible] of imagination even – but it was his own, bald bleak 
frontages but naked and unashamed.” (Holden, c.1943 [Ahp/10/2/xiv]: 14) 
 
At this key point in Holden‟s emerging practice, a degree of faith replaces failure; or put 
another way, generative creativity replaces (to a degree) parliamentary creativity. The 
constraining and diminishing of his nature and judgement in favour of delegation and 
reverential mimesis was a failing that became as obvious to Holden as it had been to 
Whitman. It was both a personal failure of over-reliance, and a wider failure of creativity 
and original thought in preference to ingrained doctrine. Furthermore, the logic of defining 
these others as above oneself (i.e. as “superior” or “divine” in Whitman‟s terminology) 
exacerbated that failing as they would always be slightly aloof, and one could only fail to 
meet their standards. As he expected, Holden‟s competition entry did not win (although it 
received a commendation (Ibid)), but he had, for the first time, neither eschewed nor 
displaced himself in favour of mimetic attainment and perceived expectation. By availing 
himself of the “divine law of indirections” (Whitman, 1882 (1973): 386-387.), he 
rediscovered his own volition and the possibility of scope, as opposed to submissions to 
the sovereignty of unconsidered norms.  
 
Rediscovery of volition – reduction as creation:  
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Holden‟s early architectural practice was a fraught journey between different possibilities 
and proficiencies. But moreover, it‟s evident that the theme of his journeying was the 
degree to which he either involved himself, or effaced himself, in various different ways. At 
this latter extreme, Holden was constantly searching for anyone or anything (except 
himself) to do his architecture for him. Yet, underlying Holden‟s varying involvement was 
his very haptic presence: even at the point where he was most effaced, a key element of 
that surrender was his experience of the materialisation of buildings, and using this 
practical understanding of constructional methods and materials to provide obvious cues 
and solutions. On the other hand, a near-absolute haptic indulgence defined Holden‟s most 
introspective moments in which lines, shapes, and shades emerged through drawn 
performances. One way or another, Holden‟s practice of architecture always contains and 
attains some degree of bodily involvement as an element of its production, regardless of 
how un-involved Holden aimed to be.  
 
As such, it‟s also important to note that his rediscovery of volition was an act of re-
balancing, rather than a revolutionary change in his approach. What changed was the 
interplay of servitudes and the idea that his role was composed of key acts of servitude. 
Some degree of duty and being dutiful (as distinct from servile) remained and he always 
understood architecture as a multiply populated undertaking which required, out of 
necessity, multiple delegations and the representation of others. The rediscovery of his 
volition was used not to indulge himself, but rather to produce his own understanding of 
his duty. Post-Whitman, Holden understood that both structure and material were 
amenable to his creativity as resources to be utilised rather than limitations that, sufficiently 
understood and reverenced, would answer for his creative anaemia with a singular or 
limited choice of logical outcome(s). This newly discovered creative amenity did not alter 
the fact that structure and materials (and the constructional methods that shaped them) 
were constraining insofar as their technical limitations curtailed any fanciful creativity: he 
still retained a practitioner‟s respect, but in a different form which I discuss shortly. 
Moreover, Holden was alerted to the fact that to base architecture on a nomenclature of 
formulas and prescribed manifestos of form, proportion, and other physical and/or 
aesthetic attributes was stifling, and in eschewing them he began to create a new 
architectural territory for himself. 
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This start of terraforming his territory led Holden towards a particular declaration of 
honest architectural faith: “You see” he wrote, “I took myself very seriously in those 
days...” 
 
“...I felt that somewhere behind the facade there was to be found an 
architecture as real and as purposeful as life itself and I sought to bring it forth 
and put it upon the map of our daily life. 
It was an ambitious programme and far beyond my capacity – but youth is ever 
audacious.” (Holden, c.1936 [Ahp/26/1/1/iii-iv]: 2-3) 
 
Part of this highly involved architecture directly in the “map of our daily life” was based 
around a concept of honesty which relied equally on a definition of dishonesty, and for 
Holden, architectural dishonesty was that that failed to achieve the “purposeful” and “real” 
or (at best) engaged with the purposeful and real from behind some facade-like 
contrivance. Underlying these two definitions is a hierarchy of function and aesthetics 
which needed to be maintained in order to attain architectural honesty:  
 
“[A]n architect can say, as I have heard it said, „I don‟t mind how a thing is 
done so long as it looks all right‟. There can be no real vitality in any building 
on these lines. It does matter how a thing is done and it matters a great deal.” 
(Holden, c.1936 [Ahp/26/1/1/vi]: vi) 
 
Holden re-issued this point on a number of different occasions, and in a contemporaneous 
document titled AA talk91 he clarified the nature of what was being “done”... 
 
“...so long as it looks all right. Who would trust you to design an aeroplane 
[illegible]. It matters a great deal how it is done. Remember you are designing a 
piece of machinery for your client which must function perfectly in all its 
parts.” (Holden, c.1936 [Ahp/26/1/3/xi]: 11) 
 
Architectural honesty was a function of efficacy, both in the way the building performed 
the purposeful work required of it and, preceding this, the architect‟s understanding and 
                                                   
91 “AA” refers to the Architectural Association, and this particular document (handwritten on twelve pages) is drafted in 
such a way that suggests it was to be spoken, but I have not been able to find out if it was ever delivered.  
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prioritisation of those purposes and how they could best be performed. For Holden, this 
was the kernel of architectural brilliance and therefore merited the bulk of an architect‟s 
time, skill, and consideration. To dwell on other aspects at the expense of purpose dulled 
the potential emergence of that brilliance, and to look to these other aspects to take the 
place of (or ameliorate the inadequate of incompetent provision for) purpose outright 
occluded it in a visual appeal to forgiveness or subterfuge (in either event, dishonest). Of 
these other aspects, Holden recognised the aesthetic as architecture‟s favourite evasion 
(Ibid) and further recognised that many of architecture‟s design manifestos (or “formulae”) 
awarded primacy to aesthetic expressions, which he warned against in AA talk: 
 
“If I can offer you any advice it would be to make „fitness for everyone‟ your 
slogan – if you are tempted to sacrifice human purpose to the cause of Art I 
say „don‟t‟.” (Holden, c.1936 [Ahp/26/1/3/xi]: 11) 
 
Holden‟s hierarchical ethic found expression as “sanity”, which does not immediately 
correlate with “fitness for everyone”: fitness suggests service and duty to human occupants, 
whereas sanity represents that corner of Holden‟s practice – slavishly dutiful prior to 
Whitman‟s laws – that accounts for structures and materials. 
 
“Structural sanity and functional sanity must go hand in hand in the use of old 
or new materials, for mere novelty is not enough and it is the right use of any 
material old or new which really matters.” (Holden, c.1936 [Ahp/26/1/2/iii]: 
3) 
 
Structures and their materials did not merely take precedence over the aesthetic in Holden‟s 
nomenclature; the aesthetic was actually bound to them and obliged to a sort of fidelity 
which meant that aesthetic treatments could be equally amenable to architectural honesty 
as to dishonesty: 
 
“Functionalism today is the outcome of the [illegible92] of steel and concrete 
construction as a means to architectural expression in its own right + not as 
something to be clothed and hidden away in the guise of something that it is 
not. (Holden, c.1936 [Ahp/26/1/1/vi-vii]: vi-vii) 
                                                   
92 But possibly “acceptance”. 
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That is to say: architectural aesthetics were dutiful, and they had to pay due respect to the 
primary structural and material realities that kept the building upright and watertight, and 
these in turn had to form the functional and purposeful spaces of use. These were 
Holden‟s three “sane” realities of a building – function, structure, and material – and the 
aesthetic treatment could not extend or diverge so far from the structural and material 
reality of a building so as to veil it with facades.   
 
Of these three sane realities of building, “function” was paramount and critical to “fitness”, 
as was Holden‟s apprehension towards anything that might jeopardise the functional 
efficacy of a design and his wish to excise it from the creative process: 
 
“I began to ask myself what architecture meant not in terms of order, 
[illegible], or proportion, not in terms of actual embodiments, but in terms of 
human needs + of human service in providing for those needs.” (Holden, 
c.1936 [Ahp/26/1/3/iii]: 3) 
 
To shift the subject matter away from manifestos and formulations of (literally) matter 
marks a substantial departure from the excesses of his practitioner‟s approach. At the same 
time, basing architecture on a suite of solutions and ideas that provide service to human 
needs retains a fundamental feature of his parliamentary approach, allowing his (potential) 
assertions to be displaced by a designed representation of other assertions whose interests 
can be broadly incorporated under the term “inhabitation”. From this logic, Holden began 
a process of reduction, critically excising those approaches that sought only to produce 
shapely attributes or aesthetic treatments (his “box of tricks”), and retaining those that 
rendered service to the inhabitants and inhabitations to follow: 
 
“In my small way I began to analyse the architectural forms which served as 
the basis of our training [illegible] I can assure you that I found my archt‟ box 
of tricks very nearly empty when I had completed my enquiries – and I had 
very little to put back in it.” (Holden, c.1936 [Ahp/26/1/3/iv-v]: 4-5) 
 
For Holden, a large part of what functionalism entailed was this reduction of architectural 
practice through the exclusion of “sentimentality” (as opposed to purpose (Ibid [vii]: 7)). 
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By way of a strangely logical paradox, this reduction was also an expansion: it opened a 
space for the retention and enhancement of the service an architect could architecturally 
deliver to people. And in order to broaden this space, he maintained the diminution of the 
aesthetic, denying it an overt role in the formation of “beauty”: 
 
“If you ask me what is my idea of beauty I cannot tell you – I see it always as 
something closely related to the service of body + mind and the expression of 
a balanced harmony + happiness.” (Ibid [viii]: 8). 
 
Holden‟s notion of “fitness for everyone” (Ibid [xi]: 11) and the ideal of architectural 
service was bound in an exclusionary notion that there would be more room and 
opportunity for service in architecture once sentimental approaches had been excised. 
There would, additionally, be more room for creativity if an architect had the confidence to 
excise those more insistent architectural precedents that Holden himself had once sought 
so eagerly. It is easy to interpret this combination as a negative approach, one of finding 
faults to blame and eliminating them to arrive at a purified, but much diminished 
architectural practice. I would suggest that this is at least partially true, and there is an 
implicit assumption in Holden‟s work that good architecture is achieved not so much 
through the addition of good things, but in the identification of the faulty, inadequate, or 
pointless and, so judged, their elimination. 
 
“‟When in doubt, leave it out‟ this rather crude statement [illegible] be taken as 
mere defeatism. It is a recognition of something wrong about the design and a 
decision to get down to it and find the right direction. 
This is a case of „clearing the decks for action‟.” (Holden, c.1908 [Ahp/26/1/6/i]: 1) 
 
Holden‟s understanding of architectural deficiencies is often described in quantitative terms 
and argues that the many deficiencies of architecture stem from a common source of 
profusion; indeed, Holden never seems to engage with the possibility that a building might 
fail because of a scarcity of features. He maintained this point throughout his architectural 
practice and the evidence of it is clear not only from his archived notes, but also in the 
austerity of some of his buildings, and in his personality which he recalled with a rare 
insight into his childhood: 
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“As a child I remember playing on a raft of loose planks. I removed one plank 
after another to see how few planks would keep me afloat. When I removed 
one plank too many I began to sink and got a ducking for my too [illegible] 
adventuring. My engagement with architecture was rather like that – I left out 
one accepted convention after another + found that I could still keep my archt‟ 
craft afloat. The only difference is that I do not appear to have reached the 
limit of elimination for I haven‟t sunk yet.” (Holden, undated [Ahp/26/1/9/i]: 
i) 
 
The more planks he removed, the more “simple truths” could be asserted, both those of 
constructional plausibility, and especially those of purpose (that is to say; to house 
inhabitants and enable their chosen inhabitation). Holden “...found that it opened the door 
to a new world with endless vistas of delight. There was no hesitation, no turning back 
after that.” (Holden, undated [Ahp/26/1/11]) It is these vistas, endless because of the 
obstacles Holden removed to original thought, that represent the space he created to 
practice in. 
 
Holden‟s dual and potentially contrdictory wish was, it seems, to assert himself and assert 
the wishes of others at the same time. Holden looked to his clients to both achieve and 
resolve this. In the first instance, to give one‟s full attention to the clients and the way they 
might inhabit a building drew an architect‟s attention away from fashionable precedent and 
facadism and towards the architectural provision of solutions. He wrote, on the reverse of 
a British Aluminium complimentary calendar for 1936, 
 
“Our critics don‟t matter, but what does matter – and matters a great deal – is 
that we should be straight with ourselves, that we should look at our problems 
fairly and squarely and not deceive ourselves.” (Holden, c.1936 
[Ahp26/1/4/iii]: 3) 
 
And the basis of that provision was the client: 
 
“Our duty as architects is first + foremost to render service to our clients + the 
community – that style is not a true objective but something wh. emerges in 
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doing a job as well as you know how + with pride and pleasure in the doing of 
it.” (Ibid: [iv] 4)  
 
As such, how a design emerged, and how usefully it emerged, depended on what the 
architect paid attention to. Holden paid very close attention to his clients and in this key 
way his practice of architecture retained a dutiful shape that emerged from and conformed 
to the inhabitation that was to follow, and which Holden pre-empted. At first glance, this 
reverses the flux of intention, reception and effect: it was not Holden‟s explicit aim to 
create effects in and with the buildings he designed. The client and their proposed 
inhabitation provoked and effected the design of the building and induced forms. This 
sounds like a creeping abandonment of his newly rediscovered volition in favour of other 
inducements, but this was not the case.  He had no more intention of producing a facsimile 
of a client‟s wishes than he had of diminishing himself to criticism. Rather than doing what 
he was asked or told, he crafted his own solutions to his clients‟ needs as he understood 
them. Whilst he evidently did not believe that he had the option to produce an indulgent 
architecture bereft of solutions, the characteristics and volumetric arrangement of those 
solutions were Holden‟s own, and the result of his own (if prompted) volition. By 
condensing the reception of his work closely around the clients and allowing his work to be 
a reception of their needs, Holden achieved a self honesty after Whitman‟s example 
alongside a simultaneously selfless honesty of provision and service. 
 
In the transition from this highly devolved, highly parliamentary approach to the Whitman-
esque rediscovery of volition, certain features are worth noting and summarising. In the 
first place, Holden always retained a practitioner‟s edge to his work, a result of his 
“insatiable” appetite for drawing, and also his training which emphasised the methods and 
techniques of construction. This may explain, at least in part, why he should have 
proceeded to formulate a parliamentary approach which represented other disciplines and 
trades involved with building paying more attention to them than either Voysey or 
Lubetkin did, perhaps especially Voysey who, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
implicated himself into the behaviours and abilities of the contractors who worked to 
construct his buildings. Holden, on the other hand always seemed to recognise their 
abilities and their key role in actualising the buildings he was designing, and there may be a 
degree of plausibility in this, quite different to that which Voysey (and to a lesser degree 
Lubetkin) sought to articulate. This may represent plausibility in co-operation, a 
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recognition – substantially overemphasised initially but retained nonetheless after his 
awakening to Whitman – that the architect‟s role was not definitive in the creation of 
buildings and that, in the act of designing buildings he had to make a space for that which 
he couldn‟t define, and which he had to delegate to other professionals. As such, Holden‟s 
understanding of plausibility was defined in one sense by the implausibility of the idea that 
he was fundamentally the building‟s maestro: his practice of architecture was plausible 
because it was collagist, and it arranged practices together in the act of designing, each 
respectfully treated and each credited with the final outcome (as I will explain shortly).  
 
Holden‟s rediscovery of his volition was not, and could not plausibly be therefore, an 
abandonment of the parliamentary, but it was an abandonment of dishonesty or “owning 
superiors” and using these superiors to accumulate a box of tricks which in order to 
recover his honesty and self confidence, he proceeded to employ.  This employing may also 
contain a germinating kind of plausibility, which, in his risk averse and self effacing phase 
prior to Whitman‟s influence, he otherwise filled with deference to and reflection of 
treatments and features he had sourced from, and tested against the opinions of, other 
architects (via the Designing Club). The plausibility that emerged from emptying his 
practice of architecture of superiors was a relatively free space in which to produce 
architecture insofar that his volition was not obliged to the preferences of the wider 
architectural field, so allowing him to exercise what he thought best for the clients who 
employed him, and the service of their needs, along with a degree of fidelity to the essential 
truth of what a building was, rather than the obligation to other‟s tastes and opinions that 
he had previously practiced.  
 
The collagist approach to the design of buildings, and the inclusion of the other 
practitioners who provided his work with plausibility, is suggested by the substantial degree 
of respect for these other practitioners, and he was careful to praise them and the need for 
a close relationship with them: 
 
“An archt‟ is more than a designer, he is also an [illegible] of the works of 
others and it is his duty to bring harmony in each + every one of these 
services.” (Holden, c.1936 [Ahp/26/1/3/ix]: 9) 
 
And he further encouraged... 
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“...a free imagination in those who work for you. Look on your work always as 
a joint effort + do not be afraid of giving credit where credit is due and let us 
always remember with proper humility that the skilled craftsman knows more 
about his own particular craft than you or I can ever know and that we owe 
some of our greatest triumphs to their skill and willing co-operation” (Ibid: [ix-
x] 9-10) 
 
Holden always remained close to the building process and the contractors who worked to 
create buildings, in part because he always retained a practitioner‟s edge to his practice, but 
also in more strategic terms because he needed them to realise his intentions in built form. 
The outcome of this was a more extended understanding of architectural design which 
went beyond the production of plans and elevations and included the careful arrangement 
of practitioners to receive that design in a kind of proxy (and virtual) materiality. An 
architect, therefore, was duty bound not only to design the building but to write the 
opening lines of its ongoing narrative, and to place characters there with roles that had 
scope to develop. Part of Holden‟s job was to create jobs for these practitioners, and create 
around each practitioner an envelope in which some degree of self-determination was 
afforded them. For Holden, a key part of architecture was to produce such conditions for 
the designed building to happen in. 
 
In a letter to Edward Carter, who was at that point the R.I.B.A‟s librarian and archivist, 
Holden revealed one means by which he wove these jobs into the opening chapters of a 
building‟s life (Holden, 1942 [Ahp/26/6/1]). His proposition was a progress chart for the 
construction process which had the appearance of a histogram laid over an image of the 
finished building. The vertical axis denoted the degree of completion, and the horizontal 
axis was split into units of time. Each trade had a line, ascending from left to right, at 
various different points along the graph that denoted when they should arrive on site, 
whereabouts on the building (represented floor by floor in cross section) they were 
working on, and what their deadline was to complete the work. So presented, Holden‟s 
intention was clearly to control the timing and location of each trade on site so that, for 
instance, as the first floor was finished, the masons‟ and bricklayers‟ lines would move to 
the next storey, and the plumbers‟ and glaziers‟ lines would begin in the storey the masons 
and bricklayers had just vacated. The same efficiencies he hoped for in his buildings were 
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thus imposed on the site, and whether or not he ever used this diagram, the temporal 
discipline is clearly stated and intended to give those opening chapters a specific 
momentum and a logical emergence (Holden, 1942 [Ahp/26/6/1/ii]: ii). 
 
Holden’s inhabitant :  
 
The previous section outlined the emergence of a Holden‟s conception of architecture as 
the efficable equipping of the building for the inhabitant‟s benefit. The heart of this 
process – the most basic and enduring facet of architectural equipping – was “the plan in 
service and the planes + masses arising out of that plan” (Holden, 1936 [Ahp/26/3/1/v]: 
4). This was the primary point at which the building rendered its service and made certain 
inhabitations possible. It was also the genesis of the design as it conformed to the client‟s 
chosen inhabitations, and the other elements of the building either helped to contain the 
plan, or were themselves produced by it. It was where Holden started his design: 
 
“I cannot even begin to think of the aesthetic side of the problem until I have 
arrived at a plan which is so simple + straightforward that its smooth working 
in daily occupation is assured!” (Holden, undated [Ahp/26/1/5/iii]: iii) 
 
Smoothness and smooth working were the principal offerings to inhabitants via the 
correctly designed plan. Whatever business the client had to do, it was the architect‟s 
business to design a space that allowed it to happen without impediment, and preferably 
with a certain materially produced encouragement:  
 
“It is right and proper that any person, be he engineer or architect, who 
designs for any specific purpose, should wish in the first place that his plan 
should have the highest possible efficiency for the purpose it has to fulfil; in 
the second place it must be constructed to fulfil its purpose with reasonable 
economy...” (Holden, 1944 [Ahp/26/18/1/ii]: 2) 
 
These proposals produced particular plans for particular kinds of inhabitant and 
inhabitation, and the key to both was the logical separation and re-ordering of tasks. 
Holden‟s inhabitant, as he imagined them, had a purpose to achieve, which required of 
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him/her a series of actions, i.e. tasks. A building‟s plan was intended to help effect the 
inhabitant‟s plan in this way. 
 
Holden‟s devotion to his clients was extensive in some directions, and truncated in others, 
which in turn depended on his understanding of his clients and their needs. One such 
extent, which also forms a minor extension into the future inhabitation of his buildings, 
was to insulate the clients from potential risks, and in this case, Holden discussed risk in 
non-specific (nautical) terms: 
 
“Altho‟ we may fear shipwreck for ourselves, we don‟t want our clients to be 
involved in the wreck of any ship, especially when it is their ship we are 
navigating. I myself have sailed some of these unchartered seas.” (Holden, 
undated [Ahp/26/1/15]) 
 
This policy of risk avoidance was given a formative role in the design: more accurately, it 
was formative in what was absent from the design, negating certain adventurous or creative 
possibilities that might risk failure, and leaving what was, in principle, a fundamentally 
conservative and sober remainder. The constraints were Holden‟s, but they were for the 
client‟s sake and imagined from their perspective. Whether Holden was entirely dedicated 
to the client, fulfilling their needs and ameliorating their susceptibilities (such as to non-
specific risk), or whether the client he virtualised was contrived to helpfully support his 
philosophy (in which flippancy was displaced by common sense) is in many respects a 
moot point. The client, however they were formed, was central to Holden‟s philosophy. 
His understanding of his client‟s needs was vital to the duty Holden saw himself fulfilling, 
an approach which Holden defended for its satisfying completeness (using a bodily 
metaphor): 
 
“Depressing common-sense! What do they want? A life of sensationalism a 
poor life – all on the surface. 
All nerves and no flesh + blood” (Holden, undated [Ahp/26/1/21]) 
 
Sensationalism was futile and deflected architecture from its particular and serious purpose, 
and the particular and serious inhabitations it was based around (i.e. “living”): 
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“I must confess I prefer the [illegible] comedy of living to the flippant gaiety of 
changing fashion, which passes for comedy but really means an effort to 
escape from a full + purposeful life” (Holden, c.1933 [Ahp/26/1/22]) 
 
These statements of intent contain more than emphases on pragmatism and fullness. They 
also reflect Holden‟s assumptions about his clients and their future inhabitation, and in 
particular, that they would define their inhabitations around intentionally productive acts, 
strung together by aims, tasks, and accomplishments. There was little room in Holden‟s 
conceptions for leisurely, unproductive dwelling (and perhaps especially those facile acts of 
keeping up appearances): he designed his buildings as effective places where useful results 
were generated by purposeful applications of effort. As such, the functionality of Holden‟s 
architecture was, in part, based on this assumption of functional, purpose-focussed humans 
in, or about to be in, occupation. This was a notion that architecture should usefully serve 
people‟s fundamental (and diligent) usefulness by assuring amenable conditions for it: 
 
“Architecture not an extravagance but an economy: 
Good architecture means:- 
good health 
light 
air 
conditions in which to work and to concentrate on work with unfrayed nerves 
+ in peace and quiet 
sanitation 
ventilation 
Bad means the lack of these.” (Holden, c.1933 [Ahp/26/1/24]) 
 
This is one of a number of lists Holden produced as to what buildings should achieve for 
the particular kind of client he imagined. In a contemporaneous but somewhat shorter 
“list” he suggested that buildings should achieve comfort, convenience, and “economy of 
movement” for their inhabitants (Holden, c.1933 [Ahp/26/2/1/ii]: ii). In either case, the 
features of a building were combined to provide amenable conditions in which people 
could undertake work, understood as pragmatic tasks aligned towards a purpose, and the 
building was an amplifier for the inhabitants‟ productive characteristics, providing an 
environment to maintain them in and, in some cases, rendering the building a tool for 
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effecting productive work directly (such as “economy of movement”). Unlike Voysey, 
Holden did not expect buildings to invoke particular forms of thought, but he did believe 
buildings could enhance and amplify the purposeful usefulness that he assumed was at the 
core of people‟s lives.  
 
Clearly then Holden understood inhabitants and inhabitation through their material 
partnerships: what people were able to do depended on what materialities they partnered 
with and what those materialities offered, and as such his concept of human agency did not 
allow for people to generate actions and produce results from themselves alone, nor from 
merely being in situ in ontological or biological terms (i.e. the impossibility of not being 
somewhere and able to respire). Materialities like architecture completed the possibilities of 
being human through being partnered with, not simply from being occupied. 
 
For Holden, this deep functional implication for architecture is laden with plausibility, in 
fact plausibility is, logically speaking, inexorable. If people are fundamentally purposeful 
and they need to co-opt materialities in the form of tools which they cannot be without to 
achieve that purpose, then architecture can be understood as a tool.  This understanding of 
architecture as a tool, as Holden did, automatically achieves a purposeful plausibility insofar 
as it is always implied in the everyday lives or at least the understanding of everyday life and 
the everyday productive activities that Holden maintained. Because of this, the functional 
aspects of architecture formed the keynote of architectural beauty for Holden, or at least 
beauty which grew as functionality became more perfect.  Beauty could not be applied to 
something as a surface treatment. It had depth, it was deeply embedded in the purpose of 
that which was to be designed and became beautiful in the degree to which it enabled that 
purpose, which Holden explained in corporeal terms: 
 
“I finally came to the conclusion that beauty is as intimately related to function 
in architecture as it is in the human body and that it is possible to achieve a 
high degree of beauty with as little resort to decorative embellishment” 
(Holden, c.1936 [Ahp/26/1/2/ii]: 2) 
 
And, in more explicit terms: 
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“Is there anything in the world more beautiful than the healthy human body? 
And yet is there anything which so completely and perfectly fulfils the demand 
for fitness for purpose with the most perfect economy [illegible] most perfect 
harmony? There is not more infallible guide to an architect that to keep before 
him always the lesson of the perfect human body.” (Holden, c.1936 
[Ahp/26/1/3/xii]: 12; see also c.1936 [Ahp/26/3/1/vi]: 5) 
 
“Harmony” and “economy” were key to achieving this functional beauty: harmony 
suggested that no component should diminish the effect of another, and economy 
suggested that the whole of that effect should be directed to fulfilling the overall purpose. 
This was a highly efficient and simultaneously very dependent understanding that saw 
beauty emerging principally from between things, that is to say, from the way components 
were arranged around one another and intended to engage with each another. Beauty in 
architecture, as with bodies, was found not in the beautiful execution of components or 
forms in a bounded sense, but by fitting together beautifully and achieving perfect diligence 
to the whole. Holden‟s design philosophy gained much of its momentum from this 
metaphorically corporeal de-aestheticisation of beauty, inspired by the body‟s beautiful in-
betweens. A beauty formed of beautifully fitting together out of neatness.  
 
This understanding of beauty-in-fitness is further revealed in a short handwritten document 
in which Holden discussed his membership of the Design and Industries Association 
(DIA93): 
 
“I am a member for one thing + for one thing only – for its slogan „Fitness for 
Purpose‟. 
A society with that for its slogan, no matter what vicissitudes it may pass 
through, no matter to what extent it may have become obsessed with the 
passion for paradox + publicity – a society which holds fast to that slogan will 
never stray far from the true path.” (Holden, undated [Ahp/26/8/1/i]: i) 
 
                                                   
93 The Design and Industries Association was formed in 1915 to promote the principle of good design in the production 
of goods for use and consumption by individuals, and latterly to promote good industrial design in general. It continues 
to exist and, unlike MARS (see chapter five) has a formal structure as a registered charity. (Design and Industries 
Association, 2010) 
195 
 
At the same time, however, he recognised that his concept of beauty as purposeful fitness 
in action sounded perhaps a little dry and staid, potentially lacking in fun and flair: 
 
“There are those who say that fitness for purpose is not enough – may be not, 
but let us try it + believe me we have a life‟s work before us to bring our life 
and our work up to even that simple standard. I have been trying it for 40 years 
+ I haven‟t yet come to the end of its aesthetic possibilities, and what is more 
we shall find that we have embarked upon a great + glorious adventure in the 
pursuit of beauty which is real, intimate, + satisfying.” (Holden, undated 
[Ahp/26/8/1/ii]) 
 
In saying “let us try it”, Holden‟s response was to essentially see what happened, evading a 
point which he couldn‟t quite respond to except to say that he had found it enough and that 
he found it had produced a solid and satisfying beauty. This slightly uncertain defensiveness 
hints at the possibility that the DIA‟s slogan and his belief in it was not so much a 
guarantee of beauty as it was a prop to support his rarefied understanding of beautiful 
functionality. By his own admission, Holden had found decorative and ornamental 
architecture difficult, and he did not consider that his skills were adequate to achieve it 
(Holden, 1954 [Ahp/26/7/2/ii]: 1). The plain form-and-mass based aesthetic he preferred 
was something he arrived at as a result of addressing this perceived deficiency, and it was 
part of the self re-discovery which condensed around his understanding of Whitman‟s 
Laws:  
 
“In the process I discovered the significance of form as distinct from the tricks 
of architectural ornament. The building would take on a character of its own 
often requiring little in the way of embellishment and finally confirmed the 
value of my slogan, „when in doubt, leave it out‟” (Holden, 1954 
[Ahp/26/7/2/ii]: 1) 
 
This statement confirms a sense of the indigenous, the sense that Holden had discovered 
something that belonged to the building rather than the imposed theatre of detailing, and 
his logic of removal suggested that this indigenous aesthetic, based on the components 
which actually made the building work, became more apparent for being less subsumed by 
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“tricks”. In a sense, Holden was letting the building do the work of aesthetic expression 
itself from the basis of its indigenous character. 
 
The bodily metaphor Holden drew on was useful beyond bodily confines too, extending to 
a wider and temporal concept of biology and suggesting a logic of improvement to him 
which may, as an inadvertent effect, have disparaged that which preceded it: 
 
“The architect is not predominantly a purveyor of aesthetics. Yet his work is 
essentially creative. The planning of rooms to fulfil a defined purpose is 
creative and, as one usually endeavours to improve on past experiences, the 
process may be said to be biological.” (Holden, c.1933 [Ahp/26/2/1/i]: i) 
 
Holden‟s temporal understanding had a high resolution, in that he saw creative 
opportunities recurring regularly at small scales, but in profusion, without particularly 
obliging him to respect precedent or preceding approaches to architectural design. This 
temporal ontology, defined by its composition of small but numerous opportunities, 
offered the continuing possibility of evolution, a dynamic which Holden sought to inhabit 
for the design possibilities it offered: 
 
“I know I shall not shock your susceptibilities when I say that I believe that all 
effort is biological + therefore creative + by the same token all effort to 
improve the fitness of design is a piece of what I like to call the daily renewal 
of creation” (Holden, c.1933 [Ahp/26/2/1/v-vii]: v-vii) 
 
This renewing temporality, laden with a high resolution of opportunity, received florid 
treatment in Architecture is the Mother of the Arts (Holden, undated [Ahp/26/4/1] fully 
transcribed in Box 4d), where architecture is temporally idealised as both matriarchal and 
youthful: it was architecture‟s recurring state of youth that invoked recurring opportunity, a 
metaphor which Holden used to represent a sense of exploration and discovery (though 
one more considered than the merely teenage, hence the dual metaphor or youth and 
matronly matriarchy, the latter invoking a degree of wisdom). The space that this renewing 
made available allowed for creative inhabitation and the (controlled) possibility of growth: 
this included deficient possibilities such as “grandiloquence”, and Holden reiterated that 
architecture was at its most graceful and meaningful when deployed in humble and honest 
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Box 4d: Architecture is the Mother of the Arts 
 
“I refuse to call it the Mistress Art for there is something 
sinister in that title which is altogether unworthy of that hoary 
and respectable matron but who (notwithstanding her age and 
respectability) is perpetually renewing her youth. 
The mother of the arts is not the “also ran” that might be 
inferred from that home of rest, the Architecture Room. 
This dear lady of my heart is a very elusive person: she shows 
herself in the most unexpected places. Often she finds more of 
the grace o‟ life in a back elevation than in the most 
grandiloquent facades. 
She tolerates magnificence because she must perforce wear the 
garments we provide for her; she wears with a certain flippant 
gaiety our playful and facile variants upon her ancient 
wardrobe, well knowing that these will pass into oblivion - - 
she knows! 
But she hungers for the grace o‟ life and she has a lot of young 
and enthusiastic workers blindly labouring on her behalf. She 
looks on their efforts with interest and amusement - - and, I 
may say, just a little apprehension. 
Will these efforts bring the grace o‟ life any nearer? Who 
knows? But from whatever quarter is comes, life will be the 
richer and more significant and more beautiful for it.” 
 
(Holden, undated [Ahp/26/4/1] transcribed in full.) 
service. This temporal idealism took advantage of both the dynamism that generated 
opportunities, and the enduring “ancient wardrobe” of basic architectural truths. 
 
The concept of architecture 
and its purpose that Holden 
created was, in some ways, 
alarmingly frank and honest. 
In insisting that architecture 
was duty bound to self 
constraint and the service of 
human need, Holden engaged 
with architecture at its most 
fundamental and 
unpretentious level: that of 
necessary shelter. Neither 
Voysey nor Lubetkin sought 
to pare architecture down to 
such basics: both believed that 
it had fundamentally wider 
contributions to everyday life than providing dryness and warmth through the enclosure of 
space. In truth, so did Holden, but he still chose to remind himself and others that: “I have 
always found it useful to think of archt as serving one of the three primary needs of life – 
food, clothing + shelter” ((Holden, 1954 [Ahp/26/7/1]), and also (Holden, undated 
[Ahp/26/9/1/i]: i) in which he compared the architect‟s position to that of a farmer or a 
baker, that is to say, central to life‟s continuation). Holden was, quite unlike Voysey or 
Lubetkin, comfortable with the nakedness of this reduction and the salient reminder it 
offered him as to his scope: 
 
“In my early days I asked myself what was architecture? As I saw it it served 
one of the three primary needs of man food, clothing and shelter and that the 
architect was a purveyor of service and the provision of that service took on 
the dignity of a dedicated service not in any inflated idealistic sense but of 
conscientious service ranking equally with the services of food and clothing 
neither more nor less. That may have seemed a plebeian approach but it kept 
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me from overwhelming pride or “swelled head” and, I hope, from artistic 
snobbery.” (Holden, 1954 [Ahp/26/7/2/i]: 1) 
   
Holden found it important to keep himself from being “overwhelmed”, and the idea of 
service at this most basic level allowed him to maintain a nomenclature in which the 
indulgences of artistic snobbery were subsumed by the heightened appreciation of critical 
need from which architecture, as a solution, owed its origins, and from which it could 
harvest a degree of “sanity”: 
 
“I always feel that it is this undercurrent of service to the needs of man which 
keeps architecture sane. That it is today touched with the prevailing tendency 
to experiment with new forms in a manner comparable to the many different 
“isms” in painting and sculpture is true enough, but there is also the basic 
human need to save it from becoming simply an intellectual adventure into 
unrelated abstract form…” (Holden, c.1942 [Ahp/26/5/1/i-ii]: i-ii) 
  
Urgent necessity separated architecture from the other arts, and it was also a means of 
protection from them. These indulgences did not make a building any less effective as a 
simple shelter, but being reminded of architecture‟s urgent necessity in human survival and 
possibility forced Holden (and, he hoped, other architects) to hope for the perfectibility 
and potential brilliance of architecture to house people and their abilities, to serve them 
only, rather than serve a given idea (including ideas of what they were like or, moreover, 
ought to be like). 
 
As with Voysey, Holden believed that the possibilities for architectural effect were 
provided by the client and their capacity to understand and co-operate with his approach 
and beliefs, but unlike Voysey, Holden put the client at the heart of his work, generating an 
architecture from their needs and habits (albeit a pared-down understanding of their 
needs). He did not seek to foist an ethic on his clients as Voysey had hoped to. However, 
some effort was required from the client: it was not the architect‟s job alone to bridge this 
gap, and if the client saw the architect as a “charlatan” or “middleman”, or simply an extra 
expense to be incurred, then this lack of appreciation would be evident in the outcome 
(Holden, 1942 [Ahp/26/5/1/ii]: ii; undated [Ahp/26/5/2/iii]: iii). Confidence, on the 
other hand, would be repaid: 
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“To enjoy the confidence of your client is happiness indeed, and the finest of 
architecture is not too good a monument to him.” (Holden, c.1936 
[Ahp/26/3/1/ix]: 7) 
 
This ethos lay somewhere between professional service and friendship, and Holden found 
this necessary in order to intimate himself with his clients and their needs, and from that 
intimacy, to produce an architecture of service. It was not, Holden argued, the architect‟s 
role to submit to the client alone: some degree of submission, by way of confidence, was 
needed from the client. 
 
This is an important point to make because it is potentially very easy, given Holden‟s onus 
on service, to lose sight of the fact that his architecture was not merely a submission to the 
inhabitant and their needs, especially bearing in mind the tool-like plausibility which, I 
argue, motivated much of Holden‟s approach to architectural design and how design was 
inevitably implicated in everyday lives. As an essential tool, architecture assisted inhabitants 
with their tasks through smoothness and the absence of impediment which, executed 
correctly, was an achievement of a certain kind of working beauty (or beautifully working) 
which beguiled Holden much as the human body beguiled him as a metaphysical examplar 
of it. Regardless of whether Holden‟s understanding of beauty was a symptom of his 
(perceived) lack of visual flair (or, indeed, the possibility that he used a professional 
understanding of functional beauty as a prop for an ethical preference for the non-
aesthetic), the upshot was the continual strengthening of his idea of plausibility of crafting 
an architecture whose tool-like implication in everyday life approached the perfectibility of 
the (beautiful) body – the more body-like he understood his work to be, the more beautiful 
he believed it to be.  
 
As the keystone of architectural plausibility, the indispensible nature of architecture that 
Holden arrived at was also suffused with duty: something so indispensible and critical to 
people‟s wellbeing could not be treated lightly and, as such, architecture‟s profound 
plausibility in people‟s lives made certain indulgences and options implausible of it: it had 
to stay sane, and it had to achieve this sanity by avoiding risks that were not necessary, or 
the snobbery of idealism. As such, the plausibility that architecture had, as an essential tool 
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of the everyday lives of beings that could not be without tools, closed down other more 
artistic plausibility as far as Holden was concerned.  
 
An interesting example of this is provided in Holden‟s account of a research trip he made 
to the United States. In 1913 whilst he was involved in the design for Kings College for 
Women, Holden was awarded a travel scholarship of £65 to visit the United States and 
study how American universities planned and built their science and household science 
departments, (Karol, 1997: 196-197) and his account of this tour outlines one interesting 
(and charming) facet of the thinking I have just outlined. More importantly, perhaps, than 
this is a later tour of Northern Europe Holden undertook with Frank Pick94 in 1930 which 
marks the start of a change in Holden‟s understandings of plausibilities that I have just 
outlined here.  
 
The redevelopment of Holden’s approach:  
 
Holden‟s first research tour of the United States undertaken in 1913 (Holden, 1913 
[Ahp/26/10/1] with an accompanying sketchbook [Ahp/26/11]) substantially precedes 
Holden‟s work for the University of London and takes campus architecture as its subject. 
This contrasts with the purpose of the later Northern Europe tour of 1930 which explored 
the different ways of aesthetically treating emerging structural technologies.  Both tours 
combine descriptive accounts and judgements as to what is worthy and what is not. As 
such, both tours are expeditionary in terms of practice in that they seek to go elsewhere, 
record practices and ideas, and return with particularly useful and credible ones that could 
then be utilised in Holden‟s future designs. Holden had no qualms about collecting, 
cataloguing, and then importing other ideas from other places into his work.  In doing so 
he sought to identify corollaries of his own approach, and found comfort in finding 
buildings whose design had emerged from the ethic of service and sensible articulation of 
function that he himself employed.  
 
In the report of his 1913 tour of North American universities, Holden‟s perspective closely 
matched his preferred practice. He expressed a preference for stylistically quiet buildings 
                                                   
94 Frank Pick (1878-1941) was the managing director of the London Underground (in its varying guises) from 1928 until 
1940, overseeing a period of substantial expansion. Pick oversaw a design driven transformation of the network which 
included, in addition to employing Holden as principal architect, the commissioning of new typefaces including the 
standard London Underground typeface, Johnston, and a generally design-centred approach to the growing network. 
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that conformed to the wider schemes of which they were part (Holden, 1913 
[Ahp/26/10/1/iv, vi]: 4, 6) and which avoided traditional pastiche (Ibid: [vii] 7). In this 
instance, style was treated as something ancillary to the primary content of architecture. A 
discreet element of revivalism was allowable (Ibid), but whatever aesthetic approach was 
used, it could not be employed as the basis on which to derive the functional heart of the 
design. What Holden really sought from the 1913 tour were examples of how to provide 
service by architectural means, which explains why he dwells on interior plans, fixtures, and 
fittings, and how they work to enable the inhabitant‟s chosen inhabitations. One particular 
inhabitation that Holden found charmingly useful was an ingenious way of managing the 
consumption of food at Cornell‟s Ithaca campus, and he relayed in great detail the act of 
collecting a tray, a napkin and some cutlery, and then... 
 
“...you come to the food, you make your selection from a bewildering array (but 
easier to select from than a menu) and pass on to a desk where you receive a 
check representing the price of your meal. Thus equipped, you find an empty 
table and sit down to your meal. When you have finished you carry your tray, 
plates, knives, forks &c. to a hatch where it is received and passed on to be 
washed. 
As you pass out you hand your check to the cashier and pay the amount. And 
so all these hundreds of students are served every day simply and cheaply, 
without bustle, check by jowl with the professors and higher officials, serving 
themselves, and carrying away their own dirty dishes.” (Holden, 1913 
[Ahp/26/10/1/xv]: 15) 
 
The now commonplace refectory, experienced here as something new and interesting, is a 
useful microcosm of Holden‟s architectural ideal, given away by his use of the term 
“equipped”. Holden‟s ideal was to understand what sort of inhabitation his client wanted 
and needed, and to use architectural design to equip that inhabitation with an environment 
of carefully crafted spatialities and materialities that helped this inhabitation to happen. 
Architecture, understood as the equipping of inhabitation, also reformulated those 
inhabitations. But this equipping was fundamentally understood by Holden as an act of 
service to the chosen inhabitation, rather than to invoke a new form of inhabitation and a 
parallel “refurbishment” of the inhabitant‟s thinking, as did Voysey. Holden simply wished 
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to enable and express the chosen inhabitation as fully as possible by removing impediments 
and generating efficiencies. 
 
In contrast, the 1931 tour of Northern Europe (Holden, Pick and Edwards, 1931 
[Ahp/26/13]) was critically located both spatially, but perhaps especially, temporally. 
Changes were evident in 1930 that had not been nearly as insistent in 1913, and 
contemporary architecture was coalescing around new structural technologies. Technology 
had always been implicated in architecture insofar as buildings could have technologies 
installed in them, but buildings in this sense contained technologies rather than 
representing technological exercises in themselves: in fact, the report of their tour opened 
with the premise that no new structural technologies of significance had been developed 
since the middle ages (Holden, Pick and Edwards, 1931 [Ahp/26/13]: 1). The critical 
timing of the 1930 tour hinged on the emergence of two new structural technologies 
(described shortly) which were shaping architecture both literally, because they could 
produce much larger and differently shaped buildings, and metaphorically, as their 
quickening adoption required new skills and approaches of architects after an extended 
period of relative continuity. Technological engagements could no longer be avoided.  
 
However, the 1930 tour and the 1931 report on it were specifically concerned with 
“contemporary” architecture, and had a bipartite configuration that included the 
continuation of “contemporary architecture of a traditional character” (Holden, Pick and 
Edwards, 1931 [Ahp/26/13]: 14-16) alongside the emergence of the new (Ibid: 6-14). 
Whilst admitting to the complexities of the time, this configuration belies a degree of 
uncertainty which reflects Holden‟s temporal ontology, and remains evident here despite 
the dual authorship. No matter how new or tangential something was, it was always 
emergent from what had gone previously (Ibid: 15). The possibility of something being 
entirely new worried Holden (and possibly Pick). Whilst producing transcripts of past 
forms was of no special interest or concern to him, to efface the traditional was to 
simultaneously abandon its repository of experience, as he later suggested: 
 
“...you may or may not be helped by tradition – you may indeed be hindered by 
tradition, even as you may be hindered by a set formula: but at least tradition 
provides you with an encyclopaedia of well tried techniques, or methods of 
construction, of qualities of techniques [...] and of aesthetic forms expressing 
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these qualities, which, even if this encyclopaedia does not offer you a solution 
of your particular problem, it does show you how the pioneers of the past 
faced up to their own new problems and how they adjusted their techniques to 
the needs of their new problems.” (Holden, 1944 [Ahp/26/18/1/ix-x]: 9-10) 
 
What is clear from this is that how tradition worked was very much dependent on the 
practitioner‟s perspective. A formulaic perspective would simply transcribe traditional 
features into current architecture, but an encyclopaedic apprehension of tradition offered, 
if not solutions, then exemplars of the original non-formulaic thought that might generate 
one. To ignore tradition and start from zero was to wilfully ignore a legacy of brilliance and 
rob future inhabitants of its beneficence. New architecture could never really be “new” in 
purely ontological terms, but Holden‟s point was that it should never attempt to be “new” 
in practical terms either. Contemporary architecture had to express continuity. 
 
Traditionally, architects had to design buildings around quite rudimentary lintel-and-post 
structural principles in which horizontal elements like roofs and beams discharged their 
mass through regular vertical members such as pillars, or angled props such as buttresses. 
If this discharge of a building‟s mass was not properly managed, either the horizontal 
member would accumulate too much mass at its least supported point, or the vertical 
member would be overburdened by the masses that were routed through it. The two new 
structural technologies Holden wished to see in action were vastly more capable and 
efficient in terms of withstanding, transmitting and discharging mass. The reinforced 
concrete monocoque (Holden referred to it as ferro-concrete) was the more recent and 
revolutionary of the two: the earlier technique of steel girder framed buildings had 
precedents in the structural ironwork of large architecture-cum-engineering projects like 
the Forth Bridge, Crystal Palace, and St. Pancras station. Between them, these two methods 
were displacing the less efficient lintel-and-post techniques and, as such, they heralded 
changes for architecture. On one hand, these changes were understood to be generative 
insofar that the new structural techniques both required and allowed opportunity for 
different architectural treatments (Holden, Pick and Edwards, 1931 [Ahp/26/13]: 3). On 
the other hand, the architectural options these new structural technologies offered required 
a double relegation within the then-current architectural vocabulary. Both technologies 
relegated the need for regular vertical elements, so things like columns and archways... 
“changed their character, and where they continue their existence they do so as a 
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decorative, not a structural feature.” (Ibid: 1) Moreover, so relegated, they no longer made 
sense in the context of the new structural technologies and he continued... “the 
presumption is, nevertheless, against them. Because they have become useless structurally, 
they tend to become meaningless even as ornament” (Ibid). This opening statement set the 
tone for the document which aimed to define something quite new for Holden: it sought 
to derive an aesthetic and decorative policy which would somehow express and emphasise 
the truth of the building, including the truth of its structural formation.  
 
The rehabilitation of the aesthetic:  
 
This is something of a departure from Holden‟s 1913 travelogue, and his practice more 
generally, insofar as the aesthetic became more prominent in his thinking. Although both 
travelogues emphasise the need to generate external appearances from the logic of the 
planned internal spaces, the 1930 travelogue admitted to the fact that this aesthetic 
generation could not be left to resolve itself or merely “kept simple” (which was Holden‟s 
expressed preference in 1913). The aesthetic had to be managed. It‟s unclear who was 
responsible for this rehabilitation of the aesthetic: given Holden‟s previous inclination to 
relegate and subordinate aesthetic considerations, it would be easy to suggest that Pick 
germinated the argument, but there‟s no definite attribution in the 1931 travelogue or in 
the wider manuscript collection. Definite origins notwithstanding, Holden‟s rehabilitated 
aesthetic continued in his written notes thereafter and, arguably, redefined his architectural 
output too.  
 
The rehabilitation of the aesthetic began from the troubling definition of functionalism 
which, when taken too literally, could reduce architecture to engineering, producing 
surfaces and volumes from a purely efficient logic without recourse to artistry, but from 
which beauty would somehow emerge of its own accord (Holden, Pick and Edwards, 1931 
[Ahp/26/13]: 4). Between them, Holden and Pick reconsidered, and ultimately rejected the 
auto-beautiful, granting beauty with some independence from functional efficiency whilst 
retaining a logic of functional relevance, the same logic on which columns and archways had 
been rejected previously (Ibid: 1). Their new definition of functionalism was... 
 
“...a very different definition from the other. It does not assume that where 
there is efficiency there is also necessarily beauty, but rather that beauty can be 
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best obtained by the design of a building being based on the expression of its 
functions.” (Ibid: 5)  
 
This refiguring had potentially significant ramifications for Holden‟s practice. Aesthetics 
and the possibility of beauty could no longer be left to resolve themselves, such 
expressions had to be designed for. Moreover, the building was no longer the purely 
functional creation he had previously assumed: it was obliged to contain additional 
elements which were not implicated in the provision of functional spaces for public service. 
This was a substantial departure for Holden, and he dealt with it by defining strict 
conditions for aesthetic relevance. Attempts at aesthetic beauty, though non-functional in 
themselves, were conditional on expressing the functional motives of a given building 
(Ibid). The mild irony of this was that architectural functionalism, pared back to its purpose 
and rendered nakedly honest, was too functional, naked, and honest to express the diligent 
benevolence of its motives. Logically speaking such a stark approach should have stated its 
purpose with total clarity, yet it required a haze of aesthetic interjections that lightly 
occluded its functional motive with expressions that serenaded the functionalities they 
occluded. Irony notwithstanding, these were the only aesthetic possibilities in architecture 
that Holden/Pick considered “permissible”. 
 
“...under this definition certain decorative features will be permitted which, 
though not strictly functional in what we have called the “pure” sense, repeat 
the motif of some definite function of the building. But this raises the question 
[...] of what are the functions proper or relevant to a building, the functions 
which, in other words, it is permissible to express.” (Holden, Pick and 
Edwards, 1931 [Ahp/26/13]: 5) 
 
Aesthetic expressions of architectural beauty had to enunciate and draw out the functional 
truth of the building in the exercise of its service. The possibility of beauty was a function 
of this immediate relevance, an immediacy which barred aesthetic treatments from the 
indulgences of symbolism or iconography and forcibly aligned them in parallel with what 
Holden/Pick considered to be the primary purpose of architecture. 
 
The functional truth of these new buildings was, in the first instance, horizontality. 
Whereas Voysey had aimed to generate particular affections and behaviours with the 
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horizontal orientation, the 1930 travelogue simply observed that steel framed or concrete 
monocoque buildings tended to lend themselves to low and flat-roofed designs because 
they dispensed with the many vertical supports that previous constructional methods had 
required, so rendering the horizontals more evident (Holden, Pick, and Edwards, 1931 
[Ahp/26/13]: 3, 6). Whilst the old and new methods were fundamentally different, the way 
they were addressed remained fundamentally the same insofar that the exterior treatment 
should diligently reflect the constructional basis. At no point in this or any archived 
document were the new constructional methods understood to open up elevations for 
creative purposes.  The numerous and closely spaced supporting members that traditional 
constructional methods required had an insistent effect on style which was absent in the far 
less intrusive steel frame or concrete monocoque whose structural components, far more 
slender and far less frequent, left large tracts of frontage free from structural intrusion or 
the obligation of support (Ibid). Pick and Holden conspicuously ignored these new 
opportunities and continued to express structures that no longer imposed themselves.  
 
On one hand, this could be criticised as the most banal, derivative, and potentially easiest 
outcome to have chosen, but it could also be lauded for its restraint and its fully honest 
expression of the building and the materialities that made it happen. Such aesthetic 
treatments were almost diagrammatic, like textbook illustrations or beguiling cross sectional 
drawings that slice through otherwise mysterious objects to reveal their workings: as an 
aesthetic it was absolutely dedicated to architecture and its self-expression. Holden would 
have likely answered the criticism of banality with his own criticism that “liberty is never 
far removed from licence. With the freedom to create forms possessing a new beauty, there 
goes also the temptation to be merely bizarre.” (Holden, Pick and Edwards, 1931 
[Ahp/26/13]: 3) 
 
In the 1931 travelogue, new German architecture came in for such criticism when 
measured against the benchmark of Holden‟s temporality. It sought an absolute newness 
that was not really possible to Holden‟s way of thinking, and as a result, it had mistakenly 
entered into an “iconoclastic” architecture that aimed to efface its traditional genesis (Ibid, 
16). In this light, it could be argued that Holden‟s aesthetic policy was also one obvious 
way of carrying some traditional principles over to the new architectural approaches. 
Understood thus, tradition was not sobering per se (for instance, Pick/Holden were clear 
that Germany‟s new iconoclasm had emerged from a tradition of “hybris” [sic] (Ibid)): 
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tradition was a cue to engage with and account for precedent and experience without 
literally transcribing past forms. It was a temporal policy rather than a basis for style, and its 
consideration in design meant that architecture would not attain the sort of escape velocity 
that was evidently aimed for in Germany. Architecture had to be rooted, and although it 
didn‟t have to be traditionally rooted, tradition was an adequate reminder of rootedness. 
Holden/Pick hoped for a more Dutch model of new architecture: 
 
“There is much modern work being done [in Holland] which, while it has been 
influenced primarily by the new architecture, does not seem, at least in the best 
examples, to have cut right away from the older styles in the way that German 
architecture has done. For Dutch work, though it has rid itself almost entirely 
of traditional ornament, retains most of the elements of traditional design.” 
(Holden, Pick and Edwards, 1931 [Ahp/26/13]: 14-15) 
 
The braking effect of temporality further suggests that Pick and Holden were concerned 
that, without limiting principles and constrained possibilities, architects would be 
unprincipled and unconstrained. This assumed lack of self control and the concurrent need 
for a constrained field of practice may explain the emphasis on tradition and the 
vernacular. As an archive of policies rather than a catalogue of design options, tradition 
naturally suggested (even presupposed) aesthetics that reflected the structural means of 
enclosing the functional plan, as had been the case in the best architecture of the past, and 
also reflected in Holden‟s appreciation of the Greek temple form. Architectural aesthetics 
were not the place for other ideals and manifestos to be visually or ergonomically exercised. 
Architectural aesthetics were creative expressions of architectural functionalities. 
 
There is here a dawning recognition (perhaps provoked by Pick, but retained by Holden) 
that if buildings cannot be pared back to the functionally expedient alone, then inhabitation 
cannot be pared back to the sole exercise of useful and productive behaviours either. A 
building had to be more than useful, because its inhabitants‟ scope for behaviour and 
engagement extends beyond the useful to include the meaningful. As such, whilst 
functional expedience remains at the heart of his architectural concept, the content and 
breadth of that concept, and his parallel concept of inhabitation, seems to broaden from 
the singularly functional. This new concern with aesthetic expression displaced Holden‟s 
previous policy. Although that policy decried facadism insofar as it sought to restrict 
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architecture‟s potential functionality within a preconceived aesthetic girdle, it 
simultaneously allowed a different form of facadism in that, once the design had reached 
an adequate level of functionality and service, any treatment could be applied to the 
exterior. In a 1939 letter to Pick (one of a series which I discuss below) Holden defended 
Gilbert-Scott‟s use of a gothic aesthetic for his proposed memorial to King George V at 
Westminster Abbey: 
 
“Shall we say that gothic is wrong? If so, what is the alternative? For if we 
would be destructive we must also be constructive. There is nothing inherently 
wrong in Gothic, it is very flexible and it can be as modern as you like” 
(Holden, 1939 [Ahp/29/8/4/ii]: 2) 
 
Styles themselves were innocent: the potential for fault lay in their being implied, rather 
than applied. Facadism was a perfectly plausible outcome of aesthetic relegation precisely 
because it was, in an ideal world, separate from those elements of the building that actually 
rendered service. In the case of Gilbert Scott‟s (unbuilt) memorial, its function was 
wrapped around its aesthetic, and it matched the aesthetic of its setting. Holden‟s first 
major work, Bristol Central Library (see figs. 4.6, 7, 8, and 9), had entirely different facades 
to suit the different panoramas it faced onto, whilst the internal structure continued its 
work regardless. In the report of the 1930 tour of Northern Europe and in Holden‟s 
writings thereafter, the aesthetic treatment was brought in from the periphery to perform a 
crucial supra-functional role. Its repatriation did not mean that the functional mattered less: 
what changed was that the aesthetic had to connect into why the functional mattered.  
 
Aesthetics and function 
 
This repatriation of the aesthetic is best explained in Aesthetic Aspects of Civil Engineering 
Design (Holden, 1944 [Ahp/26/18/1]), which despite its title offers a distinctly architectural 
and aesthetic perspective that represents the development of those thoughts he started, or 
was induced to start, in 1930. Aesthetic Aspects was also critically timed on the cusp of the 
massive post-war reconstruction efforts, and critically directed at a group of professionals 
who would be implicated in it. It shares in common with Holden‟s other writings a sense 
that the inhabitant and their inhabitations are fundamentally (although not only) 
endeavour-driven beings who undertake tasks for the purposes of producing a result or 
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getting something done. Buildings, in serving the processes of inhabitation, had to serve 
whatever inhabitants were working towards (Ibid: [ii] 2), but this fundamental was joined 
by the additional fundamentals he‟d started to address in 1930. By 1944, Holden had 
combined these in the idea of significant form, which defined the golden standard for 
expressive functional architecture. The best architectural forms were those that were direct 
and purposeful, but whose purpose was imaginatively drawn out of an otherwise 
diminutive state so that it received the attention it merited: 
 
“I do not think I can do better than end this lecture by my definition of 
„significant form‟:- Form which is purposeful in all its parts arising from the 
play of the imagination on hard facts rather than free and uncontrolled 
fantasy” (Holden, 1944 [Ahp/26/18/1/xvi]: 17) 
 
A slightly different temporality was utilised in Aesthetic Aspects to explain how such aesthetic 
treatments were arrived at, and how those treatments connected intimately to the 
functional processes of the object being designed (in this example he used a car, and then a 
kitchen). This temporality repeated Holden‟s hopes for accumulations of worthwhile 
techniques, along with the evolutionary passage of time and its cumulative momentum as 
one generation succeeded the next and inherited the proceeds. Both cars and kitchens, 
understood as machines, were designed in the first instance to function as simply and 
directly as possible. Subsequent generations of that machine were improved in terms of 
efficacy and efficiency, and it was the consciousness of, and especially the pride in, that 
improvement on earlier versions that fuelled a worthy aesthetic treatment:  
 
“[H]e now wants it to look as fine and good as it is in operation. That is the 
beginning of Art – that is how good architecture was and is evolved, and that is 
how beautiful engineering structures were, and will be, and some are today 
evolved.” (Holden, 1944 [Ahp/26/18/1/iii-iv]: 3-4) 
 
Confusingly, the “beginning of art” was specified twice. The first mention (above) explains 
how the motivation for a worthy aesthetic treatment is generated, and specifies that 
aesthetics is essentially an outcrop of functionality, produced by the witnessing of 
functional efficacy and the desire that such witnessing inspires to aesthetically serenade it. 
Holden was very clear that the aesthetic couldn‟t simply arrive out of a general nonspecific 
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desire among people and practitioners to have things attractive and tidy. It had a definite 
source and emerged through a meritorious logic insofar as such aesthetic treatments only 
made sense applied to that which were evidently good (i.e. evolved and improved), and the 
act of serenading that merit required those treatments to make visual sense and extend 
their expressions around the original shapes and lines. This represents a development from 
the 1930 Northern Europe travelogue. In that instance, the aesthetics had to re-present the 
functionalities over which they were applied. 
 
The second “beginning of art” was the beauty inherent in order: 
 
“We are not sufficiently aware that order is perhaps the most important 
component of beauty [...], the condition in which every part or unit is in its 
right place, tidiness, normal or healthy or efficient state” (Holden, 1944 
[Ahp/26/18/1/v]: 5)  
 
This key to beauty was relationally defined. Rather than the individual articulations of 
individual elements, beauty emerged from between and around individual elements in 
terms of how they were placed and sequenced. Treated individually, the constituent 
elements were of little consequence. Their consequence emerged from the way they were 
influencing and influenced by what they were adjacent to, i.e. what their proximity 
achieved, rather than what they achieved per se. Holden‟s approach was compositional and 
relied on each form in the composition to work as a proxy and modify its neighbouring 
forms to generate a flowing aesthetic. It is most evident in Holden‟s second tranche of 
Underground stations, in which large central halls, which might be stark and obtrusive 
taken alone, are allowed to ebb away through wings and canopies placed adjacent, and 
which are themselves able to crescendo into the large central mass (similar massing is 
evident at 55 Broadway and Senate House). Holden himself found beautiful order evident 
in the clean and well organised domestic kitchen, which generated pleasure for both its 
creator and the visitor: 
 
“That is the beginning of art, and the housewife is the artist because she has 
been able to convey to the visitor some of her own pleasure and pride in her 
kitchen.” (Holden, 1944 [Ahp/26/18/1/v]: 5) 
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Working beautifully and looking beautiful were intimately related and realised through 
pride. It wasn‟t just a case that they ought to be made so (as suggested in the 1930 
travelogue of Northern Europe): this was naturally the case. Whilst this may sound like a 
return to his pre-1930 policy of allowing the aesthetic to simply emerge, the distinction 
should be drawn between being motivated to produce a good aesthetic reflection on one‟s 
functional achievement, and actually achieving it. The motivation was naturally emergent 
from functional achievements, but that motivation had to be converted into a working 
expression and would not happen on its own. And it was important that it did happen: 
 
“Our pride and pleasure in our work must have visual expression if we would 
reach our destination, for without that pride and that pleasure in getting the 
last ounce of delight out of the work we cannot expect to get far – because the 
will to adventure and achievement is not there.” (Holden, 1944: 
[Ahp/26/18/1/xiii]: 13) 
 
Aesthetics represented a crucial visual conveyance of pride and an important confirmation 
of achievement. It was equally as necessary to impart its benefits to practitioners as to 
inhabitants and users, it helped to create a consciousness of their achievement and the 
motivation for achievements to follow.  
 
Holden‟s implication in the future of his buildings orbits around the possibility that 
inhabitation, rather than being the property of the inhabitant and their choices, is in fact 
substantially contained in the building, but always on their behalf and representing, even 
amplifying, their intentions. In this respect he was unlike Voysey. Holden‟s buildings were 
not conceived as attempts to impose whole new and ethically superior forms of 
inhabitation (and the deletion of existing, inferior ones), and unlike Voysey, whose 
architectural currency was of the hints and hopes that colours, shapes and proportions 
could materialise, Holden‟s architectural currency was expressly pragmatic and, he assumed, 
to be encountered pragmatically. (Iconographic or symbolic messaging was, initially, of no 
concern, and later, of only secondary concern and of a very specific and functionally 
proximate vocabulary.) More specifically, Holden‟s architectural currency was bound into 
the systems of availability he created whereby certain key materialities and technologies 
were installed in certain arrangements and in a particular order so that they were available 
to be encountered and used by people to execute a series of tasks.  
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This is perhaps most evident in his second tranche of London Underground stations in 
which passengers were exposed to materialities and technologies which liberated resources 
for them in a particular order and along a particular route.  In Holden‟s buildings, 
inhabitation, understood as tasks, naturally coalesced (or were corralled) around the 
materialities he provided to serve them. Holden was implicated in the future experiences of 
his buildings by making alternative inhabitations awkward, and his simple ideal of a 
building working smoothly in daily occupation (Holden, undated [Ahp/26/1/5/iii]) could 
be readily interpreted as using the building to smooth out daily occupations by organising, 
equipping, and streamlining inhabitation. However, that logic and its material expressions 
was only ever intended to serve the chosen inhabitation of his clients with more efficient 
possibilities for the inhabitations they wanted, rather than enforce alternative inhabitations 
he might have hoped to evoke in their place. In his understanding, efficiency was a re-
issuing of already existing inhabitations, and provided, at most, a refreshed, rather than a 
fresh, inhabitation. And despite later changes in his understanding of the inhabitant, he still 
considered that people were – at least as far as it was the business of architects – 
fundamentally purposeful and task oriented beings who could work better if impediments 
were removed from their environments, and replaced with helpful and highly considered 
materialities. His architecture was pitched at this conception, and he never aimed to alter 
people‟s beliefs or the way they thought.  
 
This is not to suggest that such streamlining and re-organising is less of an incursion into 
the future inhabitation of the building, though that possibility remains. Holden never 
aspired to the sort of didactic ambition that defined Voysey‟s output wherein suggestive 
forms aimed to demonstrate noble possibilities, but in adding efficiencies (and removing 
inefficiencies) to the inhabitations of his buildings, he essentially gave them the dwelling 
equivalent of a current which gently grabbed and pulled people along. His efficient 
materialities appealed to people‟s own efficiencies more than any other aspect and, even 
when engaging with their aesthetic sensibilities, aimed to coax them into such behaviour. 
The fact that efficiency was an alteration that retained the theme of the original inhabitation 
does not, therefore, mean that the original inhabitation continued as before, only more 
efficiently. 
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Fig. 4.1: Senate House. 
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Fig. 4.2: Senate House. 
 
Fig. 4.3: Colliers Wood Station 
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Fig. 4.4: Turnpike Lane Station. 
 
Fig. 4.5: Rayners Lane Station 
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Fig. 4.6: Bristol Central Library. 
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Fig. 4.7: Bristol Central Library, foyer (photograph by Steve Cadman). 
 
Figure 4.8: Bristol Central Library, staircase (photograph by Steve Cadman). 
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Fig. 4.9: Bristol Central Library, reading room (photograph by Steve Cadman). 
 
Fig. 4.10: Southgate Station. 
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Fig. 4.11: Arnos Grove Station. 
 
Fig. 4.12: Chiswick Park Station. 
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Expertise and inhabitation: 
 
Peter (at Senate House) and Alexander (at Bristol Central Library) have both developed 
expertise of their respective buildings, and both factor that expertise into the way they 
inhabit them. That expertise has produced two, possibly even three fundamentally different 
inhabitations. Peter‟s inhabitation is distinctly bilateral, with two qualitatively different and 
distinct types of experience that occur parallel to and concurrently with one another. One 
of these apprehends the building in terms of how it functions and what it accommodates, 
whereas the other comprehends the building as an intentionally produced thing with a 
history and a motivation, as he explains: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material]  
 
My understanding of Peter‟s [Redacted interview material] is that there is an inhabitation 
that sounds functional, even banal, and full of tea, bookshelves and those other things in 
his day-to-day business that the building can functionally accommodate, alongside which is 
a quite different inhabitation for which his knowledge and professionally ingrained 
curiosity forms a foundation, and which produces a far more commodious Senate House. 
This inhabitation creates a space behind the forms and features of the building which could 
plausibly be understood as “depth”. By “depth” I mean the virtualising of a particular kind 
of potential which looks behind or beyond the functionally apparent, and I use the term to 
reflect the capacity to contain more than somewhere to put your tea or shelve your books.  
And perhaps, in Peter‟s case, depth further represents the sedimentation he seeks to find in 
the building and his experience of it, that is to say, more and deeper levels of insight as to 
how Senate House came to exist as it does. “Depth” articulates the potential for authorship 
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and allows Peter to plausibly understand Senate House as resultant, and to track its 
emergence such that its forms and features as he experiences them in the present can 
plausibly be seen as a material articulation of what Holden was trying to achieve and 
interpret which, he explains, is the purpose of such an inhabitation: [Redacted interview 
material - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] 
 
Such an enquiring inhabitation requires expertise: it cannot emerge from the building alone, 
but is (at least in part) activated by the inhabitation that Peter brings with him and 
produces between inquisitive habit and critical faculties. It also reveals, he suggests, a 
different and more complex Senate House to him which requires working at depth to eke 
out, and which many other users do not occupy, he explains: [Redacted interview material - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] 
 
At the centre of Peter‟s inhabitation of Senate House is a recovering and re-enacting of 
Holden‟s ideas and the work they were supposed to do, fostered not only by Peter‟s 
inquisitive style of inhabitation, [Redacted interview material - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - -]95. Peter‟s 
enquiring approach to inhabitation is not solely for his particular interest: his personal 
understanding of Senate House (as resultant from Holden‟s intentions) has also been aimed 
at [Redacted interview material - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
                                                   
95 This refurbishment took place in the 1990‟s and was limited to the interiors of one (albeit large) section. Richard‟s role 
was, broadly speaking, within project management, though he was not the actual project manager 
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - --] 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material]96 
 
In discussing his relationship with the building in such terms, Peter admits to a possessive 
kind of vanity, one that stems from his belief that his understanding of Senate House is 
exacting and proper, and one that understands his surrogation of Holden‟s approach to 
have been vindicated [Redacted interview material - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
                                                   
96 In listed buildings, VAT is excluded for decorative or constructional work that is intended to restore an original feature. 
Additional work on a listed building is not VAT exempt (e.g. replacing a window frame would be VAT exempt, but 
adding an extractor fan would not be, though it would have to be judged as in keeping with the building‟s character). The 
listed status of Senate House is returned to in some of the discussions that follow. 
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[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
[Redacted interview material - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - -]. This correlates with, and is also stimulated by, Peter‟s enquiring 
inhabitation of Senate House, solidifying his belief that the building he experiences is a 
discernable result of Holden‟s intentions. [Redacted interview material - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
-   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - -] his conception that the building‟s effect is 
not self sustaining, but needs to be sustained by people who, like him, are willing to 
“understand it quite carefully”. 
  
This is an expanding and penetrating kind of inhabitation insofar as it expands (and 
complicates) what Senate House could potentially be beyond (i.e. deeper than) the 
functional inhabitation of tea and bookshelves that he maintains in parallel to it. 
Alexander‟s inhabitation of Bristol Central Library also puts expertise to work, but not in 
the same way or, arguably, to the same degree of “depth”. This is not to say that Bristol 
Central Library achieves what it achieves by accident in Alexander‟s experience: the quality 
of its experience is (at least partially) the result of the experience Holden made possible, 
and the forms and features it iterates are material strategies that were intended to solidify 
the possibilities for such inhabitations which have “worked”. One such functioning 
materiality is the “processional” route that funnels library patrons from the main entrance 
to the main reading room, exposing them en route to a series of contrasting environments, 
almost as though there‟s a little experiential journey built into the fabric of the library, 
which Alexander explains thus: 
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[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
As to the processional route as an example of the building working, and doing work on the 
inhabitants, Alexander is clear that such working is not really geared to producing a specific 
effect. The experiences that the building produces have, he suggests, an effectiveness that 
works at a diffuse (perhaps affectual) level, one that impresses and is “marvellous” rather 
than articulating a particular impression, which is the idea I (mistakenly) tried to open out 
in the following exchange:  
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
  
In understanding that they‟ve “worked” Alexander doesn‟t especially need or want to 
inhabit the full scope of the building that Peter seeks: he does not need to explicitly open 
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up a depth behind these working forms and features and understand what they resulted 
from. I interpret his experience of the building as, quite simply, a cache of experiences 
apprehended for their face value qualities. Put another way, Alexander inhabits the library 
at the level he believes it should be: as a finished experiential product, to be apprehended in 
its finished state and experienced for the experiences it offers as a finished thing, without 
interrogating its origins or dissecting that experience. The library is “marvellous” at the 
point of encounter, and this quality was designed to work at the point of its encountering 
without any particular need to add depth to that point and locate, in that depth, a structure 
of intentionality.  
 
In Alexander‟s terms, it seems that the inhabitation coalesces at the point of experience and 
is contained in the building, whereas Peter‟s inhabitation seems to do the opposite; not 
coalescing, but expanding and deepening with the aim of reconciling what is apparent with 
what was intended. Certainly, on probing the possibility of intention in Alexander‟s 
experience, my line of questioning was truncated with a particular and revealing note of 
caution, specifically that as something to be experienced for its experiences the library 
could not reliably elucidate Holden or be used to build an image of Holden‟s aims, ideas, 
and material strategies: In Alexander‟s experience the building is not plausibly suggestive of 
or resultant from Holden‟s aims and does not provide a secure way to know him except, as 
the following passage suggests, to speculate to some degree.  
 
Paul: And do you reckon that was Holden‟s intention or was that something 
that just kind of- 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
The intention I was (mistakenly) attempting to track in the above quote followed our 
discussions on one particular way that Bristol Central Library worked in terms of his 
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experience, namely that: [Redacted interview material - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - -]. However, the existence of such character in Alexander‟s experience is 
not only the result of friendly, tactile features being knowingly juxtaposed against classical 
magnificence – I will return to this combination shortly. Before such experiences can 
happen, there is the possibility that the building needs to be contextually set-up to be 
experienced in such a way: to be put into a position where such experiences are plausible.  
 
Positioning plausible experiences, stories and effects: 
  
The building‟s ability to do the sort of work that makes it likable, and likely to gather 
affection in the course of its inhabitation, has some basis in comparison and, perhaps more 
accurately, contrast as a material and aesthetic strategy (although the term “strategy” may 
unduly characterise the building and the way it is understood as a working attempt to do 
something, which reflects only part of my interviewees‟ experiences or understandings at 
best). In both Alexander‟s case at Bristol Central Library and Samuel‟s case at Arnos 
Grove, there is a recognition that the buildings are contrasting and tangential to what might 
be expected or taken to be normal. Samuel‟s experience of and affection for Arnos Grove 
seems to be made possible, in part, because it is different to what he would normally expect 
or commonly experience, and he explains here that the building‟s uniqueness is, in a way, 
the start of him liking it: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
  
This passage leads me to identify an inhabitation that creates or allows a field of plausibility 
around some of Holden‟s buildings as they are experienced, without necessarily realising 
227 
 
actual things happening within that plausible field. For Samuel, his affection is partially 
produced by Arnos Grove making itself noticeable insofar as it stands out from everyday 
experience, and Alexander at Bristol Central Library appears to note a similar possibility in 
his (and other peoples‟) experiences. Part of what the library does and how it works is 
through being “special” and how different the library would have been (and still is) for 
people using it in comparison to what they accustomed to.  
 
In the following quote, Alexander suggests that the special-ness of buildings like Bristol 
Central Library was produced, or at least started to be produced, in an architectural act of 
contrast achieved by deploying a palatial kind of grandeur. 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
  
In both quotes above it‟s important to note that it is not only contrast at work: the drum at 
Arnos Grove is easy on Samuel‟s eyes, and the library‟s interior has palatial tones for 
Alexander, and these factors (which I discuss shortly) do not simply arise out of contrast. 
My interest in contrast, in terms of the building being thought of as working, is not that 
contrast is understood as a specific act, but works as a general condition for the emergence 
of acts in their experiences, a positioning or posturing of the building in such a way that 
such acts might become more likely or plausible facets of their experience. Being tangential 
and contrasting may position the building forward of (or highlight it against a background 
of) relative normalcy, and there is a possibility that, in quantitative terms, both Samuel and 
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Alexander pay more attention to their respective buildings because they are prominent and 
different. In short, I would consider that in experiencing Holden‟s buildings as different, 
their inhabitations are potentially more attentive and, therefore, inclined to notice and 
consider things. 
 
In terms of Alexander‟s inhabitation, the library works through being appealing, and at 
least one facet of its appeal could be in the contrasted positioning I‟ve just described: being 
special requires it to be different to and better than the ordinary, and this simple design 
strategy on Holden‟s part represents the start of making the building work, that is to say, 
setting up the conditions for it to be liked by being noticeably different and noticeably 
more generous in terms of the palatial surrounds that were offered to its patrons. The 
material achievement of this is bound up in a dual kind of character that I repeat here from 
the preceding discussion: [Redacted interview material - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - -]. Alexander expanded on this by describing a combination of material 
elements, each working differently, and all combined to create what I interpret as a 
material-aesthetic politics of access in which large and grandiose elements are couched in 
“warm” or “domestic” elements that allow magnificence to be made more accessible and 
experienced from a more comfortable and, perhaps, familiar vantage. 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
For Alexander, this seems to be a key way in which Bristol Central Library is understood to 
work; through this special materiality that makes it possible to comfortably inhabit a space 
which, to be special, is also replete with classical bombast. The mistake I made in trying to 
clarify this in terms of intention (Paul: “And do you reckon that was Holden‟s 
intention”...), was to suggest that this particular experience had been installed by Holden 
with any deeper motive than that of creating a special place, and Alexander‟s inhabitation 
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belies my attempts to understand the library as an active palimpsest of Holden (e.g. as a 
deliberate exercise of his persona, or an attempt to enforce a particular inhabitation). In 
fact, although the friendly magnificence of the library is definitely an outcome that Holden 
planned and designed for, Alexander does not inhabit it as such or believe that Holden 
sought to route anything else into that outcome. It is an enjoyable, special place to be 
without burrowing into one‟s agency, articulating or imposing a manifesto of any 
description. 
 
Peter, on the other hand, finds that certain macro scale material and aesthetic features of 
Senate House open up an indelible field of possibility which enable such scenarios and 
powerfully suggest the exercise of intention, or more accurately, a non-specific intentional 
posture: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
The fact that the design is “consistent” suggests planning, control, and the steadily insistent 
articulation of an idea or suite of ideas. This may be because consistency entails the absence 
of abrupt changes in the design, and the repeated sameness further suggests an absence of 
either indulgence or reckoning, which creates in Peter‟s inhabitation a likely sense of a plan 
or policy being adhered to and, especially, of things being thought through, and the 
consistent application of thought (it did not occur to him that the exercise of consistency 
could equally be interpreted as the wilful absence of thought). This, along with Peter‟s 
enquiring style of resultant inhabitation, evinces the capacity for intention. It suggests that 
at the causal root of the building‟s history there was someone being thoughtful, and the 
building transcribes that in a number of ways – in this case through the material articulation 
of consistency. In this respect his inhabitation is unlike Alexander‟s at Bristol Central 
Library whose experience of intentional forms cannot be reasonably treated as transcribing 
Holden‟s intentions, habits, persona or philosophy. 
 
Leonard‟s experience of Senate House is, on the face of it, broadly similar to Alexander‟s 
experience of Bristol Central Library, but whilst Leonard may not engage in inquisitive acts 
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of inhabitation at Senate House, I would suggest that such an inhabitation isn‟t beyond 
him. In our discussion of Holden and his experience of Senate House it emerged that 
Leonard was familiar with Holden‟s work for London Underground97, however, this was a 
very different and more incisive familiarity than he believed he occupied Senate House 
with. Leonard‟s understanding of Holden‟s station designs is that they were replete with 
features that directed and channelled people to the right place, an understanding that 
allowed for the plausibility of deliberate architectural devices, and the concurrent 
impression of an architect using architectural forms to do something to the inhabitants of 
those spaces. Such possibilities, however, were largely absent in his experience of Senate 
House, as he related to me with some degree of surprise... 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
                                                   
97 Leonard‟s familiarity was with the historical and technical aspects of London Underground and not with the 
architecture per se, but in reading some of the more historical accounts he had also read about Holden and had formed an 
understanding (and granted a degree of plausibility) to the purposeful nature of his station architecture. 
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[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
This quote suggests that Leonard can provide an analytical and insightful kind of 
inhabitation: one capable of ascertaining the architectural will of a building for its ongoing 
inhabitation and additionally capable of ascertaining how certain devices might solidify 
these intentions into interactions (like uplighters). The fact that he finds no such equivalent 
communicability at Senate House could have a number of reasons, perhaps most 
prominently, and in the manner of a building event (see Jacobs 2006, and also Adey 
200698), Senate House has not been “narrated” by key literatures which Leonard, as a 
personal interest, is motivated to read about London Underground. Another potential 
reason is that Leonard‟s experience of Holden‟s stations, augmented though it may be by 
the “event” of key literatures, is able to recognise without being “taught” the idea that it is 
articulating something, whereas Leonard cannot quite surmount the fragmentary nature of 
Senate House‟s design in his experience and tap into Holden‟s overarching “vision”, as he 
explains:  
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
  
We can better understand Leonard‟s absence of, yet ability for, inquiring inhabitation by 
contextualising his insights in the wider context of his experience of Senate House, a 
building which he likes, but not because he thinks it is particularly attractive in visual terms, 
or in the way the current owners and its predecessors have treated it: 
                                                   
98 Adey does not use the term “building events” in his Airports and air-mindedness article (Adey 2006), but I would suggest 
that his argument (that what Liverpool Airport could do as a building was framed by attendant discourses about what was 
hoped of it and what spectacles could be witnessed from its viewing balconies) is compatible with Jacob‟s ideas of building 
events as those discourses that aim to narrate how architecture should be apprehended and understood in a way that the 
architecture itself does not fully vocalise. (Jacobs 2006). 
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[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
  
In Leonard‟s terms, the appeal of Senate House is not in its appearance, but in an acquired 
sense of its eccentricities: “acquire” being one potentially key term insofar that the appeal 
of Senate House has to be eked out from an apparent lack of charm, and “eccentric” being 
a second key term insofar that some of that appeal, perhaps the lager part, is contained in 
the building‟s behaviour. On this facet of the building Leonard was substantially less “lost”, 
and his experience of Senate House is full of Senate House‟s eccentric behaviours (even if 
he hasn‟t experienced them in person): 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
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Leonard‟s inhabitation among such eccentricities creates a prominence for Senate House in 
that, by being unusual and having “eccentricities” it is also (potentially) more noticeable in 
a quirky kind of way, even if, in the case of Holden‟s panel heaters, it‟s a quirky kind of 
failing. There is a possibility that these eccentricities are attractive in themselves, but I 
would also suggest that a substantial part, perhaps the larger part of the attractiveness of 
these eccentricities is through the stories that are attached to them, such as the local 
substation wilting under the pressure of Holden‟s panel heaters. A profusion of these 
stories (and myths) in Leonard‟s experience seems to have produced a friendly kind of 
familiarity with Senate House, even if the source of those stories have little to do with the 
building and Holden‟s intentions for it. Some of the stories that, taken together, seem to 
form Leonard‟s familiarity are formed by the building performing in a way errant to its 
original design intentions (as is the case with the panel heaters), or else performing in 
stories that are genuinely fictional, stories where Senate House is there, but its details and 
features do not speak for themselves. They are vocalised as part of the story.  
 
My understanding of Leonard‟s experience is one defined to an extent by stories and myths 
which draw on, but then extend away from, certain aspects of the building. Put another 
(somewhat metaphorical) way, the building is to these stories what soil is to plants: a 
growth medium that matters, but which is given far less attention than that which emerges 
from it. One such myth, for example, is that the Nazis had selected Senate House as their 
post-occupation headquarters in Britain. This story, one of a number that define Leonard‟s 
experience, includes Senate House and a particular aspect of its physical appearance, but 
quickly thereafter deflects away from the building and towards, in this case, crystallography 
and the prediction of bombing patterns: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
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[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
This story, which is as much a story about how the original story is partially untrue, utilises 
the (arguably) stocky build of Senate House as a starting point that seems to quickly recede 
in Leonard‟s experience. The possibility that Senate House‟s materiality is understood as 
being story-worthy would potentially necessitate a certain quietness of the building, though 
not outright silence of course: that stocky build is an important starting point for the story 
Leonard recounts in the above excerpt. My interpretation of the position of Senate House 
as an “eccentric friend” in Leonard‟s experience centres on this sense that the building is a 
diligent starting point for stories which, to varying extents, proceed to arc away from it. If 
Leonard‟s inhabitation is, thus, “story-worthy”, his experience of Senate House may be one 
of starting the points that the building provides through aspects like stockiness, or 
eccentric heating, after which the building remains quiet and unobtrusive in a way that lets 
these stories unfold without continuing narration. In fact, outside the scope of Senate 
House‟s story-worthiness, Leonard understands the building as [Redacted interview 
material - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - -] 
 
Stories and myths seem to be central (though not exclusive) to the way Leonard 
experiences Senate House, and it may be this emphasis on stories that displaces the 
potentially enquiring inhabitation he seems to use to engage with Holden‟s London 
Underground stations. There is the possibility that his fragmentary and eccentric 
impression of Senate House may make it good, fertile “soil” for stories, but it may also 
constrict the plausibility Leonard might otherwise have for the building‟s own narratives in 
favour of the production and dissemination of other narratives, and indeed, there is a 
tradition of such production and dissemination as Leonard explains:  
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[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
This interest seems to be focused on the other things that are and have been going on at 
Senate House, and the building is so suffused with these that it no longer becomes 
plausible for the building to work as either a biography of Holden, or as an attempt by 
Holden to effect certain ideas and inhabitations, a point emphasised by the fact that many 
of these stories arc away from ideas of what the building shouldn‟t have been doing: from 
apparently banal aspects such as failed panel heaters, to the semi-fictional (or entirely 
fictional) involvement of Senate House in Nazism and Orwellian ministries. 
 
Making impressions: 
 
Leonard‟s experience excepted, a general observation of my interviewees and their 
understandings and inhabitations of their respective buildings is their impression that 
making impressions is what Holden designed (or should have designed) the buildings to do 
even if, as in Peter‟s case, a substantial process of recovery is needed to re-attain that 
impression, or as in Alexander‟s case, whereby the impression need not be specific or 
pressed into service to make definite effects happen. However it is articulated, there is 
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something important about being impressive; it may not exactly constitute the doing of 
something, but it might set up, open out a space for, and enable the potential for those 
architectures to plausibly do something. So understood, being impressive might be similar 
to the exercise of contrast insofar as, according to my interviewees, contrast doesn‟t so 
much do something, as put the building into a position where having an effect is more 
plausible. 
 
This is especially evident in Sydney‟s account of Morden99 precisely because of how 
unimpressive the building is. Given the opportunity to compare it with buildings that he 
does find significant, Morden is left somewhat adrift in a cityscape full of what sounds like 
material theatre, or at least the wilful architectural exercise of panache, as he explains:  
 
Sydney: I mean, like 55 Broadway100. 
Paul: Right. 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
                                                   
99 Completed in 1926 (before the inauguration of London Transport) for the City and South London Railway, Morden is 
the southern terminus of the Northern Line, located in Merton, London, it is part of a group of stations including South 
Wimbledon, Colliers Wood, Tooting Broadway, Tooting Beck, Balham, and Clapham South, all designed by Holden. The 
staff who work for the group rotate between the different stations, rather than being tasked to a particular station. 
100 55 Broadway is the headquarters for Transport for London, and was designed by Charles Holden. 
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[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
Morden emerges from this passage, or rather doesn‟t emerge, as a shadow or what a 
building could and ought to be, and whilst comparisons with Holden‟s 55 Broadway, Peter 
Leonards‟ Lloyds Building, or Caesar Pelli‟s One Canada Square may sound unlikely, those 
buildings all evidence an intent (“[Redacted interview material]”) and an execution that 
achieves that to an extent, but Morden does not appear to engage with this key criterion of 
his inhabitation. It seems that being impressive is the principal condition that Sydney 
would require for any building to appear significant to him or engage his interest, and its 
absence entails that it cannot be thought of as working for Sydney in the same sense that it 
works (or at least has the potential to work) for Samuel or Alexander. Morden does not 
strive to stand out or engage with his idea of “impressive”, insofar that buildings cannot 
really get away with being diminutive: they need to have a certain momentum in their 
design and execution in order to access his favour or be recognised by him as significant, or 
even noticeable. Though they are not Sydney‟s own descriptions, I think it is reasonable to 
suggest that this momentum is a combination of panache and, perhaps, a degree of 
bombast, and a building has to carry and project these qualities to make an impression on 
him. In other words, to make an impression, a building must do what Morden does not do, 
and be impressive. 
 
This idea of buildings making an impression also makes sense to Samuel, but only in a 
potential form that remains largely unrealised. Unlike Sydney at Morden, Samuel‟s station 
had the capacity to make an impression, and it is plausible to suppose that it had been 
designed to do so, but whilst the architecture has that capacity, it never resolves that 
capacity into an actual impression in his experience. In the following quote, responding to 
my seeking of specifics, Samuel offered only the possibility of something potentially 
happening: 
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Paul: Do you look at something and say, yeah, I can see what he was trying to 
do there, what Holden was trying to do? 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
This potential-laden vagueness was the culmination of a discussion in which I tried to 
sketch out what Samuel‟s experience was like and what plausibility existed there as to 
architectural intent and its realisation. So Samuel‟s response here is, at least partially, his 
reflection on that plausibility as part of our discussion. At earlier points in the discussion, 
the potential for architectural affect or effect was substantially more diminished. As to 
mood, for example: [Redacted interview material - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ]. There is a further interesting example of 
plausibility being granted to an idea without that plausibility actually solidifying into 
something he had experienced, or something that was likely to be experienced: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
In this case, the idea of designing a building with the human body as an inspiration is 
plausible enough, but is somewhat locked into the architect‟s own territory and is not 
something that would plausibly cross over into the inhabitation of Arnos Grove, or indeed, 
Morden.  
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
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I have little doubt that Sydney is correct on this point: Holden‟s use of the human body as 
a metaphor for efficiency in architecture was solely for his own consumption or to explain 
to others his beliefs and hopes. There‟s no evidence to suggest that he thought inhabitants 
should “get” this metaphor, although it is more reasonable to suggest that he thought they 
might knowingly experience the benefits that his metaphor realised when translated into a 
plan. My purpose in mentioning it in my interviews was, in fact, as a means to ascertain 
what is plausible in the experience of architecture and what capacity inhabitation has to 
“get”, or at least think it‟s possible to “get” a building as part of their experience.) 
 
Samuel is similarly vague as to what particular impressions these were.  There is, for 
example, something interesting in Holden‟s use of brick... [Redacted interview material - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - ]. There is also [Redacted interview material - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -]. This reflects the absence of 
particular intents or portents at work within Samuel‟s experience at Arnos Grove, but at 
the same time it still suggests a recognition that the building contains a more diffuse and 
general posturing towards doing something. In his experience, (making an) “impression” is 
a state which orientates the building in the general direction that suggests the exercise of 
will, or else gives it general momentum away from the otherwise unremarkable. And in 
Samuel‟s case, at least part of this is comparative and stems from his recognition that 
Arnos Grove is unique, and that uniqueness is a necessarily functional start of making an 
impression or, more accurately, opening up the possibility of doing so and realising that 
such possibility exists without necessarily actualising it. 
 
It is, of course, plausible to argue that Samuel states as much because I was sitting in front 
of him, entreating him to consider a possibility which he didn‟t feel inclined to dismiss, and 
that he never saw such possibilities, realised or otherwise, in the fabric of Arnos Grove. 
This is a possibility I explore in the next section: in fact, I believe this mechanism is quite 
plausible and that Samuel‟s experience has been engineered to some extent in an extra-
architectural way. However, whilst I might concede that I am not unlike the culprit, I am 
sure I wasn‟t the culprit per se. The plausibility of Arnos Grove in Samuel‟s experience has 
been incubated by an extra-architectural narrating of the building long before my arrival, 
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perhaps especially by the special aura that the idea of “heritage” precipitates around the 
building. This is not to say, however, that my interviewee‟s experiences are entirely or even 
predominantly couched in attendant discourses. In fact, the temporal state of Morden has 
specifically and insistently material consequences for Sydney and his experience. 
 
Temporalities: 
 
All of my Holden interviewees understand their respective buildings as being, in some form 
or other, locked into the time in which they were produced. This is not to say that the 
passage of time hasn‟t been significant for the fabric of these buildings in terms of 
necessary alterations: none of them are original or in the process of being restored to an 
exactly original state. But despite their ongoing reproduction, key aspects of their 
contemporary experience are defined by the past actively intruding into the present in a 
way quite different from descriptions like “antecedent” or “precursor” might suggest. 
These terms inherently suggest a sedimented reality in which the present rests upon and 
mostly supplants an accreted foundation of largely quietened pasts, whereas at Morden 
Sydney has found that the past is far less whispered and asserts itself in a way that cannot 
be gently made opaque by incremental alterations. Morden, Sydney explains, is too small, 
and it‟s too small because it was built with a fixed temporality, big enough for its present 
(1926), but not for the future it failed to grow into: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
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I interpret an important temporal distinction in this passage. Sydney is not exactly 
suggesting that Morden is a building from a former time working (roughly) to present 
expectations. Rather, he seems to suggest that Morden reiterates its original time-frame 
through the material aspect of its size. Sydney‟s experience and inhabitation of Morden is 
generally inflected by the idea (and bodily experience) of it being locked in its original time 
frame. This extends to his opinion of Holden, and whilst Sydney has never really 
considered Holden‟s motivations (see below), his experience of a station that isn‟t large 
enough leads him to suggest that Holden practiced a conforming or referencing kind of 
architecture which transcribed in architectural form the norms and expectations of the 
time: 
 
Paul: First of all, have you ever really thought about it [Holden‟s motivations]? 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
The temporal limitation of Morden stems, in this instance, from the temporal limitation of 
Holden‟s architecture, especially compared with the newer stations on the network which 
(literally) allow space for the passage of time. I get the sense that Holden could and should 
have been more temporally proactive for Sydney, rather than simply subscribing to the 
needs of the time and assuming a future broadly similar to the original situation. 
 
In this case, the oldness of the building generates an intrusive temporality, clinging to and 
reasserting its own time. In most other cases the temporal experience of Holden‟s work has 
a more beneficial, even soothing effect that can deflect criticism away from the fact that 
certain elements of the building do not perform well. At Arnos Grove, Samuel recalled: 
[Redacted interview material - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -]. However, the application of 
heritage has ameliorated this. 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
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[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
This is a very different temporal dynamic, and one which, in my interpretation, is far more 
delegated than Sydney‟s. The intrusive temporality that Sydney deals with is very much 
produced by the building, whereas the narrative temporality that Samuel experiences is 
extra-architectural, that is to say that it is proximate to, rather than inherent in, the building, 
sharing some aspects of a building event (Jacobs, 2006: 14-21). The rehabilitating effect of 
heritage is not the work of the building. [Redacted interview material - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] beneficially subtitles his experience of the building, but 
what those subtitles actually narrate in terms of facts or insights is less important than the 
atmosphere they evoke and the enhanced sense of connection they offer to his experience.  
 
That atmosphere is constituted, in part, by the realisation that Arnos Grove receives quite a 
lot of attention, interest, and affection, such that Samuel inhabits both the building and a 
cultural broth of recognition. The affect of this is one of plausibility: the existence of this 
culture of interest around the building suggests that it matters in some way, and if others 
find it interesting and significant, then the possibility of the building‟s interesting-ness and 
significance is manifested for Samuel, who hasn‟t found such significance per se, so much as 
concluded that there must be significance somewhere to explain this interest. Through 
such means, Arnos Grove is allowed to matter more and attain a value (one that is, at least 
initially, separate from the building in material terms), even if that interesting significance is 
left in a fluid state and never actually solidified into stories, characters, contexts or 
motivations. This is not so much confirmed knowledge, as the sense that there is 
knowledge awaiting that could be uncovered. In fact, in the following quote, the work of 
making an impression sounds as though it has transferred to him, but remains general and 
fluid and is constituted by a general raising of appreciation:  
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Paul: How important do you think this knowledge is to the way you 
understand the building, er, and the way, er-, to your opinion of the building? 
Do you think it changed the way you think about it because of what you knew? 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
The temporality of Sydney‟s experience is, therefore, one of assertive near-original oldness, 
whereas the oldness Samuel experiences at Arnos Grove is, I argue, subtitled by narrative 
and recognition which softens that oldness and populates it with either actual significance, 
or more commonly, the potential for more significance. Samuel‟s office may still be old, 
but that oldness attains more potential than temporally intrusive material awkwardness. In 
more immediately material terms, and regardless of how much Samuel and his staff actually 
know about Arnos Grove or its sister stations, the heritage status of the buildings entails 
that their maintenance is rather more special than the immediate tasks of keeping the 
buildings clean, safe, and in one piece, even if that means enduring a degree of 
inconvenience, as he explains: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
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In this quote, I detect the possibility that enduring those constraints and inconveniences is 
a key element of how they maintain the building: their capacity to undertake the tasks they 
need to in spaces that aren‟t always aligned to those tasks allows those spaces to be 
maintained in their not-always-useful forms. Maintaining the building means maintaining 
certain postures on their part (squeezing into and out of spaces, going round the houses, 
and so forth) that keep them from needing to embark on major alterations to the building, 
but which also feels special for maintaining, in the same acts, the status of having heritage. 
 
Heritage is also important Leonard‟s experience, but in his case the question of heritage is 
juxtaposed between defending the building against certain alterations and arguing in favour 
of others. In an example of the former, Leonard recalls a stand-off between his 
departmental staff and a contractor over what may appear, at first, to be a relatively minor 
feature. 
 
Paul: Do you ever find that a bit annoying? The number of things you can‟t do 
that would make sense and that wouldn‟t particularly detract- 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
As “[Redacted interview material]101”, Leonard and his colleagues are arguably engaging in a 
process of sovereignty over the status of the building and certain key original features, and 
it is plausible to suggest that in defending certain aspects of its originality they are retaining 
                                                   
101 [Redacted interview material] 
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Senate House in a way that retains Holden‟s original design features and, therein, enhances 
(though by no means ensures) the possibility of his continuing influence.  
 
In contrast, however, Leonard sometimes finds himself in a position where he has to argue 
for somewhat larger alterations which have to be negotiated into existence with the local 
authority (Camden), an often arduous process where different conceptions of what and 
where the past should be are exchanged. In the following example, for instance, the 
university wished to refurbish a lecture theatre and add additional seating where it had once 
been removed, which met with some degree of reticence with the local authority as the new 
seating was positioned differently to the seating plan at the time that Senate House was 
listed. But it was obvious to Leonard and his colleagues that their proposals were, in fact, a 
reinstatement of the original seating positions and a return of sorts to Holden‟s original 
design. [Redacted interview material - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - -]102 
 
In other cases, alterations have been necessary for Leonard and his colleagues to continue 
using the building which are entirely new to the building, neither transcribing nor 
interpreting what was there originally, and which are equally as difficult to argue the case 
for: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
                                                   
102 [Redacted interview material  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] 
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In Leonard‟s understanding, heritage appears to occupy a broad logic, from the retention 
of originality on one hand (door plates) to the outright new on the other (ventilation ducts), 
and between them, a kind of newness that reiterates what went before. My understanding 
of this aspect of Leonard‟s inhabitation is in the manner of a thematic approach to the 
heritage of Senate House. The way he (and his colleagues) might understand and deal with 
that heritage is not to restore it or conserve it as such (although there is obviously some 
element of this in the above excerpts). I believe that these two aspects appear to be 
combined in an effort to arrive at and then maintain a Senate House “theme” which works 
like a material and aesthetic summary of how the building feels.  
 
The feel of the building is, for instance, contained in some way by the repetition of small 
features like brass door plates (and indeed, brass (or possibly bronze) features in general 
throughout the building: [Redacted interview material - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -]. I would suggest the possibility that an idea of the 
originality of Senate House is contained thematically and that new additions and alterations 
have to reiterate that theme (which the new door fittings failed to do), and whilst the shape 
and function of Senate House changes in, for example, the partitioning of rooms103, the feel 
of it being Senate House is thus retained in the reiteration of Senate House emblems such 
as, for instance, metalwork. If this is the case, then it marks an interesting way in which the 
agency of inhabitation is retained in an environment where the preservation of that 
environment is emphasised. Reducing what Senate House is to thematic emblems allows 
the feel of Senate House to be fairly easily reiterated in among its new and otherwise 
different spaces. 
 
Peter, on the other hand, understands Senate House to be a collection of particularly 
designed characteristics that were manipulated by Holden to produce a given effect. But at 
the same time, there is a realisation that his experience of the building (and his 
understanding that the building is resultant of Holden‟s intentions) does not mean that he 
credits his actual experience to the currently working influence of Holden alone, or his 
                                                   
103 On this subject, Leonard says: [Redacted intervierw material - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - -]  
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surrogations of Holden‟s intentions and practices. In fact, as a historian, Peter recognises 
that the contemporary reception of old things can lead to the sense that there‟s something 
“exceptional” about the old, a kind of historical para-quality that may have been applied to 
Senate House (and Holden) and, indeed, Peter may not be unaware that he might have 
been involved in the application of this quality, a possibility I was careful to cover in our 
discussion:   
 
Paul: Was-, was it-, is it-, is it a deliberate evoking of emotion that Holden 
designed into it- 
Peter: Ah. Well [laughs]. 
Paul: -or, and it‟s a very different question: is it you? 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
Although Peter‟s experience is predicated on the correct understanding of the building, he 
is also aware that he may be producing a narrative that ennobles Senate House on the basis 
of its historical status, a similar kind of special heritage feeling that Samuel reported at 
Arnos Grove, an effect that is not exactly of the architecture. There is a possibility, which 
Peter admits to, that it may be produced by him. In fact, it may complement Peter‟s 
attempts to regenerate Holden‟s presence insofar as that historical veneer may place 
Holden‟s original ideas and devices in a more favourable light in Peter‟s experience. The 
building did not have the advantage of that veneer when it was new. In fact, the possibility 
of Senate House working to reiterate Holden‟s intentions and ideas when it was new was 
potentially limited by the building‟s poor reception on its completion and the fact that the 
client was particularly astute and demanding (Simpson, 1996), contexts which may have 
since been ameliorated by the building‟s heritage. If Peter is susceptible to the veneer of 
heritage (or, indeed, involved in its re-application), then it may be that Holden‟s original 
ideas and devices find more support in Peter‟s current context  then they otherwise would 
have in the context of the reception of Senate House at the point of its completion. This is 
an interesting way to view the disjuncture between the architect and the current resident in 
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legacy buildings like Senate House. Depending on the inhabitation, that disjuncture may 
amplify, rather than diminish, the effect of the architect‟s original intentions. 
 
The absence of functionality: 
 
I want to close this chapter by reflecting on the temporal incursions that Sydney and 
Samuel deal with (and the functional problems that those incursions are credited with 
producing) against the absence of the functional in Alexander‟s experience of Bristol 
Central Library: Alexander is unusual among my Holden interviewees for his willingness to 
dismiss the functional and exclude functional expediency from his inhabitation of (and 
affection for) the library. As the following quote suggests, it was almost strange of me to 
ask, and moreover, perfectly plausible that the quality of the experience at the library 
doesn‟t so much outweigh as displace the more procedural and functional benefits that are 
often absent there: 
 
Paul: What functional aspects of this building do you find appealing? Or, 
alternatively, which ones do you find annoying? 
Alexander: Functional...? 
Paul: Yeah, functional, as in-, things working as they‟re supposed to work. 
Ergonomic, perhaps. 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
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[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
The way Alexander dismisses the functionally expedient, not only from his particular 
inhabitation but as a characteristic of all inhabitations, suggests that functional expediency, 
if it was present, would provide a feebler, more staid, possibly less theatrical and certainly 
less “wonderful” kind of enjoyment as compared to the indulgences that Holden actually 
deployed, which as Alexander explains, are important insofar as they are functionless in 
pragmatic terms, but whilst they cannot be usefully used, they are potent in the provision 
of “delight”: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
What strikes me about Alexander‟s experience is that this doesn‟t sound like a case of 
ameliorating functional weaknesses with some charming architectural treatments. Nor is it 
a whimsical transaction of the functional in favour of the indulgent on Holden‟s part. 
During our exchange, it became apparent to me that in Alexander‟s experience, an 
architecture designed to impart delightful experiences draws upon a far more potent and 
weighty beneficence than functional expediency would otherwise provide. Convenience, 
reliability, and efficacy are thus dismissed to make room for a suite of materially articulated 
elements that suggest alternatives like humour, grandeur, interest, anticipation, and 
excitement, and other provisions that are fundamentally more laden with the potential for 
delight. It is also apparent that such provisions might require the removal or suppression of 
sensibly functional elements whose logic might curtail that delight, and indeed, there is the 
250 
 
slight suggestion that for the delightful to work, the sensible and “civic” needs to be 
effaced to a degree as part of that process, and quirks allowed to take their place...  
  
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
In short, Alexander‟s analytical inhabitation of the library dismisses the very things that 
Holden believed would define the inhabitant and, by extension, the building. Alexander not 
only eschews the functional: he maintains a logic that such a dismissal is necessary to open 
up the full prospects of a joyful experience. This is not the joy of witnessing the holistic, 
body-like perfectibility of the building as Holden sought, but the joy of what sounds like a 
rambling mischievousness which, in Alexander‟s analysis, may necessarily displace the 
functionally expedient. Alexander‟s inhabitation hinges on this analytically derived 
plausibility. 
 
The experiences of my interviewees in Holden‟s buildings, and the astute components of 
those experiences, are as varied and interesting as those of my Voyesy inhabitants, but 
exhibit some key differences and emphases. The role of the unresolved is certainly 
noteworthy: the act of holding certain aspects of the building in a potential format, rather 
than being actualised, creates a particular kind of plausibility that does not need the 
completion of being actualised to work. Also worthy of note are the conditions of 
plausibility, which receive greater emphasis in this chapter, whereby buildings have to act in 
a certain way in order to attract the attention of those more astute elements of inhabitation. 
Furthermore, Alexander‟s articulation of joyful plausibility at Bristol Central Library 
suggests that the process of “splitting” that I described in the previous chapter has a more 
pronounced corollary, the ability to fully redact part of the experience of a building in order 
to  emphasise another part – in this case a redaction of the functional in favour of the 
joyful. 
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Box 5a: Berthold Romanovich Lubetkin 
 
Personal events and associations: 
 
28th Dec 1901: Born: Tiflis, Georgia, to Roman Lubetkin 
and Fenya Menin. (Unconfirmed) 
c.1903: Alternative date and place of birth, Warsaw, 
Poland). (Unconfirmed) 
c.1916: Moves to Moscow for schooling.  
1922: Accompanies Exhibition of Russian Art to 
Berlin, where he remains. 
1925: Moves to Paris 
1931:  Moves to the United Kingdom (London) 
1939: Naturalised as a British citizen. 
Marries Margaret Louise Church  
Moves (with Margaret) to Upper Kilcott 
Farm, Gloucestershire. 
c.1942  Death of parents. (Unconfirmed) 
1969:  Moves to Bristol. 
1978:  Margaret Lubetkin dies. 
23rd Oct 1990: Dies,  
 
Education*: 
 
1916: Stroganoff Art School (Moscow). 
c.1917-1922 SVOMAS Free Art Studio (St. Petersburg 
and Moscow) 
 VkhUTEMAS Advanced State Workshops 
of Art and Industrial Art (Moscow) 
1922: Technische Hochschule (Technical 
University) (Charlottenburg) 
 Höhere Fachschule für Textil und 
Bekleidungsindustrie (Textile School) 
1923-1925 Warsaw Polytechnic (Diploma in 
Architecture) 
1925: L‟ecole Speciale d‟Architecture (Paris) 
 Institut d‟ Urbanisme (Paris) 
Ecole Superieure de Beton Arme (Paris) 
Ecole des Beaux Arts (Paris) 
 
*Note: the only certificate I have actually viewed is that issued 
by Warsaw Polytechnic, for Lubetkin‟s diploma in 
architecture (1925). 
 
(Source: Allan, 2007) 
5. 
Lubetkin: 
 
 
In the final section of chapter 
two, I discussed the 
“belonging” of the three 
architects I studied and 
outlined my reasons for 
eschewing such classifications 
in my empirical chapters. In 
this, the final empirical chapter, 
I begin by outlining Berthold 
Lubetkin‟s own particular 
misgivings about modernism 
and the problem of belonging 
to something called “modern”, 
and indeed, the problems of 
certain types of belonging in 
general to the ongoing 
plausibility of effective 
architecture. 
 
Berthold Romanovich 
Lubetkin (for whom basic 
biographical details are 
provided in Box 5a) brought to 
his practice of architecture a 
reasoned certainty in the 
existence of fundamental and 
universal truths, and a similarly 
reasoned certainty of the possibility of using architectural form to help people access and 
understand it. He could  plausibly be called a modern architect  but, as I have suggested 
above, such classifying efforts serve to neaten and homogenise the full potential scope of 
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Box 5b: Berthold Romanovich Lubetkin 
 
Professional timeline and key commissions: 
 
1925: Studies in the atelier of Auguste Perret. 
1925-1931: Makes exploratory trips to London 
seeking potential work. 
1931: First completion, in partnership with Jean 
Ginsberg – apartment block, Avenue de 
Versailles (Paris). 
1931: Offered first commission in the UK. 
1932: Co-founds Tecton with six members of 
the Architectural Association. 
1932-1954: Period of significant commissions. 
1933: Gorilla House, London Zoo. 
1934: Penguin Pool, London Zoo. 
1935: Highpoint One. (London) 
1937: Dudley Zoo (West Midlands) 
1938: Highpoint Two. (London) 
1938: Finsbury Health Centre. (London) 
1948: Tecton disbands. 
c. 1937-1950: Spa Green Estate (London)* 
c. 1937-1952: Priory Green Estate (London)* 
c. 1937-1954: Bevan Court Estate (London)* 
c.1954: Begins to retire from practise. 
1982:  Awarded R.I.B.A Gold Medal. 
 
(Source: Allan, 2002) 
architects and architecture (and posed problems for Lubetkin, too). There were a number 
of ways in which Lubetkin deviated from his contemporaries that might be lost if he were 
simply labelled “a modernist”. He recoiled, for example, from functionalism, berating one 
of his most important 
contemporaries, Le Corbusier104, 
for adhering to a brute 
architecture of measurable, 
surface-level facts, and ignoring 
the more fundamental underlying 
bases of reality that required far 
more substantial (and abstract) 
analyses to eke out. His 
architecture was designed for a 
future society that would 
rationally seek out these 
fundamentals, and he worked in 
a context where such advances 
were deemed both plausible and 
desirable, against a backdrop of 
scientific and social advances and 
the (assumed or hoped for) 
enlightened redaction of myth, superstition, and irrationality in general. Lubetkin shared 
this desire, whilst being astute enough to recognise that such approaches could easily go 
awry and lead to, for example, the functional approaches he invariably derided. 
 
The buildings that emerged were, in some cases, extraordinary – and suitably futuristic. 
They exhibit swooping sculptural features, and took advantage of the most advanced 
engineering available to instil them with the bare minimum of apparent support. Lubetkin‟s 
zoo architecture (on which see Gruffudd, 2000) best exhibits these qualities, perhaps 
because they were Lubetkin‟s most theatrical commissions (insofar that the animals were 
                                                   
104 Charles-Édouard Jeanneret (1887-1965) was a pioneer, and probably the most noted practitioner, of modern 
architecture. His pseudonym, Le Corbusier, means “the raven” or “raven-like”. Many of the buildings he produced have 
been considered “prototypes” for many similar buildings around the world, especially high-rise apartment buildings. He 
also developed ambitious town planning proposals, and before settling on architecture had engaged in painting, sculpting, 
and furniture design. He  published a number of books and pamphlets detailing his approaches and philosophies, and he 
is credited with substantial influence, especially in the adoption of function as a principal maxim in architectural design. 
For a full discussion, see Frampton, 1992: 149-161. 
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staged for an audience), with minimal consideration required for the ergonomic or 
functionally expedient. The enclosures at the three zoos he worked on (being London, 
Whipsnade, and Dudley (figs. 5.5, 5.6, 5.7)) are curvilinear and ethereal: ethereal because 
they have none of the monumental solidity that it appears they should need to stay upright 
(which is a credit to their engineering), and because they eschew the standard architectural 
nomenclature of walls and ceilings. A number of these buildings are formed primarily out 
of their circulation spaces and supports (fig. 5.7) and are open both above and to each side, 
giving them a semi-transparent quality. For those buildings that were for human 
inhabitation, rather than entertainment, Lubetkin opted to produce rhythmic variations 
working in from the outline of a fairly simple shape. In his later housing schemes, such as 
Priory Green (fig. 5.4) a simple oblong outline shape was layered with indentations and 
protrusions, and in his earlier schemes such as Highpoint105 (figs. 5.1, 5.2) a similar kind of 
shape was worked out from to create a similar rhythmic undulation (in this instance, with 
the use of balconies). In all of these buildings, the geometric prevailed, and was accentuated 
by the surface treatment – whereas Voysey used roughcast, tiles and timbers, and Holden 
used stone and brick, Lubetkin opted for the finish that would accentuate the shapes as 
much as possible – flat, white, and smoothly finished render. In the sections that follow, I 
explain why Lubetkin arrived at the geometric as a fundamentally important element in 
creating effective architecture for a particular purpose. 
 
Belonging: 
 
Lubetkin‟s complex modernism found an outlet in response to a letter from Wells Coates 
in the winter of 1932-1933. Coates‟ original letter was circulated to a select few “modern” 
architects practising in Britain at that time, proposing the formation of MARS (Modern 
Architecture Re[S]earch group106) and inviting the recipients to become members. 
Lubetkin‟s reply was a fiery political analysis which diagnosed in Coates‟ proposal an 
                                                   
105 Lubetkin (with Tecton) produced two apartment blocks on the same site in North Hill, London: Highpoint I, 
competed in 1935, and Highpoint II, completed in 1938. Lubetkin‟s own penthouse was located at the top of Highpoint 
II, and in total the scheme provided 72 flats. See Allan (2002: 84-105) for further details and illustrations. 
106 MARS was established in 1933 by a group of prominent architects, all identifying themselves as modern, as the British 
arm of the Congrès internationaux d'architecture modern (CIAM), and sharing its objective to promote and spread the 
principles of the modern movement. It was not the first such attempt to form such a group in the UK, but it was the 
most prominent and the longest-lived, finally disbanding in 1957. It is difficult to arrive at a description for MARS – it 
never attained a formal structure that would allow it to be called, for instance, a think tank, although it certainly promoted 
discussions and produced proposals for large planning projects and building improvement programs in the manner of a 
think tank. It is perhaps better described as a society, held together by a need for mutual support in a country that was 
perceived to be hostile to modernism. See Gold, 2000 for further details. 
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authoritarian and orthodox tone, and he recoiled from the idea that modern architecture 
might socially coalesce around a merely oppositional practice to the status quo: 
 
“So it would appear that the only criterion of eligibility for membership (apart 
from personal friendship with one‟s cronies) would be the negative one of 
opposition to currently accepted architectural values, and readiness to break 
with the familiar. If we have nothing more positive in common, this could lead 
to an endless, aimless pursuit of originality [...], and originality which produces 
nothing but its own opposite is just eclectic rubbish.  (Lubetkin 1933/1975(a) 
[Lub19/1/1/i]: 3) 
 
For Lubetkin, if the full energies of modern architecture were to be spitefully directed, they 
would be without reason in both senses of the term: lacking any reasoning except of the 
limited kind required to work out an opposite position, and having no greater purpose than 
the merely reactionary. Lubetkin was also attuned to the irony of Coates‟ proposition 
which, in the acts of reacting and opposing, sought to undermine and displace the status 
quo only to occupy its place and assume its guise. In aiming to oppose the current 
authoritarian orthodoxy, MARS was placed on a trajectory that would produce the same 
kind of authoritarian orthodoxy with the same exercise of control: 
 
“To put it bluntly, the aim you appear to want to set out for it [MARS] would 
be to secure the acceptance of modern ideas in architecture by an effort to 
dislodge the entrenched mandarins in the professional institutions, and thus 
gain controlling positions within them.” (Lubetkin, 1933/1975(a) 
[Lub/19/1/1/i]: 3) 
 
Lubetkin‟s modernity and architectural practices firmly eschewed the political hazards he 
detected in the formation of groups that aimed to generate commonality. He believed that 
the seeds for authoritarianism were couched in such efforts, as had been the case in Soviet 
Russia where the post-revolution artistic and technical schools (some of which, like the 
Vkhutemas, Lubetkin had attended) were subsumed by creeping state interventions (see 
Nash, 1974: 49-52). Lubetkin recognised the same potential in MARS, and had no qualms 
about comparing the two: 
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“In the event, on Oct. 12th 1920, a solution was imposed from above, and the 
avant garde groups were firmly incorporated into the [Soviet] state machine, 
never to emerge alive [...]. When imagination is displaced by orthodoxy, 
initiative is stifled, and platitude takes over: authoritative utterances are 
substituted for critical thought, and blunt mediocrity protrudes through the 
blanket of officialdom like a sore thumb.” (Lubetkin, 1933/1975(a) 
[Lub/19/1/1/ii]: 4) 
 
MARS (which Lubetkin later referred to as a “club” (Lubetkin, 1933/1975(b) 
[Lub/19/1/2/ii]: ii)), in common with the Soviet Department of Fine Arts, subsumed the 
exploratory initiative and individual trajectories of practitioners with a central cache of 
authoritative and orthodox procedures. To some degree, this echoes Voysey‟s need for 
individuality and the ability of individuality to rehabilitate the kind of thought that 
degenerated when exposed to particular (particularising) forms of sociality.  
 
Ideology: 
 
In his notebooks107 (which I will refer to regularly throughout this chapter), Lubetkin 
addressed issues such as the formation of MARS nature under the heading of “ideology”, 
which he understood as a particular intersection of sociality and thought (much as he 
seemed to understand MARS). Although he considered ideology from a number of 
perspectives, they were all linked together by some degree of negativity which approached, 
or surpassed, his distaste for the mediocre orthodoxy of imposed authority that he detected 
in Coates‟ proposition. Ideology was understood by Lubetkin to be a means of 
                                                   
107 I will refer to Lubetkin‟s notebooks frequently in this chapter: in the first instance, they are relatively underused in the 
architectural and academic work on Lubetkin such as, for example, Allan (1992) and Gruffudd (2001). They are rough 
notes and it could be argued that Lubetkin‟s opinions and philosophies are better represented in the more final material 
he produced. And because they are rough notes, I can‟t rule out the possibility that they have been avoided because 
they‟re not always very legible or written in continuous prose. However, I found them enormously interesting: there is 
material in them that is not repeated in those more final documents. It‟s here that Lubetkin explores alternatives and visits 
concepts and ideas that would not be evident in those typescript and loose-leaf documents in R.I.B.A‟s collection, and 
because they are rough notes, they often seem to be lacking the restraint that (perhaps) emerges in the normalising 
process of writing material for publication or speech. This is not to say that the notebooks record a “purer” Lubetkin or 
that those more final documents are somehow more opaque, but I do believe they represent important additions and 
allow a fuller account by reminding us (in a way that the Holden, and especially Voysey manuscripts do not so readily 
afford) that there is a messier process behind the final veneer. See also my discussion of archive methodology in Chapter 
Two. 
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manufacturing certain impressions for the comfortable effect of making people feel ok, 
safe, and adequate, such as virtue108: 
 
“The main object of the belief is comfortable assurance of VIRTUE. Sense of 
VIRTUE remain unimpaired.” (Lubetkin, c.1969-1975 [Lub/18/2/xvi]: xvi) 
 
Alternatively, but with the same effect in mind, ideology could generate a sense of common 
membership and create comfort in the knowledge that if everybody else was doing the 
same thing, it had to be “right and natural”, and further removed the troubling prospect of 
new and different thinking and the risks contained therein. Thus understood, ideology was 
a: 
 
“Device for assuring us that we are safely rooted in conformity, safeguarding 
us from worry of constn. thinking anew.” (Ibid: [xx] xx) 
 
And... 
 
“Adoption of new is prevented by tacit assumption about what is right and 
natural.” (Ibid: [xx]ii xxii) 
 
Baldly expressed in terms of its constituent processes, Lubetkin could also define ideology 
in terms that sounded almost innocent: in this interpretation, ideology was not an 
inherently bad act. It was a seemingly understandable thing for people to indulge in when 
they found themselves sharing a “common situation”.  
 
“Ideology not a deliberate distortion of reality, but  a way in which people  
who share a common situation give coherence to their hopes and fears, and 
prepare for social and political action.” (Ibid: [xvii] xvii) 
 
Whilst this invokes what sounds like a benevolent and mutually helpful sociality, it retains 
the idea of the “deliberate distortion of reality”. It‟s critically important to understand that 
Lubetkin thought at length, and acted upon, a particular understanding of reality which he 
                                                   
108 The following excerpts are taken from a section of Lub/18/2 (Lubetkin, c.1969-1975) which are grouped under the 
heading “ideology”. Other commentaries on ideology recur frequently in Lubetkin‟s notebooks, but they are not always 
labelled and presented together as the following excerpts were. 
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allied to particular epistemological hopes. In fact, this chapter will dwell at length on 
Lubetkin‟s epistemology and his belief that it was definitely possible for people to ascertain 
what reality was (or, if not reality per se, then at least the beneficial idea of reality), but 
equally as possible for correspondences with reality to be obscured by, for example, the 
communal displacement of that correspondence with fabricated ideologies (and the 
possibility of thinking one‟s way toward or about reality, which I explain in the following 
sections). In contrast to the previous excerpt, Lubetkin also did hold critical opinions of 
the unreal and fabricated aspect of ideology. 
 
“Ideology or MYTH is a story which aims not at giving pleasure for its own 
sake but at alleviating perplexities which trouble.109” (Lubetkin, c.1969-1975 
[Lub/18/2/xxi]: xxi) 
 
Lubetkin seemed to deploy such criticisms directly at MARS, as a device for virtue, for 
conformity to its idea of what was “right and natural”, and for the myths required to 
sustain them. Regardless of how true this actually is (and I return to the matter of its 
“truth” below), Lubetkin‟s rejection of MARS, if understood as a critical rejection of 
ideology, may be reflected in the temporality into which his architecture was engaged. 
 
In “declining” Coates‟ offer, Lubetkin expressed a preference for what I understand to be a 
fast (i.e. quick) and light (i.e. minimally laden) architectural trajectory. For the student of 
Lubetkin, understanding this trajectory is the start of unfurling his hopes and intentions for 
effective architectural forms. He argued that modern architecture had to be pre-emptive, 
not responsive. Fast architecture ought to have a pathfinder temporality that operated in 
advance of social changes, rather than a circumstantial temporality that obliged architecture 
to navigate circuitous contemporary interests. The latter was precisely what he believed 
would happen if architecture were “incorporated” into organisations such as MARS 
(Lubetkin, 1933/1975(a) [Lub/19/1/1/i-ii]: 3-4). This pathfinder‟s temporality could not 
be achieved if architecture were anchored to an organisation that normalised aims and 
standards. Architects had to be “allowed to set their own aims, and their own criteria of 
excellence freely.” (Ibid, [ii] : 4). Pragmatically speaking, designing buildings for a different 
time served as a temporal mechanism which distanced him from that which might 
                                                   
109 Lubetkin believed that this was, at least partially, the individual‟s fault It could not be blamed entirely upon the 
corrupting influence of certain contexts, thus: “But no conspiracy: people don‟t get corrupted by contemplating 
degenerate art – but rather they do contemplate degenerate art because they are corrupted” (Ibid: xxxi) 
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incorporate and normalise his aims and practices. Lubetkin always understood his 
architecture as being “fast”: his buildings were not designed for contemporary inhabitants. 
They were designed to make sense within a fundamentally different set of expectations and 
circumstances that were yet to happen, and Lubetkin expected future social and cultural 
realities to align with his architectural designs, along with new forms of inhabitation. These 
expectant designs, strategically placed in advance of such social and cultural changes (like 
architectural goalposts for future times) were conceived not to produce these changes 
directly, but to support their emergence. They achieved this by making sense in and being 
legible relative to the new ways of living, thinking, and behaving: creating in advance a 
more likely backdrop that would fit with, be intelligible to, and serenade modernist ideals. 
 
Lubetkin’s temporality: 
 
This is the start of a complex temporality in Lubetkin‟s thinking that re-imagines both the 
future and the past and imposes important methodological considerations on the use of his 
archive from the outset. Lubetkin‟s 1933 reply to Coates (Lubetkin, 1933/1975(a) 
[Lub/19/1/1]) is not the original document. The original, as Lubetkin noted, was 
“probably lost with B. Carter110” (Ibid). Lubetkin produced two versions of this letter 
around 1975. The first (Lubetkin, 1933/1975(a) [Lub/19/1/1]) supposedly transcribes the 
original (though I do not know how, given it was “lost” and no handwritten version is 
archived – in any event, it is marked as “edited”), and a second version (Lubetkin, 
1933/c.1975(b) [Lub/19/1/2]) was re-written for publication, possibly in the Architectural 
Review. This second version constitutes a very substantial re-imagining. Lubetkin made 
himself much more palatable and sociable, exercising a significantly restrained vitriol and 
the almost total removal of references to Soviet bureaucratic oppression. And then, in a 
spectacular and contradictory volte-face which is absent from the “original” Lubetkin stated 
that: 
 
“From all this you will conclude, dear Wells, that I do not intend to take an 
active part in the Group (Club?), though I will, of course, do everything in my 
power to help and promote and organise it. 
Fondly, 
                                                   
110 At that time, Bobby Carter was the librarian and archivist at R.I.B.A. Lubetkin made this annotation in his own hand, 
but the letter itself is in typescript. 
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B. Lubetkin.” 
(Lubetkin, 1933/c.1975(b) [Lub/19/1/2/ii]: ii) 
 
What is evident from this is that Lubetkin did not treat the past as a finished time which 
had stopped happening. The temporal understanding he crafted allowed both the future 
and the past to be available and malleable from his present, and he did not allow either to 
slip into circumstance. But what is “evident” needs to be cautiously considered given 
Lubetkin‟s malleable temporality. This is true of all three of the archive collections I‟ve 
worked with, but it is most obvious – sometimes to the point of blatant – in Lubetkin‟s 
archive, despite the fact that in other documents from his archive he expressly recognised 
and criticised this possibility in historical practice. In Credo (Lubetkin, undated 
[Lub/19/3/1] (a usefully compact statement of some of his key beliefs)) he took care to 
state that he was not trying to immortalise himself in history: in fact, he was aiming to 
efface himself from the kind of history created by; 
 
“[N]imble specialists, whose task it is to fashion opinion in a way that sustains 
and justifies the power clique to which they aspire to belong, or the social 
firmament in which they hope to shine, can collect gossip, manipulate the 
evidence, erase the past and bury the living.” (Ibid: [i] 1) 
 
It cannot, therefore, be said that Lubetkin‟s re-issuing of his past self was an innocent and 
innocuous case of a wishful old man indulging in nostalgic hindsight. He was clearly aware 
that history was an epistemologically powerful tool, one which could virtualise a different 
past that would nonetheless solidify beneficially in the present for those who knew how to 
exercise it. Certainly, his virtualisation of a friendlier, more gentlemanly Lubetkin in 1933 
was intended to actualise in his favour in 1975, and by distancing himself from such efforts 
in Credo he merely reconfirmed such paratemporal habits. (In fact, Lubetkin was involved 
with MARS from an early stage, though he was never a very diligent member and 
eventually resigned his membership.) 
 
The temporal momentum of Lubetkin‟s architectural practice (always abreast of current 
circumstances) was an ontologically functional aspect of his design that shifted his work 
from a position when/where it could be unduly influenced by current circumstance, to a 
virtual field of newness in which he had the space to generate new theoretical approaches. 
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These acts of dilating the future with circumstance-free opportunities had significance for 
Lubetkin not only in terms of the oppressive socialities he wished to eschew, but for that 
he wished to express. So liberated, he hoped to express a universal architectural theory 
which itself expressed a universal, singular and coherent logic underlying reality as a whole. 
In the first instance, he believed that this was our normal state. In a draft of a speech he 
wrote for the Architectural Association he stated quite confidently that: “Man assumes the 
existence of a coherent universe, and looks for one underlying substratum.” (Lubetkin , 
c.1964 [Lub/19/4/2/]: 6). But it was this coherence, above all else, that was at risk of 
becoming opaque in contemporary society, and Lubetkin hoped for – and took a calculated 
risk on – pitching his work into a future where such universal coherence had been 
rediscovered. This adds an additional – and important – aspect in understanding his work 
and how it was implied in a future inhabitation: the architectural forms he created were 
designed to be sensible to and synchronised with a particular way of (currently effaced) 
thinking, to appeal to that which we didn‟t yet know (or had forgotten) was appealing, 
namely the particular comfort of knowing that all things took shape from a cache of 
common mechanisms. 
 
Lubetkin’s rationality: 
 
The fact that such reasoning had been effaced at all was, he argued, a result of eighteenth 
century enlightenment whereby phenomena were investigated in isolation, rather than 
being understood as expressions of and emergence from a universal logic of order and 
purpose (Lubetkin, c.1964 [Lub/19/4/2/]: 6-7). The result, Lubetkin argued, was a loss of 
confidence in universal thinking and a concurrent habitual belief that, with no universal 
force to gel everything together, our immediate perceptions became the stuff of existence, 
so producing: 
 
“A wild, unbridled subjectivism and irrationalism [that] tends to tear to pieces 
the fabric of society, spells boredom and decadence, makes whims and 
opinions their own proof.” (Lubetkin, c.1964 [Lub/19/4/2]: 7) 
 
This fictional ontology in which nothing existed independently of perception was further 
disparaged in his speech for the acceptance of the RIBA 1982 Gold Medal (Lubetkin, 1982 
[Lub/19/9/1]). “By analogy with physics”, he argued... 
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“...reality is treated as a compound of unrelated events. Since the individual 
particles fly in unpredictable directions, it is inferred that reality as such is 
unpredictable.” (Ibid: [iv] iv). 
 
With the vanguard and old guard of British architecture assembled before him, Lubetkin 
spelled out very clearly the consequences, as he saw them, of abandoning rationality... 
 
“We have been warned by Voltaire that people who tolerate absurdities will 
sooner or later commit atrocities.” (Ibid: [vi] vi) 
 
Lubetkin, on the other hand, was convinced that all things, including his architectural 
things, should be referencing things. He believed that all things developed from a common 
logical mechanism, and that those things should express that lineage. Because of this and, 
equally, because of the inherent dangers of denying that correspondence, Lubetkin aimed 
to produce in architectural terms a clear referring-to the universal, to iterate and 
demonstrate it as a way of reminding people what it was and why it was important. This 
was not just because people were habitually eschewing reason and analysis in favour of 
“unbridled subjectivism”. It was because, by ignoring the common basis of all things, 
people also abandoned their ability to exert control and order on things, and were instead 
stranded in a politics of chance. 
 
One of Lubetkin‟s principal hopes, then, was to make a particular (i.e. causal, origin-
emergent, universal) idea of rationality palpable in material form. One plausible means of 
such palpability was in architectural acts of intentional, planned precision, or as the case 
maybe, the avoiding of the considered, unplanned, or random. If any part of a building had 
been evidently unplanned or inadequately thought through, then that rational articulation 
of control would be eroded by way of a silly or fruitless result. For architecture to reflect 
and evoke rationality, every corner and feature had to evince and exercise control over the 
silly and fruitless by being, as Lubetkin described in conversation with Brett, deliberate. 
Even the empty space between a doorframe and an adjacent wall had to be intentionally 
and precisely planned to deliberately do or achieve something, thus:  
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“I would say that the first step is for an architect to have a reason for 
everything he does. You know as well as I do how much of a building just 
happens. Take this little room we are in. The door is about fifteen inches from 
the end of the wall. Why? Too much for the architrace and not enough to 
accommodate a bit of furniture. Did the architect draw that wall in elevation 
and see where the door looked best in it? Of course not. His T-square 
probably found itself in that position whilst he was on the 1/8 scale plans and 
(the plans being late anyway) the door is in that meaningless position for ever. 
The first thing is to be deliberate. (Lubetkin, in Brett and Lubetkin, c.1945 
[Lub/20/1/1/iv-v]: 4-5)  
 
Being deliberate, and being precise, seems to work in two ways here: first, by a 
demonstration of wilfulness that potentially fosters an effective “mood”, such that an 
occupant, surrounded by such a concentration of sense making and deliberateness would 
realise, if not the actual articulation being attempted, then at least the attempt to do or 
mean something. The second way is bound up in notions of service and speaks to that kind 
of rationality that pares away the useless and thoughtless and deploys, in its place, a precise, 
efficient and smooth working architecture that people (and furniture) neatly slot into, but 
in that very neatness is the potential for invisibility. Whereas the random and unplanned 
brought themselves to prominence by requiring inhabitants to work around or against 
them, the neat, efficient, precise architecture Lubetkin hoped for and, as I will show 
shortly, aimed to produce, was less arresting for being less obstructive and too meekly 
servile, a point noted by Brett: “I think it is just possible that by being too deliberate one 
might pare away those pointless, generous, glorious spaces that made life in Vitruvian days 
so exhilarating.” (Brett, in Brett and Lubetkin, c.1945 [Lub/20/1/1/vi]: 6) 
 
By turning to some of the rough notes Lubetkin produced on “composition” a similarly 
problematic potential (or lack of potential) seems to emerge. Those notes also clarify that 
architecture‟s job was to draw upon a volumetric, material, and aesthetic vocabulary to 
express the relations and connections that unified all the seemingly disconnected and messy 
things in the world, thus:  
 
“An attempt to understand and give account of order, relation, uniformity, that 
underlies the bewildering diversity of nature; a striving to represent record a 
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system of views that contains all human experience within the ultimate 
structure, logos of all things.” (Lubetkin, c.1969-1975 [Lub/18/2/i]: i) 
And, 
“An endeavour to record in terms of geometry a system of views upon logos...” 
(Ibid: [ii] ii) 
And, 
“It is a projection of man‟s yearning for order in a disorderly world” (Ibid) 
   
What interests me in these statements, especially in terms of “uniformity, that underlies the 
bewildering diversity of nature” and “yearning for order in a disorderly world”, is that 
Lubetkin‟s expressions ran against the grain of what was apparently real, i.e. messy 
complexity. In trying to express what reality really was, it could only appear to be different 
from, or even the antithesis to, what reality actually looked (and seemed to work) like. By 
trying to express the uniform origins of a reality that seemed, he noted, bewildering, 
diverse, and disorderly (or, more accurately, trying to prevent the apparent messiness of 
everything being interpreted as an arbitrary basis to reality). Whilst such expressions may 
have had the impact that was (potentially) lacking in the “too deliberate”, there is the 
problem that those expressions may have seemed logically adrift given what reality was 
normally taken to be, that the same sense-making approach would not make sense if the 
reality of the world was generally understood to be of disparate  origin. Insofar as looking 
sensible might not make sense, Lubetkin‟s architectural hopes have the potential for a 
conspicuous sort of invisibility: conspicuous by being so different, but with a message that 
logically stands apart from what normally makes sense, or is expected. 
 
Alternatively, by revisiting his suggestion that composition “is a projection of man‟s 
yearning for order in a disorderly world”, (Lubetkin, 1969-1975 [Lub/18/2/ii]: ii) it is 
plausible to suggest, in Lubetkin‟s belief that the related and connected logic he sought to 
espouse in architectural terms was not adrift in a context that could not comprehend it, but 
attractive and comprehensible to a “yearning” to impose order where disorder had been 
identified. In this possibility, though his architecture stands apart from the disconnected 
and messy, it stands beside, supports and is supported by, an inclination to understand 
such messiness as a façade obscuring a true reality and reassert more rational connected, 
and controlling traits in their place. Thus: 
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“A framework of relations upon which man projects his sense of order, 
harmony, relation upon confusion and obscurity. [Illegible] as a sign of 
sovereignty. Rising it from contingency into realm of necessity” (Lubetkin, 
1969-1975 [Lub/18/2/iv]: iv) 
 
This reasserts the sort of model human behaviour in terms of analytical ability that 
Lubetkin believed emerged in (and was inherent in) people through their use of language 
and the understanding of things and their relations that acts of description fostered. 
Understood thus, instead of struggling against an illusionary façade of messiness, his 
architecture reflected already existing hopes among people for what reality was or should 
be, and this tentatively confirms my earlier point that a key element of Lubetkin‟s 
architecture was contained in an assumed motive power provided by the inhabitant-user‟s 
understanding and analytical abilities to “get” his work. But this possibility can only ever be 
“tentative” given that, in the same notes on composition from which the preceding quote 
is taken Lubetkin also suggests that:  
 
“In concrete sensuous form the prevailing notions. Reflecting the malaise of 
our time, inability of seeing things as a whole.” (Lubetkin, 1969-1975 
[Lub/18/2/v]: v) 
 
In Lubetkin‟s understanding, what becomes concretised and materialised (or “composed”) 
is not securely bound to either yearning for the rational or desiring to dwell among 
disjointed façades. This reopens the territory of the user-inhabitant in Lubetkin‟s 
understanding, and as my following argument shows, his reasoned faith in the centrality of 
reasoning in human experience and behaviour was not consistent, and what the 
user/inhabitant was capable of (and the attendant degree to which they could help his 
thesis to emerge) varied in plausibility. Whilst his work remained true to the aim of 
serenading the rationality of “the ultimate structure, logos of all things” (Ibid: [i] i), there is 
a sense that he was never quite sure how capable people were of grasping that possibility, 
or what lengths he would need to go to in design terms to achieve it without knowing what 
resources the users/inhabitants could provide to the dynamics. I think that the key 
problem here, in wanting or hoping that people were analytically endowed, is that he could 
not  account for the existence of so much art and architecture that failed to express as 
much.  
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Knowledge and language: 
 
Lubetkin also aimed to criticise and expose the inadequacies of any art, architecture, 
politics, or philosophy that provided the wrong sort of nourishment, and he described 
himself as an “idiote”, one who remains negative despite the “jollifications” of the ancient 
Greek city state (Lubetkin, c.1964 [19/4/2/i]: 1). (He then countered himself by suggesting 
that exposing inadequacy was not an especially negative act (Ibid: [i-ii] 1-2)). In his Gold 
Medal speech of 1982 he deployed this criticism against postmodern art and architecture, 
the way it eschewed the rational and found comfort in the ignorance of what it assumed 
was a meaningless time (Lubetkin, 1982 [Lub/19/9/1/v]: v), and the way it bemoaned or 
denied the possibility of clarity and universal purpose: 
 
“When a man cannot find an ascertainable and verifiable truth, he is forced to 
accept the truth of his own intuition and remain forever imprisoned in the 
circle of his egocentric subjectivity, determined by tyranny of chance.” (Ibid: 
[vii] vii) 
 
These were the “muddy waters” which he had foreseen in his letter to Monica Felton over 
almost thirty-five years earlier111 (Lubetkin, 1947 [Lub/19/1/9/ii]: 2), where he explained 
that... 
 
“...the dislike of theory is a kind of theory itself, which reflects man‟s 
unwillingness to control events, and thus it implies the acceptance of things as 
they are, and bolsters up the status quo ante bloody bellum.” (Ibid) 
 
Importantly, as far as Lubetkin was concerned, to glimpse the universal, constitutive, and 
causal beyond the immediately apparent also constituted the exercise of control and created 
opportunities for control. The alternative was a mental hiatus which left events to develop 
without attempts to control them because of a shared belief in a social reality driven by 
chance where such attempts were pointless. Glimpsing the universal/causal were not 
simply exercises in the general improvement of philosophical quality: to have a theory that 
                                                   
111 However, I should point out that the Felton letter, like the Coates letter, seems to have been re-written for inclusion in 
the Architectural Review, and no handwritten original is archived. 
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extended beyond the immediately apparent suggested causal thinking in place of circuitous 
subjectivities, and to know how something emerged and how it related to other things 
opened up its inner workings, or revealed it to be the inner working of something far 
larger. This raises the interesting question as to how such knowledge worked: whether it 
steered people away from, or reminded them of alternatives to, the arbitrary and subjective, 
or whether knowledge actually allowed ontological reality to be epistemologically colonised 
(in which case knowledge did not so much suggest as constitute it to some degree). 
 
Of these two mechanisms, I suggest that the second, more constitutive one seems to have 
held sway with Lubetkin: “man is a professional maker of circumstances”, he wrote in 
Credo: “His work is not just a reflection of current events and prevailing moods, but an 
active force, moulding reality to his will, within necessity.” (Lubetkin, undated 
[Lub/19/3/1/ii]: 2) This moulding was conditioned by knowledge which had a particular 
abstracting power that worked beyond the evident. To generate knowledge was to breach 
the immediately evident/sensuous boundaries of an object or concept and enter an unseen 
world of forces, links, and emergences that engaged with how that thing was (and had 
been) produced. This enlargement from the evident to the abstract constituted a substantial 
reorganising of the thing in question, which in itself was an imposition of control. 
Moreover, by being sufficiently insightful to broaden the conception of something towards 
a universal and systemic understanding, reality was made predictable. The ability of things 
to surprise was undermined when their inner workings and outer connections were known. 
 
It seems as if, in Lubetkin‟s understanding, knowledge is the temporality of control, 
allowing the agency of temporality to be transacted from an ontologically closed reality to 
an empowered epistemological inhabitation, where the reality is no less real, but its agency 
is no longer secreted away beyond the possibility of knowledge. Temporally speaking, 
reality becomes expected through the application of knowledge, so its ability to surprise 
and impose is diminished, transacted against faculties to expect and predict which can only 
be generated by treating encountered things as more than the immediately evident, and 
turning to those invisible forces and connections that made them evident. Knowledge did 
not, as such, allow for control to happen: it was, in fact, a very substantial part of what 
control was.   
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The ability to control was dependent on the wider state of knowledge to some extent, and 
Lubetkin believed that art and architecture reflected the degree of control a society felt able 
to assert at a given time, suggesting in Credo that “the artist consciously or unconsciously 
reacts to the conditions of his time. He reflects current concepts of order, structure, cause 
and effect, or the inter-relation of the general and the specific.” (Lubetkin, undated 
[Lub/19/3/1/ii]: 2) This returns us to the logic of his temporality. If there was a general 
sense that control and order were being successfully exercised, then reality was seen as 
reliable and legible, and art was seen not as a sensory pleasure but as a reasoned statement 
of cause, effect, and broad understanding (Ibid: [ii-iii] 2-3). If, however, there was a general 
mood that indulged in chance and chaos: “Artistic composition, instead of being a 
statement engaging with orderly precision, becomes a gruesome kitsch, a rag-bag of ready-
made trend-swept tricks and a hotch-potch of marketing ideas.” (Ibid: [iii] 3) The 
temporality of this is contained in the sense that architecture could be an archaeology of its 
time, so Lubetkin chose to virtualise a different time altogether to design from, with a 
different social fabric and bespoke circumstances. 
 
As knowledge was a key element of control, so language was a key element of knowledge. 
Lubetkin argued that it was through language that people normalised the process of seeing 
beyond the immediately apparent to engage with a more exploratory and more formative 
reality of universals. It therefore followed that, if deprived of language, “man” was also 
deprived of knowledge “mainly because”, Lubetkin explained112, “having no words, he 
lacks the very instrument of articulated thought, a method of defining, co-ordinating, 
generalising, and apprehending his environment.” (Lubetkin, 1958 [Lub/19/2/1/ii]: 2) For 
Lubetkin, language was not merely the communication of knowledge; it was actually 
constitutive of knowledge in the process of making phenomena communicable. The initial 
perception of the phenomena in question had to be expanded into an account of that 
phenomena in order to be communicated, in other words: it had to be translated from 
encounter to account. Language offered this expansion from simple encounter to engaged 
account. Temporally speaking, language made phenomena (or accounts thereof) available 
after their encounter, expanding their timeframe through a powerful disassociating function 
that evoked phenomena without them being present and engineered an abstract recursivity 
                                                   
112 This three-page typescript document is marked “draft” and is dated (in pen) “18 Oct 58”. I cannot find any record of 
it having been published in this (untitled) form, though certain insights Lubetkin outlined here were reused in later 
speeches and lectures, and those insights themselves may have originated in one of his notebooks referred to below 
(Lubetkin, undated notebook [Lub/18/1/lxxxi]: lxxxi) 
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for things. Importantly, this suggested that normal human reality lied (to some degree) in 
fields that were abstract and, furthermore, analytically ploughed to enable such recollecting: 
 
“The disassociation of the word from the object, its abstracting power, is at the 
root of human intelligence, a pre-condition of existence of any forms of 
conceptual thought – from elementary reasoning processes to the formulation 
of complex categories, theories, and methods of investigation” (Lubetkin, 1958 
[Lub/19/2/1/ii]: 2) 
 
The analytical work of language that made this possible can be further understood in scalar 
terms. In this instance language was understood to be supra- or inter-phenomenal (perhaps 
even parasensual) for its necessary ability to create an account of a phenomenon both 
larger and more knowledge-laden than a perception of its existence that otherwise started 
and ended at its apparent boundary (Ibid: [i] 1). This “abstracting power” with which 
language recalled phenomena in spite of their absence did not (or could not) recall them as 
they presented to the senses directly, it couldn‟t transcribe them in their immediately 
encountered forms. To recall something without it being there, it had to be recalled 
through its properties and relationships, i.e. through that which caused it to take the form it 
did and what position it occupied, rather than trying to recall it as the form per se. This 
marked a substantial increase in the scope of experience: rather than accepting a 
phenomena as it was encountered, language (understood as a mode of behaviour) queried 
the origins of phenomena, compared them with similar and possibly related phenomena, 
pinned down their attributes, and perhaps most importantly, sought in those (particular) 
phenomena the operation of larger, more fundamental and underlying (general) 
phenomena, thus:  
 
“In relating them [phenomena] together, he relies on a complex network of 
acquired influences, which enable him to compare and discern common 
properties of related objects, and thus to recognise the general in the particular, 
discarding what is accidental, incidental, and out of context.” (Lubetkin, 1958 
[Lub/19/2/1/i]: 1) 
 
In short, to recall a non-present phenomena required everyday behaviours that orbited 
around certain acts of analysis entwined with acts of abstraction. The use of language both 
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opened up an abstract (and temporally potent) space in people‟s experiences and provided 
trajectories through it by providing the impetus for and frameworks of analysis. Moreover, 
to analyse in the abstract was not special or scholarly in any way.  Crucially for Lubetkin 
and his understandings of architecture, this was how people normally behaved: their 
everyday use of everyday language meant that analytical and conceptual thought could be 
reliably expected of them, almost in the manner of unconsidered consideration. The human 
use of words, he argued, apprehended far more than the words themselves, and whilst the 
following excerpt seems limited to “great minds” it succinctly outlines his expectations of 
language: 
 
“It is a fine characteristic of great minds113 that they love the truth that is in the 
words rather than the words themselves.” (Lubetkin, c. pre-1969 
[Lub/18/1/lxxxii]: lxxxii) 
 
Lubetkin’s inhabitants: 
 
People‟s lives, and the architectural inhabitations as part of their lives, were suffused with 
abstract possibilities fulfilled by perceptive analyses which emanated, almost idly, from their 
everyday use of language wherein people looked beyond the perceptually obvious to 
glimpse the logical and theoretical. It is, I argue, crucial to understand this point because 
the ability, or possibility, of Lubetkin‟s architecture to reference or demonstrate a coherent 
universal logic, courted this everyday and normal analytical inhabitation. As such, his 
referencing architecture did not seek to invoke or enable such analytical thought: language 
already did that work. His architecture assumed this ability of the inhabitants. No extra or 
special effort was required of Lubetkin to discharge analytical content toward non-
analytical people. His linguistic understanding of everyday life indicated that analytical 
ability was was already and inherently present, and not a new habit he had to invoke.  
 
In defining and theoretically justifying the analytical possibilities of inhabitation, and in his 
concurrent hope that this regular and normal ability would liberate the thesis he hoped to 
articulate in his architecture, Lubetkin deliberately and clearly circumscribed the body, 
                                                   
113 I believe that this was a general observation as Lubetkin was not specifying anyone in particular when he was 
discussing “great minds”, but rather, the concept of having a “great mind”. 
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arguing that artistic114 endeavours has to extend beyond the body (much as analytical 
endeavours had to extend beyond the immediately apparent aspects of phenomena) except 
insofar as they provided informational basics. Analysis, loosely defined in the following 
quote as “understanding, evaluation, and meaning”, needed to displace, or if not displace 
then very substantially augment (or “transmute”) the impressions of the senses and one‟s 
bodily existence, as Lubetkin argued in Credo: 
 
“By rejecting reason as a guide to human enterprise, art denies the universal 
norms, attacks systematic thought, and plunges headlong into hedonistic 
formalism, confining the mind in a closed circle of biological sense 
impressions. 
Now I have nothing against sense impressions as a source of information 
about reality, but a great deal against the assumption that the earth is flat and 
stationary, although it appears so to my senses. 
It is only in the light of our whole social experience, slowly developed, along 
with man himself and his civilisation, that direct sense impressions can be 
transmuted into recognition.” (Lubetkin, undated [Lub/19/3/1/iv]: 4) 
 
As far as Lubetkin was concerned, to close reasoning tightly around sense impressions was, 
in the same moment, an act of hedonistic self-imprisonment in and among the restricted 
knowledges (and, therefore, restricted control) that sense data evoked. Such an imprisoning 
was twice false, in the first instance because it denied the full scope of reality that people 
inhabited, i.e. it created a fictional bubble of mostly corporeal unreality that effaced the 
wider reality of phenomena; their relations, and (perhaps especially) their emergence from 
an underlying logic. In the second and closely related instance, it generated an implausibly 
hedonistic human behaviour that disengaged people from that which came normally and 
regularly to them at the behest of language; that enquiring trajectory through the 
experiential wherein “perception must be shot through with inference” (Ibid). This returns 
us to his central criticism of art (under which term he included architecture) because, he 
observed, that it effaced not only the ontological reality of emergence-from-universals, but 
additionally eschewed a social reality of enquiring trajectories which could plausibly 
                                                   
114 Lubetkin used the terms “art” (or “artistic” in this case) and “architecture” interchangeably, often slipping between the 
two in the same document, as can be seen below and in a number of the excerpts of his manuscripts that I use elsewhere 
in this chapter. 
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correspond with that ontological reality. The fictional bubble that art/architecture occupied 
reflected and supported a similar kind of practice in society, and thus, argued Lubetkin: 
 
“Whether we realise it or not, this is the CONTENT of today‟s architecture, 
and the part its brutal inhumanity plays in our social practice” (Lubetkin, 
undated [Lub/19/3/1/vi]: 6) 
  
Perhaps more important, I would suggest, is Lubetkin‟s faith in the wider communicability 
that results from the displacement of the intuitive and sculptural with the precise and 
engineered. It is precisely because of precision that lay people or critics could critically 
understand the building prior to being built (i.e. from its plans and elevations) rather than 
having to wait for the finished article and the (no longer) inevitable changes that set design 
and realisation apart. Moreover, to engage with the building at its design stage allowed the 
full nature of the building to be perceived, not only from inception to completion, but in 
its philosophy as well as of its plans, which was far better, Lubetkin argued, than “a 
subjective wander around a finished building” (Ibid: [iii] 3). 
 
Such was Lubetkin‟s expectations of the precise and rigid relationship between his ideas 
and the completed building. But I would further argue that this represents a powerful 
indication of his reasoned hope for the analytical and enquiring inhabitation that he 
believed people would bring to buildings (and which he could draw upon to liberate his 
ideas), one more productively intelligent that a “suggestive wander”, and one that was 
sufficiently astute for Lubetkin to suggest the opening out of what might otherwise be 
considered professional architectural territory (Voysey, for instance, would certainly have 
eschewed it). But despite his faith in the analytical inhabitant (outlined above), Lubetkin 
hoped to impose a structure of limited possibilities in the way that buildings were 
apprehended. The intelligence of inhabitants did not absolve them from a profoundly 
didactic effort to have their potential for understanding disciplined, directed, and corrected; 
“What is wanted”, proposed Lubetkin, “is an aesthetic code of practice.” (Brett and 
Lubetkin, c.1945 [Lub/20/1/1/iv]: 4) Brett, replying with a pithy kind of caution that 
belied a degree of sympathy for the idea said: “A new Vitruvius115. A tall order.” (Ibid) 
Lubetkin‟s response to this idea did not specify what – if any – appreciations should be 
                                                   
115 Vitruvius is explained in greater depth in footnote 39 (Chapter 2) 
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enabled or quashed as such, but he did specify that without such a code of practice people 
would be unlikely to arrive at any kind of appreciation at all: 
 
“At the moment, yes. If we could just be aware of our lack of it that would be 
something. When old Vitruvius was liquidated I don‟t suppose the tyrannicides 
realised for a second that they would have to find a successor; i.e. that if you 
abolish law, human beings don‟t behave by instinct. They just moon about 
doing nothing in particular.” (Ibid) 
 
In Lubetkin‟s terms, clearly defined here, people‟s analytical ability couldn‟t be allowed to 
wander. And it could be argued that in seeking a “new Vitruvius” Lubetkin (and Brett) 
aimed to create a benevolent and empowering field of inhabitation into which their work 
could be received, a framework that would “tyrannise” other and alternative receptions. 
This discussion was, of course, aside from architecture in its physical form. Lubetkin and 
Brett proposed this as a separate discourse, not unlike a narration, running alongside 
architectural forms and defining how they could be addressed, although their discussion 
did not expand upon how a “new Vitruvius” could be enforced, sustained, or disseminated. 
 
At this point it‟s increasingly evident that Lubetkin‟s ideas about the occupation of 
buildings and the capacity of occupants take on a contradictory character. On the one hand 
there is his statement of faith in the ability of people‟s analytical faculties: sufficient faith to 
be included as part of the motive power that would animate his intentions (his “thesis”) at 
the point of their experience. On the other hand, and apparently contradicting this faith, is 
the didactic imposition I‟ve just outlined. In the first instance this suggests that people 
require, if not instruction, then at least some sense that there is a framework from which 
they can construct their actions, else they would “moon about doing nothing in particular”, 
which seems to belie their in-built ability to analyse and apprehend the logical structure to 
and connectedness of things. 
 
Exerting control over the architectural process: 
 
In common with Voysey and Holden, Lubetkin considered the temporal continuation of 
his intentions as they took three dimensional form on site and in the hands of contractors. 
Unlike Voysey and Holden, who both felt the need to engineer a supervisory presence 
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through specifications or diagrams, Lubetkin believed that the transition from two-
dimensional designs to three-dimensional realisations would look after itself to an extent, 
and saw far less potential for discontinuity between them. The idea that this transition 
would happen in a manner more akin to transcription may seem simplistic when compared 
to both Voysey and Holden‟s recognition of a more fluid discontinuity. However, the 
relative simplicity of Lubetkin‟s transition was emergent from what he understood to be an 
increased degree of precision required by contemporary constructional methods and 
required of both architects and contractors. Paradoxically, simplicity could spring from 
complexity insofar that the complexities of contemporary construction created a kind of 
rigidity between design and realisation that resulted in a simpler and more predictable 
transition where there had once been a more fluid and interpretable discontinuity. This 
allowed Lubetkin to “possess” the building without having to secure it as Voysey and 
Holden had felt inclined to: 
 
“In the old days when an architect chipped about at his building like a 
sculpture [...] you could foretell no more from working drawings than you can 
foretell the result of a battle from reading the generals‟ operation order. 
Nowadays, our methods of construction force us to be so precise in our 
planning that I personally possess the whole building in my mind before a 
trench is dug and my visits to the site are simply connected with forcing the 
most rigid adherence to my plan.” (Brett and Lubetkin, c.1945 
[Lub/20/1/1/ii]: 2) 
 
This desire for control over the outcome of his projects was not, however, immutable: 
whilst precision engineering may have solidified any variances between the architect and 
the contractors, Lubetkin‟s designs and his sovereignty over them could still be invaded by 
legislative processes of planning. His strategies when he came up against what he 
considered to be irrational or invasive demands are evident in the way Lubetkin and some 
of his colleagues at Tecton116 approached the issue of planning.  In a published feature in 
the Architectural Review of 1938 Lubetkin documented the substantial and circuitous political 
discourse he had been forced to take part in to get Highpoint Two approved (Lubetkin, 
                                                   
116 Tecton was the practise in which Lubetkin was, in essence, the principal architect. Formed in 1932 and disbanded in 
1948, the partners changed over the years but the core of the practise included, additional to Lubetkin, Francis 
Skinner, Denys Lasdun, Godfrey Samuel, and Lindsay Drake. In truth, Lubetkin dominated Tecton (Frampton describes 
it as “Lubetkin and his Tecton team” (Frampton, 1992: 252)) and very few Tecton designs can be traced to someone 
other than Lubetkin.  
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1938: 161-163). The reticence of the local authority, he argued, was afforded by restrictive 
town planning measures which had been instigated since the completion of Highpoint One 
and which had been written not, as Lubetkin would have preferred, as an affirmation of 
what was possible, but in a negative tone which detailed what was prohibited, and which 
extended the sense of safety in the “familiar” and suspicion of the “different” that already 
existed. He writes, 
 
“It was never intended that the powers given to local authorities under the 
various town planning acts should be obstructive to good architecture. Yet it is 
accepted today as almost inevitable that if an architect and his client plan a 
modern building, they must be prepared to spend a great deal of time on 
negotiations before the buiding is approved of: and they must face the risk of 
its total rejection [...] It is partly due to beaurocratic conservatism – to a natural 
suspicion of anything that is unusual [...], and partly to the fact that town 
planning regulations are treated solely as restrictive measures.” (Lubetkin, 1938: 
161) 
 
Because the local authority (the Municipal Borough of Hornsey) worked from a basis of 
what was unacceptable, Lubetkin entered into a prolonged period of trial and error in 
which design schemes were submitted for rejection. On the basis of what the planning 
committee liked or disliked, a new scheme would be submitted , retaining the approved 
features from the previous scheme and including new ones to be judged. In due course and 
after the submission of numerous schemes, Lubetkin had accumulated an array of features 
which he could use to design the building he wanted and which had secured its approval, 
feature-by-feature, through this process. This process which Lubetkin regarded as 
ridiculous is interesting because, faced with such restrictions, Lubetkin was able to astutely 
(if laboriously) open out an affirmative space for Highpoint Two. Though Lubetkin 
recognised that the process was restrictive and didactic, Lubetkin treated it as neither; more 
accurately, he utilised the approval process to extract affirmative potential.  
 
Whilst Lubetkin and Tecton met no such resistance at Finsbury Borough Council 
(Gruffudd (2001) outlines Finsbury‟s support for and compatibility with the practice), the 
process of building the larger housing schemes in the borough required approval and 
funding from London County Council (LCC). Their stipulations were far more quantitative 
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and less opinion driven than the ultimately successful tribulations Lubetkin faced regarding 
Highpoint Two.  
 
In August 1937 a representative of Tecton visited the offices of the LCC to ascertain what 
material and financial possibilities existed for the proposed Buscasco Street Scheme (which 
later became Priory Green): they included, reported its author, densities of no more that 
60-62 rooms per acre and a maximum six storey height, and the bureaucratic procedure 
that Tecton and Finsbury would have to go through was also noted (Anon (Tecton), 1937a 
and Anon (Tecton), 1937b). In this case, Lubetkin (Tecton) submitted uncomplainingly to 
these stipulations, as there was no “battle” to endure as there had been at Highpoint Two. 
Neither Lubetkin nor Tecton made a habit of pitching themselves against (or hollowing a 
space in) the regulatory environment except when, as at Highpoint Two, their intentions 
were met by an over-zealous understanding of the town planning legislation. If the 
planning left a sufficiently large affirmative space for the practice to achieve what they 
wanted (and it appeared that the LCC‟s were sufficiently low key to allow this) then that 
aggressive posture was not taken. Indeed, in the case of Buscasco Street/Priory Green, 
Lubetkin (Tecton) submitted to their stipulations twice, as there was insufficient time to 
start the scheme before the outbreak of war, and by the time the Buscasco Street/Priory 
Green scheme was built, different density and height stipulations were in place (two-
hundred persons per acre at no higher than eighty feet). Thus, when getting his projects 
built, Lubetkin (and Tecton) could deploy imaginatively aggressive tactics when it suited 
them, and at other times they employed diffidence. But even at his most aggressive, 
Lubetkin used the existing structures and norms that were obstructing him to create an 
affirmative space for his work to happen as he wanted it to.  
 
Lubetkin’s ideas, architectonically enabled: 
 
My findings so far suggest that Lubetkin‟s aim was to generate through architectural means 
a material demonstration of how reality was more than what the senses made apparent: that 
it was, in fact, emergent from a coherent and universal substratum. What I cannot do is 
make steadfast claims as to how ambitious Lubetkin was regarding whether his buildings 
should simply demonstrate the more-than apparent scope of reality, or whether they should 
fill out that scope with detailed accounts of that substratum and how it worked. Put 
another way, I cannot be sure whether his buildings were gestural signposts pointing out 
276 
 
interesting things, or detailed and didactic maps of that causal field. The answer would 
partly depend on how capable Lubetkin thought people were to read or otherwise 
apprehend the suggestion or demonstration of such a substratum in his architecture, but 
my preceding analyses suggest that Lubetkin‟s understanding of people‟s capability varied. I 
cannot be categorical in this regard: I can suggest that Lubetkin‟s buildings were more 
gestural in their intent and support this by reiterating his faith in people‟s analytical abilities, 
an extra-architectural motive power that could perhaps have done the more complex work 
of filling out the scope for him in an autodidactic way. Having said that, I am also faced 
with his criticisms of ideology and fashionably thoughtless art whereby he observed the 
opposite process at work. This contradiction does not easily resolve, and that lack of 
resolution extends materially through Lubetkin‟s belief that;  
 
“The pattern of truth is complexity but complexity is structurally incompatible 
with the pattern of our understanding so that truth has inevitably to be lopped 
into consciousness” (Lubetkin, undated [Lub/18/1/lxxvii]: lxxvii) 
 
This assertion seems to be at odds with his faith in people‟s linguistically generated 
analytical ability.  But at the same time it tentatively supports the possibility that he saw his 
architectural demonstrations as gestural towards the bases of reality rather than explicating 
them.  In this alternative iteration reality had to be converted into simpler forms before 
people became receptive to it, and art, Lubetkin argued, was one such medium of 
conversion.  
 
“Art provides us with a simplified concept that illuminates the world for us by 
communicating emotional associations in a rhythmic or formal context which 
makes us receptive. [...] Composition of any work is determined by the logic of 
the theme to be communicated and not for the comfort of the age. And if eye 
is satisfied it is because a physical order in the order of perception corresponds 
to the rational order present in whatever is intelligible. (Lubetkin, undated 
[Lub/18/1/lxxxi-lxxxii]: lxxxi-lxxxii) 
 
Such insights start to open out the means by which Lubetkin intended to effect his hopes 
in material form, with compositions that were simple and rhythmical in the way they 
demonstrated the complex reality of things. Lubetkin seemed to put this conversion 
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process close the heart of his work, despite its strangely counterproductive effect, forcing 
Lubetkin to belie the actual complexity of things, either because inhabitants/users were not 
astute enough to grasp such complexities and had to have them rendered into a powerful 
sort of simplicity, or perhaps because it was the task and modus operandi of architecture 
(and art) to provide bold, simple, and gestural compositions that pointed excitedly to 
certain conceptions and left the detailed analytical work to linguistically enabled inhabitants 
to work out. In either event – as I cannot with certainty declare one as being “true” – 
architecture, in Lubetkin‟s terms, demonstrated not the full or original complexity of truth, 
but a “proxy” truth where “truth” was the theme rather than an explicit apprehension. In 
Lubetkin‟s terms, perhaps architecture was about, or was related to truth, rather than being 
involved in its precise articulation. 
  
Lubetkin, for all his political and politico-temporal complexities, had slightly more 
straightforward ideas about how a building would actually convey this important theoretical 
message. In his c.1964 Architectural Association speech, he suggested that architectonic 
forms could declare singular connections to a wider reality, i.e. that forms, plains, and voids 
could “assert, in geometrical form, a system of thought whereby the parts are relevant only 
interms [sic] of a constantly changing whole.” (Lubetkin, c.1964 [Lub/19/4/2/iv]: 4) 
Confirmed in an earlier letter to Monica Felton117 (17th July 1947) Lubetkin said: 
 
“[Architecture] is a thesis, a declaration, a statement of the social aims of the 
age. Its compelling geometrical regularities affirm man‟s hope to understand, to 
explain and control his surroundings. By thus asserting itself against 
                                                   
117 Although Monica Felton‟s identity is not specified in these documents, I would suggest that the recipient of 
Lub/19/1/9 is Monica Felton, chairman of the Stevenage Development Corporation until her dismissal on the 13 th June 
1951 for failing to attend meetings of the corporation, and failing to present herself to the Commons Public Accounts 
Committee on the 7th June. Felton‟s story makes for an interesting contextual aside. Hansard‟s entry for the 13 th June 
reproduces an exchange between Anthony Eden (Conservative, Deputy Leader of the Opposition) and Hugh Dalton 
(Labour, the Minister for Local Government and Planning), who, in dismissing her from her post steadfastly insisted that 
“it is a matter of total indifference to me whether Mrs. Felton was absent in Hollywood or the Riviera or anywhere else. 
The point to me is that she was absent, and neglected her functions.” (HC Deb 5th series, 13th June 1951, vol. 488, col. 
2308-2309) A blizzard of further questions arose on the subject of her location (North Korea) and her alleged sympathies 
(communist) on which Eden asked: “is the right hon. Gentleman sure that it is in order for a Government official to 
travel abroad on a visit to enemy territory, or a matter of that kind? Is not that the concern of the Government?” (Ibid, 
col. 2310). Her correspondence with Lubetkin gives us some idea as to the ideological firmament he placed (or found) 
himself in and reminds us of the sort of resistance (and indeed, risks) he might have faced for his political persuasion, 
although I believe was probably more socialist than outright communist. The potential degree of that resistance is hinted 
at in Green (1951) who notes that there was a discussion as to whether Felton‟s presence in North Korea was, as Eden 
hinted, treasonous insofar as it might aid or comfort the Chinese (it wasn‟t: war had not been officially declared and the 
Director of Public Prosecutions recommended against such a charge) (Green 1951, p.462). Felton actually received the 
Lenin Peace Prize in 1951 and published a number of books, at least two of which discuss her time in North Korea and 
the basis for her sympathies (What I saw in Korea and North Korea: That’s Why I Went (Felton 1951, 1953)). Lubetkin may 
not have been as extreme as Felton, but he was certainly evangelical in his political beliefs and may have experienced 
lesser, though spirited, resistance and distaste. 
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subjectivity and equivocation, it discloses a universal purposeful order and 
clarity in what often appears to be a mental wilderness.” (Lubetkin, 1947 
[Lub/19/1/9/i]: 1) 
 
Such declaration helped to reconnect people to the universal and, by making sense (or 
suggesting the possibility of making sense) of the idea and philosophy of a single and 
coherent universal logic, Lubetkin hoped to remind people of their faculties to both 
understand and control their “surroundings”. However, declaration contains two quite 
different potential mechanisms: to “assert” or “compel” suggests that reconnection is 
performed in some way and made to happen, whereas to “state” or “declare” suggests that 
reconnection is vocalised in a far more invitational and contingent way. In fact, for 
Lubetkin, these were essentially the same thing, or at least, different aspects bound closely 
together in the same process. As hopeful expressions of the human ability to explain, 
control, and universalise, “geometrical regularities” worked to remind or hint at the 
possible consistency of human experience, and to vocalise that option in architectural 
terms formed part of the momentum towards (eventually) making it happen. Lubetkin did 
not believe that his architecture, or any architecture, could actually achieve this theoretical 
threshold and directly “assert” these changes or “compel” people to change the way they 
thought. It was, however, in architecture‟s somewhat more indirect power to “guarantee” 
that those universal possibilities were actually available and attainable, and he continued... 
 
“To me this represents the CONTENT of architecture. But I must make it 
clear that content does not mean a story, a subject, nor the programme; it 
means a world outlook, a visual guarantee of the consistency of the whole 
human experience, a committed driving force on the side of enlightenment 
aiming, however indirectly, at the transformation of our present, make believe 
society...” (Lubetkin, 1947 [Lub/19/1/9/i]: 1) 
 
As such, Lubetkin‟s aim was to provide a nourishing material and aesthetic context of 
encouraging reminders that such transformations were possible and desirable.  
 
Lubetkin was not always very specific about what he wanted his architecture to look like: 
but his self-confessed status of “idiote” – his tendency to criticise – seems to have 
produced a discernable nomenclature of forms, treatments, and ideas that he would have 
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assiduously avoided. In attending to these eliminations, it is possible to get a sense of what 
material-aesthetic tactics he would have used (allied, of course, to those rarer occasions 
when he did specify his approach).  Perhaps the most interesting branch of his taste was 
the “Barocco”, his own choice of term in reference to Rococo, the latter stages of the 
baroque118 style in architecture. 
 
It would be easy to say that Lubetkin simply disliked the “Barocco”, but this would belie 
his fascination with it, one that is (perhaps) tinted with a degree of admiration. In a 
journey-like manner, Lubetkin‟s engagements with the Barocco eventually arrived at a 
critical kind of distaste having engaged his analytical fascination en-route. That distaste 
emanated from his observation that Barocco failed to engage with logic, consistency, or 
similar indications that might suggest universals at work. The material-aesthetic root of this 
failure was in the deliberately unresolved and un-resolvable juxtaposition of parts in the 
whole composition and, as Lubetkin explained, that those parts should struggle against 
each other in their juxtaposition was not the problem. The problem was that the 
juxtaposition was not resolved by either by victory, defeat or harmony between them: that 
would imply that each part had an identity as to what “side” it was on and what it 
represented, but Lubetkin could not see any such identity in the Barocco. As such, their 
struggle was indeterminate both in terms of temporality (i.e. that no conclusion was arrived 
at so the struggle was indeterminately ongoing) and in terms of the absence of a 
determining universal logos. The constituent parts of Barroco struggled for a supremacy 
they could never attain because the system of composition that Barocco employed was 
positioned short of such resolutions : The struggle, mutual agitation, and confused, swirling 
movement suggested, in Lubetkin‟s own words:  
 
“There cannot be any doubt that movement as it presents itself in Barocco 
buildings is first of all a dramatic struggle of parts, components for 
domination” [...] “But it is not a struggle of opposites, with the conflict 
resulting in a victory of one principle against all others (like before good-bad, 
right-wrong, light-darkness) It is much more a tension of common participation 
                                                   
118 The Baroque style in architecture is defined by an excess of florid ornamentation and, according to Ian Sutton, non-
logical dynamism such that the classical norms of stable and clearly defined forms serving evident functions are 
subordinated “to the single-minded expression of energy and movement” so that, for instance, columns no longer 
pretend to support loads, but are designed to aggressively flourish (Sutton, 1999: 171). Sutton traces its inception to 1597 
(Ibid: 172). Rococo, referring to the late Baroque, is simply Baroque in its most extreme form, with a very high density of 
intricate, florid ornamentation and colouring. 
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of parts in a general tendency, endeavour, without clear realisation of own role 
in the total. [...] The confusion is perpetual, the movement – a natural state in 
which participating forces gain self recognition, during and through struggle.” 
(Lubetkin, undated [Lub/18/1/il-l]: il-l) 
 
Importantly, that “recognition” was always contingent upon a “participating forces” 
continued reassertion of its position, not of its truthfulness to a larger body of logic and 
underlying truths. Barocco, both in its parts and in a systemic structure that kept those 
parts permanently (pointlessly) embattled, was anathema to Lubetkin‟s hope for coherence 
and logic being expressed architecturally. I detect, in some aspects of his discussion of the 
Barocco, a grim kind of excitement at the drama and dynamism of it and, perhaps, a degree 
of annoyance that it should achieve as much despite a myopia whereby the drama and 
conflict were the end in themselves, rather than a means to an end:  
 
Details confirm each other, imply each other increase potency. Tension + 
drama of contradiction ascends in equal intervals, heavy pediments into floating 
fragments, multiform complexity, mobility of planes. Elevations decompose 
and into eparalissiment of waves, reflection on agitated water. Organised folly. 
(Lubetkin, c.1969-1975 [Lub/18/2/lxxxvii]: lxxxvii) 
 
The ramifications in terms of Lubetkin‟s actual strategies or policies for a working building 
is that the buildings he designed had to demonstrate a unity throughout with each part and 
feature relating to its neighbouring part, rather than warring with its neighbours for the 
sake of the exciting effect that such architectural warring could produce. It had to suggest, 
in this unity, something finished, something certain and agreed upon. Lubetkin‟s (slightly 
reticent) revolt against “Barocco” is a revolt against the fact that in expending all its energy 
against itself, it was, in his terms, purposefully impotent.  
 
Lubetkin expressed substantial faith in geometry as a means to expressing his thesis as to 
what reality was. In expressing this faith he also rendered geometry as a fixed and factual 
point in his philosophy and he believed (or may have once believed) that “clean edged 
regularities of sharp, crisp geometrical shapes have universal meaning, independent of 
whims and fads, perceived by all, unequivocal interpretation.” (Lubetkin, c.1969-1975 
[Lub/18/2/cxxiii]: cxxiii) A statement such as this is, perhaps, slightly out of character for 
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Lubetkin given the evidence thus far presented of his critical faculties.  My doubts 
notwithstanding, he seems to suggest that the physical manifestation of geometric shapes 
was emergent from the (abstract) logic of mathematics, almost like mathematics solidified, 
and moreover, those geometric shapes could only be seen as thusly emergent, their logical 
origins were more powerfully vocalised in their “crisp” forms than their sensuality: to 
witness them one could not escape the fact of their “relations” with an underlying logic, no 
matter how base and sensually myopic the encountering person was. As such:  
 
“Relations satisfied by matem. equivalents, geometry – very embodiment of 
balance, harmony, causality , logic.  
Not only seen but validated. BL” (Lubetkin, c.1969-1975 [Lub/18/2/cxxiii]: 
cxxiii) 
 
The very regularity of geometry meant that it could do – could only do – this, and it can be 
contrasted to the Barocco insofar that shape expressed geometrically with mathematical 
logic, resolved commonality and relationality with other parts as a result, contrasted to the 
perpetually warring forces of the Barrocco with a repetitious quality of forms. Lubetkin 
suggested, in a passage titled “art = order”: 
 
“Repetitive events – a form of order, pattern, code. 
Are what they are only because of the whole complex of which they are part” 
(Lubetkin, c.1969-1975 [Lub/18/2/lvii]: lvii) 
 
And that their character, quite unlike that the Barroco, was one of “Modest self effacing 
deferential simplicity, restraint grandeur of design obtained by grouping” (Ibid: [lviii] lviii), 
a modesty that allowed for their resolved relationality. Nonetheless, geometric regularities 
were a risk. Mathematics, as Lubetkin noted “Look for proportions in the universe and cast 
their arguments into the form of proportions.” (Ibid: [xcii] xcii) They could, potentially, 
close reasoning tightly around “proportions” (i.e. quantitative expressions) without the all-
important attempts at seeing beyond such expressions into the abstract and toward notions 
of significance. Understanding this risk, he cautioned: 
 
Knowledge conditioned not only by senses, but by own interests and purpose. 
The world is not simply there it is made by us by selecting and grouping in 
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relation to kind of activities we engage in.” (Lubetkin, undated 
[Lub/17/1/xxxiii]: xxxiii) 
 
As such, bold crisp, and defined geometric shapes connoted their common logical origins, 
but in doing so seemed to contain the limited risk of closed understandings being invoked 
by their mathematical origins, not as an object shaped by an unerring logic, but as an object 
that was, from one side to the other, just an occupation of space. What Lubetkin actually 
hoped for was a geometry beyond geometry, for an occupation of space by forms so crisp 
and taut that they could only be the exercise of a productive logic.  
 
Lubetkin’s rejection of functionalism: 
 
In early 1959 the BBC organised a discussion of Le Corbusier, timed to coincide with the 
opening of a Le Corbusier exhibition, which was to be broadcast on the Third Programme 
and to which Lubetkin was invited (Cohn, 1959 [Lub/20/2/13]119). In and of itself this 
represents a particularly interesting reflection on Lubetkin‟s own work, insofar as it 
eschewed Le Corbusier‟s approach (or at least Lubetkin‟s understanding thereof). But this 
account is made even more interesting through being annotated by way of a handwritten 
account on its production which Lubetkin wrote the day after his Le Corbusier piece was 
recorded. Dated “Tuesday, 2nd February 9.45pm”, it hints at the enormous amount of work 
and worry that he invested in it (and it‟s possible that some the other documents I‟ve 
quoted in this chapter received similarly exacting attention): “For the last 4 days”, he wrote: 
 
“I have been working 18 hours per day in preparing my part of the script for Le 
Le Corbusier talk – During this time Mag was left alone to look after the farm, 
feed the animals, keep up the fire, transport children to and from school, and 
during the weekend when the children were home their quarrelled in whispers, 
buckering on tiptoes. I have also smoked 180 cigarettes so that my fingers on 
the left hand are the colour of iodine.” (Lubetkin, 1959 [Lub/20/2/8/i]: i) 
 
Lubetkin further claimed, in a rare insight into family life at Upper Kilcott, that he would 
have refused the invitation save for “The howls of children‟s snobbish delight” (Ibid: [ii] 2) 
and this document further reveals the key role of his wife Margaret in the production of his 
                                                   
119 Cohn‟s letter was dated 16th January 1959 and the show was broadcast on the 1st February 1959. 
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work (and enabling him to do any at all by somehow looking after their three children, the 
farm, all the domestic tasks, and the typing for all four drafts of the speech). 
 
“...I had to comb out the 3 previous drafts to see whether some words have not 
been missed whilst Mag was tiping [sic]” (Ibid [i] i) 
 
Lubetkin further suggested that in an initial meeting with Cohn to discuss the talk, she had 
hoped for a staid, descriptive discussion rather than a philosophically critical enquiry (the 
contents of which I will turn to shortly). Said Lubetkin: “I refused rudely. And because I 
was rude, and she was definitely scenting Papa Marx, I thought that‟s that.”  (Ibid: [ii] 2) In 
fact, Cohn did agree to Lubetkin‟s proposal and recalling a later meeting, Lubetkin 
suggested that: 
 
“[D]uring our subsequent talk I told her approximately what I intent to say, 
hoping, so to speak (and not so to say) for a raspberry even at this stage. But I 
only received from Miss Cohn an old English tolerant smile, and I think right 
now I know why she smiled.” (Lubetkin, 1959 [Lub/20/2/8/ii]: 2)  
 
What I detect here is an implied suggestion that Cohn retained Lubetkin either because her 
stance was sympathetic, or that she believed his inclusion would make for “good copy” and 
that Lubetkin was, in essence, being used to spice up the show. Cohn‟s “old English 
tolerant smile” could be interpreted either way: Lubetkin didn‟t specify. Notwithstanding 
this open-endedness, this document is important insofar as it emphasised Lubetkin‟s 
domestic and family life, and his reliance on Margaret‟s substantial labours both in 
domestic terms and in support of his (also substantial) professional labours. It also hints at 
the degree to which he eschewed or displaced his children, who appear in the particular 
context to be intrusive, annoying, and base in their delights. It is finally, a useful contextual 
insight into the contemporary reception of Lubetkin. I have already suggested that as an 
(apparently) ardent socialist, Lubetkin‟s beliefs may have placed him at risk of being 
criminalised120 (through his correspondence with Monica Felton, for example), but his 
beliefs and his expression of them seemed more likely to meet a belittling kind of English 
tolerance that found such expressions neither risky or distasteful, but apprehended them as 
                                                   
120 See my previous footnote on the abortive criminalisation of Monica Felton. 
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quirky, silly, and entertaining. This was not the outright rejection that Felton had faced. 
Instead, it represented a disparaging kind of inclusivity.  
 
 The talk itself returns us to the architectural hopes for particular kinds of actions and 
messages, and much like his rejection of M.A.R.S, Lubetkin‟s criticisms of Le Corbusier 
help us to understand where he placed himself relative to architectural design, art in 
general, and the social function of both. Le Corbusier, he argued, had grown his approach 
“organically from the 19th Century positivist philosophy, as formulated by Auguste 
Compte” (Lubetkin, 1959a [Lub/20/2/4]: 1) and resultantly, Le Corbusier‟s universe was 
one of separate, self contained and self-sustaining phenomena which could be fully 
apprehended by the senses and, therefore, extended no further than what the senses could 
ascertain (Ibid: [ii] 2). What was missing in this account (and what Lubetkin missed, i.e. was 
sorry for the absence of) was the possibility of continuity and Hegelian notions of coherent 
realities (Ibid). In short, reality was broken up into fragments, adjacent but non-cohering, 
and each divorced from causal origins: this false autonomy reminded Lubetkin of previous 
generations of architecture. 
 
“Each separate block becomes an expandable interchangeable entity to the 
point of parading in an arbitrarily borrowed historical dress. And it is the dress, 
to be sure, the observable surface appearance, the pure form, that defines 
architecture in a world, ex hypothesi, devoid of causality, concerned exclusively 
with the measurable aspects of phenomena, where knowledge can be acquired 
only through sensations. 
Such is the heritage of the 19th century eclectic architecture, and I submit that if 
we now turn to Le Corbusier‟s work, we will find the very same features.” 
(Lubetkin, 1959a [Lub/20/2/4/ii]: 2)  
 
The key aspect here is the displacement of hypotheses (i.e. causality) with measurement: 
Lubetkin conceded that Le Corbusier‟s architectural positivism had, in attending closely to 
the immediately (sensually apparent) factual nature of things, dispensed with a priori dogma 
(Ibid [iii-iv], 3-4), but lamented that it “also included a mood of aimlessness and scepticism 
that continued to sap vitality […] the tidy analytical approach of the bureaucrats and 
trained specialists often amounts to nothing more than the vivisection of life ideas and the 
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fetishism of brute facts, in their finality, results in a static outlook, which is inimical to 
change.” (Ibid [iv], 4)  
 
What is evident from Lubetkin‟s criticism is the degree to which he recoiled from the arid 
functionalism that (he supposed) Le Corbusier practiced, and I would argue that one of the 
most important aspects of Lubetkin‟s approach is an anti-functionalist ethos, starkly 
evident here, even if his opinion of Le Corbusier is perhaps slightly disingenuous121. This 
recoiling serves to confirm a particular grip on reality in his own approach, and a trajectory 
for architectural effectiveness therein, that was absent in Le Corbusier‟s, whose approach 
effectively imposed a falsely functional epistemology on a much richer and variegated 
reality than he was willing to admit to (even if, Lubetkin argued, the “sober positivist is 
inevitably driven in spite of himself to conclude that beyond the dead-end of ascertainable 
facts there must be something unaccountable, irrational.” (Lubetkin, 1959a 
[Lub/20/2/4/iv]: 4)). Lubetkin was, in effect, claiming to work in, and produce working 
architecture in, a real world of real (and changeable) inhabitations; not in a rarefied, 
functional, disconnected existence which appealed to a singular aspect of reality and real 
life. Architecture, if it was to work, had to firmly grip the nature of the reality in which it 
was expected to work. This is not to say that Lubetkin rejected functionalism: rather, he 
incorporated and subdued it into a much larger schema, asking: “How are we to account 
for the richness and variety of our experience, our emotional life?” (Ibid) and concluding 
that analytical methods…  
 
“lead in the last resort to an accumulation of frozen, lifeless, abstract forms. 
It ultimately surrenders the rich and colourful material reality to the phantom 
of efficiency, and thus accepts technique as master instead of servant.” 
(Lubetkin, 1959a [Lub/20/2/4/v]: 4a)   
 
As such, Lubetkin‟s rejection of Le Corbusier marked his own rejection of the 
disconnection (with causal origins) and aridity (of richness and emotions) he detected in Le 
Corbusier‟s approach.   
 
                                                   
121 In his Corbusier speech, Lubetkin noted that Corbusier eventually rejected his purely functionalist approach in favour 
of an artistic articulation in his later work. 
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Lubetkin‟s architectural ambitions, in summary, were aimed away from the fragmentary and 
disjointed extremes of positivism that he found in Le Corbusier‟s work, but without taking 
up occupancy in a different extreme of functional pragmatism. Or, put another way, he no 
more wished to indulge in the fetishisation of things in their singular sensuality than he 
wished to fetishise their utility. Reality, as he understood it, allowed for neither to stand 
apart: things could not stand ontologically separate from universal logos and mean only 
what our subjectivities conjured about them but they couldn‟t shrug off the subjective and 
default to mere function either, a betweeness that he expressed a number of times in his 
notebooks:  
 
“Separation of UTILITY and EMOTION leads to a logical conundrum: 
Since all our motives, purposes are generated rooted in by emotion –  
UTILITY without emotion – is 
UTILITY without PURPOSE! 
BL” (Lubetkin, c.1969-1975 [Lub/18/2/cxv]: cxv) 
 
In short, Lubetkin hoped for a more-than functional and more-than immediate architecture 
because reality, as he understood it, was laden with emotions and perceptions that were not 
amenable to function, and laden with connections and reaction from a consistent and 
causal basis that were not amenable to quasi-positivist isolation. What follows is my 
account of how he hoped to vocalise this spectrum in his work.  
 
Lubetkin’s human architecture: 
 
Of course, the functional and emotional are by no means separate, and in this sense it is 
interesting to compare, as Lubetkin did, Highpoint One with Highpoint Two. Highpoint 
One was one of Tecton‟s early commissions, a block of flats completed in 1935, which was 
joined in 1938 by a second block, Highpoint Two, adjacent to the first. This offers a unique 
opportunity to view two very different formulations of Lubetkin‟s work constructed within 
only three years of each other. But my interest is rather more focused on the article that he 
wrote for the Architectural Review in 1938 in which Lubetkin himself narrated both the new 
block and compared it to Highpoint One (Lubetkin, 1938). Highpoint One, he explained 
was a far more limited compositional offering because there was limited opportunity to be 
287 
 
compositional: the structural technology of the time dominated its finished form, as he 
explained: 
 
“The architectural character of the first Highpoint was essentially diagrammatic. 
In form its exterior was a vertical projection of its plan and the elements that 
constituted its exterior, though carefully proportioned and related to each 
other, remained somewhat impersonal in character” (Lubetkin, 1938: 166) 
 
Improvements in constructional technique and style, however, allowed a different 
treatment at Highpoint Two and the buildings and projects that followed - the functional 
and structural element were substantially less assertive and the space they left vacant could 
then be used as a compositional space, allowing Lubetkin to move “towards a maturer and 
much more imaginative architectural language [that was] an important move forward from 
functionalism” (Ibid). Specifically, Highpoint two was, Lubetkin contended, more “human” 
by means of “accentuation” and “variety”, thus:  
 
“In the new block [...] the on the other hand, the conscious accentuation of 
certain forms and the variety of the materials used give a much more human 
character to a facade that reads as a more deliberate architectural composition.” 
(Lubetkin, 1938: 166) 
 
At Highpoint Two, sophisticated structural functionality enabled Lubetkin to move away 
from functionalism and include compositional elements in the design that hadn‟t been 
feasible at Highpoint One. Moreover, composition allowed for a more “human” result and 
one possible means of such a result seems to be, as I have already suggested, a sense of 
being “deliberate”: that the start of realising an intention through architecture is contained 
in the diffuse sense that such an arrangement of features, treatments and spaces evinces the 
exercise of choice, that such an effect has been assembled not by accident, whim, or as a 
transcript of functional elements, but to some kind of plan. “Deliberate” is not so much 
doing something, as looking purposeful or acting purposefully so that those experiencing a 
designed object, though they might not “get” it, do at least “get” the sense that it must be 
trying to do something, or that such a composition is, at least, not likely to be attempting to 
do nothing.  I get the sense, in Lubetkin‟s work, that the start of articulating his thesis was 
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in such preparatory compositional acts of not doing nothing, a pre-articulation of presence, 
that prepared the ground for more particular articulations.  
 
A pre-articulation of not doing nothing at Highpoint Two was followed by what seems to 
be scalar attempts at being “more human”, wherein Lubetkin described Highpoint One as 
“somewhat impersonal”. I use the term “scalar” to summarise my understanding of what 
Lubetkin did to achieve this at Highpoint Two, because his compositional treatment was 
more variegated, in a way that Highpoint One could not have been. This variegation and 
“accentuation” implies that, in compositional terms, a large scale, either in the monolithic 
sense of a large blank volume/surface, or the monotonous sense, of the same thing 
repeated along the same axis, did not work for people. This further implies that variegation 
and tessellation should characterise architectural compositions rather than blankness and 
monotony. My argument in terms of scale is not, therefore that the size of the building was 
important for Lubetkin but that in order to correspond with user/inhabitants Lubetkin 
believed than the composition of the building needed to be richer than unmediated 
largeness could provide containing larger qualities of smaller parts and varying treatments 
and features that were interestingly arranged. This sounds like, and probably is, an act of 
harmonization between the building (in terms of composition) and the capacities he 
presumed potential user/inhabitants had in terms of how apt they were to notice things 
that were either too monolithic or monotonous.  Perhaps this makes sense relative to 
Lubetkin‟s understanding of the human capacity to be interested and enquiring insofar that 
the monolithic and monotonous did not contain enough variety and contrast (and quite 
possibly in purely qualitative terms, enough content) to narrate anything of interest; that 
one literally couldn‟t tell anything from it, that there wasn‟t enough “data”. 
 
This argument hints at an aesthetic kind of lexicon and, indeed, Lubetkin‟s discussion of 
composition tends to refer to the elevational as something visible and observed (see quotes, 
below). His compositional ideas are much less evident in the interiors he designed, wherein 
ergonomics are more important. However, I wish to trace the key aspects of Lubetkin‟s 
compositional approach to two later documents, both concerning Spa Green122 (a housing 
estate of 129 flats), and comprising a published account of the new estate broadly similar in 
purpose and tone to Lubetkin‟s earlier account of Highpoint Two (though lacking the 
                                                   
122 Referred to as the “Roseberry Avenue scheme” in some earlier documents, this public housing scheme was completed 
in 1950 (although the commission and design precede the Second World War) in what is now Islington, London, 
compromising three large blocks of flats. See Allan (2002: 108-111) for further details and illustrations. 
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belligerent preamble) and a longer, unpublished account of Spa Green, circa 1944 
(Lub/1/24/1), which may have served as the source document for the published account. 
Both reiterate Lubetkin‟s belief that functionalism isn‟t enough, and moreover, pares the 
user/inhabitant back to their biological basics in providing, and believing that people need 
no more than bodily requirements, thus:  
 
“In the Roseberry Avenue scheme the attempt is made to combine 
uncompromising clarity of plan, articulation of volumes, and causal 
interrelation between structure and design, but without, however, allowing 
these to become the whole aim” (Lubetkin, 1951: 140) 
 
He added that developments in constructional techniques allowed for... 
 
“...freeing the elevations from their structural burden, to introduce a richer, 
three dimensional treatment, combined with the use of traditional materials 
and colours [...]. The solid and void of balustrades alternates from floor to 
floor, to give an overall rhythm, which allows the elevation to be perceived as a 
closed composition rather than a series of strips” (Ibid) 
 
This outlines a rectification in which Lubetkin was determined not to “dismiss, as earlier 
modern architecture has, the principles of composition or the emotional impact of the 
visual” (Ibid: 139-40). In this sense, composition, “a richer, three dimensional treatment, 
combined with the use of different materials and colours” (Ibid: 140), was specifically 
geared for emotional “impact” through a similar sanding treatment as I argue for at 
Highpoint Two, and was similarly attributed to “freeing the elevations of their structural 
burden” (Ibid). In addition, Lubetkin mentions the importance of relieving monotony, 
especially given how ubiquitous he believed it to be in flat design more generally, not that 
any block of flats should pretend to be anything different… 
 
“In designing the individual blocks an attempt was made to find a form of 
expression entirely characteristic of blocks of flats and not reminiscent of small 
domestic dwellings. At the same time it was thought desirable to try and break 
away from the rather monotonous character of so many blocks of flats where 
every floor is treated similarly with a resulting monotony which is unrivalled by 
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any concession towards the total effect of the building.” (Lubetkin, c.1944 
[Lub/1/24/1/iii]: iii) 
 
Acts of composition were thus constrained between the avoidance of fictions on one hand, 
and the importance of avoiding outright functionalism on the other, to create an “effect” 
which was, I argue, supposed to be plausibly “effective” (Ibid. iv). I argue that scale is at 
the core of that plausibility: there is a sense here that Spa Green (and Highpoint Two) 
needed to be feature-laden in compositional terms, a design of non-monolithic morphology 
where different forms variously tessellated and circuitously weave their way around the 
elevations, though not so variously and circuitously that they ceased to look like flats. The 
human scale in Lubetkin‟s elevational compositions had a certain arranged density that 
avoided the largeness of blankness or monotonous repetition, or put another way, scalar 
effects of homogeneity. Considering Lubetkin‟s explanations here, I would suggest that his 
alternative scalar effects of variegation are plausible compositions of a kind of readability, a 
lexicon that excludes planar voids of mass homogeneity simply because they don‟t have 
enough content to be “read” or considered “readable”.  On the understanding that there is 
nothing to read on a blank page (or nothing more to read than the first word if all the 
others are the same), the plausibility in this approach was at best partly quantitative, of 
there being enough “stuff” to see, arranged such that it didn‟t simply merge into that 
adjacent to it.  
 
This was more than just a quantitative composition of noticability, however: it was personal 
and human through being personable (and humanising) as another published narration by 
Lubetkin suggests. “Bungalows at Whipsnade” is the earliest of the three published 
narratives I‟ve referred to here, and concerns Lubetkin‟s own “dacha” built on a sloping 
site near, and owned by, Whipsnade Zoo.123 It is unusual insofar as it lists not 
specifications, but anti-specifications, (that which it hopes not to be) and it is interesting 
insofar as it was Lubetkin‟s not only to design, but to also inhabit, and thus potentially tells 
us what he wanted and what he believed was plausible of architecture as a person it would 
happen to in terms of inhabitation. The first thing to note is that his Whipsnade dacha was 
not intended to be diminutive or retiring: it was definitely supposed to do something – and 
not a reiterative kind of something that responded to, reflected, or mimicked immediate or 
                                                   
123 Lubetkin designed enclosures for zoos at Whipsnade, London, and Dudley, creating a whole complex from scratch at 
the latter.  
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contemporary conditions and contexts. On this matter of sovereignty and the elimination 
of anything that might ventriloquise his dacha (and by “ventriloquise” I mean the sense 
that material, professional, or ideological conditions might cause or explain its forms and 
features) Lubetkin was adamant; the bungalow did not form a “link in any chain of 
specifically Nordic or English tradition” (Anon and Lubetkin, 1937: 60) nor was it  
“dictated by any trigonometry of the lines of kitchen circulation, or by angry attempts to 
trap sunlight into some dust-proof corner, or by the standard length of reinforcing 
rods”(Ibid), and there was emphatically no suggestion “that its design grew “naturally” 
from the given conditions like an ordinary pumpkin, Victoria Regina, or deep sea fish” 
(Ibid). In fact, Lubetkin argued: 
 
“It is not a “Modern House”, a “Shelter,” which, according to professors, 
should be self obliterating, unselfconscious, and insignificant in its hygienic 
anonymity; a thing of which one can only say that it is made of reinforced 
concrete.” (Ibid) 
 
These multiple dismissals forcefully hollowed out a space for the wilful character of this 
bungalow, insulating it from circumstances like tradition (English or otherwise), 
trigonometric norms, of functionality or the commonly available lengths of rebar), and 
rejecting the idea that the will of its design should be transacted to what prevailing 
conditions would dictate. It was, in the first place (and in a foundational kind of way), 
wilful insofar as it hoped to displace that which might impinge on its will, jealously 
guarding its potentials through anti-specifications which to my mind, seem to remove the 
specifically impersonal, saving these potentials for something altogether more human. 
Indeed, Lubetkin‟s anti-specifications seem to emphasise (by proxy) key reminders on a 
theme of personal, homely acts of dwelling and, I would suggest, a personable style of 
communication. The impression I get from Lubetkin‟s anti-specifications is that by 
claiming a will of its own and jealously containing its own motivations, the building could 
also claim to have a personality, directed away from “shelter” and towards an amicable kind 
of dwelling that contained the delightful, interesting, and enjoyable. Lubetkin suggested as 
such: 
 
“On the contrary, the designer admits that there is, on the walls of the W.C., a 
collection of cold-blooded tropical butterflies; while the bedspreads have little 
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bells sewn onto them to brighten the dreams of the occupants.” (Lubetkin, 
1937: 60) 
 
To me, this sounds like a personal and personality-laden articulation of architecture which 
effects plausibility in a conversant way. I believe that the Whipsnade anti-specifications 
suggest that the bungalow was intentionally less like a machine and much more like a 
person.  An anthropomorphic building, which acted as it did because it had attitudes 
certain ideas, certain elements that were not strictly necessary but, being as such, 
represented wilful exercises of choice and preference. This anthropomorphic possibility has 
particular ramifications for the plausibility of the building and, I believe, Lubetkin‟s 
buildings on the whole. Like his understanding of people, his buildings were more than 
simply functional, and like people, they expressed that exceeding through the expression of 
their choice. If, as an object, the building could have some kind of personal attribute, then 
inhabitants might engage with it as they would with another person, treating it as such and 
making the sort of judgements about what it was “like” rather than it being just a building, 
a mere collections of rooms. I contend that the wilfulness of Lubetkin‟s architecture was 
directed at inhabitants by a cache of material/aesthetic forms that, together, gave the 
building personable attributes such that people would engage with them far more 
intimately and in detail than if they were just objects. 
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Fig. 5.1: Highpoint 1 (photograph by Steve Cadman) 
 
Fig. 5.2: Highpoint Two (photograph by Steve Cadman). 
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Fig. 5.3: Genesta Road 
 
Fig: 5.4: Priory Green Estate 
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Fig. 5.5: Dudley Zoo, Elephant House (parapet). 
 
Fig. 5.6: Dudley Zoo, Aviary. 
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Fig. 5.7: Dudley Zoo, former tiger enclosure. 
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Entraining: 
 
In chapter two I outlined an interview methodology which aimed to entrain the more 
analytical and critical thoughts of inhabitants by inviting them to question me, my presence, 
and my approach. I open this half of the chapter with an example of what such a 
methodology can produce, and the suggestion that it has made insights available to me that 
might not otherwise have been forthcoming. 
 
Richard: I mean, you haven‟t really asked about living here 
Paul: Go on then124, I mean, what-, what is it like to live here? 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
The preceding excerpt from my interview with Richard can be equally thought of as 
Richard‟s interview with me. The methodologically invitational interview I outlined in 
chapter two did not always result in interviewees challenging me and deflecting the 
directions and ideas I proposed, but none of my interviews were quite so deflected as when 
Richard bluntly suggested that I hadn‟t “really” tapped into the nature of his experiences as 
an inhabitant. It is worth beginning the second half of this chapter here, not only as a brief 
reminder of the methodology I hoped to weave through my interviews, but also because it 
points to how different my expectations and presuppositions were as compared to the 
accounts my interviews provided me with, and in Richard‟s case, felt able to provide for me 
within the framework of the interview. As he became the interviewer, he took the 
opportunity to unwind these expectations and suppositions as he understood them, and 
continuing our conversation, he asked me: 
 
Richard: Ok, do you think living in this building is different from living in a... 
er... living in an ordinary building? 
                                                   
124 This reads in a way far more belligerent than it actually sounded. 
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Paul: Yes. I definitely do. But the thing is, without doing an involved 
ethnography, and actually coming and living in one, I don‟t know that I‟d be 
able to imagine what it‟d be like. I know that it can‟t be the same.  
Richard: Mm.  
 
In this instance I attempted my own deflection by amplifying a claim that I could not be 
reasonably expected to have an opinion that mattered because I was not in a position to 
matter, or have the building matter to me (an ethnography). I therefore offered my opinion 
– “yes” – and an immediate disclaimer that defaced it, a defensive retraction into a context 
defined by my lack of imagination and which, in the following excerpt, I followed with a 
positive sort of endorsement, but one couched in uncertainty and ambiguity. Of course, 
not knowing could equally connote too much imagination rather than its absence, and it 
was this kind of conclusion that Richard vectored the discussion towards, challenging what 
he perceived to be my over-imaginative hope to find a building full of forcibly or 
surreptitiously articulated impacts on inhabitants like him, through buildings such as his 
house, and from architects such as Lubetkin:   
 
Paul: [It‟s] the reason why I fall back on interviews I think, it‟s because I can‟t 
make that imaginative leap. I have a vague impression that I‟d like it. I-, I don‟t 
think about this, but I think I like all of the buildings I‟ve looked at so far, er, 
from all three of my architects. But... it‟s difficult for me- 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
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[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
Despite me, but in a methodological way which I hope was also because of me, Richard 
articulated an aspect of his experience which demonstrates a degree of analysis in his 
understanding of the building which, as I argue below, may also be evident in the 
experiences of a number of my other Lubetkin interviewees. I would suggest that the above 
excerpt is not an experience of ineffective or empty architecture that fails in its pitch, 
intensity, or the adequacy of its devices to force an effect, but an experience and 
understanding of Lubetkin‟s work as the deliberate articulation of forms and features to 
deliberately create agentic space for inhabitants like him. Richard does not believe that 
Lubetkin was seeking to impose either narratives or parameters into the inhabitations that 
can happen in his house. His house, in Richard‟s own terms, works much more like a 
[Redacted interview material] on which inhabitants can follow inhabitations of their own 
devising, and unlike the impositions that Victorian properties are understood to foist on 
inhabitants, Richard does not believe that Lubetkin intended to make him think or behave 
in any particular way. What strikes me is how deliberate the absence of deliberateness is 
understood to be here. It does not entail that Lubetkin‟s architecture is one of voids and 
blankness: it is, rather, the deliberate creation and of an affirmative environment by using 
certain architectural tactics, forms, and combinations of features which are effective at 
deposing that which would interfere rather than imposing on Richard‟s freedom to inhabit 
the building and “pose” his life into it: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
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[Redacted interview material]  
[Redacted interview material] 
 
My understanding of Richard‟s experience is one where his choice and creativity to make 
his own “narrative” or “posing” happen is not forced to work against the grain of the 
architect‟s preferences – his inhabitation is not despite the architecture. And by the same 
token, his inhabitation is not because of it either: the features of his life and the nature of 
his thinking are not induced by deliberate architectural features. It is for this reason that I 
start this half of the chapter with Richard‟s account. I believe that he expresses, in a way 
perhaps more explicit than my other interviewees, a theme that is nonetheless present in all 
the accounts that my Lubetkin interviews provided me with. This theme is the apparently 
paradoxical benevolence of a building whose ability is directed at having no ability for itself 
and, indeed, getting rid of the ability that it does or could have by purposefully transacting 
it to the inhabitant. This analytic, central to Richard‟s inhabitation of his house and present 
in the inhabitations I discuss below, has substantial ramifications as to what a building, and 
Lubetkin‟s buildings in particular, are capable, incapable, and capably non-capable of doing 
(or paradoxically doing). 
 
Keith125 does not recognise the potential for his house to communicate, far less impose, an 
ideology either by way of a statement of intentions, or the actual attempt to carry out those 
intentions on him. I would suggest that the relatively inert nature of his house stems from a 
style of inhabitation that includes particular analyses and understandings which likely reflect 
the fact that, at the time of the interview, Keith worked as a semi-retired architect. His 
analysis is interesting in that it contains an anti-analysis, outlining the sort of analysis that is 
“a danger”, and I suggest the following quote demonstrates that this danger stems from the 
possibility of fictionalising a building through over-imaginative acts – including research 
acts – of reading-into, which connects the building to a level and intensity of ideas that 
belies the normal, sensible, and perhaps commercial processes of producing a building. In 
Keith‟s account, I get a sense that to see the building as being able to contain and 
potentially effect ideals is, in itself, a kind of ideal which reforms the building so that it can 
be found to be as it was hoped to be, but one which is unrealistic and potentially unfair. 
And perhaps Keith recognised that it was an ideal that I may have brought with me to the 
interview. 
                                                   
125 [Redacted interview material] 
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[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
Once this danger is, if not ameliorated, then at least recognised, Keith felt more able to 
venture what Lubetkin might have been trying to do from a more normal context (of 
needing work and being given a brief), one of which was to [Redacted interview material] 
and perhaps – with a firm emphasis on perhaps – “re-examine” what a house could be by 
disregarding what houses were at the time. Keith‟s experience puts his house into a sensible 
context, which rules out the heights of idealism (to include the potential for my idealism) 
but still recognises the potential for the building to give away certain intentions such as 
these wilful acts of originality. But it‟s important to understand that such acts, and the way 
his house is understood as the outcome of them, are only plausible from this sensible 
context which precludes, additional to overt idealism, the idea that they can be deployed to 
reconstruct and alter his experiences and thoughts, and Keith reiterates that [Redacted 
interview material - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - ]. Furthermore, and in much the same way that Keith may have 
countered the ideals I may have brought with me to his house, reading about or being told 
about Lubetkin and his idealism does not transform the building through appending 
biographical or theoretical narrations to the forms, or stretch his idea of the building‟s 
plausibility. In this sense, his experience of the building seems to coalesce around its 
physical form, rather than ceding credence to what external narratives can tell him: they are 
still too much of a reading-into, and I would further argue, a potentially unfair removal of 
the building from a context of functional normalcy to a position where the building is 
asked to articulate things that are not plausible or reasonable to expect of it. 
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Paul: Your knowledge about Lubetkin, has that changed the way you think 
about and experience your house? Or do you still- 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
In deflecting my questions about the house, Keith expressed a particular analytic of 
plausibility based around scale, and how the scale of the building, understood here in terms 
of size and status, generates opportunities to route discourses into it. The suggestion in this 
instance, which is also a formation of plausibility, centres on the issuing of a brief as a 
formative act before the architecture happens, one that opens out the space and the 
opportunity to create the sort of content that might plausibly have effects or make 
statements. In Keith‟s experience, this plausibility in itself is of a macro-scale insofar that it 
may be the plausibility in his experience that defines all the other plausibilities for his 
inhabitation thereafter, or lack thereof. Put simply, his house does not communicate or 
perform any kind of ideology because it was never in a position to: it was conceived from 
the outset on a scale too modest and formed too tightly around delivering the necessary 
provisions to enjoy the necessary leeway that he thinks such intentions require. The brief 
does not adequately resource such possibilities, as he explains: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
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[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
This is not a case of Keith imposing a silence on his house through an articulation of 
annoyance or affront at sharing the house with latent intentionalities. It is, rather, the 
plausible belief that for a building to make statements and route discourses and ideologies 
through it, an adequate brief is required which will resource such efforts. As such, there are 
all sorts of buildings that can plausibly have such properties (like Finsbury Health Centre 
and Highpoint) but to no small extent the capacity for those properties are pre-given by the 
sort of brief which doesn‟t exist for Keith‟s house, and which therefore does not make that 
plausibility available.  
 
Benjamin was also inclined to contend what may have been a hope in the back of my mind 
to locate a vector along which his house could reiterate (and install in his experiences) the 
particular hopes that Lubetkin had. Benjamin‟s contending was rather less implied than 
Keith‟s contending had been in understanding my approach to be errant. To no small 
extent this was because I mangled the delivery of an (admittedly challenging) question on 
the status of the building and what potentials he thought it could contain126. I had, 
embarrassingly, used the word “alive” and the suggestion of “having a heartbeat” in an 
attempt to describe what a building might achieve, or fail to achieve, in terms of character 
or attitude (I don‟t exactly know why I didn‟t use “character” and “attitude”, as they were 
the terms I specified on my cue cards). Nonetheless, this was a useful mangling: it allowed 
me some insight into a critical and enquiring corner of Benjamin‟s inhabitation that might 
not have otherwise been elucidated to the same degree. In hindsight, I am glad that my 
performance in the interview was questionable in this way, and glad that Benjamin felt 
comfortable enough to find it questionable. Certainly, he contended, his house was not 
alive, but formed from undoubtedly inert materials. But by the same token, that inert 
constitution was still able to hold ideas and ideals in some sense than Benjamin describes as 
“indivisible”, and which the building definitely expressed through the nature of how its 
forms were arranged into a geometric kind of aesthetic. Moreover, this expressing became 
an awareness in the excerpt below – “you become generally aware” – and this transition 
from expression to awareness suggests the potential for something to have been transacted, 
                                                   
126 This was part of a series of questions that sought to invite discussion, or dismissal, of whether the building could 
contain more than the sum of its component parts, and if/how those parts could be actant in a way that exceeded the 
materials from which they were formed. 
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or perhaps even imposed into the experiences and awareness of the inhabitant from the 
building without the inhabitant‟s necessary co-operation, i.e. the possibility that 
“awareness” is the inhabited outcome of an architectural practice where expression has 
been successfully given exceptional and inexorable momentum. 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
Of course, if Richard, Keith, and Benjamin are correct in their explicit or (possibly) implicit 
recognition of a certain ideal that I impress on them through my approach, then I could be 
making too much of this transition from expression to awareness. In fact, the sheer 
number of times that the un-alive reality of the building is reiterated in this excerpt leads 
me to suggest that the ideas and ideals incorporated in Benjamin‟s house remain there in 
evidential, rather than enacted terms. The expressions that he discusses here may be 
understood by him as traces or palimpsests that can be made to evidence Lubetkin‟s likely 
intentions, reconstructed by Benjamin as a function of a particularly analytical inhabitation 
which, I would suggest, is equal to but very differently directed to that which Keith 
maintains. By reiterating their un-alive reality, Benjamin may disallow them an animate 
status in and of themselves, until his particular and enquiring inhabitation has activated 
them as evidence and granted them that status. The building is thus a repository, not a 
recurrence, a recording of certain acts and intentions without its own playback mechanism. 
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In saying as much, I am very obviously veering from one extreme of awareness and 
intentions forcefully actualised in buildings, to another of expressions where intentions are 
actualised from buildings by particular acts of inhabitation. Whilst “becoming genuinely 
aware” sounds like it might be the former scenario, I believe that it actually discloses an 
investigative aspect of Benjamin‟s inhabitation which, in its analytical posture, produces 
plausibility.  
 
These investigative aspects have emerged in other interviews where different plausibilities 
are produced, and in Richard‟s case, one such instance is understood to be present in the 
building, but not for him. Responding to a question I asked on what he thought Lubetkin‟s 
motivations might have been (and how he might know about them) Richard suggested that 
Lubetkin‟s motivations were not, in fact, simply routed towards the inhabitation of his 
house and providing him with a narrative to absorb (as I‟ve established above). In fact, 
Richard‟s house has the potential to be motivated otherwise, rather than automatically 
oriented towards him as an inhabitant. Lubetkin‟s motivation could just as easily be routed 
away from the house and, ultimately, towards Lubetkin himself, the impression he wished 
to make, and (potentially) the clients he hoped to attract. Richard‟s house is thus 
understood akin to an announcement or, perhaps, an advertisement: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
In a number of cases, the appeal and plausibility of the buildings which my interviewees 
occupy is attained by the originality of the building. Three of my interviewees made 
statements much like that which I quote from Richard here insofar that [Redacted 
interview material - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ] and this 
annoyance is part of a larger process whereby the originality of the building, i.e. as it existed 
on completion, is more important and more meritorious than those changes and alterations 
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that have been applied thereafter. In one sense, the reassertion of originality represents a 
reconnection to the professionalism which is credited to its original design, and the idea 
that Lubetkin knew best how the building should work. I would argue that this 
understanding (and experience) has motivated Benjamin to alter his house back to how it 
used to be. I should make it clear that this restoration is not motivated by nostalgia or a 
taste for the modernist past (although Benjamin does have a taste for modernism). His 
motivation, suggested in the following excerpt, restores Lubetkin‟s professionalism to his 
experience and makes the useful and pleasant offerings that Lubetkin wove into the 
building available for him to benefit from again. 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
Benjamin‟s restoration seems to be underpinned by reasoning in that it isn‟t motivated by a 
particular respect for Lubetkin (or such romantic notions): it is motivated to restore 
Lubetkin‟s respect for them and the forms and features that, in their original state, 
articulated this respect. This makes logical sense to Benjamin insofar that these are 
beneficial features that render useful and pleasing service, and it is pointless to remove that 
which is beneficial and logical to reinstate it. Of course, the restoration itself is not without 
recognition of Lubetkin‟s ability, even if it is not motivated as an act of respect for him. His 
professionalism is recognised through being reconnected to in this way, and where 
previous residents have left the building alone, that professional articulation of domestic 
space is evident in terms of the service it renders: [Redacted interview material - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - -]. 
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The logic of this restoration also has a potentially powerful temporal element: it articulates 
a co-presence that diminishes the intervening time between the building‟s originality and 
Benjamin‟s later inhabitation. This diminishing works in two ways, first: it changes how 
much those prior inhabitations mattered (that their importance is diminished) and second: 
it compresses the time elapsed since the completion of the building such that the building 
is engaged with as though it is of present origin, not a past object restored to emphasise its 
past origins. Previous inhabitations accost this co-presence because they imposed 
themselves on Lubetkin‟s original ideas; they not only obstruct them and their efficacy, but 
they obstruct that co-presence of time by distancing the building from its original form. In 
other words, as Benjamin effaces the inhabited history of the building, he restores some 
sense of its originality not so much as a restored historical object, i.e. something of the past 
in the present, but as a repaired contemporary object that never ought to have been absent 
from the present: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
The original features maintain a beneficence, pleasantness, and usefulness which are still 
effective, and seem to grant Benjamin‟s house, and Lubetkin‟s forms therein, a recursive 
kind of plausibility such that it achieves a long-lived kind of present-ness. In this case, the 
altered kitchen window and the new hatch removed an existing feature or obstructed 
existing features whose beneficence was more substantial and meaningful in their original 
format and hence, despite being older than the new features, they could be said to be more 
present if presence is understood in terms of the plausibility of functioning relevance. If, 
conversely, those new features had been improvements, this account may have been quite 
different: had Lubetkin‟s original features, been deficient in meeting Benjamin‟s needs or 
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otherwise failed to be beneficial, the plausibility for the contemporary understanding that 
Benjamin seems to maintain in his inhabitation might not seem logically possible any 
longer. 
 
The nature of Benjamin‟s plausible temporality is contained in the sense that the forms and 
features that he has restored at his house are not of the past, but of the present, and hence 
plausibly working in the present. George‟s account of temporality forms an interesting 
complication of this dynamic through a plausible kind of interloping. Part of the attraction 
of Highpoint for George is its spaciousness: spaciousness was high on his list when he was 
looking for a new flat and he appreciates it in and of itself. But there is a temporal edge to 
his appreciation and a recognition that such spaciousness may not be valid in a 
contemporary context. In fact, as he explains, spaciousness is also a potential waste of 
space: 
 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
[Redacted interview material] 
 
In contemporary terms, spaciousness is implausible: spaciousness is where something else 
could go that isn‟t just spaciousness and, if left as much is understood as wastefulness. And 
yet, the actual existence and experience of spaciousness at Highpoint is entirely valid in 
George‟s experience and the way it fulfils his wishes of the building. The idea that 
spaciousness is assumed to be not “modern” and of the past does not render its 
beneficence any less potent in the present, despite the idea that it would no longer be 
practiced in the present and is unacceptable to present norms and the way present 
approaches would work. Spaciousness at Highpoint, is producing an effect of the past, and 
George clearly understands as much. Unlike Benjamin, the fact that this past effect is 
presently producing benefit does not cause it to be understood as being of the present. 
309 
 
Highpoint‟s spaciousness is interloping from the past, but in George‟s experience it is 
doing so in a successful way such that being of the past does not render it implausible. 
 
The responses I received from my Lubetkin interviewees in response to my questions were 
some of the most striking in this study, not least because of the way they were directed 
against me in the acts of “friendly unfreidliness” I described in chapter two, refuting my 
approach to the interview in doing so. The possibility that such a methodology offers for 
interviewees to be epistemically entrained into the interview process is one that I consider 
proimising, and which has produced insights that would not have otherwise been available 
to me. One result of this is an explicit statement from an interviewee on the danger of 
over-interpretation, backed up by an analytic of when interpretation is plausible of a 
building (in this case, scalar in nature). A further result is the complicating of the temporal 
nature of astute inhabitation, one in which architectural features can be made plausible 
either by being considered present (i.e. old but still contemporary), or successfully 
interloping in the current despite being of the past. Similarly, acts of restoration can be 
understood as restoring something to the present that should have never been absent, and 
that more recent accretions have less contemporary validity than original features. 
 
Perhaps the most interesting result of my discussions with those who inhabit Lubetkin‟s 
buildings, though one evident in my interviews with Holden and Voysey interviewees too, 
has been the apparently paradoxical benevolence of a building which uses its opportunity 
to produce effects to create a space for inhabitation purposefully freed of effects, except 
that of a growth medium for inhabitants. A not insubstantial portion of the plausibility of a 
building may, therefore, be contained in its self-effacing nature by opening spaces in which 
inhabitants proceed unimpeded. 
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6. 
Conclusion: 
 
 
My intention, in this final chapter, is to make an argument for the idea of plausibility in 
architectural geography, i.e. that which a building is considered able to do (and by 
“considered” I mean habitually analytical and considered acts of enquiry). In asking “how 
does architecture happen within peoples‟ experiences” and reviewing how the current 
architectural geography literature answers that question (see chapter one), I have identified 
plausibility as an area which, I argue, needs to be taken into account when geographers study 
architecture.  This is especially important relative to the diffuse and re-happening way that 
architectural geography approaches architecture, diffuse insofar as it is produced over 
multiple sites, and re-happening insofar as it is in continual change through being used and 
inhabited. However, the small body of literature that I reviewed in chapter one leaves me 
with what I can best describe as a “kinetic” impression. By “kinetic” I mean that 
effectiveness of architecture seems to be understood as attempts to nudge, push, and steer, 
but rarely to converse, entreat, or argue. Buildings are not thought of as engaging with 
people in an actively cerebral way. What buildings do is make impressions – literally, to 
bear down and make an impression, a kinetic kind of effect which is manifested as a sense 
or a feeling, without needing to be drawn out by analysis and interpretation.  The possible 
exception may be Jacobs (2006), but whilst her building events are created from, and 
seemingly interpreted from, bases of analysis and consideration, the events themselves are 
proximate to the buildings. For example, in the case of the Ronan Point collapse (Jacobs, 
2006: 17-20), the blunt trauma was the work of the building, whilst an enquiring narration 
was provided by the building event. Ronan Point, in this instance, has turned out much like 
the prayer room at Liverpool John Lennon Airport, or Nant-y-Cwm Steiner School (Kraftl 
and Adey, 2008). The prayer room, for instance, is analysed as if it is supposed to be 
inhabited without consideration, so that features such as books and lighting bear upon the 
inhabitant or user rather than engaging with them. The effects they describe (below) are 
“senses” – they do not need to be helped into existence by prayer room users through any 
kind of analytical engagement whereby they have to query and consider what these 
materials and forms are doing (nor is such an engagement expected from the prayer room‟s 
design): 
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“[T]he organisation and choreography of materials and bodies creates a 
stubbornness or persistence of affect, to invoke simultaneously repetitive (a 
school curriculum, or one reader after another in the Prayer room) and iterative 
senses of space, and dwelling, simultaneously to create senses of stability and 
safety [sic].” (Kraftl and Adey, 2008: 227) 
 
My concern throughout this thesis is that accounts such as these do not engage with the 
full scope of how a building happens in terms of the experiences that can be had there, and 
the experiences the architect intended it to provide. But I wish to point out, before 
proceeding further, that the arguments I make are additional to those that already exist in 
the architectural geography literature, not pitched against them. In outlining the role of 
plausibility in architectural experience (and architectural influence) my aim is to account for 
another aspect of architectural experience that such literatures have yet to address in 
substantial detail. I hope to add plausibility to a suite of aspects that already includes 
events, networks, policies, bodies, affects (and etcetera) which, together, widen our concept 
of how architecture happens within people‟s experiences. For example, in the course of my 
research I believe I have seen a number of building events in action alongside the plausibilities 
I have investigated, and I would suggest that such texts as Hitchmough‟s work on Voysey 
(Hitchmough, 1995), Karol‟s work on Holden (Karol, 2007) and Allan‟s work on Lubetkin 
(Allan, 1992) merit consideration as particular forms of building event that make the actual 
buildings they refer to happen differently (although I should point out that I initially 
expected the event-ness of what we might call “design biographies” to be far more critical 
to the experience of the buildings I studied than was, in fact, the case). I believe I have also 
seen a number of instances of the kinetic effects (distilled from affects) that Kraftl and 
Adey (2008) discuss (see preceding quote). The experience of architecture is multifaceted, 
with the capacity for events, affects, delegations, discourses, and plausibilities alongside 
each other. Certain aspects of a person‟s experience will be as astutely considered as those 
examples I have researched in the preceding three chapters: other aspects of that same 
person‟s experience will be kinetically affectual, and others again will be event-assisted (and 
so on). Plausibility – the extent to which people believe in the ability of a building as a 
result of enquiry and consideration, and the extent to which inhabitant‟s astuteness was 
conceived at the building‟s inception – represents a new ingredient in this mix, an addition 
to the broad and noisy church that architectural geography is developing into. In a recent 
paper, Kraftl has suggested that the study of architectural geography could benefit from 
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rehabilitating representational considerations alongside affective understandings of the 
ongoing production (or “re-happening”, in my terminology from chapter one) of 
architecture (Kraftl, 2009: 129). Plausibility shares some aspects of this in that there is an 
element of de-coding at work, as my summaries below suggest, and plausibility also turns 
its attention away from those more affectual and kinetic understandings of architectural 
effectiveness. I would suggest, however, that plausibilites do not work as representational 
devices do. Representation seems to suggest the production, availability and consumption 
of meanings, whereas plausibility enquires as to how secure such availabilities might be: an 
enquiring not limited to academics who are interested in the way representation works, but 
shared among people such as those I‟ve interviewed and varyingly influential in their 
experiences. If architecture is to be effective (through representation or otherwise), and if 
people are to “get” or be effected or affected by it, perhaps first people need to “get” and 
believe in the mechanics of the way it‟s trying to deliver that content – in short, an enquiry 
into architectural plausibility, whereby plausibility is not so much the analysis of end results, 
as it is an analysis of the production of the functional possibility of their continuation. 
 
The bipartite structure of the three preceding chapters, whilst useful in presenting the 
proceeds of two very different methodological processes at different stages of a building‟s 
existence, is somewhat rudimentary insofar that it creates an impression of “sides” to the 
plausibilities I‟ve investigated – that is to say, the plausibility of a building being able to 
generate effects and perform acts. In the first instance I have discussed plausibility as it 
exists from the architects‟ “side” at the inception of the building and, in the second, I have 
discussed plausibility from the inhabitants‟ “side” at the reception of the building. This 
duality, which I will retain in my summary (below), is only an impression, a side effect of 
the structure I employed, rather than any suggestion that the plausibility of architecture is 
inherently dualistic. I hope that, in any event, such impressions are fleeting given that my 
accounts in the preceding empirical chapters quickly and consistently demonstrate that the 
architects‟ understanding of the plausibility of the building was based around the potential 
capacities of the inhabitant (one in which their astuteness was a resource for the architect 
to hope for, virtualise, and draw upon, or at least proceed on the basis of). For their part, 
the inhabitants I interviewed produced conceptions of the plausibility of the buildings they 
live in and use which were astute. More specifically, those conceptions were produced from 
aspects of their inhabitations that are analytical, critical, and enquiring. In turn, they were 
capable of producing, and had in a number of instances actually produced, ideas of how 
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(and how likely) the building which they inhabited could have been designed as something 
effective, to effect or affect their latter inhabitations.  
 
In short, both the inception of these buildings and their current reception are suffused with 
consideration as to how a given building could be made to happen and be experienced in a 
certain way, but moreover, the architect and the inhabitant can, and do, recruit one another 
into these considerations. For some inhabitants, the architect matters because – broadly 
speaking – the plausibility or implausibility of the building as something able to render 
intended effects implies a designer – the architect – deliberately crafting the building to 
perform as much. Their analyses as to the plausibility of the architecture they inhabit often, 
though not always, include analyses of the architect, his motivations and ideals, which I 
have explored throughout the empirical chapters of my thesis and that I now summarise 
below. 
 
Plausibility – the architects: 
 
All three of my architects presupposed future inhabitants for their buildings who were 
capable of complex inhabitations, quite unlike the “kinetic” description of inhabitation that 
I refer to above. This potential in inhabitants was both assumed and reasoned for, and the 
buildings they designed were intended to be compatible with astute inhabitations. Put 
another way, the effects they designed into their buildings could only be actualised by the 
latter application of astute consideration or behaviour from an astute inhabitant. My 
understanding of all three architects in this study is that they did not believe the building 
could plausibly do all of this work itself. However, what the building could do is extend 
into the adjacent astuteness of the inhabitant and co-opt that ability. As such, the 
inhabitant was the motive power in the plausible architecture that my three architects 
practiced. Inhabitants completed the designed effect, which was crafted to engage with and 
maximise an inhabitants‟ astuteness and amplify certain aspects of it. 
 
The plausibility of architecture, therefore, lies with the ability of the inhabitant and the 
efficacy of the building‟s design to prompt that ability. The building itself is implausible as a 
means of generating the effects that my three architects hoped for: a building‟s plausibility 
is limited to being able to prompt inhabitants into producing the full desired effect. It is 
important to note, however, that my three architects didn‟t take complex future 
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inhabitations for granted or assume that such possibilities were definitely waiting for them. 
Even Holden, who took it largely for granted that people were astute, efficient, and 
purposeful in their inhabitations, had to adjust the bare functionality of his approach to 
include aesthetic reminders as to the effects he was hoping to create with his buildings. In 
short, their architectural designs had to work up the potential for that astuteness: each 
architect believed that people were capable of it, but also conceded that this capability 
often remained latent, or could easily become errant. Plausibility required not only 
compatibility with astute future inhabitations, but the coercion of them in the first instance. 
For Holden, this meant developing a purposeful aesthetic stance that serenaded a building‟s 
functional and purposeful underpinnings. For Voysey, it meant surrounding people with 
examples of the outcome of keen consideration and proper affections. For Lubetkin, it 
entailed the production of forms that referenced fundamental universal logics. None of 
these coercions were designed to have definite effects – that would have been implausible 
– but all of them were designed to gesture boldly towards the general area of astute 
consideration or behaviour that each architect hoped for, and intended to be housed in 
their buildings. 
 
The downside of astute inhabitants was that they could exceed plausibility – those critical 
faculties that completed the plausibility of effectiveness could also be used to question the 
architecture, query its motivations, and criticise the means by which it tried to enact them. 
In Voysey‟s case, an expanded “blanket” virtuality of design opportunity (which he created 
despite the clients who employed him, and the contractors who were building their houses) 
maintained his absolute creative control over the building so that it could not be 
mishandled or criticised by errant astuteness until the very last minute, giving him as long 
as possible to secure it and its honesty, which could not be truly honest except as his work 
alone, undertaken individually. That honesty of intent and purpose was vital to his 
gesturing, pointing as it did toward an alternative to collectivism‟s artifice. Holden, on the 
other hand, practiced very differently with what I have called a “parliamentary” approach. 
He recognised that his designs required astute practices that were beyond his ability, so his 
design process invited these astute others to practice without the draconian constrictions 
such as those which Voysey would have provided – indeed, at the start of his career 
Holden‟s invitational design process seemed practically without limit, with his own volition 
substantially (and voluntarily) redacted until the end of his training. Both approaches were 
considered to help secure the plausibility of gesturing – in Voysey‟s case by making sure 
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him gesturing was uncontaminated, and Holden by ensuring that the building, and its 
gesturing, was as expertly crafted as possible, taking advantage of as many astute others as 
he could. For Holden, this was entirely compatible with the solid, dependable, risk-averse 
approach he took, and by combining all three, his buildings were poised to gesture at 
productive, efficient, and highly competent service. In short, if his buildings were as highly 
suffused with competence as he believed they could be (and if, in a later modification to his 
approach, the buildings serenaded that competency), this would form the gesture towards 
highly competent inhabitations that he hoped for. For Voysey, as well as Lubetkin, 
plausibility relied on their respective understandings of disciplined astuteness – one that led 
to proper and spiritual affections, and the other that dwelt on order and control, glimpsed 
in the abstract through language. If astuteness was not disciplined as they thought it should 
be, the effects would be lost, and they both pitched themselves not only against 
thoughtlessness (as each interpreted it) but against wrongly directed intelligence. 
 
Despite the risks of intelligence as I‟ve described them here, the astute inhabitant was 
much preferable to the docile inhabitant as far as Voysey and Lubetkin were concerned. 
The plausibility of their architecture required people to be able to think critically and 
provocatively – the social and cultural realities of the places into which their buildings 
would go required it. Both Voysey and Lubetkin looked upon their respective times with 
dismay, Voysey perceiving the redaction of independent, ethical consideration in the face 
of collectivism, and Lubetkin perceiving the failure of control at the hands of irrational 
norms. Any potential inhabitant willing to drift in the currents of such norms might simply 
accept the material offerings of the building as shapes, forms and colours (in short, a 
kinetic kind of engagement) and never think to query it for deeper meanings and more 
substantial effects. 
 
Holden, by contrast, did not look upon the world with disdain, and never really discussed 
the possibility of inhabitants being over- or under-astute: nor, indeed, did he ever design 
for an inhabitant that wasn‟t purpose-fulfilling (I have previously mentioned that he never 
designed a building for leisurely dwelling). The inhabitant, for him, was a fixed point whose 
astuteness, at least whilst they were in his buildings, might vary, but always remained close 
to pragmatism, and this absolved him of the troubling possibilities that Voysey and 
Lubetkin faced. It may have also allowed him to consider that the effectiveness of 
architecture was more securely contained in the buildings he designed than in the 
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inhabitations that complimented them. Nonetheless, he did recognise the necessity for 
complimentary inhabitations of a rather more pragmatic kind than Voysey or Lubetkin, and 
the additional need for the building to do work beyond immediate functional expediency to 
secure it. This is suggested by the later development in his practice of an aesthetic style that 
aimed to boldly state the functional intent of the building, to suggest to those who looked 
upon or approached it that this particular building aimed to work beautifully. As an 
aesthetic lexicon, this can be interpreted as a pre-conditioning kind of prompt for 
purposeful inhabitations to follow, a plausibility contained in readying or forewarning 
approaching inhabitants as to the nature of the building‟s function, and aiming to secure in 
advance the benefit of their astute ability once inside, and confirming Holden‟s wish to 
maximise the purposeful, efficient, and astutely pragmatic capacities of his inhabitants. 
Such a conversant approach can also be seen in the plausibilities of Voysey and Lubetkin, 
that is to say: if a building is made to look as though it is trying to appeal to or otherwise do 
something, that tactic can cause the potential inhabitant to pay closer attention to it than, 
say, a relatively plain building. The difference is that Holden was trying to assist and 
enhance an astuteness that existed securely, whereas Voysey and Lubetkin were battling to 
rescue an astuteness which, in their interpretation, was far more vulnerable and much less 
assured. 
 
For the three architects I have studied here, the prompting of inhabitants to complete the 
effects that architecture alone is implausible for is central to their understanding of 
architectural plausibility. Each architect undertakes this process with different tactics and 
through different philosophies in a way that my summary above can only hint at, and 
which the previous three chapters detail in much greater depth. During my interviews with 
the inhabitants of their buildings, the variety of plausibility is similarly expansive, and is 
only touched upon here. 
 
Plausibility – the inhabitants: 
 
Plausibility among inhabitants is, in many cases, affected by temporality, and the way in 
which inhabitants address temporality produces different plausibilities. The building, in 
temporal terms, is thought to be more plausible if the architect has made adequate 
provisions for the passage of time – if, in short, the architect was seen to be forward 
looking and pre-empted future needs so that effects would actually happen in the future. 
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This demarcates a thought-through efficacy in the building‟s inception, alongside usability 
in the present, and is understood to be plausibly and intentionally effective. By the same 
token, temporal failure substantially undermines the idea that the building is effective. If 
the design of the building fails to effectively reach beyond the immediate chronology of its 
inception, this failure can be analysed as a fundamental inadequacy at the design level and 
the judgement of the architect, which casts the potential plausibility of the building into 
considerable doubt. In certain cases, this is interpreted as the intrusion of past conditions 
into the present in a way that is manifestly unsuitable, and locks the building into a past 
timeframe from which it cannot plausibly effect the present. 
 
The restorations some inhabitants undertake of their buildings may represent equally 
potent temporalities that partially collapse the disjuncture between the inception of the 
building and the current inhabitation. Restoration generally includes processes of research 
which gently reveal something like the originality of the building in the present, a process 
which can produce plausibility as the features of the building are connected to the specifics 
of its inception and become, in some sense, explained instead of curiously present. Such 
research can be considered through the lens of a building event (Jacobs, 2006: 11), but if this 
is an event, it is one actualised by the inhabitants as part of their inhabitation. This differs 
from Jacob‟s conception, in which building events are part of official discourses that are 
actualised by statutory weight, not by the inhabitants, and both the motivation to undertake 
such research, and the proceeds of that research, can potentially produce a double 
plausibility insofar that the motivation in the first instance is usually an interest in the 
building and a wish to return it to an original form, the research for which brings features 
of its inception, including proposed effects, into sharp relief. (It is, of course, possible that 
such knowledge stalls or even redacts plausibility if those new insights are interpreted as, 
for example, patronising). 
 
Restorations do not automatically produce temporal plausibilities, nor are they always 
predicated on acts of research. In some cases, the restoration of a building has been at least 
partially motivated by recovering the professionalism of the architect from accreted layers 
of inhabitation and alteration. The perception of professionalism denotes a likelihood of 
effectiveness. As compared to these accretions, the original professionalism represents an 
improvement and this analysis may produce some degree, and perhaps a substantial degree, 
of plausibility for the architecture. I would suggest that the logic of restoring initial 
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professionalism is, to some extent, generally contemporaneous with research interests in 
the building as described above, but they can and do exist separately – research can taken 
place without restoration and vice versa. In the first instance, the interest of the inhabitant 
is a potential precursor to plausibility, and in the second instance, a consideration of the 
building leads to the conclusion that the original features are superior to and more effective 
than latter additions, not necessarily because this is definitely the case, but because the 
attentions of a professional architect, even if he is buried behind accretions, are logically 
more likely to produce effective, useful and beneficial features. This conclusion benefits the 
original building with some degree of plausibility insofar that it confirms the quality of the 
original design, a restoration based on the logical outcome of consideration, rather than an 
interest in restoration per se. 
 
The idea that an architect has given thought to the future inhabitation of a given building 
also evidences the exercise of care and consideration by making certain provisions available 
(ranging from the banality of door-latches to the joy of frivolity) – evidence which is 
astutely arrived at, and which generates substantial plausibility in the process. Almost all of 
the inhabitants I interviewed who felt that a building was beneficial for them believed that 
it successfully delivered deliberate effects and that their effective beneficence had been 
instated by intentional acts of design. In some cases, this led inhabitants to believe in the 
plausible effectiveness of the building more generally, on the basis that those features had 
been successfully instated.  Alternatively, the absence or misplacement of care substantially 
redacted plausibility. If care could not be effected, then the building itself was often 
considered ineffective by failing to execute an essential task. Such an absence, where there 
ought to be an intended, crafted presence, made the building seem implausible as a means 
to be effective more generally. 
 
In either such scenario, i.e. the enjoyment of beneficence or the disdain at its absence, a 
number of inhabitants connected with the design of buildings. In those cases where 
beneficence was absent or skewed, opportunities arise to consider how the architect could 
have proceeded, or how the inhabitant would have proceeded had they been the architect, 
to rectify this (with the interesting effect of producing a virtual kind of plausibility). Where 
beneficence was seen to be present, some inhabitants were given to consider why, and by 
what means, this should be the case. In both cases, inhabitants involved themselves 
thoughtfully in the mechanics of architecture being effective such that, even in those 
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buildings where beneficence was absent, the means and likelihoods of effects being 
plausible (i.e. imagined how they ought to be) was considered. 
 
Closely related to this is the inhabitants‟ consideration of the architect in what I have called 
“diagnostic” terms. In some, but not all cases, making sense of plausibility required that a 
practitioner be connected to the building, or a particular feature (beneficent or otherwise). 
Instated plausibility, when it is understood to be deliberate and working, is logically 
considered to be the outcome of a strata of motivations (as to why this feature is desirable), 
ideas (as to what or how a feature might best be instated) and efforts (the crafting of that 
instatement). This has emerged in some cases as a key component of the plausibility of the 
building. Connecting the working features to the intentionality and the character of the 
designer confirms the intentionality of the effectiveness that inhabitant‟s experience, an 
analytic of plausibility generated by transiting the features in question from an accidental to 
an intended status. 
 
It‟s important to note that architectural effectiveness is managed through the lens of 
plausibility by inhabitants such that the existence of implausibility in the architect‟s 
approach to their building is kept separate from those things that they consider plausible, a 
process I have referred to as “splitting”. A recurring feature of my interviews suggests that 
each inhabitant maintains a point – whose position may be quite flexible – at which 
plausibility reaches a maximum for their building as to the effects they consider that it can 
have. Below this point, the analytical part of their inhabitation grants credence to the 
possibility of effects, but that is not to say that anything above this point is outright 
implausible. Though such things as Holden‟s bodily metaphor may not be plausibly 
experienced by Holden inhabitants, it is considered plausible as a metaphor or heuristic for 
his own use. For those occasions when the effective hopes for the building are seemingly 
implausible, the split acts like a partition, the position of which is analytically defined, and 
the implausibility of the overambitious or ridiculous is kept from tainting that which is 
considered plausible – even if the architect originally conceived of the effects in a more 
unitary or inseparable way. 
 
This process of splitting represents the potential of the inhabitants in this study to craft the 
plausibility of the buildings they inhabit in particular ways, in that the retention of certain 
plausibilities, and the partitioning (or ignorance) of others, creates an “invitational” field in 
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which inhabitants perceive that their choices of lifestyle, tastes and habits will actively 
assisted by them. In fact, in a number of cases the effectiveness of the buildings I‟ve 
studied were interpreted as deliberately affirmative, specifically designed to redact 
obstructions and open out affirming spaces for choice-laden dwelling. (It‟s worth noting 
that most of the buildings that are disliked, or at best partially liked, in this study are so 
judged because they are, in fact, obstructive.) Such spaces should not be interpreted as 
blank – in many cases they were interpreted by inhabitants as produced by particular effects 
of particular features, and in some cases were analytically perceived to be like growth 
mediums, rather than voids. 
 
The plausibility of effective architecture is also enhanced – and simultaneously constrained 
– by hierarchical understandings of effectiveness among the inhabitants I‟ve studied, and in 
particular the diffuse nature of likely effects that inhabitants expect and think plausible of 
their buildings. I would suggest that most inhabitants do not expect, nor think it plausible, 
that their buildings should render precise and definite effects. The plausible action of 
architectural effect is, rather, considered to be that of general impressions or themes, and 
this expectation generates a plausibility insofar that they do not, in the first instance, ask or 
expect too much from the building. This does, however, constrain the building from 
plausibly attaining precise effects. Similarly, some inhabitants take the building as a finished 
product, to be experienced at face value without enquiring after its potential motivations 
and the mechanisms for effecting them. Perhaps the most interesting examples of diffuse 
plausibility are experiences of potential by inhabitants. An inhabitant may not need to 
know, understand, or even experience the importance or effectiveness of their building, but 
an awareness of the potential for such things, despite never solidifying from potentiality to 
actuality, may constitute the production of plausibility in diffuse form. This has been the 
case in some of my discussions with interviewees on the subject of heritage, which is not 
credited with producing effects per se, but which connotes that the building is somehow 
special and noteworthy, and that this is a signal that it could produce such effects, or else 
merit its status in some significant way. The potential for significance can be instrumental 
in producing diffuse plausibilities on the basis that they – or something – could happen, a 
pre-conditioning kind of plausibility. 
 
There are a number of other analytical acts that inhabitants enter into in their construction 
of the plausibility of a building that can be understood as pre-conditions. One such act is to 
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consider whether a given building is of the sort that can deliver ambitious effects at all, and 
a number of my inhabitants have arrived at considered hierarchies in this respect. Smaller, 
more modest buildings, for instance, may not be considered to contain sufficient design 
scope for generating substantial effects, and their plausibilities are limited as a result. 
Similarly, plausibility can be either enhanced or diminished depending on how active a 
building is at attracting attention, with a possibility that analytical responses to buildings 
have to be provoked by architectural verve, bombast, or deliberate design articulations of 
difference to prompt people out of taking that building for granted, or noticing it as a 
“kinetic” level only. Finally, and somewhat obviously, plausibility depends on what the 
building matters for in the conceptions of inhabitants. If, for instance, the effectiveness of 
the building matters less than the discourses, events, and stories that happen in it – if, in 
short, the building is considered to be the stage rather than the performance – then 
plausibility is neither enhanced or diminished as such. There are times when a building can 
take on the role of a container in the experiences of inhabitants, whereby plausibility is not 
really a consideration. The effect of architecture in this instance is for the provision of 
fertile ground for these other, more prominent discourses and happenings to proceed, and 
a place for other effects. 
 
In the broadest possible terms, the above summaries represent my findings and, with them, 
the contribution of a new perspective to the field of architectural geography and its 
understandings of how buildings are experienced. To occupy this perspective, I arrived at a 
particular methodology (detailed in chapter two), which I now turn to by way of drawing 
this thesis to a close. 
 
Methodology and analytical capacity:  
 
In the first instance, I reiterate a point from chapter two: this thesis is not an historical 
geography. The methodology I required was one that could grasp the concept of longevity, 
of something relatively old continuing to be present, and my archival studies specifically 
sought to discover how architects had attempted to plausibly sustain the effects of their 
buildings. This has led me to an unusual position as a user of archives for something other 
than the purposes of historical research. But it is a position which is inherently portable, as 
Lorimer would describe it (Lorimer, 2010: 257) insofar that, by treating my archival study 
as essentially present, I am absolved from having to re-imagine and re-animate it (Ibid). 
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From the outset, I approached the archive as though it were current (rather than “dusty” 
(Ibid: 248-249)). Specifically, I approached the archive as if it were contemporaneous with 
buildings that were, after all, still in existence. For me, the buildings became distributed 
objects of study, located both on site, and in the archive, and my archival findings did not 
belong any less to the physical buildings because of that disjuncture (indeed, the theme of 
my methodology has been one of overcoming disjuncture). I believe this to be an 
important equalisation of Lorimer‟s “vitalism” (Ibid: 257) in which the portability of 
archives from the repository to the field becomes a co-presence, that is to say, of the same 
thing in distributed form, and assuming that the archive is already part of an already 
animate (and widespread) object, rather than re-introducing it to a field in which it had 
previously ceased to occupy. This ethic helped me to equalise the presence of the 
manuscripts with the building and the inhabitants, rather than approach the archive as 
something of the past and with diminished viability in the present. I would suggest that 
such equalisations are important in studies that deal with longevity, or cannot be certain as 
to the whether the objects of study are of the past, or how the transition from present to 
past can be identified. My research could not have been undertaken without this approach 
in place, and though I may not have been as delicate with my archival research as Lorimer 
was, I am convinced of the importance of leaving the possibility open for archives to be 
distributed into the present (and for the present to be distributed into them). 
 
Co-presence is also a theme of my interview methodology, one in which I have taken the 
covalent entraining of Ezzy‟s approach (Ezzy, 2010). I combined them with Brinkmann‟s 
epistemic approach (Brinkmann, 2007) in order to place interviewees such that they can 
astutely engage with the interviewer. Such an approach is, I suggest, promising: some of 
that promise is overtly demonstrated in my interviews with those people who inhabit 
Lubetkin‟s buildings (see chapter five). Opening out a free and unimpeded “caressed” 
space (Ezzy, 2010: 166) for an interviewee to speak in is not necessarily fair, voided as it is 
of epistemic opportunity. Such opportunities have to be made available within studies such 
as mine, which aim to engage with the analytic potential of interviewees not by bombarding 
them with epistemic norms, but by making the interviewer vulnerable to them, almost as an 
epistemic inferior in the interview dynamic. The friendly unfriendliness I was able to create 
because of this not only engaged with analytical capacities (which, I suggest, are relatively 
rarely engaged with in architectural geography), but allowed the sort of deflections and 
refutations from my interviewees which produced insights I never could have envisaged, 
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and displaced insights which I may have tried to instil. Because, in my experience, such a 
methodology has produced such interesting results, I would argue for the consideration of 
such friendly unfriendliness as a methodological starting point not only in architectural 
geographies, but in human geography as a whole. 
 
Summation: 
 
My purpose in this thesis has been to investigate how architecture happens in people‟s 
experiences. It has focused on what architecture is understood to be capable of when 
architecture is addressed astutely, that is to say: in terms of analytical capacity. I have 
conducted extensive empirical investigations into the architectural production of effects 
(i.e. to affect people‟s experiences) by architects, and the experience of effects by 
inhabitants of their buildings. My findings suggest that there are a number of different ways 
in which architectural capability is astutely considered by architects, inhabitants, and users. 
These findings were enabled by a methodology which specifically sought to engage with 
analytical capacities as part of the research process.  My analyses suggest that such astute 
considerations by architects, inhabitants and users constructs and accumulates plausibilities, 
understood as the process and result of investigating effects with a view to their likely 
efficacy, not so much in terms of the results, or impact, of that effect, but in terms of how 
steadfast an effect is thought to be. This forms my original contribution to the field of 
architectural geography in which the analytical capacity of architectural experience is under-
represented. 
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viii. 
Appendix: 
 
 
Over the following pages I have provided, in the first instance, some examples of the cue 
cards I used during my interviews. These are followed by a full transcript of my second 
interview, undertaken in 2007 with “John and Anna”, who live in one of six Voysey 
households in Cumbria. (Other than living in Cumbria, their identities, and potentially 
identifying remarks, are blanked throughout.) In my first two interviews, I experimented 
with a “reveal” – a presentation of some of my findings from the Voysey archives for their 
consideration, and as a means to open out further opportunities to demonstrate their astute 
generation of (im)plausibility. In all the remaining interviews I elected not to repeat the 
reveal. Although it was compatible with my interview methodology, I judged it to be an 
imposition, and allowed future interviews to demonstrate astute inhabitations as they 
emerged from their experience of the building and their existing knowledge, rather than 
from my archival findings. The reveal was posed after the principal themes of the interview 
(examples of which follow by way of cue cards) had been covered, and were then returned 
to in light of the reveal. 
 
Examples of my cue cards follow over the next two pages, followed by the content index 
and transcript of my interview with John and Anna. 
 
Addendum to the electronic deposit appendix: 
 
In this electronic deposit of the thesis, the above-mentioned transcript is excluded 
excepting the frontispiece (p.337). I have, additionally, included the correspondence 
between Aberystwyth University‟s repository advisor, Dr Nicky Cashman, and myself in 
regard to the redactions in this version of the thesis (from p.338). 
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Figure 6.1: Cue card, “Have your impressions of this building changed over time?” 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Cue card, “How do you think about buildings?” Generally used to open interviews, the 
intention was to explain how I thought about buildings and how I wanted to move away from my 
preconceptions to better understand their experience.  
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Figure 6.3: Cue card, “How do you perceive this building‟s personality/soul/heartbeat?” This card 
was later changed for one which replaced personality/soul/heartbeat with “character/attitude”, 
although I still caught myself using the original terms. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Cue card, “Do you think this building is inert or “active”? 
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xxxxxx: 
Transcription of xxxxxx interview. 
 
 
Date:   xxxxxx June 2007 
Location:  xxxxxx 
   xxxxxx 
xxxxxx  
Cumbria 
xxxxxx 
Interviewer:  Paul Wright 
Interviewees:  xxxxxx and xxxxxx 
Pre-interview briefing: Standard: privacy, permission to record, and recognition of leading 
and “porous” questions. 
Recording: Approx 90 minutes (1105 counts), analogue and mono, at single 
speed on C90 cassette using the internal microphone, all of side A, 
all of side B. 
 
 
The transcript of this interview is not provided in this edition, but is provided in the 
printed copies of this thesis (where it runs to p.368), please refer to p.x for further details 
of these printed copies. 
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viii (b). 
Appendix – Electronic Deposit edition: 
 
Copied below are three e-mail correspondence with Dr Nicky Cashman, Repository 
Advisor at Aberystwyth University, regarding the production of this edition of the thesis. 
 
From: Paul Wright [mailto:pww98.aber@googlemail.com]  
Sent: 06 December 2010 14:22 
To: cadair@aber.ac.uk 
Subject: Embargo query 
  
To whom it may concern; 
  
I am about to send my bound and corrected thesis back to Aberystwyth, and I have a query 
regarding the electronic submission. 
  
My thesis includes a number of interviews, which the interviewees consented to on certain 
understandings. The first of these was anonymity, which I‟ve covered in the way the data 
was presented/analysed and is not a concern. The second of these was the latter availability 
of their conversations with me. At the time I undertook the interviews, an electronic 
deposit of the thesis was not, as far as I am aware, mandatory. My interviewees (and I) 
assumed that there would only ever be two publicly available copies of the thesis: one at 
the University and the other at the NLW. Although my interviewees did not specifically 
object to the wider availability of these conversations, their consent was not explicitly 
secured for the substantially enhanced availability that Cadair provides. 
  
The ramifications are: 
a. Some of my interviewees may have withheld consent if this has been known to them 
– it‟s unlikely, but not impossible. 
b. Some of these conversations would have been different if my interviewees had 
known that the thesis would have been as easily available as Cadair makes it, as 
opposed to the availability that two library deposits alone would likely provide. My 
interviewees may have divulged details to me which they were comfortable to share 
with a limited readership, but far less inclined to be made available without such 
limits. 
  
Given that the interview material is written as three distinct and bounded sections within 
my thesis, I could create an electronic deposit edition which simply blanks these sections, 
or I could, as an alternative, be more selective within these sections and blank the 
interviewee quotes and my more explicit analyses of them. If, however, neither such option 
is viable, I would have to ask you to consider a long-term embargo on the electronic 
availability of my thesis. 
  
Your insights in this matter would be appreciated. 
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Yours faithfully, 
  
Paul Wright. 
  
 
 
From: Nicky Cashman [nnc] [mailto:nnc@aber.ac.uk]  
Sent: 08 December 2010 09:35 
To: Paul Wright 
Subject: RE: Embargo query 
  
Dear Paul, 
I totally understand your predicament. Looking at the options you mention, would it still 
be possible for you to „be more selective within these sections and blank the interviewee 
quotes and my more explicit analyses of them‟ ? If this is possible and you are happy to do 
so, then that would be the most ideal situation as far as I‟m concerned. Let me know if this 
is the case. 
Best wishes, 
  
Nicky 
  
Dr Nicky Cashman 
Ymgynghorydd Cadwrfa / Repository Adviser 
Llyfrgell Thomas Parry Library  
Prifysgol Aberystwyth / Aberystwyth University  
Llanbadarn Fawr  
Aberystwyth  
SY23 3AS 
  
http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/ 
 
 
  
From Paul Wright 
To 'Nicky Cashman [nnc]' 
Sent 09 December 2010 01:15 
Subject RE: Embargo query 
  
Dear Nicky; 
  
That will be fine – I‟ll run through the thesis and blank the bare minimum from the 
interview sections that I can. I‟m afraid I can‟t do this immediately, but I hope to be able to 
complete it early next week. Am I correct in thinking that Cadair became fully operational 
in 2008? I recall that it went through a pilot stage first. In any event, over half of my 
interviews had been conducted by Christmas 2007. 
  
Best, 
Paul. 
 
